GUATEMALA

Republic of Guatemala
República de Guatemala

CAPITAL: Guatemala City

FLAG: The national flag consists of a white vertical stripe between two blue vertical stripes with the coat of arms centered in the white band.

ANTHEM: Himno Nacional, beginning "Guatemala feliz" ("Happy Guatemala").

MONETARY UNIT: The quetzal (q) is a paper currency of 100 centavos. There are coins of 1, 5, 10, and 25 centavos, and notes of 50 centavos and 1, 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100 quetzales. q1 = $0.13072 (or $1 = q7.65) as of 2005. US notes are widely accepted.

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES: The metric system is the legal standard, but some imperial and old Spanish units also are used.

HOLIDAYS: New Year's Day, 1 January; Epiphany, 6 January; Labor Day, 1 May; Anniversary of the Revolution of 1871, 30 June; Independence Day, 15 September; Columbus Day, 12 October; Revolution Day, 20 October; All Saints' Day, 1 November; Christmas, 25 December. Movable religious holidays include Holy Thursday, Good Friday, and Holy Saturday.

TIME: 6 am = noon GMT.

LOCATION, SIZE, AND EXTENT

Situated in Central America, Guatemala has an area of 108,890 sq km (42,043 sq mi), with a maximum length of 457 km (284 mi) nnw–sse and a maximum width of 428 km (266 mi) ene–wsw. Comparatively, the area occupied by Guatemala is slightly smaller than the state of Tennessee. It is bounded on the e by Belize, Amatique Bay, and the Caribbean Sea, on the se by Honduras and El Salvador, on the s by the Pacific Ocean, and on the w and n by Mexico, with a total boundary length of 2,087 km (1,297 mi).

Guatemala has long laid claim to territory held by Belize (formerly known as British Honduras). In 1821, upon achieving independence, Guatemala considered itself the rightful inheritor of this former Spanish possession and continued to regard Belize as an administrative adjunct of Guatemala. In 1859, British rights to the area were defined in a treaty with Guatemala, but, alleging that the United Kingdom had not fulfilled its obligations, Guatemala subsequently refused to recognize the British title. In mid-1975, Guatemala demanded the cession of one-fourth of the territory of Belize as a condition for recognizing that country's sovereignty.

When Belize did become independent in September 1981, Guatemala refused to recognize the new nation. In January 1983, the Guatemalan government announced that it would drop its sovereignty claim and would press instead for the cession of the southernmost fifth of Belize's territory. Guatemala's claim has been rejected not only by the United Kingdom and Belize but also by the UN General Assembly and, in November 1982, at the CARI-COM heads of government conference. In mid-1986, Guatemala and the United Kingdom reestablished consular and commercial relations.

Guatemala's capital city, Guatemala City, is located in the south central part of the country.

TOPOGRAPHY

A tropical plain averaging 48 km (30 mi) in width parallels the Pacific Ocean. From it, a piedmont region rises to altitudes from 90 to 1,370 m (300 to 4,500 ft). Above this region lies nearly two-thirds of the country, in an area stretching northwest and south-west and containing volcanic mountains, the highest of which is Mt. Tajumulco (4,211 m/13,816 ft). The larger towns and Lake Atitlán are located in basins at elevations of about 1,500 to 2,400 m (5,000 to 8,000 ft). To the north of the volcanic belt lie the continental divide and, still farther north, the Atlantic lowlands. Three deep river valleys—the Motagua, the Polochic, and the Sarstún—form the Caribbean lowlands and banana plantation area. North of it, occupying part of the peninsula of Yucatán, is the lowland forest of Petén, once the home of the Mayas. The largest lakes are Izabal, Petén Itza, and Atitlán.

Near the boundaries of the Cocos and Caribbean plates, Guatemala is in a geologically active region with frequent earthquakes and volcanic activity. Of some 30 volcanoes in Guatemala, six have erupted or been otherwise active in recent years. A catastrophic earthquake in February 1976 left nearly 23,000 dead, 70,000 injured, and 1 million people whose homes were partially or completely destroyed.

CLIMATE

Temperature varies with altitude. The average annual temperature on the coast ranges from 25 to 30°c (77 to 86°f); in the central highlands the average is 20°c (68°f), and in the higher mountains 15°c (59°f). In Guatemala City, the average January minimum is 11°c (52°f) and the maximum 23°c (73°f); the average minimum and maximum temperatures in July are, respectively, 16°c (61°f) and 26°c (79°f). The rainy season extends from May to October inland and to December along the coast, and the dry season from November (or January) to April. Because of its consistently temperate climate, Guatemala has been called the "Land of Eternal Spring."

On 4 October 2005, Hurricane Stan, a Category 1 hurricane, struck Guatemala's Pacific coastal region, sending winds of 128 km/h (80 mi/h) along the coast below Guatemala City. The disaster caused landslides and mudslides, which destroyed many towns. Villages near the popular tourist area of Lake Atitlán suffered damage. Almost 1,000 died and hundreds lost their homes.

FLORA AND FAUNA

Flowers of the temperate zone are found in great numbers. Of particular interest is the orchid family, which includes the white nun (monja blanca), the national flower. There is also an abundance of medicinal, industrial, and fibrous plants. Overall, there are more than 8,600 plant species throughout the country.

Indigenous fauna includes the armadillo, bear, coyote, deer, fox, jaguar, monkey, puma, tapir, and manatee. The national bird is the highland quetzal, the symbol of love of liberty, which reputedly dies in captivity. Lake Atitlán is the only place in the world where a rare flightless waterbird, the Atitlán (giant pied-billed) grebe, is found; this species, classified as endangered, has been protected by law since 1970. There are more than 900 other species of native and migratory birds. Reptiles, present in more than 204 species, include the bushmaster, fer-de-lance, water moccasin, and iguana.

ENVIRONMENT

Guatemala's main environmental problems are deforestation—over 50% of the nation's forests have been destroyed since 1890—and consequent soil erosion. As recently as 1993, the nation obtained 90% of its energy from wood, losing 40,000–60,000 hectares of forest per year. Between 1965 and 1990, Guatemala also lost over 30% of its mangrove area, which totaled 16,000 hectares in the early 1990. From 1990–2000 the rate of deforestation was about 1.7% per year. In 2000, about 26.3% of the total land area was forested.

The nation's water supply is at risk due to industrial and agricultural toxins. Guatemala has 27.8 cu mi of water with 74% used for agriculture and 17% used in farming activity.

United Nations sources show that environmental contamination is responsible for a significant number of deaths due to respiratory and digestive illnesses. Despite the establishment in 1975 of a ministerial commission charged with conserving and improving the human environment, coordination of antipollution efforts remains inadequate, and Guatemala still suffers from a lack of financial resources and well-trained personnel to implement environmental control programs.

In 2003, 20% of Guatemala's total land area was protected. Tikal National Park is a UNESCO World Heritage Site and there are four Ramsar wetland sites. According to a 2006 report issued by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), threatened species included 7 types of mammals, 10 species of birds, 10 types of reptiles, 74 species of amphibians, 14 species of fish, 2 species of invertebrates, and 85 species of plants. Endangered or extinct species in Guatemala included the horned guan, Eskimo curlew, California least tern, green sea turtle, hawksbill turtle, olive ridley turtle, spectacled caiman, American crocodile, and Morelet's crocodile.

POPULATION

The population of Guatemala in 2005 was estimated by the United Nations (UN) at 12,701,000, which placed it at number 69 in population among the 193 nations of the world. In 2005, approximately 4% of the population was over 65 years of age, with another 42% of the population under 15 years of age. There were 95 males for every 100 females in the country. According to the UN, the annual population rate of change for 2005–10 was expected to be 2.8%, a rate the government viewed as too high. Although the government implemented programs that provide access to subsidized contraception, only 31% of women used modern contraception and the fertility rate remained high at 4.9 births per woman. The projected population for the year 2025 was 19,962,000. The population density was 117 per sq km (302 per sq mi). Most of the population is concentrated in the southern third of the country.

The UN estimated that 39% of the population lived in urban areas in 2005, and that urban areas were growing at an annual rate of 3.27%. The capital city, Guatemala City, had a population of 951,000 in that year. Other large cities and their estimated populations are Quezaltenango, 250,000, and Escuintla, 68,000.

MIGRATION

Because of persecution and civil war, Amerindian peasants began emigrating across the Mexican border in 1981. Under the CIRE-FCA plan (International Conference on Central American Refugees), 18,000 Guatemalans repatriated between 1989 and 1994. In 1995, 9,500 repatriated from Mexico, and in 1996, another 3,974 repatriated from Mexico. In 1997, there were still 40,000 in Mexico and Belize. Between 1984, when the first repatriation movements took place, and 1999, a total of 43,663 refugees had returned to more than 160 communities throughout Guatemala. The Guatemalan government spent some $30 million on 36 farms purchased for collective returns. In 2004 there were 656 refugees, 4 asylum seekers, and 8 returned refugees. A population that remained of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) at the end of 2004 was 660 persons in Guatemala City.

In 2003 remittances were $2 billion. In 2005, the net migration rate was -1.63 migrants per 1,000 population, down from 4.3 per 1,000 in 1990. The government views the migration levels as satisfactory.

ETHNIC GROUPS

Guatemala has a larger proportion of Amerindians in its total population than any other country in Central America. In 2004, persons of mixed Amerindian and Spanish ancestry, called mestizos, constituted about 59.4% of the national total. Amerindians who have become assimilated and no longer adhere to a traditional Amerindian life-style are also called ladinos, but this term is sometimes used to refer to mestizos. There are at least 22 separate Mayan groups, each with its own language. The largest minority groups include the Quiché (9.1%), the Cakchiquel (8.4%), the Mam (7.9%), and the Q'equchi (6.3%). Other Mayan groups account for about 8.6% of the population. The Garifuna are de scendants of African slaves. The white population is estimated at less than 1% of the total.

LANGUAGES

Spanish, spoken by about 60% of the population, is the official and commercial language. Amerindians speak some 28 dialects in five main language groups: Quiché, Mam, Pocomam, and Chol—all of the Mayan language family—and Carib, Kekchi, Garifuna, Cakchiquel, and Xinca. Amerindian languages are spoken by about 40% of the populace. A 2003 Law of Languages mandates the use of Mayan languages in public sectors such as health, education, and justice.

RELIGIONS

Historically, Roman Catholicism is the predominant religion (between 50–60%), with an archbishopric at Guatemala City and bishoprics at Quezaltenango, Verapaz, and Huehuetenango. Many inhabitants combine Catholic beliefs with traditional Mayan rites. Protestants account for about 40% of the population. The largest Protestant denominations are the Full Gospel Church, the Assembly of God, the Church of God of the Central American Church, and the Prince of Peace Church. Other denominations represented are Presbyterians, Baptists, Lutherans, Episcopalians, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, and Jehovah's Witnesses. Minority groups and religions with small communities include Jews, Muslims, and followers of the Indian spiritual leader Sri Sathya Sai Baba.

A 1995 Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples was approved to provide freedom of practice and promote respect for the forms of spirituality practiced by the Maya, Garifuna, and Xinca groups. As of 2005, however, very little had been done to implement the agreement. Though there is no official religion, the constitution recognizes the Catholic Church as a distinct legal personality. Other religious groups must register with the government in order to make legal business transactions. Some tension exists between Christian groups and the indigenous Mayan religious groups. The Interreligious Dialogue and Foro Guatemala are groups that encourage tolerance and cooperation between indigenous and Christian faiths. The Ecumenical Forum for Peace and Reconciliation is a group of primarily Christian leaders who conduct public conferences and debates on a variety of social and political topics.

TRANSPORTATION

In 2002, the total length of Guatemala's road system was estimated at 13,856 km (8,610 mi), of which 4,370 km (2,715 mi) was paved, including 140 km (87 mi) of expressways. In 2003, there were approximately 127,800 passenger cars and 145,900 commercial vehicles registered. Two international highways cross Guatemala: the 824-km (512-mi) Franklin D. Roosevelt Highway (part of the Pan American Highway system) and the Pacific Highway. Guatemala Railways operates 90% of the nation's 884 km (549 mi) railroad system, all of it narrow-gauge.

Few of the rivers and lakes are important to commercial navigation. Of the 990 km (615 mi) only 260 km (161 mi) are navigable year round, an additional 730 km (454 mi) are only navigable during high water. Puerto Barrios and Santo Tomás on the Caribbean coast are Guatemala's chief ports. The Pacific coast ports are Champerico and San José. In 2002, Guatemala had no registered cargo ships.

There were an estimated 452 airports in 2004, but only 11 had paved runways as of 2005. La Aurora International Airport at Guatemala City, the first air terminal in Central America, serves aircraft of all sizes, including jumbo jets. The government-owned Aviateca has a monopoly on scheduled domestic service and also flies to other Central American countries, Jamaica, Mexico, and the United States. In 1998, (the latest year for which data was available) 508,000 passengers were carried on scheduled domestic and international flights.

HISTORY

Three distinct stages—Mayan indigenous, Spanish colonial, and modern republican—have left their mark on the history of Guatemala.

Guatemala includes much of the old Mayan civilization, which may date back as early as 300 bc. The classical Mayan period lasted from about ad 300 to 900 and featured highly developed architecture, painting, sculpture, music, mathematics (including the use of zero), a 365-day calendar, roads, and extensive trade. This great pre-Columbian civilization seems to have collapsed around ad 900, and by the 12th century, the Mayas had disintegrated into a number of separate Amerindian groups. The Amerindians offered resistance to the Spanish expedition sent by Hernán Cortés from Mexico and led by Pedro de Alvarado during 1523–24, but by the end of that time, their subjugation to Spain was virtually complete.

Alvarado founded the first Guatemalan capital, Santiago de los Caballeros de Guatemala, in 1524. Because of several earthquakes, the capital was moved a number of times until it became permanently established at Guatemala City in 1776. From 1524 until 1821, Guatemala (City and province) was the center of government for the captaincy-general of Guatemala, whose jurisdiction extended from Yucatán to Panama. Economically, this was mainly an agricultural and pastoral area in which Amerindian labor served a colonial landed aristocracy. The Roman Catholic religion and education regulated the social life of the capital. Spanish political and social institutions were added to Amerindian village life and customs, producing a hybrid culture.

In 1821, the captaincy-general won its independence from Spain. After a brief inclusion within the Mexican Empire of Agustín de Iturbide (1822–23), Guatemala, along with present-day Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, formed the United Provinces of Central America in 1824. This federation endured until 1838–39, but was fragmented by liberal and conservative divides. Guatemala proclaimed its independence in 1839 under the military rule of the conservative Rafael Carrera, an illiterate dictator with imperial designs. Though the people went through three different pushes for independence, representative democracy was the exception from the mid-19th century until the mid-1980s. The country passed through dictatorships, military rule, insurgencies (in the 1960s), and coups.

After Carrera died (without reaching his dictatorial goals), Guatemala fell under a number of military governments. These included three notable administrations: Justo Rufino Barrios (1871–85), the "Reformer," who ruled through the transition from the colonial to the modern era; Manuel Estrada Cabrera (1898–1920), whose early encouragement of reform developed later into a push for increased power; and Jorge Ubico (1931–44), who continued, and elaborated upon, the programs begun by Barrios.

Guatemalan politics changed with the election of reform candidate Juan José Arévalo Bermejo in 1945. Arévalo's popularity marked one of the first mass-based movements in Guatemalan politics. In 1951, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán was elected. Following Arévalo's approach to land reform, Árbenz expropriated holdings of the United Fruit Co., a US firm. The United States alleged communist influence within the Árbenz government, and began mobilizing opposition against him. In the summer of 1954, Col. Carlos Castillo Armas and an army of Guatemalan exiles, backed by the CIA, invaded Guatemala from Honduras and toppled Árbenz. Castillo took over, restored expropriated properties, and ruled by decree until he was assassinated by a presidential palace guard in July 1957.

After a period of confusion, Gen. Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes became president in January 1958. His administration was essentially a military dictatorship, even though he claimed to follow democratic principles. He was particularly hard on his domestic critics, denouncing them as communists. He was equally bombastic on the international stage, denouncing the United States, quarreling with Mexico over fishing rights, and challenging the United Kingdom over Belize. He was also contemptuous of Fidel Castro, and allowed Guatemala to be a training area for the exiles in the abortive US invasion of the Bay of Pigs in April 1961.

In March 1963, Ydígoras was overthrown by Defense Minister Col. Enrique Peralta Azurdia, who declared a state of siege. For two years, Peralta ruled dictatorially, and continued to assert Guatemala's claims on Belize. In September 1965, the Peralta regime announced a new constitution and elections, and in March 1966, Dr. Julio César Méndez Montenegro was elected president. He was the first civilian president since Árbenz, and would be the last for some time. During his term, the army and right wing counter-terrorists proceeded to kill hundreds of guerrillas, who were believed to be sponsored by Cuba, and claimed destruction of the guerrilla organization by the end of 1967. Uprooted from the countryside, the guerrillas concentrated their efforts on the capital, where, in 1968, guerrillas assassinated US Ambassador John G. Mein.

Guatemala returned to military rule as Col. Carlos Arana Osorio was elected president in 1970. He instituted the country's first comprehensive development plan, but the plan was upset by guerrilla violence, which now engulfed the country. Ambassador Karl von Spreti of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was murdered in April 1970 by leftists. Many prominent Guatemalans were killed or held for ransom. In response to the violence, Arana suspended civil liberties from November 1970 to November 1971. In 1974, Arana's candidate, Gen. Kjell Laugerud García, was confirmed by Congress as president, after an election marred by charges of fraud. Laugerud followed a centrist policy and obtained a measure of popular support. During his tenure, guerrilla violence decreased, and some political liberties were restored. The principal challenge to Laugerud's administration was the need to rebuild Guatemala after the catastrophic earthquake of February 1976.

A militant rightist, Gen. Fernando Romeo Lucas García, was elected president in 1978. As guerrilla violence continued, there was also an upsurge of activity by right wing "death squads," which, according to unofficial Guatemalan sources, committed over 3,250 murders in 1979 and even more during 1980. In addition, hundreds of Amerindians were reportedly massacred during antiguerrilla operations. The Carter administration objected to Guatemala's deteriorating human rights record, whereupon the military charged that communist influence had reached the White House.

In January 1981, the main guerrilla groups united and escalated while the government went into crisis. The elections of March 1982 were won by Laugerud's handpicked candidate, Gen. Angel Aníbal Guevara. Three weeks later, a coup placed in power a "born-again" Protestant, Gen. José Efraín Ríos Montt. After his month-long amnesty offer to the guerrillas was rejected, he declared a state of siege in July, and the antiguerrilla campaign intensified. The government's counter-insurgency killed between 2,600 and 6,000 in 1982, and drove up to a million Guatemalans from their homes by the end of 1983. In March 1983, Ríos lifted the state of siege and announced that elections for a constituent assembly would be held in July 1984. But Ríos, who had fought off some 10 coup attempts during his administration, was overthrown in August 1983.

The new government of Brig. Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejía Victores declared that the coup was undertaken to end "abuses by religious fanatics" and pledged continued efforts to eradicate the "virus of Marxism-Leninism." Elections for a constituent assembly were held, as promised, in July 1984. In May 1985, the assembly promulgated a constitution for a new government with an elected Congress. The general elections of November 1985 were followed by a runoff election in December. The overwhelming winner was Mario Vincio Cerezo Arévalo of the Guatemalan Christian Democratic Party (DCG). He also brought a majority into Congress. Political violence decreased under Cerezo, who withstood two attempted coups. But he was unable to make any progress on human rights in Guatemala, and was unwilling to risk prosecution of military personnel who had been the most serious violators. As the economy worsened, political instability increased, including violence.

The elections of 11 November 1990 necessitated a runoff election, which was won by Jorge Serrano of the Movement for Solidarity and Action (Movimiento para Acción y Solidaridad—MAS). Serrano's inauguration in January 1991 marked the first transition in memory from one elected civilian government to another. Serrano promised to negotiate with insurgents and bring to justice both corrupt former officials and human rights violators, but was deposed by the military after he declared a state of emergency and suspended the constitution on 25 May 1993. The military, in unusual service in defense of democracy, then allowed Congress to name Ramior de Serrano's successor. This unusual service of the military in defense of democracy led to the naming of Ramior de León Carpio as president on 5 June. De León, a human rights advocate, promised to bring to justice those responsible for the dismal state of human rights in Guatemala. He also proposed reductions in the military, which predictably were not well-received by the officer corps.

On 29 December 1996, under the government of Alvaro Arzu, the Guatemalan government signed a peace accord with the guerrilla Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity. This signaled the end of Central America's longest-running guerrilla war, beginning with an informal cease-fire in March 1996, and the signing of the socioeconomic accord (which called for the government to raise its tax revenues from 8% to 12% of GDP and increase its spending in health, education, and housing). The last accord, signed in Mexico City in September 1996, called for legislative and judicial reforms. It also included a reassessment of the military's role, as the parties agreed to remove the army from public security functions and to annul the law that provided for the Civil Defense Patrols established in the 1980s to fight guerrillas in the highland villages.

In February 1999, the country's Historical Clarification Commission blamed the army for more than 90% of the deaths or disappearances of more than 200,000 Guatemalans during the 36-year civil war. In many instances, the army committed genocide against entire Mayan villages, the report concluded. The three-member commission blamed the United States government for supporting right wing regimes even though it knew about the atrocities being committed by the army. An earlier report by the Catholic Church revealed similar findings. During a short visit to Guatemala in March 1999, US president Bill Clinton said his country had been wrong for supporting the Guatemalan army. He pledged to support the peace process. In May, the peace process suffered a setback when Guatemalans rejected 50 key constitutional reforms that would have diminished the role of the army and given protection and recognition to Amerindian languages and traditional customs, in a vote in which only about 20% of Guatemalans took part.

In November of 1999, a populist lawyer named Alfonso Portillo captured 47.8% of the vote in the presidential election. This vote was not enough to prevent a runoff election (held a month later), which was unsurprising as Portillo was a very controversial candidate. Portillo had fled Mexico in 1982 to avoid what he termed unfair prosecution for the killing (in self-defense) of two men in Guerrero. Further, he was also associated with former dictator Rios Montt (whose 17-month regime in 1982–83 committed some of the worst atrocities against Amerindians) through membership in the conservative Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG). Ríos Montt, who had his eye set on the presidency in 2003, worked closely with Portillo as FRG's secretary general. Portillo built support with promises to reduce crime, one of the worst problems facing the nation after the war. Crime was rampant throughout the nation, with dramatic increases in murders, kidnappings, and armed robbery. Portillo also promised to aid the poor and curb unemployment, a message that did not go unheard in a nation where 64% of Guatemalans are unemployed or underemployed. In the December runoff election, Portillo captured 68.3% of the vote to win the presidency. His party captured 63 of 113 seats in Congress, while the conservative PAN won 37 seats. A leftist coalition captured nine seats.

Montt attempted to overturn a constitutional ban preventing former coup plotters from running for public office, but he failed to overturn the ban in 1999. It was widely speculated that, in the midst of meager economic growth, a 60% poverty rate, and increasing levels of crime and violence, Montt's tough-on-crime stance would be able to convince the Guatemalans to give him a second chance. However, Montt was defeated in the first round of voting, as he was only able to win 19.3% of the vote. The former Guatemala City mayor, Oscar Berger Perdomo won 54.1% of the vote as the Grand National Alliance (GANA) candidate. Alvarado Colom Caballeros, a center-left candidate of the National Unity for Hope (UNE) party, garnered 49.1% of the vote. Though there were fears that violence and fraud might mar the election, those fears were not realized. Berger Perdomo, a conservative backed by the business class, assumed office on 14 January 2004. Portillo, however, quickly fled Guatemala as news of a corruption scandal in the presidency grew. In October 2005, Guatemala requested that Mexico send Portillo back to face accusations of public funds misuse—specifically, a diversion of about $16 million in military funds.

In his inaugural speech, Oscar Berger Perdomo committed to adherence to the 1996 Peace Accords. However, the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) reported that many of the fundamental reforms of the 1996 Peace Accords were not being realized due to persistent racism and social inequality. MINU-GUA predicted that the persistence would lead to an engendered future social conflict, stunted economic development, and corrosion of democratic government. Violence against women, femicide, was also a growing problem in Guatemala, where 527 women, mostly poor, were reportedly raped and murdered in 2004.

Civil war, corruption, and instability are among the reported reasons that Guatemala maintained a 75% poverty rate in 2005. The effects of Hurricane Stan and its concomitant flooding and landslides, claimed thousands of lives in October 2005.

GOVERNMENT

Constitutionally, the Guatemalan government is defined as democratic and representative, and the new constitution that took effect on 14 January 1986 reaffirms that definition. Since the 1950s, however, civil disorder has often prompted the suspension of constitutional guarantees. In October, 1999, Congress approved constitutional reforms that ended the military's constitutional role in internal security except for limited periods and under civilian control.

Guatemala is a republic. The president, who must be a nativeorn lay person at least 40 years old, is elected by direct vote for a four-year term and may not be reelected. The constitution calls for a popularly elected vice president. The office of vice president provides a guarantee of presidential succession in case of the death or disability of the chief executive. There is a five-member court of constitutionality, which officially advises the president. Its members are appointed, one each by the Supreme Court, Congress, the president, the University of San Carlos, and the bar association. The president, who has broad powers, appoints and is assisted by a cabinet. The cabinet members traditionally resign at the end of each year so that the president may choose a new cabinet. The president, who is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces, appoints most military officers, the 22 governors, and other important public and diplomatic officials. Presidential duties include preserving public order, proposing laws, and making an annual presentation of the budget.

The unicameral National Congress has 113 members elected to four-year terms. Ninety-one members are elected from departmental constituencies, while 22 are elected by proportional representation. In districts with a population over 200,000, an additional deputy is elected to represent each additional 100,000 inhabitants or fraction exceeding 50,000. In addition, at-large representatives are elected by proportional representation from lists submitted by each political party. Under the constitution, Congress imposes taxes, enacts the national budget, declares war and makes peace, and ratifies treaties and conventions proposed by the president. Congress elects the president of the judiciary and judges of the Supreme Court and courts of appeals. The president may veto congressional bills, but Congress may override by a two-thirds vote. All public officials must declare the amount of their incomes and property holdings before assuming their posts and after they leave office.

Citizenship is acquired at the age of 18. Voting is obligatory for literate men and women 18 years of age and older and optional for nonliterate citizens.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Political power in Guatemala has been largely a matter of personal, rather than party, influence. Although parties have generally developed along conservative or liberal lines, political periods are commonly identified with the names of important leaders.

Under President Carlos Castillo Armas (1954–57), the Guatemalan Communist Party and other leftist parties were dissolved, and all other parties were temporarily suspended. To prevent further party proliferation, the membership necessary for party certification was raised from 10,000 to 50,000 in 1963. Only three parties were able to meet this requirement in time for the March 1966 elections: the Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario—PR), a center-left party, the conservative Institutional Democracy Party (Partido Institucional Democrático—PID), formed in 1965, and the militantly anticommunist National Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional—MLN).

During the 1970s, these parties remained dominant. The MLN won the presidency in 1970, and an MLD-PID coalition took the 1974 election (which was ultimately decided in Congress), defeating Gen. José Efraín Ríos Montt, representing the leftist National Opposition Front, a coalition of the several parties, including the Christian Democrats (Partido de Democracía Cristiana Guatemalteca—DCG). In 1978, the PR and PID formed a center-right coalition. In the congressional voting, the MLN won 20 seats, the PID 17, the PR 14, the DCG 7, and other parties 3. In the presidential elections of March 1982, a coalition of the PR, PID, and the National Unity Front (Frente de Unidad Nacional—FUN), an extreme right wing party formed in 1977, won a plurality of 38.9% of the vote. Congress endorsed the PR-PID-FUN candidate, Gen. Ángel Aníbal Guevara, as president, but he was deposed in a coup later in March. All parties were suspended by the new ruler, Gen. Ríos, but political activity resumed in March 1983. In the 1980s, the Christian Democrats grew significantly, winning the 1985 presidential and congressional elections. In addition, a host of new parties entered the political arena. Many had hopeful names suggesting national reconciliation, moderation, and solutions to Guatemala's problems. Among these were the National Union of the Center (Unión del Centro Nacional—UCN), the Democratic Party for National Cooperation (Partido Democrático de Cooperación Nacional—PDCN), the Solidarity Action Movement (Movimiento para Acción y Solidaridad—MAS), the National Advancement Plan (Plan por el Adelantamiento Nacional), and the National Authentic Center (Centro Auténtico Nacional).

The left wing guerrilla movement is represented by the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca—URNG). Founded in 1982, these groups consist of the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres—EGP), the Guatemalan Workers' (Communist) Party (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo—PGT), the Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes—FAR), and the Organization of the People in Arms (Organización del Pueblo en Armas—ORPA). During the 1999 elections, the leftists won nine seats in Congress. The main political parties in 1999 were the conservative Frente Republicano Guatemalteco and Partido de Avanzada Nacional; Frente had 63 seats in Congress and PAN had 37 seats.

In the November 2003 elections, the Grand National Alliance (GANA) won 49 of the 140 seats in Congress; the FRG won 42 seats; the National Unity for Hope (UNE) won 33 seats; and PAN took 16. In the November and December 2003 presidential elections, Óscar Berger Perdomo of the Grand National Alliance won both the first and second rounds of voting to become president. His opponent, Caballeros, won 49.1% of the vote. The next legislative and presidential elections were scheduled for November 2007.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Guatemala is divided into 22 departments, plus Guatemala City, each with a governor appointed by the president. Municipalities are governed by a mayor and independent municipal councils whose officials are popularly elected for two-year terms.

JUDICIAL SYSTEM

The Constitution of 1985 established an independent judiciary and a human rights ombudsman. Courts of ordinary jurisdiction are the nine-member Supreme Court, 10 courts of appeals, 33 civil courts of first instance, and 10 penal courts of first instance. There is also a Constitutional Court. Judges of the Supreme Court and courts of appeals are elected for four-year terms by the National Congress from lists prepared by active magistrates, the Bar Association, and law school deans. Judges of first instance are appointed by the Supreme Court. Courts of private jurisdiction deal separately with questions involving labor, administrative litigation, conflicts of jurisdiction, military affairs, and other matters. An independent tribunal and office of accounts supervises financial matters of the nation, the municipalities, and state-supported institutions, such as the National University.

In 1986, under Cerezo's civilian government, reforms were added in the effort to end political violence and establish rule of law. These included amparo (court ordered protection), new laws of habeas corpus, and a series of Supreme Court reforms to fight corruption and make the legal system more efficient. However, the government was criticized for still failing to investigate and prosecute human rights violations throughout the rest of Cerezo's term.

A new criminal procedural code affording stronger due process protections took effect in July 1994. Trials are public. Defendants have the rights to counsel, to be presumed innocent, and to be released on bail.

In 2001, there was some concern that intimidation would stop justice, specifically in regards to the prosecution of the Bishop Gerardi murder. In this trial, retired army and foreign intelligence chief Col. Disrael Lima and his son Capt. Byron Lima were charged for murder along with former member of the Presidential Guard (EMP) Ogdulio Villanueva, among others. Archbishop Gerardi was beat to death two days after the Restoration of Historical Memory (REMHI) report was released by the human rights office (ODHA) that he headed. The report blamed the military and paramilitary for Guatemala's 36-year long civil war and the majority of deaths that occurred during that time. The reopening of the trial in 2001 was met by a bomb attack against Judge Iris Yassmin Barrios the night before the reopening of the Gerardi trial. Several witnesses died suspiciously, and judicial officials, judges, and prosecutors backed out of participation in the case due to threats and surveillance.

In 2004, Guatemala's judiciary was still said to suffer from corruption, inefficiency, intimidation, and the de facto doling out of impunity, despite its legal independence. Furthermore, military courts retain control of military personnel who commit crimes while on official business, thus disallowing civil courts to try human rights abuses by the military.

The consequently incomplete justice under the formal judicial system has been a reason that some citizens have taken justice into their own hands through the carrying out of linchamientos in vigilante groups that attack war criminals and others accused of war crimes. According to MINUGUA, an average of one lynching per week was carried out between April 1997 and May 1998, usually in rural areas lacking substantive police presence and where civil patrols had once been prevalent. Former patrollers, ironically, were often involved in the instigation of attacks.

Some outside courts have attempted to give justice where Guatemalan courts have had less progress. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ordered that the state pay compensation to victims of human rights abuses committed by the state. In December, 2004, $3.5 million was paid. The court found the state specifically responsible for the 1982 massacre of 268 people in Plan de Sanchez, Rabinal, and Baja Verapaz. The Constitutional Court, in 2005, also rejected the proposal to create a UN Commission for the Investigation of Illegal Bodies and Clandestine Security Apparatus, saying it would be unconstitutional and that alternative methods of protecting human rights from state aggression would be carried out. It also questioned the legality of Guatemala's accepting the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. An attorney with close ties to the military sought this ruling. Incidentally, Guatemala had not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, either, as of 2004.

The World Bank invested in a Judicial Reform Project aiming to create a more effective, accessible and credible judicial system that would improve consistency, equity, public trust, and confidence in its judging of the law.

ARMED FORCES

The Guatemalan national armed forces (29,200 active and 35,200 reservists in 2005) are combined for administrative purposes, with the Army providing logistical support to the Navy and Air Force. In 2005 the Army had 27,000 active personnel, while there were 1,500 in the Navy, and 700 in the Air Force. The Army's primary armament included 12 light tanks, 57 reconnaissance vehicles, and over 118 artillery pieces. The Navy's major units consisted of 31 coastal patrol craft and 1 amphibious landing craft. The Air Force had 10 combat capable aircraft, including 4 fighter ground attack aircraft, in addition to 21 utility helicopters. Paramilitary forces included a 19,000 member national police force, in addition to a 2,500 member Treasury Police force. The defense budget in 2005 totaled $101 million. A decree promulgated in December 1983 authorized military service for women.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Guatemala is a charter member of the United Nations, having joined on 21 November 1945; it participates in ECLAC and several other UN specialized agencies, such as the FAO, ILO, IMF, UNESCO, UNIDO, WHO, and the World Bank. It is one of five members of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE) and the Central American Common Market (CACM). The country also belongs to G-24, G-77, the Latin American Economic System (LAES), OAS, the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), and the Río Group. In 2004, Guatemala, the United States, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic signed the US Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). The agreement must be ratified by all participating countries before it enters into force. Guatemala has observer status in the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA). Guatemala was a founding member of the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN).

Guatemala is part of the Nonaligned Movement and is a signatory of the 1947 Río Treaty, an inter-American security agreement. The country is also part of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL). In environmental cooperation, Guatemala is part of the Antarctic Treaty, the Basel Convention, the Convention on Biological Diversity, Ramsar, CITES, the London Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, the Montréal Protocol, MARPOL, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the UN Conventions on the Law of the Sea, Climate Change, and Desertification. Guatemala is also signatory to the Central American-US Joint Declaration (CONCAUSA).

ECONOMY

Since the Spanish conquest, the economy of Guatemala has depended on the export of one or two agricultural products. During the colonial period, indigo and cochineal were the principal exports, but the market for them was wiped out by synthetic dyes in the 1860s. Cocoa and essential oils quickly filled the void. Coffee and bananas were introduced later, and in 1999, the chief exports were coffee, sugar, and bananas. Guatemala's economy, the largest in Central America, is dominated by the private sector, which generates nearly 90% of GDP. Since World War II, the government has encouraged light industrial production (such as tires, clothing, and pharmaceuticals). Nevertheless, in 1995, agricultural pursuits occupied 58% of the national labor force and accounted for some two-thirds of Guatemalan foreign exchange earnings. Living standards and personal income remain low, and no significant domestic market exists, except for subsistence crops. However, the agricultural-based structure of the economy has been changing slowly since about 1980, morphing into a country that is more services-based and focused on commerce and financial services. As of 2004, commerce was the largest sector in the economy, accounting for approximately 25% of GDP; agriculture comprised 22.8% of GDP. Manufacturing accounted for 12.6% of the GDP.

The economy boomed from 1971 thorough early 1974. Then, as a result of inflation (21.2% in 1973), the world energy crisis, and an annual population growth of 2.9%, the economic growth rate slowed from 7.6% for 1973 to 4.6% for 1974. During the second half of the 1970s, Guatemala's economic performance slowed further; during 1974–80, the average annual growth rate was 4.3%. By the early 1980s, the civil war, coupled with depressed world commodity prices, had led to decreases in export earnings and to foreign exchange shortages. The GDP dropped by 3.5% in 1982, the first decline in decades, and the GDP declined or was stagnant through 1986. The annual inflation rate, which averaged 11% during 1979–81, dropped to no more than 2% in 1982. It rose thereafter, reaching 31.5% in 1985 and about 40% in the first half of 1986.

In the 1990s the Guatemalan economy grew at a healthy pace, propelled by nontraditional exports and investment. Inflation was reduced through fiscal and monetary policies to an average of 12% in 1993. Economic growth accelerated to an estimated 5.0% in 1993 compared with 4.6% in 1992. In a sudden shift that was perceived as a recession by the private sector, GDP growth decelerated in 1996 to 3.1%. The slowdown reflected a combination of factors: windfall profits from coffee exports, a slowdown in most Central American countries causing a significant decline in Guatemalan exports, and a severe competition of domestic products by Mexican imports. In addition, domestic demand cooled off as private sector credit demand ran out of steam, and tax increases were designed to strengthen the fiscal situation ahead of the signing of the peace accords. Growth for 1997 had improved to 4% thanks to greater domestic and trade liberalization; despite Hurricane Mitch, which destroyed a large portion of the country's agricultural produce for the year, GDP growth reached 5% in 1998.

Real GDP growth remained steady throughout 2001–05, between 2–3%. Additionally, inflation remained under 10% for the 5-year period.

The US Central Intelligence Agency reported that Guatemala was still struggling with an appalling poverty rate—75% of the population lived beneath the poverty line as of 2004. The unemployment rate was estimated at 7.5% in 2003, and GDP per capita was estimated at $4,200 in 2004. In 2004, there remained an estimated 250,000 internally displaced persons, indicative of the continued negative influence of prior conflict on the current economy.

INCOME

The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports that in 2005 Guatemala's gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated at $62.8 billion. The CIA defines GDP as the value of all final goods and services produced within a nation in a given year and computed on the basis of purchasing power parity (PPP) rather than value as measured on the basis of the rate of exchange based on current dollars. The per capita GDP was estimated at $4,300. The annual growth rate of GDP was estimated at 3.1%. The average inflation rate in 2005 was 9.1%. It was estimated that agriculture accounted for 22.8% of GDP, industry 19.1%, and services 58.1%.

According to the World Bank, in 2003 remittances from citizens working abroad totaled $2.147 billion or about $175 per capita and accounted for approximately 8.7% of GDP. Foreign aid receipts amounted to $247 million or about $20 per capita and accounted for approximately 1.0% of the gross national income (GNI).

The World Bank reports that in 2003 household consumption in Guatemala totaled $22.25 billion or about $1,809 per capita based on a GDP of $24.7 billion, measured in current dollars rather than PPP. Household consumption includes expenditures of individuals, households, and nongovernmental organizations on goods and services, excluding purchases of dwellings. It was estimated that for the period 1990 to 2003 household consumption grew at an average annual rate of 4.0%. It was estimated that in 2004 about 75% of the population had incomes below the poverty line.

LABOR

In 2005 Guatemla's labor force was estimated at 3.76 million. As of 2002, it was divided among the following sectors: agriculture 38.7%; industry 20%; services 37.5%; with 3.9% in other undefined occupations. As of 2003, the unemployment rate was estimated at 7.5%.

The trade union movement was born at the end of World War II. Directed in part by foreign communist labor leaders and cultivated by a sympathetic administration, the labor movement grew in the next 10 years to a force claiming nearly 500 unions with 100,000 members. With the overthrow of the Árbenz government in 1954, however, the unions were dissolved. After slow reorganization, the trade unions numbered about 110 by 1974, but in 1979 and 1980, trade union activity was severely restricted. In 1992, the Labor Code of 1947 was amended to facilitate freedom of association, to strengthen the rights of working women, to increase penalties for violations of labor laws, and to enhance the role of the Labor Ministry and the courts in enforcement. Approximately 2% of the workforce were union members in 2002. Unions are independent of government and political party domination, however retaliation against union participation is common. Workers dismissed for union activity have little legal or administrative redress. Workers have the right to strike, but it is weakened by legal restrictions and the force of tradition in a country where strikes were illegal until recently.

The workweek is statutorily recognized as being 44 hours long, but most workers work longer hours out of economic necessity. The minimum legal age to work is 14 but child labor remains a huge problem particularly in agriculture and in the informal economy. Hazardous conditions for child laborers are common especially in the fireworks industry. The minimum wage as of 2002 was $3.57 per eight-hour day for industrial workers and $3.24 per day for agricultural workers. There is routine noncompliance of the minimum wage law in the rural areas.

AGRICULTURE

In 2003, only about 18.9% of the total land area of Guatemala was used for the production of annual or perennial crops, although almost two-thirds is suitable for crop or pasture use. Agriculture contributes about 23% to GDP, makes up 48% of export earnings, and employs 46% of the labor force. The principal cash crops are coffee, sugar, bananas, and cotton, followed by hemp, essential oils, and cacao. Coffee is grown on highland plantations; most of the bananas are produced along the Atlantic coastal plain. Cash crop output in 2004 included 18,000,000 tons of sugarcane, 216,000 tons of coffee, 1,000 tons of cotton, and 1,000,000 tons of bananas. Subsistence crop production included 1,072,000 tons of corn and 97,000 tons of dry beans, along with rice, wheat, and fruits and vegetables. Nontraditional agricultural exports have greatly increased in recent years; such products include: lychee, rambutan, melon, papaya, mango, pineapple, broccoli, okra, snow peas, celery, cauliflower, asparagus, garlic, spices and nuts, and ornamental plants. Guatemala's trade deficit in agricultural products was $454.5 million in 2004.

An agrarian reform law of 1952 provided for government expropriation of unused privately owned agricultural lands, with the exception of farms of 91 hectares (225 acres) or less and those up to 273 hectares (675 acres) if two-thirds of the acreage was under cultivation. By 1954/55, 24,836 hectares (61,371 acres) had been distributed to 10,359 farmers. The law of 1952 was supplemented by an agrarian reform law of 1956, which aimed to distribute state-owned farms (fincas nacionales) to landless peasants. From 1954 to 1962, the government distributed 17,346 land titles. In 1962, the National Agrarian Improvement Institute was created to provide assistance to the new landowners and to improve their living standards. The government requires plantation owners to set aside land for the raising of subsistence crops for their tenants. An agrarian credit bank provides loans to small farmers. Some of the land farmed by Amerindians is held in common by groups of families and is never sold.

ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

Consumption of dairy products and meat is low, despite improvements in stock raising and dairying. The wool industry in the western highlands supplies the famed Guatemalan weavers. Hog and poultry production is ample for domestic consumption. In 2005, there were 2,540,000 head of cattle, 212,000 hogs, 260,000 sheep, 124,000 horses, and 27,000,000 chickens. Guatemala exports poultry, with 155,000 tons of poultry meat and 85,000 tons of eggs produced in 2005. Total cattle numbers continue to fall despite increased illegal imports from Honduras and a decline in illegal exports to Mexico. Depressed beef prices and rising production costs are the main causes of this trend.

FISHING

Guatemalan waters are rich in fish, including shrimp, snapper, and tuna. The total catch in 2003 was 30,480 tons (up from 6,513 tons in 1991), about 32% of which came from inland waters.

FORESTRY

Forests are among Guatemala's richest natural resources; they covered some 26% of the total land area in 2000. The forests in the Petén region yield cabinet woods, timber, extracts, oils, gums, and dyes. Mahogany, cedar, and balsam are important export products, and chicle for chewing gum is another important commodity. In 2004, 16.4 million cu m (579 million cu ft) of roundwood were produced, with 97% burned for fuel. Sawn wood production was 366,000 cu m (12.9 million cu ft) that year. Imports of forestry products exceeded exports by $165.8 million in 2004.

MINING

The principal commercial minerals were gold, iron ore, and lead. Production of antimony fell to zero in 1999–2001, from a high of 1,020 tons in 1997, when Guatemala ranked third in Latin America, behind Bolivia and Mexico. Gold, which was mined from the colonial period until the early 20th century, was no longer a major export item. An estimated 4,550 kg was produced in 2003, up from an estimated 4,500 kg in 2002. Rough marble, which ranged in color from white through green, was exported to Mexico and other nearby countries. Deposits of nickel have also been found at Marichaj and Sechol. Barite, bentonite, kaolin, other clays, feldspar, gypsum, iron ore, lime, pumice, salt, limestone, sand and gravel, and silica sand were also produced, primarily for domestic use. Reported deposits of copper, quartz, manganese, uranium, mica, and asbestos awaited exploitation.

ENERGY AND POWER

Guatemala is the only oil producing country in Central America, but has no refining capacity. Therefore it must import all of its refined petroleum products. Most of the country's oil production lies in its northern jungles along the Mexican border. According to the Oil and Gas Journal, Guatemala has proven oil reserves of 526 million barrels, as of October 2005. Since the end of the civil war in 1996, the government has been granting oil exploration concessions. In March of 2005, a new oil licensing round was initiated, the first since 1997. Two blocks, A6 and A7, with known proven reserves were offered, with two unexplored blocks, Piedras Blancas and Cotcal offered. Production averaged an estimated 19,800 barrels per day in 2004, of which almost all was exported to the United States. In 2002, oil exports totaled an estimated 3,104 barrels per day. Consumption of refined products totaled 64,560 barrels per day in that year. Guatemala has modest natural gas reserves of 1.543 billion cu m as of 1 January 2002, but no production.

Guatemala is Central America's largest producer and consumer of electricity. In 2002, electric power generating capacity came to 1.698 million kW, while total production in that year reached 6.808 billion kWh, of which: fossil fuels accounted for almost 60%; hydropower for 27%; and geothermal/other sources accounted for the rest. Electricity consumption in Guatemala grew at an annual rate of 8.1% from 1993 to 2003. In 2002, electric power demand totaled 5.76 billion kWh. The surplus power generated has made Guatemala a power exporter. In 2002, electric power exports totaled 4.40 million kWh, with imports at 55 million kWh.

INDUSTRY

Manufacturing and construction accounted for a growing proportion of GDP in 2004. In that year, agriculture accounted for 22.7% of the GDP while industry accounted for 19.5% and services accounted for 57.9%. Guatemalan factories produce beverages, candles, cement, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, cigarettes, foodstuffs, furniture, matches, molasses, rubber goods, shirts, shoes, soap, sugar, textiles, and apparel. More recently established firms produce electrical machinery, refined petroleum products, metal furniture, instant coffee, pasteurized milk, plastic, plywood, aluminum and tires. Handmade woven and leather goods are sold to tourists and exported.

Most of the country's industrial enterprises operate on a very small scale. A small domestic market has traditionally limited Guatemala's industrial potential, although the CACM temporarily broadened the market for the country's exported manufactures. The value of Guatemala's exports more than tripled between 1972 and 1978. During the 1980s, however, the industrial sector declined, partly because of the collapse of the CACM but also because of a shortage of the foreign exchange necessary to purchase basic materials. In the mid-1980s, Guatemalan firms turned to export production as internal demand contracted. The 1986 devaluation of the quetzal raised the cost of imported industrial inputs. During the 1990s, the value added by manufacturing remained at a steady pace, except for during 1996. The manufacturing sector suffered from increased competition from Mexico, often unregistered and untaxed, while export to major neighboring markets was hampered in 1996 by the slowdown in Costa Rica and El Salvador.

In 2002, major manufactures included sugar, clothing and textiles, furniture, chemicals, petroleum, metals, and rubber. Heavy industry included a small steel mill located in Escuintla, and an oil refinery that had a capacity of 16,000 barrels per day. The pharmaceutical industry shrank by 53% in 1998 because several manufacturing companies had moved their businesses to Mexico. Construction, very dynamic during the first half of the 1990s, was affected by falling demand in 1996 and 1997, but grew by about 25% annually in 1998 and 1999. Electricity generation and telephone services continued to grow strongly, while oil production, thanks to a very active development policy, increased by 250% between 1992 and 1998.

Maquila plants have comprised a growing proportion of the manufacturing sector, though they are not as heavy of a proportion as in Mexico, Honduras, or El Salvador. In 1994, maquilas in Guatemala employed 70,000; this number grew to 113,200 in 2004. As of December 2004, 222 maquila plans operated in Guatemala—65.3% were Korean-owned, 27% Guatemalan-owned, and 59.9% US-owned.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

In 1987–97, total Guatemalan expenditures on research and development amounted to 0.2% of GDP, with 112 technicians and 104 scientists and engineers per million people engaged in research and development. The Academy of Medical, Physical, and Natural Sciences, headquartered in Guatemala City, dates from 1945. In 1996, Guatemala had learned societies devoted to natural history, pediatrics, and engineering, and research institutes concerned with nuclear energy, industry, and earth sciences. The Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama founded in 1949 and administered by the Pan American Health Bureau Organization and the World Health Organization, conducts research and disseminates scientific and technical information. Five universities offer degrees in basic and applied sciences. The National Museum of Natural History is located in Guatemala City.

In 2002, high technology exports by Guatemala totaled $55 million, or 7% of the country's manufactured exports.

DOMESTIC TRADE

Outside the capital city, markets are held on appointed days, and local fairs are held annually. Traders bring their wares on large racks atop buses or by mule, herding animals ahead of them. Prices are not fixed. Although there are some modern, tourist-oriented shops, traditional methods of commerce, with modifications, also prevail in Guatemala City. Franchise stores are beginning to gain acceptance. In 2002, there were about 150 franchising companies with around 450 outlets nationwide. Business hours are weekdays, 8 am to 6 pm; shops also open on Saturday mornings. Normal banking hours in Guatemala City are weekdays, 9 am to 3 pm.

FOREIGN TRADE

The Guatemalan commodity export market is dominated by coffee, sugar, bananas, and oil. Other main exports are medicinal and pharmaceutical products, vegetables, and cardamom. Nontraditional exports, such as cut flowers, fruits and berries, shrimp, and textile assembly, are of growing importance to the Guatemalan economy.

Most exports go to the United States (55.3% in 2003); they also have increasingly gone to other Central American countries. Guatemala runs a trade surplus with the region, exporting mainly to El Salvador (10.5% of exports), but also to Honduras (7.1%) and Mexico (4.1%). As of 2003, Guatemala imported primarily from

the United States (comprising 33.1% of imports), Mexico (9.1%), and South Korea (8.8%). In 2004 Guatemala imported 34% of its imports from the United States, 8.1% from Mexico, 6.8% from South Korea, 6.6% from China, and 4.4% from Japan. Guatemala typically imports fuels, machinery and transport equipment, construction materials, grain, fertilizers, and electricity.

Guatemala signed the Central American Free-Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) on 10 March 2005.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Guatemala generally finances its trade deficit through capital inflows. Capital flight caused by regional instability during the 1980s led to large deficits on the overall payments balance and brought foreign exchange reserves down from $709.6 million at the end of 1978 to $112.2 million at the end of 1982. In 1991 and 1992,

with inflation lowered, private capital inflows were large enough to offset public capital outflows and the current account deficit. As a result, foreign reserves expanded during the 1990s, growing by $559 million. Foreign exchange reserves were over $1 billion from 1997 into 1999. Exports increased by 7.2% in 1997 and by 20.7% in 1998. National income reports do not include the export value added by the textile assembly industry (as they are generally located in the Free Trade Zones), and remittances from Guatemalans living abroad, which help finance the trade deficit.

Guatemala's underdeveloped infrastructure is a hindrance to foreign investment and economic development. A disproportionate share of investment goes to the Guatemala City area, despite rehabilitation of the railway system and investment in highways, telephone service, and electricity.

The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that in 2004 exports were approximately $2.9 billion; imports were approximately $7.1 billion, resulting in a trade deficit of approximately $4.2 billion.

BANKING AND SECURITIES

The Bank of Guatemala (BANGUAT) is the central bank and the bank of issue. The Monetary Board, an independent body, determines the monetary policy of the country. Associated with the Bank of Guatemala are six other government institutions: The National Mortgage Credit Institute (the official government mortgage bank); two development banks, the National Bank of Agricultural Development and the National Housing Bank; and the National Finance Corp., organized in 1973 to lend funds to industry, tourism, and mining to provide technical assistance. BAN-GUAT intervenes in the foreign exchange market to prevent sharp deviation in the exchange rate. In 1998, the Central Bank spent over $500 million to support the exchange rate, but the currency depreciated by 15% anyway that year.

As of 2002, the formal banking system consisted of 32 private commercial banks, three state banks, and several financial houses. Over 18 international banks are represented in one form or another. The five largest banks control approximately 45% of total assets. Several financial institutions collapsed in 1998 and 1999, prompting the government to bring banks into line with the Basel convention on minimum capital requirements. The government also hopes to make credit more available. The International Monetary Fund reports that in 2001, currency and demand deposits—an aggregate commonly known as M1—were equal to $2.7 billion. In that same year, M2—an aggregate equal to M1 plus savings deposits, small time deposits, and money market mutual funds—was $6.3 billion. The money market rate, the rate at which financial institutions lend to one another in the short term, was 10.6%.

When the Bank of Guatemala was established the Fund for the Regulation of the Bond Market was created to promote security issues. Nevertheless, Guatemalans still tend to prefer tangible investments, and there is no fully developed securities market. The National Stock Exchange of Guatemala (the Bolsa Nacional de Valores—BNV) opened in 1989 where shares from private companies in the country and other securities are traded. It is the largest of Guatemala's stock exchanges. The other two main exchanges, the Bolsa Nacional Global and the Bolsa Agrícola, merged to form the Corporación Bursatil in 1994. Three government bonds are traded on the exchanges, including CENIVACUS, CERTIBONO, and CDP. The volume traded in 1999 was $5.9 billion.

INSURANCE

In Guatemala, worker's compensation (the country's Social Security Plan) is compulsory, providing pension, disability pension, medical and hospital benefits, maternity benefits, and funeral expenses. In addition, the insurance market is entirely domestic, as foreign insurers are prohibited from issuing policies. Market rates, and the types of fire, auto, life, personal accident, and crime insurance are set by the superintendency. In 2003, the value of direct premiums written totaled $271 million, with nonlife premiums accounting for $222 million. The country's top nonlife insurer that same year was G&T, which had gross nonlife written premiums of $55.2 million.

PUBLIC FINANCE

Fiscal policy loosened after the 1985 elections, but tax reforms in 1987 failed to generate additional income, and governmental expenditures continued to grow. By 1990, the public sector deficit was 4.7% of GDP. The Serrano administration transformed the deficit of 1990 to a slight surplus in 1991 and a virtually balanced budget in 1992. The consolidated public sector deficit amounted to 1.2% in 1991 and 1.0% in 1992. Guatemala's public sector is among Latin America's smallest, and the tax burden is one of the lightest, at about 8% of GDP. The budget deficit grew to 2.5% of GDP in 1998, from only 0.50% in 1997, forcing the government to reevaluate its taxation and customs practices. Continued privatization and trade liberalization should boost public finances.

The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated that in 2005 Guatemala's central government took in revenues of approximately $3.3 billion and had expenditures of $4.0 billion. Revenues minus expenditures totaled approximately -$667 million. Public debt in 2005 amounted to 26.9% of GDP. Total external debt was $5.503 billion.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that in 2003, the most recent year for which it had data, budgetary central government revenues in millions of quetzales were 21,694.4 and expenditures were 26,210.9. The value of revenues in millions of US dollars was $2,732 and expenditures $3,275, based on a market exchange rate for 2003 of 7.9408 as reported by the IMF. Government outlays by function were as follows: general public services, 22.2%; defense, 4.7%; public order and safety, 10.4%; economic affairs, 23.9%; environmental protection, 0.8%; housing and community amenities, 11.2%; health, 7.0%; recreation, culture, and religion, 1.5%; education, 17.6%; and social protection, 0.6%.

TAXATION

The corporate income tax rate in Guatemala is 31% of net income. However, companies operating there have a choice between two payment regimes: a general withholding regime, and an optional tax regime. Under the General regime, a monthly 5% tax on gross income is made. Under the optional regime, a quarterly payment at the 31% corporate rate is made on net taxable income. In addition, there is a 2.5% asset tax that is applied to the previous year's income or net assets. The asset tax is credited against the corporate income tax. An industrial development law provides tax exemptions for new industries. There is also a 3.5% tax on all foreign exchange transactions. Only income earned from Guatemalan sources is taxed. Capital gains, like the corporate income tax, offer two payment regimes: a general withholding regime; and an optional tax regime. Under the first, a 10% monthly withholding rate is applied, while under the second, a quarterly 31% rate is used. Dividends from resident companies are exempt from tax if the income tax was paid out of the income that was distributed as dividends by the distributing company. Otherwise a 10% withholding tax is applied.

The progressive personal income tax schedule has a top rate of 31%. Nonresidents pay a flat 31% rate, while income from employment and professional services is charged at the progressive rate. Other taxes include property taxes, and inheritance and gift taxes. Excise taxes are levied on beverages, cigars, tobacco, gasoline, vehicles, and airline tickets. Royalties are taxed at 31%.

Guatemala's main indirect tax is a 12% value-added tax (VAT) that is applied to most transactions. However, basic foodstuffs, sales of some low-cost housing and certain financial services are exempt. Exports are zero-rated.

CUSTOMS AND DUTIES

Guatemala requires licenses for the importation of restricted goods, including pharmaceuticals, basic food grains, milk, coffee beans, and armaments. As a member of the Central American Common Market CACM, Guatemala adheres to a common tariff classification system as well as a common customs code and regulations. Duties are stated as both specific and ad valorem. Import duties are generally minimal, ranging from 5 to 15%. Imports of agricultural products that exceed the quota have higher rates. There is also a 12% value-added tax (VAT) that is collected at the port of entry.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT

There are no general requirements for local participation nor any restrictions on repatriation of capital. Guatemala's major diplomatic interests are regional security and, increasingly, regional development and economic integration. Guatemala participates in several regional groups, particularly those related to trade and environment. Foreign investor interest in Guatemala picked up with the signing of peace accords in 1996 and deregulation of the electric and telecommunications sectors. Structural reforms, such as the privatization program and trade liberalization measures, will add to investor appetite, but substantial investment in infrastructure and training the workforce is needed. As of the first quarter of 1997, the government had invited bids for 12 oil exploration and production contracts. Oil production increased by 250% between 1992 and 1998.

In 1998, Guatemala passed the Foreign Investment Law, reducing the barriers to foreign investment. But investment was still restricted to minority ownership of domestic airlines and ground transport. Incentives are available for the forestry, mining, tourism, and petroleum sectors. There are also eight free trade zones. The Foreign Investment Law had also removed limitations to foreign ownership of domestic airlines and ground transport companies in January 2004. There were also plans within the government to form mining legislation in 2005 that would encourage foreign investment.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Guatemala's economic development policy is to create rural employment through the provision of investment incentives. Such enticements include inexpensive financing by government institutions, free assistance and technical support, and preferential treatment to use government facilities and institutions for guidance. The government has initiated a number of programs aimed at liberalizing the economy and improving the investment climate. After the signing of the final peace accord in December 1996, Guatemala was well-positioned for rapid economic growth. Growth in the late 1990s was led by development of petroleum mining and refining.

The country's economy is commanded by the private sector which generates about 85% of GDP. The public sector is small and shrinking, with its business activities limited to transportation, and several development oriented institutions. Problems hindering economic growth include illiteracy and low levels of education; inadequate and underdeveloped capital markets; and lack of infrastructure, particularly in the transportation, communications, and electricity sectors. The distribution of income and wealth remains unequal. The wealthiest 10% of the population receives almost one-half of all income; the top 20% receives two-thirds of all income.

Tax reform was one government objective in 2003, as was reform of the financial services sector, liberalizing trade, and overhauling public finances. Drought and low coffee prices harmed the economy in 2001–02, and caused malnutrition among the poor in rural areas. In 2003, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a nine-month, $120-million Stand-By Arrangement to support Guatemala's economic program through March 2004. In 2003, the government was targeting the fiscal deficit, aiming to control inflation, and working toward putting into place a new legal framework for the financial sector. The country was also improving transparency in government, and working to strengthen governing structures themselves.

A tax reform was passed in June 2004 to supplement the rolledover 2003 budget. Corporate income tax was changed, and excise duties on alcohol were levied. Further, a new corporate tax (the Impuesto Temporal de Apoyo a los Acuerdos de Paz—IETAAP) was made to support peace agreements. This replaced the agricultural and mercantile business tax (Impuesto sobre Empresas Mercantiles y Agropecuarias—IEMA) that was rejected by the Constitutional Court in January 2004 and left the government vulnerable to a shortfall in tax revenue if tax reform were not carried out.

In 2005, the IMF supported President Berger's economic policy program and declared that Guatemala was capable of dealing with potential balance of payments without a new Stand-By Arrangement. The Stand-By Arrangement that gave Guatemala a $120-million credit line ended in 2004.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

A social insurance system covers all employees, including agricultural workers. Public employees are covered by a separate program. The pensions for old age, survivorship, and disability are funded by a small contribution from employees, larger contribution from employers, and 25% covered by the government. Retirement is set at age 60. Cash and medical benefits are provided for sickness and maternity for employees of firms with more than five workers. Free medical care is provided for those receiving pensions. A grant for funeral expenses is provided.

Despite legal equality, women are paid significantly less than their male counterparts and are generally employed in low-wage jobs. Some domestic laws also discriminate against women. Women can be charged with adultery, while men can only be charged with a lesser crime. Sexual violence, including domestic violence, is widespread, and most cases go unreported. However, the number of complaints for both rape and spousal abuse has risen in recent years due to the nationwide educational program that has encouraged women to seek help. The police have little training to assist victims of sexual crimes. Sexual harassment is not illegal.

The constitution provides that all persons are free and equal in dignity and rights, and that the government must protect the life, liberty, justice, security, and peace of all citizens. Due to inadequate resources and corruption, however, the government is unable to enforce these provisions.

HEALTH

Guatemala's health care system consists of three sectors: public, private nonprofit, and private for-profit. Health coverage has been estimated to be low, with more than 40% of the population receiving no access to health care services. As of 2004, there were an estimated 89 physicians, 404 nurses, and 18 dentists per 100,000 people. Approximately 4.3% of GDP went to health expenditures. Among the chief causes of death are heart disease, intestinal parasites, bronchitis, influenza, and tuberculosis. Other major causes of death were perinatal conditions, intestinal infectious diseases, and nutritional deficiencies. Malnutrition, alcoholism, and inadequate sanitation and housing also pose serious health problems. Approximately 92% of the population had access to safe drinking water and 85% had adequate sanitation. Malaria rates are high. Guatemala does attempt to vaccinate its children and all routine vaccinations are paid for by the government. It is estimated that the poorest half of the population gets only 60% of the minimum daily caloric requirement. Some steps have been taken to fortify foods with daily vitamin requirements. Currently, sugar is being fortified with vitamin A and wheat flour will be fortified with iron.

The total fertility rate was 4.6 in 2000, a dramatic reduction from 6.5 in 1980. By 2000 the maternal mortality rate had fallen to 55 deaths per 1,000 live births, down from 200 in 1990. In 2005, the infant mortality rate was 32 per 1,000 live births and the overall mortality rate was an estimated 6.7 per 1,000 people as of 2002. The average life expectancy was 69.06 years in 2005. From 1966 to 1992 there were about 140,000 war-related deaths.

The HIV/AIDS prevalence was 1.10 per 100 adults in 2003. As of 2004, there were approximately 78,000 people living with HIV/AIDS in the country. There were an estimated 5,800 deaths from AIDS in 2003.

Political violence and problems associated with poverty have left more than 200,000 Guatemalan children orphaned. Many suffer from psychological problems and malnutrition.

HOUSING

Many of the nation's urban housing units and most of its rural dwellings have serious structural defects and lack electricity and potable water. In 2002, there were about 2,483,458 housing units in the country. Most dwellings were detached houses. Over 50% of all housing are owner occupied. About 24% of all houses are of adobe walls; 50% use concrete blocks. Metal sheeting is the most common material for roofing. Most apartment buildings are made of cement block. The housing need in 2005 stood at about 1.6 million houses and overcrowding, especially in rural area hut dwellings and urban rented rooms, was prevalent.

As of 1995, there were about 205 "squatter" settlements inhabited by homeless or displaced persons. In these settlements, shelters are made of wood, cardboard, or mud, with zinc sheet roofs. A public housing program is supervised by the National Housing Bank. The Ministry of Public Health and Welfare is charged with the improvement of rural dwellings.

EDUCATION

Elementary education is free and compulsory for nine years although enforcement is lax in rural areas. Primary school covers six years of study, followed by three years of basic secondary school. Students may then choose a two-year diversified secondary program or a three-year technical school program.

In 2001, about 55% of children between the ages of five and six were enrolled in some type of preschool program. Primary school enrollment in 2003 was estimated at about 87% of age-eligible students. The same year, secondary school enrollment was about 30% of age-eligible students. It is estimated that about 66.5% of all students complete their primary education. The student-to-teacher ratio for primary school was at about 30:1 in 2003; the ratio for secondary school was about 14:1. In 2003, private schools accounted for about 12% of primary school enrollment and 74% of secondary enrollment.

Among Guatemala's six main universities, the Universidad de San Carlos, in Guatemala City, is the most important center of higher learning. The others include Universidad del Valle de Guatemala, Universidad Francisco Marroquin, Universidad Mariano Galvez, Universidad Rafael Landivar, and Universidad Rural. In 2003, about 9% of the tertiary age population were enrolled in some type of higher education program. The adult literacy rate for 2004 was estimated at about 69.1%, with 75.4% for men and 63.3% for women.

As of 1995, public expenditure on education was estimated at 1.7% of GDP.

LIBRARIES AND MUSEUMS

There are three notable libraries in Guatemala City. The National Library, with about over 350,000 volumes, has collections of Guatemalan and other Central American books and newspapers. The General Archives of Central America has a 100,000-item collection of documents for the three-century colonial period, when Guatemala was the administrative center for the Central American area. The library of the Geographical and Historical Academy of Guatemala (30,000 volumes) is of special value to researchers. The Central American Industrial Research Institute maintains the largest technical library in Central America (36,000 volumes). The Institute of Nutrition in Central American and Panama in Guatemala City maintains an important collection of public health documents. The University of San Carlos library has 205,000 volumes. There are about 64 public libraries that are supervised through the National Library. Another 29 public libraries are sponsored by the Bank of Guatemala.

The Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology (1948) in the capital has an excellent collection of Mayan artifacts, and the Colonial Museum in Antigua contains colonial paintings, woodcarvings, iron and leatherwork, and sculpture. Also in the capital are the National Museum of Fine Arts, the National Museum of History, the Museum of the National Palace, the Popol Vuh Archaeological Museum, and the Center for Conservation Studies, founded in 1981.

MEDIA

Except for a few privately controlled facilities, the government owns and operates the postal, telephone, and telegraph services. The Guatemalan Telecommunications Enterprise provides international radiotelegraph and radiotelephone service. In 2003, there were an estimated 71 mainline telephones for every 1,000 people. The same year, there were approximately 131 mobile phones in use for every 1,000 people.

As of 2000 there were 130 AM and 487 FM radio stations. In 2001, four of the most prominent television stations were all owned by the same Mexican citizen, who has a political preference for the FRG. In 2003, there were an estimated 79 radios and 145 television sets for every 1,000 people. The same year, there were 14.4 personal computers for every 1,000 people and 33 of every 1,000 people had access to the Internet. There were 50 secure Internet servers in the country in 2004.

There were three major daily newspapers in 2004, all published in Guatemala City. They were (with orientation and 2004 circulations): Prensa Libre (moderate liberal, 110,000), Siglo Veintiuno (moderate, 56,000), and La Hora (moderate liberal, 18,000).

The constitution provides for free speech and a free press, though journalists admit that in certain cases fear of reprisals or government pressure leads to self-censorship.

ORGANIZATIONS

Artisans', consumers', service, and savings and credit cooperatives are grouped in four federations. The major employers' organizations are the General Farmers' Association, the Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Industry, and the National Coffee Association.

The Academy of Geography and History of Guatemala promotes the study of Guatemalan history, geography, and culture. There are several associations dedicated to research and education for specific fields of medicine and particular diseases and conditions.

National youth organizations include the Association of University Students, associations of Boy Scouts and Girl Guides, youth rotary clubs, and Junior Achievement of Guatemala. Sports associations promote amateur competition in such pastimes as hiking, football (soccer), tae kwon do, and squash. Volunteer service organizations, such as the Lions Clubs and Kiwanis International, are also present. The Red Cross and Habitat for Humanity are active in Guatemala.

TOURISM, TRAVEL, AND RECREATION

All visitors need a passport and may need a visa depending on nationality. Tourism has rebounded since Guatemala's return to civilian rule in 1986. In 2003, approximately 880,223 tourists arrived in Guatemala. There were 17,519 hotel rooms in 2002 with 44,579 beds and an occupancy rate of 47%. Guatemala's main tourist attractions are the Mayan ruins, such as Tikal; the numerous colonial churches in Guatemala City, Antigua Guatemala, and other towns and villages; and the colorful markets and fiestas.

In 2005, the US Department of State estimated the daily expenses of staying in Guatemala City at $200. Other areas were estimated at $156 per day.

FAMOUS GUATEMALANS

The Rusticatio Mexicana, by Rafael Landívar (1731–93), represents the height of colonial Guatemalan poetry. Outstanding figures of the romantic period were philologist Antonio José de Irisarri (1786–1868); José Batres y Montúfar (1809–44), the author of Tradiciones de Guatemala and many poetical works; and José Milla y Vidaurre (1822–82), a historian and novelist and the creator of the national peasant prototype, Juan Chapin. Justo Rufino Barrios (1835–85) became a national hero for his liberal, far-reaching reforms between 1871 and 1885. Enrique Gómez Carillo (1873–1927), a novelist and essayist, was perhaps better known to non-Spanish readers during his lifetime than any other Guatemalan author. Twentieth-century novelists include Rafael Arévalo Martínez (1884–1975), Carlos Wyld Ospina (1891–1956), and Flavio Herrera (1895–1968). The novelist and diplomat Miguel Ángel Asturias (1899–1974) was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1967.

Mario Cardinal Casariego (b.Spain, 1909–83) became the first Central American cardinal in 1969. Among the better-known Guatemalan political personalities of the 20th century are Col. Jácobo Árbenz Guzmán (1913–71), president during 1951–54, and Gen. Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes (1896–1982), president during 1958–63. Alfonso Portillo Cabrera (b.1951) served as president from 2000 to 2004. Óscar Berger (b.1946) succeeded him. Rigoberta Menchú (b.1959) won the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize for her campaign against human rights violations and for the rights of indigenous peoples.

DEPENDENCIES

Guatemala has no territories or colonies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Calvert, Peter. A Political and Economic Dictionary of Latin America. Philadelphia: Routledge/Taylor and Francis, 2004.

Dosal, Paul J. Power in Transition: The Rise of Guatemala's Industrial Oligarchy, 1871–1994. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995.

Giannakos, S.A. (ed.). Ethnic Conflict: Religion, Identity, and Politics. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002.

Health in the Americas, 2002 edition. Washington, D.C.: Pan American Health Organization, Pan American Sanitary Bureau, Regional Office of the World Health Organization, 2002.

Hendrickson, Carol Elaine. Weaving Identities: Construction of Dress and Self in a Highland Guatemala Town. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995.

Jones, Oakah L. Guatemala in the Spanish Colonial Period. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994.

Maya Cultural Activism in Guatemala. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996.

Perera, Victor. Unfinished Conquest: The Guatemalan Tragedy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Poverty in Guatemala. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004.

Stoll, David. Between Two Armies in the Ixil Towns of Guatemala. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

VanKirk, Jacques. Remarkable Remains of the Ancient Peoples of Guatemala. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996.

Woodward, Ralph Lee. Guatemala. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Clio, 1992.

GUATEMALA

Compiled from the August 2004 Background Note and supplemented with additional information from the State Department and the editors of this volume. See the introduction to this set for explanatory notes.

Official Name:
Republic of Guatemala

PROFILE

Geography

Area: 108,890 sq. km. (42,042 sq. mi.); about the size of Tennessee.

Cities: Capital—Guatemala City (metro area pop. 2.5 million). Other major cities—Quetzaltenango, Escuintla.

Terrain: Mountainous, with fertile coastal plain.

Climate: Temperate in highlands; tropical on coasts.

People

Nationality: Noun and adjective—Guatemalan(s).

Population: (2004 est.) 14.3 million.

Annual population growth rate: (2004 est.) 2.61%.

Ethnic groups: Mestizo (mixed Spanish-Indian), indigenous.

Religions: Roman Catholic, Protestant, traditional Mayan.

Languages: Spanish, 24 indigenous languages (principally Kiche, Kaqchikel, Q'eqchi, and Mam).

Education: Years compulsory—6. Attendance—41%. Literacy—70.6%.

Health: Infant mortality rate—36.9/1,000. Life expectancy—65.19 yrs.

Work force: Services—40%; industry and commerce—37%; agriculture—15%; construction, mining, utilities—4%. Fifty percent of the population engages in some form of agriculture, often at the subsistence level outside the monetized economy.

Government

Type: Constitutional democratic republic.

Constitution: May 1985; amended November 1993.

Independence: September 15, 1821.

Branches: Executive—president (4-year term). Legislative—unicameral 158-member Congress (4-year term). Judicial—13-member Supreme Court of Justice (5-year term).

Administrative subdivisions: 22 departments (appointed governors); 331 municipalities with elected mayors and city councils.

Political parties: Gran Alianza Nacional (GANA—a coalition of three parties), Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), National Advancement Party (PAN), National Union for Hope (UNE), New Nation Alliance (ANN), Unionists (Unionistas), Patriot Party (PP)

Suffrage: Universal for adults 18 and over who are not serving on active duty with the armed forces or police. A variety of procedural obstacles have historically reduced participation by poor, rural, and indigenous people.

Economy

GDP: (2002 est.) $23 billion ($46.2 billion PPP).

Annual growth rate: (2002 est.) 2.2%.

Per capita GDP: (2002 est.) $2,068 ($3,700 PPP).

Natural resources: Oil, timber, nickel.

Agriculture: (22% of GDP) Products—coffee, sugar, bananas, cardamom, vegetables, flowers and plants, timber, rice, rubber.

Manufacturing: (13% of GDP) Types—prepared food, clothing and textiles, construction materials, tires, pharmaceuticals.

Trade: (2002) Exports—$2.24 billion: coffee, sugar, cardamom, bananas, fruits and vegetables, petroleum, apparel. Major markets—U.S. 30%, Central American Common Market (CACM) 39%. Imports—$6.08 billion: fuels and lubricants, industrial machinery, motor vehicles, iron, and steel. Major suppliers—U.S. 36%, CACM 11%, Mexico 10%.

PEOPLE

More than half of Guatemalans are descendants of indigenous Mayan peoples. Westernized Mayans and mestizos (mixed European and indigenous ancestry) are known as Ladinos. Most of Guatemala's population is rural, though urbanization is accelerating. The predominant religion is Roman Catholicism, into which many indigenous Guatemalans have incorporated traditional forms of worship. Protestantism and traditional Mayan religions are practiced by an estimated 40% and 1% of the population, respectively. Though the official language is Spanish, it is not universally understood among the indigenous population. However, peace accords signed in December 1996 provide for the translation of some official documents and voting materials into several indigenous languages.

HISTORY

The Mayan civilization flourished throughout much of Guatemala and the surrounding region long before the Spanish arrived, but it was already in decline when the Mayans were defeated by Pedro de Alvarado in 1523-24. During Spanish colonial rule, most of Central America came under the control of the Captaincy General of Guatemala.

The first colonial capital, Ciudad Vieja, was ruined by floods and an earthquake in 1542. Survivors founded Antigua, the second capital, in 1543. In the 17th century, Antigua became one of the richest capitals in the New World. Always vulnerable to volcanic eruptions, floods, and earthquakes, Antigua was destroyed by two earthquakes in 1773. The remnants of its Spanish colonial architecture have been preserved as a national monument. The third capital, Guatemala City, was founded in 1776, after Antigua was abandoned.

Guatemala gained independence from Spain on September 15, 1821; it briefly became part of the Mexican Empire, and then for a period belonged to a federation called the United Provinces of Central America. From the mid-19th century until the mid-1980s, the country passed through a series of dictatorships, insurgencies (particularly beginning in the 1960s), coups, and stretches of military rule with only occasional periods of representative government.

1944 to 1986

In 1944, Gen. Jorge Ubico's dictatorship was overthrown by the "October Revolutionaries," a group of dissident military officers, students, and liberal professionals. A civilian President, Juan Jose Arevalo, was elected in 1945 and held the presidency until 1951. Social reforms initiated by Arevalo were continued by his successor, Col. Jacobo Arbenz. Arbenz permitted the communist Guatemalan Labor Party to gain legal status in 1952. By the mid-point of Arbenz's term, communists controlled key peasant organizations, labor unions, and the governing political party, holding some key government positions.

Despite most Guatemalans' attachment to the original ideals of the 1944 uprising, some private sector leaders and the military viewed Arbenz's policies as a menace. The army refused to defend the Arbenz government when a U.S.-backed group led by Col. Carlos Castillo Armas invaded the country from Honduras in 1954 and quickly took over the government. Gen. Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes took power in 1958 following the murder of Colonel Castillo Armas.

In response to the increasingly autocratic rule of Ydigoras Fuentes, a group of junior military officers revolted in 1960. When they failed, several went into hiding and established close ties with Cuba. This group became the nucleus of the forces that were in armed insurrection against the government for the next 36 years. Four principal leftwing guerrilla groups—the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of Armed People (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT)—conducted economic sabotage and targeted government installations and members of government security forces in armed attacks. These organizations combined to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in 1982. At the same time, extreme rightwing groups of selfappointed vigilantes, including the Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA) and the White Hand, tortured and murdered students, professionals, and peasants suspected of involvement in leftist activities.

Shortly after President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro took office in 1966, the army launched a major counterinsurgency campaign that largely broke up the guerrilla movement in the countryside. The guerrillas then concentrated their attacks in Guatemala City, where they assassinated many leading figures, including U.S. Ambassador John Gordon Mein in 1968. Between 1966 and 1982, there was a series of military or military-dominated governments.

On March 23, 1982, army troops commanded by junior officers staged a coup to prevent the assumption of power by Gen. Angel Anibal Guevara, the hand-picked candidate of outgoing President and Gen. Romeo Lucas Garcia. They denounced Guevara's electoral victory as fraudulent. The coup leaders asked retired Gen. Efrain Rios Montt to negotiate the departure of Lucas and Guevara. Rios Montt had been the candidate of the Christian Democracy Party in the 1974 presidential elections and was widely regarded as having been denied his own victory through fraud.

Rios Montt was at this time a lay pastor in the evangelical protestant "Church of the Word." In his 1982 inaugural address, he stated that his presidency resulted from the will of God. He formed a three-member military junta that annulled the 1965 constitution, dissolved Congress, suspended political parties, and canceled the electoral law. After a few months, Rios Montt dismissed his junta colleagues and assumed the de facto title of "President of the Republic."

Guerrilla forces and their leftist allies denounced Rios Montt. Rios Montt sought to defeat the guerrillas with military actions and economic reforms; in his words, "rifles and beans." In May 1982, the Conference of Catholic Bishops accused Rios Montt of being responsible for increased militarization of the country and for continuing military massacres of civilians. General Rios Montt was quoted in the New York

Times of July 18, 1982 as telling an audience of indigenous Guatemalans, "If you are with us, we'll feed you; if not, we'll kill you."

The government began to form local civilian defense patrols (PACs). Participation was in theory voluntary, but in reality, many Guatemalans, especially in the heavily indigenous northwest, had no choice but to join either the PACs or the guerrillas. Rios Montt's conscript army and PACs recaptured essentially all guerrilla territory—guerrilla activity lessened and was largely limited to hit-and-run operations. However, Rios Montt won this partial victory at an enormous cost in civilian deaths.

Rios Montt's brief presidency was probably the most violent period of the 36-year internal conflict, which resulted in about 200,000 deaths of mostly unarmed indigenous civilians. Although leftist guerrillas and rightwing death squads also engaged in summary executions, forced disappearances, and torture of noncombatants, the vast majority of human rights violations were carried out by the Guatemalan military and the PACs they controlled. The internal conflict is described in great detail in the reports of the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) and the Archbishop's Office for Human Rights (ODHAG). The CEH estimates that government forces were responsible for 93% of the violations; ODHAG earlier estimated that government forces were responsible for 80%.

On August 8, 1983, Rios Montt was deposed by his own Minister of Defense, Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores, who succeeded him as de facto President of Guatemala. Mejia justified his coup, saying that "religious fanatics" were abusing their positions in the government and also because of "official corruption." Seven people were killed in the coup, although Rios Montt survived to found a political party (the Guatemalan Republic Front) and to be elected President of Congress in 1995 and 2000. Awareness in the United States of the conflict in Guatemala, and its ethnic dimension, increased with the 1983 publication of the book I, Rigoberta Menchu, An Indian Woman in Guatemala. The book recounts the life of the title character, a young woman whose often tragic life experiences reflect the experiences common to many indigenous people suffering under that nation's injustices.

General Mejia allowed a managed return to democracy in Guatemala, starting with a July 1, 1984 election for a Constituent Assembly to draft a democratic constitution. On May 30, 1985, after 9 months of debate, the Constituent Assembly finished drafting a new constitution, which took effect immediately. Vinicio Cerezo, a civilian politician and the presidential candidate of the Christian Democracy Party, won the first election held under the new constitution with almost 70% of the vote, and took office on January 14, 1986.

1986 to 2003

Upon its inauguration in January 1986, President Cerezo's civilian government announced that its top priorities would be to end the political violence and establish the rule of law. Reforms included new laws of habeas corpus and amparo (court-ordered protection), the creation of a legislative human rights committee, and the establishment in 1987 of the Office of Human Rights Ombudsman. The Supreme Court also embarked on a series of reforms to fight corruption and improve legal system efficiency. With Cerezo's election, the military moved away from governing and returned to the more traditional role of providing internal security, specifically by fighting armed insurgents. The first 2 years of Cerezo's administration were characterized by a stable economy and a marked decrease in political violence.

Dissatisfied military personnel made two coup attempts in May 1988 and May 1989, but military leadership supported the constitutional order. The government was heavily criticized for its unwillingness to investigate or prosecute cases of human rights violations. The final 2 years of Cerezo's government were also marked by a failing economy, strikes, protest marches, and allegations of widespread corruption. The government's inability to deal with many of the nation's problems—such as infant mortality, illiteracy, deficient health and social services, and rising levels of violence—contributed to popular discontent.

Presidential and congressional elections were held on November 11, 1990. After a runoff ballot, Jorge Serrano was inaugurated on January 14, 1991, thus completing the first transition from one democratically elected civilian government to another. Because his Movement of Solidarity Action (MAS) Party gained only 18 of 116 seats in Congress, Serrano entered into a tenuous alliance with the Christian Democrats and the National Union of the Center (UCN).

The Serrano administration's record was mixed. It had some success in consolidating civilian control over the army, replacing a number of senior officers and persuading the military to participate in peace talks with the URNG. Serrano took the politically unpopular step of recognizing the sovereignty of Belize. The Serrano government reversed the economic slide it inherited, reducing inflation and boosting real growth.

On May 25, 1993, Serrano illegally dissolved Congress and the Supreme Court and tried to restrict civil freedoms, allegedly to fight corruption. The "autogolpe" (or self-initiated coup) failed due to unified, strong protests by most elements of Guatemalan society, international pressure, and the army's enforcement of the decisions of the Court of Constitutionality, which ruled against the attempted takeover. In the face of this resistance, Serrano fled the country.

On June 5, 1993, the Congress, pursuant to the 1985 constitution, elected the Human Rights Ombudsman, Ramiro De Leon Carpio, to complete Serrano's presidential term. De Leon, not a member of any political party and lacking a political base but with strong popular support, launched an ambitious anticorruption campaign to "purify" Congress and the Supreme Court, demanding the resignations of all members of the two bodies.

Despite considerable congressional resistance, presidential and popular pressure led to a November 1993 agreement brokered by the Catholic Church between the administration and Congress. This package of constitutional reforms was approved by popular referendum on January 30, 1994. In August 1994, a new Congress was elected to complete the unexpired term. Controlled by the anti-corruption parties—the populist Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) headed by ex-Gen. Efrain Rios Montt, and the center-right National Advancement Party (PAN)—the new Congress began to move away from the corruption that characterized its predecessors.

Under De Leon, the peace process, now brokered by the United Nations, took on new life. The government and the URNG signed agreements on human rights (March 1994), resettlement of displaced persons (June 1994), historical clarification (June 1994), and indigenous rights (March 1995). They also made significant progress on a socioeconomic and agrarian agreement. National elections for president, the Congress, and municipal offices were held in November 1995. With almost 20 parties competing in the first round, the presidential election came down to a January 7, 1996 runoff in which PAN candidate Alvaro Arzu defeated Alfonso Portillo of the FRG by just over 2% of the vote. Arzu won because of his strength in Guatemala City, where he had previously served as mayor, and in the surrounding urban area. Portillo won all of the rural departments except Peten. Under the Arzu administration, peace negotiations were concluded, and the government signed peace accords ending the 36-year internal conflict in December 1996. The human rights situation also improved during Arzu's tenure, and steps were taken to reduce the influence of the military in national affairs.

Guatemala held presidential, legislative, and municipal elections on November 7, 1999, and a runoff presidential election on December 26. In the first round the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) won 63 of 113 legislative seats, while the National Advancement Party (PAN) won 37. The New Nation Alliance (ANN) won 9 legislative seats, and three minority parties won the remaining four. In the runoff on December 26, Alfonso Portillo (FRG) won 68% of the vote to 32% for Oscar Berger (PAN). Portillo carried all 22 departments and Guatemala City, which was considered the PAN's stronghold. Portillo was criticized during the campaign for his relationship with the FRG's chairman, former Gen. Efrain Rios Montt, the de facto President of Guatemala in 1982-83. Many charged that some of the worst human rights violations of the internal conflict were committed under Rios Montt's rule. Nevertheless, Portillo's impressive electoral triumph, with two-thirds of the vote in the second round, gave him a claim to a mandate from the people to carry out his reform program.

President Portillo pledged to maintain strong ties to the United States, further enhance Guatemala's growing cooperation with Mexico, and participate actively in the integration process in Central America and the Western Hemisphere. Domestically, he vowed to support continued liberalization of the economy, increase investment in human capital and infrastructure, establish an independent central bank, and increase revenue by stricter enforcement of tax collections rather than increasing taxation. Portillo also promised to continue the peace process, appoint a civilian defense minister, reform the armed forces, replace the military presidential security service with a civilian one, and strengthen protection of human rights. He appointed a pluralist cabinet, including indigenous members and others not affiliated with the FRG ruling party.

Progress in carrying out Portillo's reform agenda was slow at best, with the notable exception of a series of reforms sponsored by the World Bank to modernize bank regulation and criminalize money laundering. The administration made some progress on such issues as taking state responsibility for past human rights cases, supporting human rights in international forums, and pressing labor rights reforms, but it failed to show significant advances on combating impunity in past human rights cases, military reforms, and legislation to increase political participation. It renounced a so-called Fiscal Pact that had been established together with business and civil society groups to finance the reforms called for under the peace accords. The government later was involved in a series of high-level corruption scandals, none of which resulted in successful prosecution of those responsible. The United States determined in April 2003 that Guatemala had failed to demonstrably adhere to its international counternarcotics commitments during the previous year. The popularity of the government, as measured by opinion polls, steadily declined as evidence of corruption and mismanagement accumulated.

A high crime rate and a serious and worsening public corruption problem were cause for concern for the Government of Guatemala. These problems, in addition to issues related to the often violent harassment and intimidation by unknown assailants of human rights activists, judicial workers, journalists, and witnesses in human rights trials, led the government to begin serious attempts in 2001 to open a national dialogue to discuss the considerable challenges facing the country. This dialogue has not taken place, despite the creation of the Guatemalan Forum, a coalition of civil society and private sector interests calling for political reforms.

National elections were held on November 9, 2003. Oscar Berger Perdomo of the Grand National Alliance (GANA) party won the election, receiving 54.1% of the vote. His opponent, Alvarado Colom Caballeros of the Nation Unity for Hope (UNE) party received 49.1% of the vote. The new government assumed office on January 14, 2004.

GOVERNMENT

Guatemala's 1985 constitution provides for a separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. The 1993 constitutional reforms included an increase in the number of Supreme Court justices from 9 to 13. The reforms reduced the terms of office for president, vice president, and congressional representatives from 5 years to 4 years, and for Supreme Court justices from 6 years to 5 years; they increased the terms of mayors and city councils from 2-1/2 years to 4 years.

The president and vice president are directly elected through universal suffrage and limited to one term. A vice president can run for president after 4 years out of office. Supreme Court justices are elected by the Congress from a list submitted by the bar association, law school deans, a university rector, and appellate judges. The Supreme Court and local courts handle civil and criminal cases. There also is a separate Constitutional Court.

Guatemala has 22 administrative subdivisions (departments) administered by governors appointed by the president. Guatemala City and 331 other municipalities are governed by popularly elected mayors or councils.

Principal Government Officials

Last Updated: 10/20/04

President: Berger , Oscar
Vice President: Stein , Eduardo
Min. of Agriculture: Aguilar , Alvaro
Min. of Communication & Public Works: Castillo , Eduardo
Min. of Culture & Sports: Salazar Tezaguic , Manuel
Min. of Defense: Mendez Pinelo , Cesar Augusto, Brig. Gen.
Min. of Economy: Cuevas, Marcio
Min. of Education: Acena , Maria del Carmen
Min. of Energy & Mines: Gonzalez , Roberto
Min. of Environment & Natural Resources: Dary Fuentes , Juan Mario
Min. of Finance: del Cid , Maria Antonieta
Min. of Foreign Affairs: Briz Abulara , Jorge
Min. of Government: Vielman , Carlos
Min. of Health: Tulio Sosa , Marco
Min. of Labor: Gallardo , Jorge
Min. of Public Health:
Attorney General: de Leon , Carlos David
Solicitor General: Rosales , Luis Alfonso
Sec. Gen. of the Presidency: Mijangos , Luis
Pres., Bank of Guatemala: Sosa Lopez , Lizardo
Ambassador to the US: Castillo , Guillermo
Permanent Representative to the UN, New York: Rosenthal , Gert

The Guatemalan embassy is located at 2220 R Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel. 202-745-4952; email: INFO@Guatemala-Embassy.org). Consulates are in Washington, New York, Miami, Chicago, Houston, San Francisco, Denver, and Los Angeles, and honorary consuls in Montgomery, San Diego, Ft. Lauderdale, Atlanta, Leavenworth, Lafayette, New Orleans, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Juan, Providence, Memphis, San Antonio, and Seattle. See the State Department Web page: http://www.state.gov/s/cpr/rls/fco/

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The 1999 presidential and legislative elections were considered by international observers to have been free and fair. Participation by women and indigenous voters was higher than in the recent past, although concerns remained regarding the accessibility of polling places in rural areas.

Portillo's landslide victory combined with an FRG majority in Congress suggested possibilities for rapid legislative action. However, under the Guatemalan constitution of 1985, passage of many kinds of legislation requires a two-thirds vote. Passage of such legislation was not possible, therefore, with FRG votes alone.

The political balance was disrupted in 2000 when allegations surfaced that the FRG had illegally altered legislation. Following an investigation, the Supreme Court stripped those involved—including President of Congress and FRG chief Rios Montt—of their legislative immunity to face charges in the case. At roughly the same time, the PAN opposition suffered an internal split and broke into factions; the same occurred in the ANN. Reforms essential to peace implementation still await legislative action.

The government increased several tax rates in 2001 in an attempt to meet the target of increasing its tax burden (at about 10.7% of GDP, currently the lowest in the region) to 12% of GDP. However, protestors took to the streets massively when the government sought further increases in August 2001, declaring their opposition to any new taxes until the Portillo administration provided better accountability for the taxes it already received.

Violent harassment of human rights workers presented a serious challenge in 2002 and 2003. Common crime, aggravated by a legacy of violence and vigilante justice, presented another serious challenge. Impunity remained a major problem, primarily because democratic institutions, including those responsible for the administration of justice, have developed only a limited capacity to cope with this legacy. Guatemala's judiciary is independent; however, it suffered during 2003 from inefficiency, corruption, and intimidation.

In early 2003, the government accepted the Human Rights Ombudsman's proposal for a U.N.-led commission to investigate possible links between illegal clandestine groups or security forces and attacks on human rights defenders and organized crime. By the end of 2003, the agreement was scheduled to be submitted to the Congress for ratification in January 2004. The UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) continued to monitor peace accord implementation and human rights problems, and the UN extended its mandate to the end of 2004, at the government's request.

Elections for president, considered by international observers to be free and fair, were held in November and December 2003. Oscar Berger of the three-party coalition Grand National Alliance (GANA) won a 4-year term; he took office in January 2004.

ECONOMY

After the signing of the final peace accord in December 1996, Guatemala was well-positioned for rapid economic growth over the next several years, until a financial crisis in 1998 disrupted the course of improvement. The subsequent collapse of coffee prices left what was once the country's leading export sector in depression and had a severe impact on rural incomes. Foreign investment inflows have also been weak, with the exception of the privatization of utilities. Potential investors, both foreign and domestic, cite corruption, lack of physical security, a climate of confrontation between the government and private sector, and unreliable mechanisms for contract enforcement as the principal barriers to new business. On a more positive note, Guatemala's macroeconomic management was sound under the Portillo administration, and its foreign debt levels are modest. The country subscribed to a standby agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2002, which it extended in June 2003 after satisfactorily meeting its targets.

Guatemala's economy is dominated by the private sector, which generates about 85% of GDP. Agriculture contributes 22% of GDP and accounts for 75% of exports. Most manufacturing is light assembly and food processing, geared to the domestic, U.S., and Central American markets. Over the past several years, tourism and exports of textiles, apparel, and nontraditional agricultural products such as winter vegetables, fruit, and cut flowers have boomed, while more traditional exports such as sugar, bananas, and coffee continue to represent a large share of the export market.

The United States is the country's largest trading partner, providing 36% of Guatemala's imports and receiving 30% of its exports. The government 's involvement is small, with its business activities limited to public utilities—some of which have been privatized—ports and airports, and several development-oriented financial institutions. Guatemala was certified to receive export trade benefits under the U.S. Caribbean Basic Trade and Partnership Act (CBTPA), and it enjoys access to U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits. Guatemala's benefits under both the CBTPA and GSP have periodically been subjected to review due to concerns over serious worker rights protection issues.

Passage of labor code reforms in May 2001, and the successful prosecution of labor rights violations against banana union workers dating to 1999 were encouraging, and the review that year was lifted. However, there is continuing concern over the failure to prosecute perpetrators of violence against labor leaders and reinstate workers who have been illegally fired.

Current economic priorities include ratification of a U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement, commonly known as CAFTA, which was signed on May 28, 2004. Priorities within CAFTA include eliminating customs tariffs on as many categories of goods as possible; opening services sectors; and creating clear and readily enforceable rules in areas such as investment, government procurement, intellectual property protection, customs procedures, electronic commerce, the use of sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures to protect public health, and resolution of business disputes. Import tariffs have already been lowered together with Guatemala's partners in the Central American Common Market, with most now under 15%.

Other priorities include increasing transparency and accountability in Guatemala's public finances, broadening the tax base, and completing implementation of financial sector reforms. These measures attempt to ensure that Guatemala can comply with the standards of the international Financial Action Task Force for detecting and preventing money laundering.

The United States, along with other donor countries—especially France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and Japan—and the international financial institutions, have increased development project financing since the signing of the peace accords. However, donors' support remains contingent upon Guatemalan Government reforms and counterpart financing.

The distribution of income and wealth remains highly skewed. The wealthiest 10% of the population receives almost one-half of all income; the top 20% receives two-thirds of all income. As a result, about 80% of the population lives in poverty, and twothirds of that number—or 7.6 million people—live in extreme poverty. Guatemala's social development indicators, such as infant mortality and illiteracy, are among the worst in the hemisphere. Chronic malnutrition among the rural poor worsened with the onset of the crisis in coffee prices, and the United States has provided disaster assistance and food aid in response.

NATIONAL SECURITY

Guatemala is a signatory to the Rio Pact and is a member of the Central American Defense Council (CONDECA). The president is commander in chief. The Defense Minister is responsible for policy. Day-to-day operations are the responsibility of the military chief of staff and the national defense staff.

An agreement signed in September 1996, which is one of the substantive peace accords, mandated that the mission of the armed forces change to focus exclusively on external threats. However, both former President Arzu and his successor President Portillo used a constitutional clause to order the army to temporarily support the police in response to a nationwide wave of violent crime.

The accord calls for a one-third reduction in the army's authorized strength and budget—already achieved—and for a constitutional amendment to permit the appointment of a civilian Minister of Defense. A constitutional amendment to this end was defeated as part of a May 1999 plebiscite, but discussions on how to achieve this objective continue between the executive and legislative branches.

The army has gone beyond its accord-mandated target of reducing its strength to 28,000 troops, and numbered 15,000 troops as of June 2004. It is equipped with armaments and materiel from the United States, Israel, Serbia and Montenegro, Taiwan, Argentina, Spain, and France. As part of the army downsizing, the operational structure of 19 military zones and three strategic brigades are being recast as several military zones are eliminated and their area of operations absorbed by others. The air force operates three air bases; the navy has two port bases. Additionally, recent steps have been taken to rede-fine the military's mission—the military doctrine has been rewritten, and there has been an increase in cooperation with civil society to help bring about this reform.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Guatemala's major diplomatic interests are regional security and, increasingly, regional development and economic integration. Guatemala participates in several regional groups, particularly those related to trade and the environment.

The Council of Central American Ministers of Trade meets on a regular basis to work on regional approaches to trade issues. The council signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the U.S. in 1998, and was part of the negotiations that led to the creation of CAFTA. Guatemala joined Honduras and El Salvador in signing a free trade agreement with Mexico in 2000, which went into effect the following year. Guatemala also originated the idea for, and is the seat of, the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN).

President Bill Clinton and the Central American presidents signed the CONCAUSA (Conjunto Centroamerica-USA) agreement at the Summit of the Americas in December 1994. CONCAUSA is a cooperative plan of action to promote clean, efficient energy use; conserve the region's biodiversity; strengthen legal and institutional frameworks and compliance mechanisms; and improve and harmonize environmental protection standards.

Guatemala has a long-standing claim to a large portion of Belize; the territorial dispute caused problems with the United Kingdom and later with Belize following its 1981 independence from the U.K. In December 1989, Guatemala sponsored Belize for permanent observer status in the Organization of American States (OAS). In September 1991, Guatemala recognized Belize's independence and established diplomatic ties, while acknowledging that the boundaries remained in dispute. In anticipation of an effort to bring the border dispute to an end in early 1996, the Guatemalan Congress ratified two long-pending international agreements governing frontier issues and maritime rights. In 2001, Guatemala and Belize agreed to a facilitation process led by the OAS to determine the land and maritime borders separating the two countries. National elections in Guatemala put a temporary halt to progress in this forum, but discussions are expected to resume in 2004.

U.S.-GUATEMALAN RELATIONS

Relations between the United States and Guatemala traditionally have been close, although at times strained by human rights and civil/military issues. U.S. policy objectives in Guatemala include:

• Supporting the institutionalization of democracy and implementation of the peace accords;
• Ratification of a free trade agreement, together with the other Central American countries;
• Encouraging respect for human rights and the rule of law, and implementation of the Commission for the Investigation of Illegal Groups and Clandestine Security Organizations in Guatemala (CICIACS);
• Supporting broad-based economic growth and sustainable development and maintaining mutually beneficial trade and commercial relations;
• Cooperating to combat money laundering, corruption, narcotics trafficking, alien-smuggling, and other transnational crime; and
• Supporting Central American integration through support for resolution of border/territorial disputes.

The United States, as a member of "the Friends of Guatemala," along with Colombia, Mexico, Spain, Norway, and Venezuela, played an important role in the UN-moderated peace accords, providing public and behind-the-scenes support. The U.S. strongly supports the six substantive and three procedural accords, which, along with the signing of the December 29, 1996 final accord, form the blueprint for profound political, economic, and social change. To that end, the U.S. Government has committed nearly $400 million to support peace implementation since 1997.

Although almost all of the 180,000 U.S. tourists who visit Guatemala annually do so without incident, in recent years the number of violent crime reported by U.S. citizens has steadily increased. Increases in the number of Americans reported as victims of violent crime may be the result of any combination of factors: increased numbers of Americans traveling to Guatemala; increased accuracy in the Embassy's reporting of crime; more Americans traveling to higher risk areas of Guatemala; or more crime.

Most U.S. assistance to Guatemala is provided through the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) offices for Guatemala and Central American Programs (USAID/G-CAP). USAID's programs support U.S. foreign policy objectives by promoting reforms in democratic governance, economic growth, and the social sectors, with special emphasis on the rural indigenous poor whose lives have been most seriously affected by the internal civil conflict. In addition to earning low incomes, these populations have limited economic opportunities for economic advancement, lack access to social services, and have limited access to, or influence over, the policymaking processes. Totaling $50 million to $55 million annually, USAID programs pursue six objectives. These are:

• Supporting the implementation of the 1996 peace accords;
• Aiding the improvement of the legal system and assisting citizens in its use;
• Increasing educational access and quality for all Guatemalans;
• Improving the health of Guatemalan women, children, and rural families;
• Increasing the earning capacity of poor rural families; and
• Expanding natural resources management and conservation of biodiversity.

USAID's largest program is the support of the peace accords. The accords require major investments in health, education, and other basic services to reach the rural indigenous poor and require the full participation of the indigenous people in local and national decision-making. They also call for a profound restructuring of the state, affecting some of its most fundamental institutions—the military, the national police, and the system of justice—in order to end impunity and confirm the rule of law. Finally, they require basic changes in tax collection and expenditure and improved financial management.

USAID's regional Central America Program is also based in Guatemala. Providing between $20 million and $30 million in annual assistance, USAID's regional program—in coordination with the U.S. Embassies in the region and bilateral USAID missions in Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Panama—supports four key objectives. These are:

• Promotion of free trade;
• Expansion of Central American natural resources management and conservation;
• Advancement of regional HIV/AIDS services and information; and
• Rural diversification to enhance incomes.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials

GUATEMALA (E) Address: Ave. Reforma 7-01, Zona 10; APO/FPO: APO AA 34024; Phone: (502) 2326-4000; Fax: (502) 2331-6660; INMARSAT Tel: 683133345; Workweek: Mon-Thu: 7:30 to 5:00 p.m. and Friday 7:30 to 12:30; Website: usembassy.state.gov/guatemala

Other Contact Information

U.S. Department of Commerce
International Trade Administration
Trade Information Center
14th and Constitution, NW
Washington, DC 20230
Tel: 800-USA-TRADE
Internet: http://www.ita.doc.gov

American Chamber of Commerce in Guatemala
5a avenida 5-55 zona 14 Europlaza,
Torre I Nivel 5
01014 Guatemala City, Guatemala
Tel: (502) 2333-3899;
Fax: (502) 2368-3536
E-Mail: trade@amchamguate.com

Caribbean/Latin American Action (C/LAA)
1818 N Street, NW, Suite 310
Washington, DC 20036
Tel.: 202-466-7464;
Fax: 202-822-0075

TRAVEL

Consular Information Sheet

July 8, 2004

Country Description: Guatemala has a developing economy, characterized by wide income disparities. Hotels and other tourist facilities in areas frequented by visitors from the United States are generally good. A peace accord, signed in 1996, ended a 36-year armed conflict. Violent crime, however, is a serious and growing concern due to endemic poverty, an abundance of weapons, a legacy of societal violence, and a dysfunctional judicial system.

Entry/Exit Requirements: A valid U.S. passport is required for all U.S. citizens to enter Guatemala and to depart Guatemala for return to the U.S. Even if dual nationals are permitted to enter Guatemala on a second nationality passport, U.S. citizens returning to the United States from Guatemala are not allowed to board their flights without a valid U.S. passport. Certificates of Naturalization, birth certificates, driver's licenses, and photocopies are not acceptable alternative travel documents. While in Guatemala, U.S. citizens should carry their passports, or a photocopy of their passports, with them at all times.

An exit tax must be paid when departing Guatemala. The exit tax (currently $30) is generally included in an airline ticket price, but may be charged separately. There is an additional airport security fee (20 Quetzales, approximately $2.50) that all travelers must pay at the airport.

Minors under 18 traveling with a valid U.S. passport need no special permission from their parents to enter or leave Guatemala. U.S. citizens do not need a visa for a stay of 90 days or less (that period can be extended for an additional 180 days upon application to Guatemalan immigration). Recently, in an attempt to stay longer than 90 or 180 days, some foreign nationals, including U.S. citizens, have obtained false or fraudulent immigration stamps in their passports showing they left and reentered Guatemala. Immigration officials have detained and fined several such individuals.

A U.S. citizen whose passport is lost or stolen in Guatemala must obtain a new passport at the U.S. Embassy as soon as possible and present it, together with a police report of the loss or theft, to the Dirección de Migración (Guatemalan immigration agency), Sub-director for Migratory Control, to obtain permission to depart Guatemala. The agency is located at 4 Calle 4-37, Zone 9. Office hours are weekdays from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.; telephone 360-8578, 360-8544, 360-8580 or 360-8540. No fee is charged by Guatemalan immigration for this service.

For further information regarding entry, exit and customs requirements, travelers should contact the Guatemalan Embassy at 2220 R Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008; telephone (202) 745-4952, extension 102; fax (202) 745-1908; e-mail at info@guatemala-embassy.org; Internet web site—http://www.guatemalaembassy.org or contact the nearest Guatemalan consulate (Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, or San Francisco).

Safety and Security: Violent criminal activity has been a problem in all parts of Guatemala for years, including numerous murders, rapes, and armed assaults against foreigners. The police force is young, inexperienced, and under-funded, and the judicial system is weak, overworked, and inefficient. Criminals, armed with an impressive array of weapons, know that there is little chance they will be caught and punished.

Large demonstrations occasionally occur throughout Guatemala, often with little or no notice, and they can cause serious traffic disruptions. Although most demonstrations are peaceful, they can turn violent, and travelers should avoid areas where demonstrations are taking place. The use of roadblocks and/or blocking of public facilities, including the international airport, has increased and demonstrators may prevent tourists caught behind the blockades from leaving.

The following recommendations will help residents and visitors alike to increase their safety:

Avoid gatherings of agitated people. Guatemalan citizen frustration with crime and a lack of appropriate judicial remedies has led to violent incidents of vigilantism, including lynchings, especially in more isolated, rural areas. Attempting to intervene may put you at risk of attacks from mobs.

Avoid close contact with children, including taking photographs, especially in rural areas. Such contact can be viewed with deep alarm and may provoke panic and violence. Rumors of foreigners stealing children to sell surface periodically and can provoke a violent response towards strangers. Foreign tourists have been attacked by mobs and one has been killed.

Keep informed of possible demonstrations by following the local news and consulting hotel personnel and tour guides. Avoid areas where demonstrations are occurring.

Strong currents, riptides, and under-tow along Guatemala 's Pacific Coast beaches pose a serious threat to even the strongest swimmers. Signs warning of treacherous surf are rare and confined mostly to private beaches owned by hotels. Lifeguards are rarely present on beaches.

Tourists planning to climb Pacaya and Agua volcanoes during Guatemala 's rainy season (May through October) should plan their climb for the morning hours, when it is less likely that thunderstorms will occur. Climbers should monitor the weather situation and return to the base of the volcano as quickly as safely possible if thunderstorms gather.

A Canadian tourist was recently killed by lightening while climbing Pacaya. In addition, armed robbers have targeted tourists while they were climbing these popular destinations. Climbing in groups reduces, but does not eliminate, the risk of assault.

More information about tourist security is available from the Tourist Protection Office of INGUAT (the Guatemalan Tourist Board) at 7a Avenida 1-17, Zona 4 Centro Cívico, Ciudad de Guatemala; telephone (502) 331-1333 to 1347, extensions 241 and 243; fax (502) 331-8893; e-mail at asistur@inguat.gob.gt or info@inguat.gob.gt. Tourist groups may request security assistance from INGUAT, Attention: Coordinator of the National Tourist Assistance Program. The request should be submitted by mail, fax or e-mail and should arrive at INGUAT at least three business days in advance of the proposed travel, giving the itinerary, names of travelers, and model and color of vehicle in which they will be traveling.

For the latest security information, Americans traveling abroad should regularly monitor the Department's Internet website at http://travel.state.gov where the current Worldwide Caution Public Announcement, Travel Warnings and Public Announcements can be found. Up to date information on security can also be obtained by calling 1-888-407-474 toll free in the United States, or, for callers outside the United States and Canada, a regular toll line at 1-317-472-2328. These numbers are available from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays).

Crime: The number of violent crimes reported by U.S. citizens and other foreigners has increased in recent years. Incidents include, but are not limited to, assault, theft, armed robbery, carjacking, rape, kidnapping, and murder. Criminals generally operate in groups of four or more and are considerably confrontational and violent. Gangs are a growing concern in Guatemala City as well as in rural Guatemala. Gang members are often well armed with sophisticated weaponry and they sometimes use massive amounts of force. Emboldened armed robbers have attacked vehicles on main roads in broad daylight. Travel on rural roads always increases the risk of a criminal roadblock or ambush. Widespread narcotics and alien smuggling activities can make remote areas especially dangerous. Though there is no evidence that Americans are particularly targeted, criminals look for every opportunity to attack, so all travelers should remain constantly vigilant.

Rather than traveling alone, use a reputable tour organization. Stay in groups; travel in a caravan consisting of two or more vehicles; and, stay on the main roads. Ensure that someone not traveling with you is aware of your itinerary. Resist the temptation to stay in budget hotels, which are generally more susceptible to crime. Travel after dark anywhere in Guatemala is extremely dangerous. Stay in the main tourist destinations. Do not explore back roads or isolated paths near tourist sites. Pay close attention to your surroundings, especially when walking or when driving in Guatemala City. Refrain from displaying expensive-looking jewelry, large amounts of money, or other valuable items. Finally, if confronted by criminals, resistance may provoke a more violent response.

Additional information: Pickpockets and purse-snatchers are active in all major cities and tourist sites, especially the central market and other parts of Zone 1 in Guatemala City and the city of Antigua. In a common scenario, an accomplice distracts the victim, while an assailant slashes or simply steals a bag or backpack while the victim's attention is diverted.

We do not allow U.S. government employees to stay in hotels in Zone 1 in Guatemala City and urge private travelers to avoid staying in this area.

Carjackings and highway robberies have become increasingly violent. At least four tourists were killed in highway robbery attempts in 2002 and at least three killed and one wounded in 2003. Many of the robbery attempts have occurred in daylight hours on main highways.

Avoid low-priced intra- and inter-city buses (recycled U.S. school buses); they are a haven for criminals and susceptible to accidents. The use of modern inter-city buses somewhat improves security and safety. There have been, however, several attacks on travelers on first-class buses on highway CA-2 near the border areas with both Mexico and El Salvador and on highways CA-1 and CA-9 near the El Salvador border. Be cautious with personal items such as backpacks and fanny packs while riding buses, as they are a favorite target of thieves.

Do not hail taxis on the street in Guatemala City. Use dispatched taxis or taxis from major hotels instead.

The main road to Lake Atitlan via the Pan-American Highway (CA-1) and Solola is safer than the alternatives, though recent attacks have made caravaning highly recommended. Violent attacks have been consistently reported on secondary roads near the lake.

There have been armed attacks on roads from Guatemala City to the Peten. Visitors to the Mayan ruins at Tikal are urged to fly to nearby Flores and then travel by bus or tour van to the site.

Violent attacks have occurred in the Mayan ruins in the Peten, including in the Cerro Cahui Conservation Park, Yaxha, the road to and inside Tikal Park, and in the Tikal ruins. Tourist police (POLITUR) patrols inside the park have significantly reduced the violent crime incidents inside the park, but travelers should nevertheless remain in groups and on the principal trails leading to the Central Plaza and the Temple IV complex, and avoid remote areas of the park, such as the Mundo Perdido and Temple VI areas.

Foreign residents of Guatemala have special concerns. At least 14 American citizen residents and five American citizen tourists have been murdered since December 1999, and none of the cases has been solved. There has been a recent rise in "express" kidnappings, primarily in Guatemala City, in which a relatively small ransom that can be quickly gathered is demanded. U.S. citizens have been kidnapped in recent years. At least one incident of a random kidnapping, in which the victim was grabbed off the street in an affluent neighborhood of the city, occurred in December 2003 and resulted in a physical and sexual assault.

Although the U.S. Embassy cannot substitute for a deficient Guatemalan police or judicial system, we can help and urge U.S. citizens who are victims of crime to contact the Consular Section of the Embassy for advice and assistance. The Embassy/Consulate staff can, for example, help you find appropriate medical care, to contact family members or friends and explain how funds could be transferred. Consular officers can help you to understand the local criminal justice process and to find an attorney if needed. For a listing of recent serious crime incidents involving foreigners, consult the U.S. Embassy's website, http://usembassy.state.gov/guatemala/.

The loss or theft abroad of a U.S. passport should be reported immediately to the local police and the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate. Citizens applying for replacement passports will need to present proof of citizenship and identity. Passport replacement can be facilitated if the traveler has a photocopy of the passport's data page. Original or certified copies of birth certificates are required for children under the age of 14. Photographic proof of identity, such as family photos at different ages, is especially important for young children because of the high incidence of identity fraud involving children. In order to produce the most secure document possible, U.S. passports are now printed in the U.S. except in emergencies; therefore, passport processing normally takes several working days.

U.S. citizens may refer to the Department of State's pamphlet, A Safe Trip Abroad, for ways to promote a trouble-free journey. This pamphlet is available by mail from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402; via the Internet at http://www.gpoaccess.gov; or via the Bureau of Consular Affairs home page at http://travel.state.gov.

Medical Facilities: A full range of medical care is available in Guatemala City, but medical care outside the city is limited. Guatemala 's public hospitals frequently experience serious shortages of basic medicines and equipment. Care in private hospitals is generally adequate for most common illnesses and injuries.

Medical Insurance: The Department of State strongly urges Americans to consult with their medical insurance company prior to traveling abroad to confirm whether their policy applies overseas and whether it will cover emergency expenses such as a medical evacuation. U.S. medical insurance plans seldom cover health costs incurred outside the United States unless supplemental coverage is purchased. Further, U.S. Medicare and Medicaid programs do not provide payment for medical services outside the United States. However, many travel agents and private companies offer insurance plans that will cover health care expenses incurred overseas including emergency services such as medical evacuations.

When making a decision regarding health insurance, Americans should consider that many foreign doctors and hospitals require payment in cash prior to providing service and that a medical evacuation to the U.S. may cost well in excess of $50,000. Uninsured travelers who require medical care overseas often face extreme difficulties. When consulting with your insurer prior to your trip, ascertain whether payment will be made to the overseas healthcare provider or whether you will be reimbursed later for expenses you incur. Some insurance policies also include coverage for psychiatric treatment and for disposition of remains in the event of death.

Useful information on medical emergencies abroad, including overseas insurance programs, is provided in the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs brochure, Medical Information for Americans Traveling Abroad, available via the Bureau of Consular Affairs home page.

Other Health Information: Information on vaccinations and other health precautions, such as safe food and water precautions and insect bite protection, may be obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's hotline for international travelers at 1-877-FYI-TRIP (1-877-394-8747); fax 1-888-CDC-FAXX (1-888-232-3299), or via CDC's Internet site at http://www.cdc.gov/travel. For information about outbreaks of infectious diseases abroad consult the World Health Organization's website at http://www.who.int/en. Further health information for travelers is available at http://www.who.int/ith.

Traffic Safety and Road Conditions: While in a foreign country, U.S. citizens may encounter road conditions that differ significantly from those in the United States. The information below concerning Guatemala is provided for general reference only, and it may not be accurate in a particular location or circumstance.

Safety of Public Transportation: Poor
Urban Road Conditions/Maintenance: Good
Rural Road Conditions/Maintenance: Good
Availability of Roadside/Ambulance Assistance: Fair

Driving in Guatemala requires one's full attention, and safe drivers must take extraordinary efforts to drive defensively to avoid dangerous situations.

Because of lax law enforcement, traffic rules are generally ignored. Many drivers do not use their turn signals to alert other drivers. Instead, a common custom is for a driver or passenger to stick a hand out the window and wave it to indicate that they will be taking an unspecified action. Speed limits, lane markings and stop signs are frequently ignored. Passing blindly on winding and/or steep mountain roads, poorly designed surfaces, and unmarked hazards present additional risks to motorists.

Common public transportation is by low-priced buses, which serve every town in the country. Criminal activity and frequent fatal accidents, however, make the low-priced inter-city buses particularly dangerous. Modern inter-city buses offer some security from highway violence, but armed attacks are increasing, showing that all buses are vulnerable.

Although city streets are lit, secondary and rural roads have little to no illumination. The Inter-American Highway (CA-1) and the road from Guatemala City to the Caribbean coast (CA-9) are especially dangerous due to heavy traffic, including large trucks and trailers. There are no roadside assistance clubs and no emergency transit services. Police patrol the major roadways and may assist travelers, but the patrols are sporadic and may be suspended due to budget restraints. For roadside assistance, travelers may call the police by dialing 120 or the fire department by dialing 122 or 123. Cellular telephone service covers most areas frequented by tourists.

Valid U.S. driver's licenses and international driving permits are accepted in Guatemala. Guatemala 's road safety authorities are the Department of Transit and the Joint Operations Center of the National Police. Drivers use the right-hand side of the road in Guatemala, and speed limits are posted depending on the condition of the road. Speed limits are different in rural and urban areas, but are rarely enforced. Drivers often drive at the absolute maximum speed possible for the particular vehicle at the time. Turning right on red is not permitted unless otherwise posted, and drivers must yield when entering a traffic circle. Seat belts must be worn in Guatemala, but there are no laws regarding the use of child safety seats. It is against the law for drivers to operate cellular phones while driving.

People found driving under the influence of alcohol or other drugs are arrested and may serve jail time. In an accident resulting in injury or death, every driver involved is taken into custody and the vehicle(s) impounded until a judge determines responsibility in a re-enactment of the accident. For additional information about road travel in Guatemala, please see the "General Information" section on the Embassy home page at http://usembassy.state.gov/guatemala.

For additional general information about road safety, including links to foreign government sites, please see the Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, home page at http://travel.state.gov/road_safety.html. For specific information concerning Guatemalan driving permits, vehicle inspection, road tax, and mandatory insurance, please contact the Guatemala National Tourist Organization offices via the Internet at http://www.inguat.gob.gt or via e-mail at asistur@inguat.gob.gt or info@inguat.gob.gt.

Aviation Safety Oversight: The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has assessed the government of Guatemala 's civil aviation authority as Category 2—not in compliance with international aviation safety standards for the oversight of Guatemala 's air carrier operations. Consultations to correct the deficiencies are ongoing. Air carriers under oversight by Category 2 aviation authorities are subject to heightened FAA surveillance when flying to the United States and may not add additional flights, new service, or larger capacity aircraft. Guatemala 's main international carrier Aviateca, part of the regional TACA group of airlines, currently operates one of TACA's flights from Guatemala City to the U.S. (Miami). For further information, travelers may contact the Department of Transportation within the U.S. at telephone 1-800-322-7873, or visit the FAA's Internet web site at http://www.faa.gov/avr/iasa/index.cfm.

Customs Regulations: Guatemalan customs authorities may enforce strict regulations concerning temporary importation into or export from Guatemala of items such as antiquities and other cultural property. It is advisable to contact the Embassy of Guatemala in Washington or one of Guatemala's consulates in the United States for specific information regarding customs requirements. In many countries around the world, counterfeit and pirated goods are widely available. Transactions involving such products are illegal and bringing them back to the United States may result in forfeitures and/or fines. A current list of those countries with serious problems in this regard can be found at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/2003/special301.htm. The U.S. Customs Service may impose corresponding import restrictions in accordance with the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act. Contact the Customs Service at 202 927-2336 or via the Internet at http://exchanges.state.gov/education/culprop for further information.

Criminal Penalties: While in a foreign country, a U.S. citizen is subject to that country's laws and regulations, which sometimes differ significantly from those in the United States and may not afford the protections available to the individual under U.S. law. Penalties for breaking the law can be more severe than in the United States for similar offenses. Persons violating Guatemalan laws, even unknowingly, may be expelled, or arrested and imprisoned. Penalties for possession, use, or trafficking in illegal drugs in Guatemala are strict, and convicted offenders can expect lengthy jail sentences and heavy fines. Those arrested on drug charges, even for simple possession of very small amounts, can expect to spend several months in jail before their case is decided. Under the Protect Act of 2003, it is a crime, prosecutable in the United States, for a U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien, to engage in illicit sexual conduct in a foreign country with a person under the age of 18, whether or not the U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident alien intended to engage in such illicit sexual conduct prior to going abroad.

Under the Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, it is a crime to use the mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce, including the Internet, to transmit information about a minor under the age of 16 for criminal sexual purposes that include, among other things, the production of child pornography. This same law makes it a crime to use any facility of interstate or foreign commerce, including the Internet, to transport obscene materials to minors under the age of 16.

Special Circumstances: Non-Guatemalan citizens who wish to marry in Guatemala are required to provide proof of identity and civil status (indicating whether they are single or divorced). Prior notice of the marriage must be given in the Diario de Centro America (Guatemala's Official Record) and any large circulation daily newspaper for fifteen days. The marriage must take place within six months of the publication of the notice.

Disaster Preparedness: Guatemala is a geologically active country. Visitors should be aware of the possibility of earthquakes at any time and the need for contingency plans. There are also four active volcanoes. Volcanic activity, such as that of Fuego Volcano near Antigua in January 2003, has on occasion forced evacuations of nearby villages; the January-February 2000 activity of Pacaya Volcano near Guatemala City also briefly closed Guatemala City's international airport. Both the Caribbean and Pacific coasts of Guatemala are also vulnerable to hurricanes and tropical storms from June through November. Mudslides and flooding during the May to November rainy season often kill dozens of people and close roads. General information about natural disaster preparedness is available via the Internet from the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) at http://www.fema.gov/.

Children's Issues: Current information on Guatemalan adoption procedures and the immigrant visa application process is available from the Consular Section of the U.S. Embassy. Prospective adoptive parents are urged to check with the Consular Section to be sure that all required documentation has been approved by the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services in the Department of Homeland Security and their child's adoption is complete and the "pink slip" issued before traveling to Guatemala to apply for their child's immigrant visa. Adoptive parents are also urged to carry with them complete adoption paperwork when traveling with their adopted child to, from, and within Guatemala. Although Guatemala acceded to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in 2002, the U.S. has not accepted Guatemala's accession. The treaty, therefore, is not in effect between Guatemala and the U.S.

For more information on international adoption of children and international parental child abduction, please refer to the Department of State's Internet site at./family/about.html or telephone 1-888-407-4747. The OCS call center can answer general inquiries regarding international adoptions and abductions and will forward calls to the appropriate country officer in the Bureau of Consular Affairs. This number is available from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays). Callers who are unable to use toll-free numbers, such as those calling from overseas, may obtain information and assistance during these hours by calling 1-317-472-2328.

Registration/Embassy Location: Americans living or traveling in Guatemala are encouraged to register with the U.S. Embassy through the State Department's travel registration website, https://travelregistration.state.gov, and to obtain updated information on travel and security within Guatemala. By registering, you'll make it possible for the U.S. Embassy to contact you in case of an emergency. You may also wish to send a scanned copy of your U.S. passport to the ACS email address at amcitsguatemala@state.gov and/or e-mail it to your own address or to someone in the United States. This will enable you to easily retrieve a copy of your passport to facilitate a replacement.

The latest security information is available from the Embassy, including its website (see below). The Consular Section is open for citizen services, including registration, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon and 1:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. Monday through Thursdays and 7:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. Fridays, excluding U.S. and Guatemalan holidays. The second and last Friday of each month are reserved for administrative matters; therefore, routine citizen services are not provided. Emergency services are available at all times. The U.S. Embassy is located at Avenida La Reforma 7-01, Zone 10; telephone (502) 331-1541 during Embassy business hours (8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.), or (502) 331-8904 for emergencies during non-business hours; fax (502) 331-0564; Internet web site—http://usembassy.state.gov/guatemala.

Public Announcement

October 29, 2004

This Public Announcement is being issued to remind U.S. citizens of the serious security situation in Guatemala. Although the majority of tourists visit without mishap, violent criminal activity on the highways in Guatemala has increased. Crimes against foreigners have included murder, rape, and armed robbery, increasingly in conjunction with highway banditry. This Public Announcement expires on May 1, 2005.

Although the majority of tourists visit without mishap, violent criminal activity on the highways in Guatemala has increased and tourists, among others, have been targeted. Buses of all categories, tour vans and private vehicles have been stopped, with drivers and passengers robbed, sometimes with violent results. Armed robbers have intercepted vehicles on main roads in broad daylight. Crimes against foreigners have included murder, rape, and armed robbery, increasingly in conjunction with highway banditry. Recent cases of highway banditry have included the rape of women and female minors.

The police force suffers from corruption, inexperience and lack of funds, and the judicial system is weak, over-worked, and inefficient. Criminals, armed with an impressive array of weapons, know there is little chance they will be caught and punished. In some cases, assailants have been wearing full or partial police uniforms and have used vehicles that resemble police vehicles, indicating some elements of the police might be involved. In several recent cases, the assault occurred within minutes of the tourists' vehicle being stopped by the police. Gangs are also a growing concern, both in Guatemala City and in rural Guatemala. Gang members are often well-armed and they sometimes use unprovoked violence. Gang members are believed to be responsible for a substantial increase of frequently violent robberies on inter- and intra-city buses that resemble U.S. school buses; U.S. Mission personnel are not permitted to travel on these buses. Mission personnel continue to observe heightened security precautions in Guatemala City and on the roads outside the capital city.

U.S. citizens are urged to be especially aware of safety and security concerns when traveling in Guatemala. Criminals look for every opportunity, so all travelers should remain constantly vigilant and take appropriate measures to limit risk and losses. Any perception by assailants of resistance by victims may provoke a violent response. The most common highway robberies involve pickup trucks pulling up next to the victims' moving vehicle with occupants brandishing weapons, or isolated roads being blocked and the tourists' vehicle forced to stop. Travel on secondary roads increases the risk of a criminal roadblock; robbers have used mountain roads advantageously to stop buses, vans and cars in a variety of ways.

U.S. citizens who are victims of crime are urged to contact the Consular Section of the Embassy for advice and assistance. U.S. citizens should update their contact information at http://travel.state.gov/travel/abroad_registration.html or at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City. The Embassy is located at Ave. la Reforma 7-01, Zona 10. The Embassy telephone number is (502) 2331-1541, the fax for the office of American Citizen Services is (502) 2332-4353, the Embassy website is http://usembassy.state.gov/guatemala/, and the e-mail address is: AmCitsGuatemala@state.gov.

More information about tourist security is available from the Tourist Protection Office of INGUAT (the Guatemalan Tourist Board) at 7a Avenida 1-17, Zona 4 Centro Cívico, Ciudad de Guatemala. The direct telephone line for tourist assistance is (502) 2-421-2810, the PBX is (502) 2-421-2879, and the fax is (502) 2-421-2891. The e-mail addresses are asistur@inguat.gob.gt or info@inguat.gob.gt. For emergencies, INGUAT may be reached 24 hours, seven days a week at (502) 5202-5389. Tourist groups may request security assistance from INGUAT, Attention: Coordinator of the National Tourist Assistance Program. The request should be submitted by fax, e-mail, or special messenger service and should arrive at INGUAT at least three business days in advance of the proposed travel, giving the itinerary, names of travelers, and model and color of vehicle in which they will be traveling. Travelers should be aware that INGUAT has very limited personnel and resources, so it might not be able to accommodate all requests.

Updated information on travel and security for Guatemala may be obtained from the Department of State by calling 1-888-407-4747 within the U.S., or from overseas, 1-317-472-2328. U.S. citizens should consult the Consular Information Sheet for Guatemala, the Worldwide Caution Public Announcement, and the travel publication A Safe Trip Abroad, all of which are available on the State Department's Internet site at http://travel.state.gov.

International Adoption

January 2005

The information below has been edited from a report of the State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Overseas Citizens Services. For more information, please read the International Adoption section of this book and review current reports online at www.travel.state.gov/family.

Disclaimer: The information in this circular relating to the legal requirements of specific foreign countries is provided for general information only. Questions involving interpretation of specific foreign laws should be addressed to foreign counsel.

Guatemala Adoption Procedures: Adoptions by U.S. citizen parents in Guatemala are processed under a "notarial system." Guatemalan attorneys receive and refer potential orphans to parents desiring to adopt a child. If the parents accept the referral, they will provide the attorney with a power of attorney to act on their behalf to complete an adoption. In most cases the attorney represents the birth parent(s), the adopting parents and the child(ren) in the Guatemalan Government proceedings. Please review current reports online at www.travel.state.gov/family for more detailed information.

Responsibilities of Your Agency & Guatemalan Attorneys: The U.S. adoption agency serves as the adopting family's agent, and the Guatemalan attorney serves as an agent for your agency, acting on your behalf. Therefore adoptive parents should be kept informed of all aspects of the identification, care, and adoption process of their prospective adoptive children by the agency or agent. Your adoption agency and/or attorney are your sole contacts for the progress of your adoption in the Guatemalan legal proceedings. You should be aware that the U.S. Embassy does not have information regarding the status of specific cases in the Guatemalan adoption process or Guatemalan passport process nor does the Embassy have authority to intervene in court or in the legal processes in Guatemala adoption process.

Some families have worked directly with an attorney in Guatemala instead of an intermediary agency or law firm in the United States. While they face certain risks and forego the support of organizations with international adoption experience, families that choose competent, experienced, attorneys can have satisfactory experiences. Unfortunately, some parents have experienced problems working with their Guatemalan attorneys, and prospective adoptive parents are encouraged to research their options before selecting an attorney.

U.S. Immigration Requirements: Children adopted abroad who have been in the custody of the adoptive parents for less than two years require U.S. immigrant orphan petitions and orphan visas to enter the United States. Please see the International Adoption section of this book for more details and review current reports online at travel.state.gov/family

Before you travel to Guatemala to receive the child: Before you make airline reservations for yourselves or for an escort and the child, confirm with your Guatemalan attorney or U.S. adoption agency that:

1. If you filed all paperwork in the U.S., the consular section has received a notice of approval of the I-600 petition (visas 38 or 39 cable), and you have all required documents for the interview, including the child's Guatemalan passport and medical exam results.

2. If you plan to file the I-600 petition in Guatemala, the consular section has received a notice of approval of the I-600A application (visas 37 cable), the DHS/ICE office has approved your adoption documents and cleared you for the appointment (after review of the Guatemalan adoption paperwork), and you have all required documents for the interview, including the child's Guatemalan passport.

Escorts: If neither parent plans to travel to Guatemala and the child will be escorted by a third party for the visa interview, the I-600 Petition to Classify Orphan as an Immediate Relative must be filed in the U.S. and the Consular Section must have the official cable (called the Visas 38 or 39) from DHS indicating its approval of the I-600 petition. A notarized statement from the adoptive parents will be required authorizing that person to take the child to the United States for the purpose of placing him/her with the prospective adoptive parent(s). This statement can also be included in the judge's authorization for the child to leave Guatemala. The escort must present at the visa interview an original Affidavit of Support signed and notarized by the petitioner who is sponsoring the child, along with the petitioner's last three years of tax returns (W-2 and 1040) and other documentation.

U.S. Fees: A. DHS Fees for I-600 and I-600A Petitions:

The BCIS fee is $525.00 for an I-600 or I-600A petition. If you have a valid I-600A and file an I-600 within eighteen months of the approval of the I-600A, no fee will be charged for the I-600, provided the petition is for one child or for siblings. If you are petitioning for more than one child and the children are not siblings, an additional fee of $525.00 for the I-600 for each additional child will be charged.

Medical Examination Fee: The adopted child must have a medical examination performed by one of the U.S. Embassy's panel physicians before the immigrant visa can be issued. The cost of this medical examination is approximately $85 ($100 for children 15 or over), payable directly to the panel physician.

U.S. Immigrant Visa Fees: The fee for the immigrant visa application is $335 for the visa issuance for each child. If not previously paid in the U.S., these fees may be paid by credit card or in cash in either U.S. dollars or Guatemalan quetzals (the local currency). The fees do not include the cost of the medical examination, DNA test, documents, or the petition. The Embassy cannot accept personal checks, cashier checks or traveler's checks but will accept the following credit/debit cards: Visa, MasterCard, American Express, Discover, Diners, MasterCard Debit and Visa Debit.

Contacting the U.S. Embassy: Specific questions about your Guatemalan adoption at the Embassy may be addressed by phone, fax, or e-mail to the Immigrant Visa Unit of the Consular Section or to ICE. Please refer to page 1 for division of responsibilities between the two offices.

The Immigrant Visa Unit of the Consular Section at the U.S. Embassy may be reached at adoptguatemala@state.gov by telephone at: 011-502-331-1541, extension 4418 by fax at: 011-502-331-0564 by mail at: Immigrant Visas/Adoption Unit; U.S. Embassy Guatemala; Unit 3308; APO, AA 34024.

Questions: You may also contact the Office of Children's Issues, SA-29, 4th Floor, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC 20520, telephone 1-888-407-4747 with specific questions.

Guatemala

Compiled from the October 2006 Background Note and supplemented with additional information from the State Department and the editors of this volume. See the introduction to this set for explanatory notes.

Official Name:
Republic of Guatemala

PROFILE

PEOPLE

HISTORY

GOVERNMENT

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

ECONOMY

NATIONAL SECURITY

FOREIGN RELATIONS

U.S.-GUATEMALAN RELATIONS

TRAVEL

PROFILE

Geography

Area: 108,890 sq. km. (42,042 sq. mi.); about the size of Tennessee.

Cities: Capital —Guatemala City (metro area pop. 2.5 million).Other major cities —Quetzaltenango, Escuintla.

Terrain: Mountainous, with fertile coastal plain.

Climate: Temperate in highlands; tropical on coasts.

People

Nationality: Noun and adjective —Guatemalan(s).

Population: (2006 est.) 12.3 million.

Annual population growth rate: (2006 est.) 2.27%.

Ethnic groups: Mestizo (mixed Spanish-Indian), indigenous.

Religions: Roman Catholic, Protestant, traditional Mayan.

Languages: Spanish, 24 indigenous languages (principally Kiche, Kaqchikel, Q’eqchi, and Mam).

Education: Years compulsory —6. Attendance —41%. Literacy—70.6%.

Health: Infant mortality rate—36.9/1,000. Life expectancy —65.19 yrs.

Work force: Services —40%; industry and commerce —37%; agriculture —15%; construction, mining, utilities —4%. Fifty percent of the population engages in some form of agriculture, often at the subsistence level outside the monetized economy.

Government

Type: Constitutional democratic republic.

Constitution: May 1985; amended November 1993.

Independence: September 15, 1821.

Government branches: Executive —president (4-year term). Legislative —unicameral 158-member Congress (4-year term). Judicial —13-member Supreme Court of Justice (5-year term).

Political subdivisions: 22 departments (appointed governors); 331 municipalities with elected mayors and city councils.

Political parties: Gran Alianza Nacional (GANA—a coalition of three parties), Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), National Advancement Party (PAN), National Union for Hope (UNE), New Nation Alliance (ANN), Unionists (Unionistas), Patriot Party (PP)

Suffrage: Universal for adults 18 and over who are not serving on active duty with the armed forces or police. A variety of procedural obstacles have historically reduced participation by poor, rural, and indigenous people.

Economy

GDP: (2005 est.) $26.98 billion.

Annual growth rate: (2005 est.) 3.2%.

Per capita GDP: (2005 est.) $2,200.

Natural resources: Oil, timber, nickel.

Agriculture: (23% of GDP) Products —coffee, sugar, bananas, cardamom, vegetables, flowers and plants, timber, rice, rubber.

Manufacturing: (18% of GDP) Types —prepared food, clothing and textiles, construction materials, tires, pharmaceuticals.

Trade: (2005 est.) Exports —$3.94 billion: coffee, bananas, sugar, crude oil, chemical products, clothing and textiles, vegetables. Major markets —U.S. 28.9%, Central American Common Market (CACM) 42.4%, Mexico 4.8%. Imports —$7.75 billion: machinery and equipment, fuels, mineral products, chemical products, vehicles and transport materials, plastic materials and products. Major suppliers —U.S. 39.6%, CACM 12.3%, Mexico 8.3%, Japan 3.8%, Germany 2.4%.

PEOPLE

More than half of Guatemalans are descendants of indigenous Mayan peoples. Westernized Mayans and mestizos (mixed European and indigenous ancestry) are known as Ladinos. Most of Guatemala’s population is rural, though urbanization is accelerating. The predominant religion is Roman Catholicism, into which many indigenous Guatemalans have incorporated traditional forms of worship. Protestantism and traditional Mayan religions are practiced by an estimated 40% and 1% of the population, respectively. Though the official language is Spanish, it is not universally understood among the indigenous population. The peace accords signed in December 1996 provide for the translation of some official documents and voting materials into several indigenous languages.

HISTORY

The Mayan civilization flourished throughout much of Guatemala and the surrounding region long before the Spanish arrived, but it was already in decline when the Mayans were defeated by Pedro de Alvarado in 1523-24. The first colonial capital, Ciudad Vieja, was ruined by floods and an earthquake in 1542. Survivors founded Antigua, the second capital, in 1543. Antigua was destroyed by two earthquakes in 1773. The remnants of its Spanish colonial architecture have been preserved as a national monument. The third capital, Guatemala City, was founded in 1776.

Guatemala gained independence from Spain on September 15, 1821; it briefly became part of the Mexican Empire, and then for a period belonged to a federation called the United Provinces of Central America. From the mid-19th century until the mid-1980s, the country passed through a series of dictatorships, insurgencies (particularly beginning in the 1960s), coups, and stretches of military rule with only occasional periods of representative government.

1944 to 1986

In 1944, Gen. Jorge Ubico’s dictatorship was overthrown by the “October Revolutionaries,” a group of dissident military officers, students, and liberal professionals. A civilian President, Juan Jose Arevalo, was elected in 1945 and held the presidency until 1951. Social reforms initiated by Arevalo were continued by his successor, Col. Jacobo Arbenz. Arbenz permitted the communist Guatemalan Labor Party to gain legal status in 1952. The army refused to defend the Arbenz government when a U.S.-backed group led by Col. Carlos Castillo Armas invaded the country from Honduras in 1954 and quickly took over the government. Gen. Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes took power in 1958 following the murder of Colonel Castillo Armas.

In response to the increasingly autocratic rule of Ydigoras Fuentes, a group of junior military officers revolted in 1960. When they failed, several went into hiding and established close ties with Cuba. This group became the nucleus of the forces that were in armed insurrection against the government for the next 36 years. Four principal left-wing guerrilla groups—the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of Armed People (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT)—conducted economic sabotage and targeted government installations and members of government security forces in armed attacks. These organizations combined to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in 1982.

Shortly after President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro took office in 1966, the army launched a major counterinsurgency campaign that largely broke up the guerrilla movement in the countryside. The guerrillas then concentrated their attacks in Guatemala City, where they assassinated many leading figures, including U.S. Ambassador John Gordon Mein in 1968. Between 1966 and 1982, there was a series of military or military-dominated governments.

On March 23, 1982, army troops commanded by junior officers staged a coup to prevent the assumption of power by Gen. Angel Anibal Guevara, the hand-picked candidate of outgoing President and Gen. Romeo Lucas Garcia. They denounced Guevara’s electoral victory as fraudulent. The coup leaders asked retired Gen. Efrain Rios Montt to negotiate the departure of Lucas and Guevara.

Rios Montt was at this time a lay pastor in the evangelical protestant “Church of the Word.” He formed a three-member military junta that annulled the 1965 constitution, dissolved Congress, suspended political parties, and canceled the electoral law. After a few months, Rios Montt dismissed his junta colleagues and assumed the de facto title of “President of the Republic.”

Guerrilla forces and their leftist allies denounced Rios Montt. Rios Montt sought to defeat the guerrillas with military actions and economic reforms; in his words, “rifles and beans.” The government began to form local civilian defense patrols (PACs). Participation was in theory voluntary, but in reality, many Guatemalans, especially in the heavily indigenous northwest, had no choice but to join either the PACs or the guerrillas. Rios Montt’s conscript army and PACs recaptured essentially all guerrilla territory—guerrilla activity lessened and was largely limited to hit-and-run operations. However, Rios Montt won this partial victory at an enormous cost in civilian deaths, in what was probably the most violent period of the 36-year internal conflict, resulting in about 200,000 deaths of mostly unarmed indigenous civilians.

On August 8, 1983, Rios Montt was deposed by his own Minister of Defense, Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores, who succeeded him as de facto President of Guatemala. Rios Montt survived to found a political party (the Guatemalan Republic Front) and to be elected President of Congress in 1995 and 2000. Awareness in the United States of the conflict in Guatemala, and its ethnic dimension, increased with the 1983 publication of the book I, Rigoberta Menchu, An Indian Woman in Guatemala.

General Mejia allowed a managed return to democracy in Guatemala, starting with a July 1, 1984 election for a Constituent Assembly to draft a democratic constitution. On May 30, 1985, after 9 months of debate, the Constituent Assembly finished drafting a new constitution, which took effect immediately. Vinicio Cerezo, a civilian politician and the presidential candidate of the Christian Democracy Party, won the first election held under the new constitution with almost 70% of the vote, and took office on January 14, 1986.

1986 to 2003

Upon its inauguration in January 1986, President Cerezo’s civilian government announced that its top priorities would be to end the political violence and establish the rule of law. Reforms included new laws of habeas corpus and amparo (court-ordered protection), the creation of a legislative human rights committee, and the establishment in 1987 of the Office of Human Rights Ombudsman. Cerezo survived coup attempts in 1988 and 1989, and the final 2 years of Cerezo’s government were also marked by a failing economy, strikes, protest marches, and allegations of widespread corruption.

Presidential and congressional elections were held on November 11, 1990. After a runoff ballot, Jorge Serrano was inaugurated on January 14, 1991, thus completing the first transition from one democratically elected civilian government to another.

The Serrano administration’s record was mixed. It had some success in consolidating civilian control over the army, replacing a number of senior officers and persuading the military to participate in peace talks with the URNG. Serrano took the politically unpopular step of recognizing the sovereignty of Belize. The Serrano government reversed the economic slide it inherited, reducing inflation and boosting real growth.

On May 25, 1993, Serrano illegally dissolved Congress and the Supreme Court and tried to restrict civil freedoms, allegedly to fight corruption. The “autogolpe” (or self-initiated coup) failed due to unified, strong protests by most elements of Guatemalan society, international pressure, and the army’s enforcement of the decisions of the Court of Constitutionality, which ruled against the attempted takeover. Serrano fled the country.

On June 5, 1993, the Congress, pursuant to the 1985 constitution, elected the Human Rights Ombudsman, Ramiro De Leon Carpio, to complete Serrano’s presidential term. De Leon, not a member of any political party and lacking a political base but with strong popular support, launched an ambitious anticorruption campaign to “purify” Congress and the Supreme Court, demanding the resignations of all members of the two bodies.

Despite considerable congressional resistance, presidential and popular pressure led to a November 1993 agreement brokered by the Catholic Church between the administration and Congress. This package of constitutional reforms was approved by popular referendum on January 30, 1994. In August 1994, a new Congress was elected to complete the unexpired term.

Under De Leon, the peace process, now brokered by the United Nations, took on new life. The government and the URNG signed agreements on human rights (March 1994), resettlement of displaced persons (June 1994), historical clarification (June 1994), and indigenous rights (March 1995). They also made significant progress on a socioeconomic and agrarian agreement. National elections for president, the Congress, and municipal offices were held in November 1995. With almost 20 parties competing in the first round, the presidential election came down to a January 7, 1996 runoff in which National Advancement Party (PAN) candidate Alvaro Arzu defeated Alfonso Portillo of the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) by just over 2% of the vote. Under the Arzu administration, peace negotiations were concluded, and the government signed peace accords ending the 36-year internal conflict in December 1996. The human rights situation also improved during Arzu’s tenure, and steps were taken to reduce the influence of the military in national affairs.

In a December 1999 presidential runoff, Alfonso Portillo (FRG) won 68% of the vote to 32% for Oscar Berger (PAN). Portillo’s impressive electoral triumph, with two-thirds of the vote in the second round, gave him a claim to a mandate from the people to carry out his reform program.

Progress in carrying out Portillo’s reform agenda was slow at best, with the notable exception of a series of reforms sponsored by the World Bank to modernize bank regulation and criminalize money laundering. The United States determined in April 2003 that Guatemala had failed to demonstrably adhere to its international counternarcotics commitments during the previous year.

A high crime rate and a serious and worsening public corruption problem were cause for concern for the Government of Guatemala. These problems, in addition to issues related to the often violent harassment and intimidation by unknown assailants of human rights activists, judicial workers, journalists, and witnesses in human rights trials, led the government to begin serious attempts in 2001 to open a national dialogue to discuss the considerable challenges facing the country.

National elections were held on November 9, 2003. Oscar Berger Perdomo of the Grand National Alliance (GANA) party won the election, receiving 54.1% of the vote. His opponent, Alvarado Colom Caballeros of the Nation Unity for Hope (UNE) party received 45.9% of the vote. The new government assumed office on January 14, 2004.

GOVERNMENT

Guatemala’s 1985 constitution provides for a separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. The 1993 constitutional reforms included an increase in the number of Supreme Court justices from 9 to 13. The reforms reduced the terms of office for president, vice president, and congressional representatives from 5 years to 4 years, and for Supreme Court justices from 6 years to 5 years; they increased the terms of mayors and city councils from 2-1/2 years to 4 years.

The president and vice president are directly elected through universal suffrage and limited to one term. A vice president can run for president after 4 years out of office. Supreme Court justices are elected by the Congress from a list submitted by the bar association, law school deans, a university rector, and appellate judges. The Supreme Court and local courts handle civil and criminal cases. There also is a separate Constitutional Court.

Guatemala has 22 administrative subdivisions (departments) administered by governors appointed by the president. Guatemala City and 331 other municipalities are governed by popularly elected mayors or councils.

Principal Government Officials

Last Updated: 12/29/2006

President: Oscar BERGER Perdomo

Vice President: Eduardo STEIN

Min. of Agriculture: Alvaro AGUILAR

Min. of Communication & Public Works: Eduardo CASTILLO

Min. of Culture & Sports: Manuel SALAZAR Tezaguic

Min. of Defense: Cecilio LEIVA Rodriguez, Maj. Gen.

Min. of Economy: Marcio CUEVAS Posadas

Min. of Education: Maria ACENA del Carmen

Min. of Energy & Mines: Luis Romero ORTIZ Pelaez

Min. of Environment & Natural Resources: Juan Mario DARY Fuentes

Min. of External Relations: Gert ROSENTHAL Koenigsberger

Min. of Finance: Hugo BETETA

Min. of Government: Carlos VIELMAN

Min. of Labor: Jorge GALLARDO

Min. of Public Health & Social Assistance: Victor Manuel GUITERREZ Longo

Attorney General: Juan Luis FLORIDO

Solicitor General: Luis Alfonso ROSALES

Sec. Gen. of the Presidency: Jorge Raul ARROYAVE Reyes

Pres., Bank of Guatemala: Lizardo SOSA Lopez

Ambassador to the US: Guillermo CASTILLO

Permanent Representative to the UN, New York: Jorge SKINNER-KLEE Arenales

The Guatemalan embassy is located at 2220 R Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel. 202-745-4952; email: INFO@Guatemala-Embassy.org). Consulates are in Washington, New York, Miami, Chicago, Houston, San Francisco, Denver, and Los Angeles, and honorary consuls in Montgomery, San Diego, Ft. Lauderdale, Atlanta, Leavenworth, Lafayette, New Orleans, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Juan, Providence, Memphis, San Antonio, and Seattle. See the State Department Web page: http://www.state.gov/s/cpr/rls/fco/

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Portillo’s 1999 landslide victory combined with an FRG majority in Congress suggested possibilities for rapid legislative action. However, under the Guatemalan constitution of 1985, passage of many kinds of legislation requires a two-thirds vote. Passage of such legislation was not possible, therefore, with FRG votes alone.

The government increased several tax rates in 2001 in an attempt to meet the target of increasing its tax burden (at about 10.7% of GDP, currently the lowest in the region) to 12% of GDP. However, protestors took to the streets massively when the government sought further increases in August 2001, declaring their opposition to any new taxes until the Portillo administration provided better accountability for the taxes it already received.

Common and violent crime, aggravated by a legacy of violence and vigilante justice, presents a serious challenge. Impunity remained a major problem, primarily because democratic institutions, including those responsible for the administration of justice, have developed only a limited capacity to cope with this legacy. Guatemala’s judiciary is independent; however, it suffers from inefficiency, corruption, and intimidation.

In early 2003, the government accepted the Human Rights Ombudsman’s proposal for a U.N.-led commission to investigate possible links between illegal clandestine groups or security forces and attacks on human rights defenders and organized crime. The initial UN agreement was ruled unconstitutional in 2004 before it was acted upon by the Congress. As of September 2006, the government and UN are in active discussion on a new agreement. The UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) ceased its 10-year project of monitoring peace accord implementation and human rights problems in November 2004 with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan declaring Guatemala had made “enormous progress in managing the country’s problems through dialogue and institutions.”

ECONOMY

After the signing of the final peace accord in December 1996, Guatemala was well-positioned for rapid economic growth over the next several years, until a financial crisis in 1998 disrupted the course of improvement. The subsequent collapse of coffee prices left what was once the country’s leading export sector in depression and had a severe impact on rural incomes. Foreign investment inflows have been weak, with the exception of the privatization of utilities. Potential investors, both foreign and domestic, cite corruption, lack of physical security, a climate of confrontation between the government and private sector, and unreliable mechanisms for contract enforcement as the principal barriers to new business. On a more positive note, Guatemala’s macroeconomic management was sound under the Portillo administration, and its foreign debt levels are modest. The country subscribed to a standby agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2002, which it extended in June 2003.

Guatemala’s economy is dominated by the private sector, which generates about 85% of GDP. Agriculture contributes 23% of GDP and accounts for 75% of exports. Most manufacturing is light assembly and food processing, geared to the domestic, U.S., and Central American markets. Over the past several years, tourism and exports of textiles, apparel, and nontraditional agricultural products such as winter vegetables, fruit, and cut flowers have boomed, while more traditional exports such as sugar, bananas, and coffee continue to represent a large share of the export market.

The United States is the country’s largest trading partner, providing 39.6% of Guatemala’s imports and receiving 28.9% of its exports. The government’s involvement is small, with its business activities limited to public utilities—some of which have been privatized—ports and airports, and several development-oriented financial institutions.

Guatemala ratified the U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement, commonly known as CAFTA, on March 10, 2005 and the agreement entered into force between Guatemala and the U.S. on July 1, 2006. CAFTA eliminates customs tariffs on as many categories of goods as possible; opens services sectors; and creates clear and readily enforceable rules in areas such as investment, government procurement, intellectual property protection, customs procedures, electronic commerce, the use of sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures to protect public health, and resolution of business disputes.

Other priorities include increasing transparency and accountability in Guatemala’s public finances, broadening the tax base, and completing implementation of financial sector reforms. These measures attempt to ensure that Guatemala can comply with the standards of the international Financial Action Task Force for detecting and preventing money laundering.

The United States, along with other donor countries—especially France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and Japan —and the international financial institutions, have increased development project financing since the signing of the peace accords. However, donor support remains contingent upon Guatemalan Government reforms and counterpart financing.

The distribution of income and wealth remains highly skewed. The wealthiest 10% of the population receives almost one-half of all income; the top 20% receives two-thirds of all income. As a result, about 80% of the population lives in poverty, and two-thirds of that number—or 7.6 million people—live in extreme poverty. Guatemala’s social development indicators, such as infant mortality and illiteracy, are among the worst in the hemisphere. Chronic malnutrition among the rural poor worsened with the onset of the crisis in coffee prices, and the United States has provided disaster assistance and food aid in response.

NATIONAL SECURITY

Guatemala is a signatory to the Rio Pact and is a member of the Central American Defense Council (CONDECA). The president is commander in chief. The Defense Minister is responsible for policy. Day-to-day operations are the responsibility of the military chief of staff and the national defense staff.

An agreement signed in September 1996, which is one of the substantive peace accords, mandated that the mission of the armed forces change to focus exclusively on external threats. However, both former President Arzu and his successor President Portillo used a constitutional clause to order the army to temporarily support the police in response to a nationwide wave of violent crime.

The accord calls for a one-third reduction in the army’s authorized strength and budget—achieved under President Berger—and for a constitutional amendment to permit the appointment of a civilian Minister of Defense. A constitutional amendment to this end was defeated as part of a May 1999 plebiscite, but discussions on how to achieve this objective continue between the executive and legislative branches.

The army has gone beyond its accord-mandated target of reducing its strength to 28,000 troops, and numbered 15,500 troops as of June 2004. Not only was this the most profound transformation of any Central American military in the last 50 years, it also illustrates the effective control the civilian government has over the military. President Berger has tasked the Defense Ministry with increasing the professional skills of all soldiers.

The military is equipped with armaments and materiel from the United States, Israel, Serbia and Montenegro, Taiwan, Argentina, Spain, and France. As part of the army downsizing, the operational structure of 19 military zones and three strategic brigades were recast as several military zones are eliminated and their area of operations absorbed by others. The air force operates three air bases; the navy has two port bases. Additionally, recent steps have been taken to redefine the military’s mission—the military doctrine has been rewritten, and there has been an increase in cooperation with civil society to help bring about this reform.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Guatemala’s major diplomatic interests are regional security and, increasingly, regional development and economic integration. Guatemala participates in several regional groups, particularly those related to trade and the environment.

The Council of Central American Ministers of Trade meets on a regular basis to work on regional approaches to trade issues. The council signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the U.S. in 1998, and was part of the negotiations that led to the creation of CAFTA. Guatemala joined Honduras and El Salvador in signing a free trade agreement with Mexico in 2000, which went into effect the following year. Guatemala also originated the idea for, and is the seat of, the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN).

The U.S and Central American countries signed the CONCAUSA (Conjunto Centroamerica-USA) agreement at the Summit of the Americas in December 1994. CONCAUSA is a cooperative plan of action to promote clean, efficient energy use; conserve the region’s biodiversity; strengthen legal and institutional frameworks and compliance mechanisms; and improve and harmonize environmental protection standards.

Guatemala has a long-standing claim to a large portion of Belize; the territorial dispute caused problems with the United Kingdom and later with Belize following its 1981 independence from the U.K. In December 1989, Guatemala sponsored Belize for permanent observer status in the Organization of American States (OAS). In September 1991, Guatemala recognized Belize’s independence and established diplomatic ties, while acknowledging that the boundaries remained in dispute. In anticipation of an effort to bring the border dispute to an end in early 1996, the Guatemalan Congress ratified two long-pending international agreements governing frontier issues and maritime rights. In 2001, Guatemala and Belize agreed to a facilitation process led by the OAS to determine the land and maritime borders separating the two countries. National elections in Guatemala put a temporary halt to progress, but discussions resumed in November 2005. Since being named Foreign Minister in early August 2006, Gert Rosenthal has reinvigorated discussions with Belize.

U.S.-GUATEMALAN RELATIONS

Relations between the United States and Guatemala traditionally have been close, although at times strained by human rights and civil/military issues. U.S. policy objectives in Guatemala include:

• Supporting the institutionalization of democracy and implementation of the peace accords;
• Ratification of a free trade agreement, together with the other Central American countries;
• Encouraging respect for human rights and the rule of law, and implementation of the Commission for the Investigation of Illegal Groups and Clandestine Security Organizations in Guatemala (CICIACS);
• Supporting broad-based economic growth and sustainable development and maintaining mutually beneficial trade and commercial relations;
• Cooperating to combat money laundering, corruption, narcotics trafficking, alien-smuggling, and other transnational crime; and
• Supporting Central American integration through support for resolution of border/territorial disputes.

The United States, as a member of “the Friends of Guatemala,” along with Colombia, Mexico, Spain, Norway, and Venezuela, played an important role in the UN-moderated peace accords, providing public and behind-the-scenes support. The U.S. strongly supports the six substantive and three procedural accords, which, along with the signing of the December 29, 1996 final accord, form the blueprint for profound political, economic, and social change. To that end, the U.S. Government has committed over $400 million to support peace implementation since 1997.

Although almost all of the 250,000 U.S. tourists who visit Guatemala annually do so without incident, in recent years the number of violent crime reported by U.S. citizens has steadily increased. Increases in the number of Americans reported as victims of violent crime may be the result of any combination of factors: increased numbers of Americans traveling to Guatemala; increased accuracy in the Embassy’s reporting of crime; more Americans traveling to higher risk areas of Guatemala; or more crime.

Most U.S. assistance to Guatemala is provided through the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) offices for Guatemala. USAID’s programs support U.S. foreign policy objectives by promoting reforms in democratic governance, economic growth, and the social sectors, with special emphasis on the rural indigenous poor whose lives have been most seriously affected by the internal civil conflict. In addition to earning low incomes, these populations have limited economic opportunities for economic advancement, lack access to social services, and have limited access to, or influence over, the policymaking processes. USAID programs pursue six objectives. These are:

• Supporting the implementation of the 1996 peace accords;
• Aiding the improvement of the legal system and assisting citizens in its use;
• Increasing educational access and quality for all Guatemalans;
• Improving the health of Guatemalan women, children, and rural families;
• Increasing the earning capacity of poor rural families; and
• Expanding natural resources management and conservation of biodiversity.

USAID’s largest program is the support of the peace accords. The accords require major investments in health, education, and other basic services to reach the rural indigenous poor and require the full participation of the indigenous people in local and national decision-making. They also call for a profound restructuring of the state, affecting some of its most fundamental institutions—the military, the national police, and the system of justice—in order to end impunity and confirm the rule of law. Finally, they require basic changes in tax collection and expenditure and improved financial management.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials

GUATEMALA (E) Address: Ave. Reforma 7-01, Zona 10; APO/FPO: APO AA 34024; Phone: (502) 2326-4000; Fax: (502) 2326-4658; INMARSAT Tel: 683133345; Workweek: Mon-Thu: 7: 0 to 5:00 p.m.; Fri: 7:30 to 12:30; Website: http://guatemala.usembassy.gov/.

Last Updated: 12/26/2006

Other Contact Information

U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration Trade Information Center
14th and Constitution, NW
Washington, DC 20230
Tel: 800-USA-TRADE
Internet: http://www.ita.doc.gov

American Chamber of Commerce in Guatemala
5a avenida 5-55 zona 14 Europlaza,
Torre I Nivel 5
01014 Guatemala City, Guatemala
Tel: (502) 2333-3899
Fax: (502) 2368-3536
E-Mail: trade@amchamguate.com

Caribbean/Latin American Action (C/LAA)
1818 N Street, NW, Suite 310
Washington, DC 20036
Tel.: 202-466-7464

TRAVEL

Consular Information Sheet : October 13, 2006

Country Description: Guatemala has a developing economy, characterized by wide income disparities. Hotels and other tourist facilities in the principal tourist sites most frequented by visitors from the United States are generally good to excellent. A peace accord, signed in 1996, ended a 36-year armed conflict. Violent crime, however, is a serious concern due to endemic poverty, an abundance of weapons, a legacy of societal violence, and dysfunctional law enforcement and judicial systems.

Entry/Exit Requirements: A valid U.S. passport is required for all U.S. citizens, regardless of age, to enter Guatemala and to depart Guatemala for return to the U.S. Even if dual nationals are permitted to enter Guatemala on a second nationality passport, U.S. citizens returning to the United States from Guatemala are not allowed to board their flights without a valid U.S. passport. Guatemalan authorities do not accept Certificates of Naturalization, birth certificates, driver’s licenses, and photocopies as alternative travel documents. While in Guatemala, U.S. citizens should carry their passports, or a photocopy of their passports, with them at all times.

An exit tax must be paid when departing Guatemala by air. The exit tax (currently $30) is generally included in an airline ticket price, but may be charged separately. There is an additional airport security fee (20 Quetzales, approximately $2.50) that all travelers must pay at the airport. Minors under 18 traveling with a valid U.S. passport need no special permission from their parents to enter or leave Guatemala. U.S. citizens do not need a visa for a stay of 90 days or less (that period can be extended for an additional 180 days upon application to Guatemalan immigration).

A U.S. citizen whose passport is lost or stolen in Guatemala must obtain a new passport at the U.S. Embassy as soon as possible and present it, together with a police report of the loss or theft, to the Dirección de Migración (Guatemalan immigration agency), Sub-director de Control Migratorio (Sub-director for Migratory Control), to obtain permission to depart Guatemala. The agency is located in Guatemala City at 6 Avenida 3-11, Zone 4, Guatemala City. Office hours are weekdays from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.; telephone 2411-2411. No fee is charged by Guatemalan immigration for this service.

In June 2006, Guatemala entered a “Central America-4 (CA-4) Border Control Agreement” with El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Under the terms of the agreement, citizens of the four countries may travel freely across land borders from one of the countries to any of the others without completing entry and exit formalities at Immigration checkpoints. U.S. citizens and other eligible foreign nationals, who legally enter any of the four countries, may similarly travel among the four without obtaining additional visas or tourist entry permits for the other three countries. Immigration officials at the first port of entry determine the length of stay, up to a maximum period of 90 days. Foreign tourists who wish to remain in the four country region beyond the period initially granted for their visit are required to request a one-time extension of stay from local Immigration authorities in the country where the traveler is physically present, or travel outside the CA-4 countries and reapply for admission to the region. Foreigners “expelled” from any of the four countries are excluded from the entire “CA-4” region. In isolated cases, the lack of clarity in the implementing details of the CA-4 Border Control Agreement has caused temporary inconvenience to some travelers and has resulted in others being fined more than one hundred dollars or detained in custody for 72 hours or longer.

For further information regarding entry, exit and customs requirements, travelers should contact the Guatemalan Embassy at 2220 R Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008; telephone (202) 745-4952, extension 102; fax (202) 745-1908; email at info@guatemala-embassy.org; Internet web site—http://www.guatemala-embassy.org or contact the nearest Guatemalan consulate (Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, or San Francisco).

Safety and Security: Violent criminal activity has been a problem in all parts of Guatemala for years, including murder, rape, and armed assaults against foreigners. The police force is inexperienced and under-funded, and the judicial system is weak, overworked, and inefficient. Well-armed criminals know that there is little chance they will be caught and punished. Traditionally, Guatemala experiences increases in crime before and during the Christmas and Easter holiday seasons.

Large demonstrations occur throughout Guatemala, often with little or no notice, and they can cause serious traffic disruptions. Although most demonstrations are peaceful, they can turn violent, and travelers should avoid areas where demonstrations are taking place. The use of roadblocks and/or blocking of public facilities, including the international airport, has increased and demonstrators may prevent tourists caught behind the blockades from leaving.

Due to uncontrolled drug and alien smuggling, the Guatemalan border with Mexico is a relatively high-risk area, in particular in the northern most Peten Department. The most dangerous area in that region is on the northwestern border of the Peten, in the area including the Sierra de Lacandon and Laguna del Tigre National Parks. Extra precautions are required when travel by U.S. Government personnel to the region is required.

In October 2005 Hurricane Stan caused widespread flooding and landslides on Guatemala’s Pacific coast and in many parts of the Highlands, affecting a number of tourist destinations frequented by foreign travelers. All major highways and tourist destinations reopened by the end of the month, and most secondary routes are also fully open. Temporary repairs are still in place; some have already been washed out and others will likely fail during the current rainy season (May through October).

The following recommendations will help residents and visitors alike to increase their safety:

Avoid gatherings of agitated people. Guatemalan citizen frustration with crime and a lack of appropriate judicial remedies has led to violent incidents of vigilantism, including lynching, especially in more isolated, rural areas. Attempting to intervene may put you at risk of attacks from mobs.

Avoid close contact with children, including taking photographs, especially in rural areas. Such contact can be viewed with deep alarm and may provoke panic and violence. Rumors of foreigners stealing children surface periodically and can provoke a violent response towards strangers. Foreign tourists have been attacked by mobs and some years ago one was killed while photographing children.

Keep informed of possible demonstrations by following the local news and consulting hotel personnel and tour guides. Avoid areas where demonstrations are occurring.

Strong currents, riptides, and undertow along Guatemala’s Pacific Coast beaches pose a serious threat to even the strongest swimmers. Signs warning of treacherous surf are rare and confined mostly to private beaches owned by hotels. Lifeguards are rarely present on beaches.

Tourists planning to climb Pacaya and Agua volcanoes during Guatemala’s rainy season (May through October) should plan their climb for the morning hours, when it is less likely that thunderstorms will occur. Climbers should monitor the weather situation and return to the base of the volcano as quickly as safely possible if thunderstorms gather. In 2003, a Canadian tourist was killed by lightning while climbing Pacaya. INGUAT, the Guatemalan Tourist Institute, has organized an active community-based tourism program in San Vicente Pacaya to minimize the risk of armed robbery on Pacaya. Climbing in groups is still highly advisable for any volcano climb to reduce the risk of assault.

Security escorts for tourist groups and security information are available from the Tourist Assistance Office of INGUAT (the Guatemalan Tourist Institute) at 7a Avenida 1-17, Zona 4 Centro Cívico, Ciudad de Guatemala. INGUAT’s 24 hour/seven days per week direct telephone numbers for tourist assistance and emergencies are (502) 2421-2810 and (502) 5578-9836 and the fax is (502) 2421-2891. INGUAT may be reached by its toll free number within the United States at 1-888- 464-8281. You may also simply dial 1500 in Guatemala to reach INGUAT Tourist Assistance. The email address is asistur@inguat.gob.gt. Travelers may also wish to visit INGUAT’s website, http://visitguatemala.com. Tourist groups are advised to request security escorts from INGUAT, Attention: Coordinator of the National Tourist Assistance Program. There have been no incidents of armed robbery of groups escorted through the Tourist Protection Program. The request should be submitted by mail, fax or email and should arrive at INGUAT at least three business days in advance of the proposed travel, giving the itinerary, names of travelers, and model and color of vehicle in which they will be traveling. Travelers should be aware that INGUAT might not be able to accommodate all requests.

For the latest security information, Americans traveling abroad should regularly monitor the Department’s Internet web site at http://travel.state.gov where the current Travel Warnings and Public Announcements, including the Worldwide Caution Public Announcement, can be found. Up-to-date information on safety and security can also be obtained by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the U.S., or for callers outside the U.S. and Canada, a regular toll-line at 1-202-501-4444. These numbers are available from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays).

Crime: The number of violent crimes reported by U.S. citizens and other foreigners has remained high in recent years. Incidents include, but are not limited to, assault, theft, armed robbery, carjacking, rape, kidnapping, and murder. Criminals often operate in groups of four or more and are confrontational and violent. Gangs are a growing concern in Guatemala City and rural Guatemala. Gang members are often well armed with sophisticated weaponry and they sometimes use massive amounts of force. Emboldened armed robbers have attacked vehicles on main roads in broad daylight. Travel on rural roads always increases the risk of a criminal roadblock or ambush. Widespread narcotics and alien smuggling activities can make remote areas especially dangerous. Though there is no evidence that Americans are particularly targeted, criminals look for every opportunity to attack, so all travelers should remain constantly vigilant.

Most tourists and visitors travel throughout Guatemala without mishap. However, violent criminal activity on the highways continues, and tourists, among others, have been targeted. Many of the robbery attempts have occurred in daylight hours on main highways. Carjacking incidents and highway robberies are often violent. Four Americans were killed in highway robbery attempts in 2002 and three killed and one wounded in 2003. In 2004 one American tourist was murdered, and women and children were raped in highway assaults. Several highway assaults of American citizens also took place in 2005, but without serious injury to the victims. In some cases, assailants have been wearing full or partial police uniforms and have used vehicles that resemble police vehicles, indicating that some elements of the police might be involved. Armed robberies have occurred within minutes of the tourist’s vehicle being stopped by the police. U.S. Embassy personnel continue to observe heightened security precautions in Guatemala City and on the roads outside the capital city. U.S. tourists are urged to be especially aware of safety and security concerns when traveling on the roads in Guatemala. Rather than traveling alone, use a reputable tour organization. Stay in groups; travel in a caravan consisting of two or more vehicles; and, stay on the main roads. Ensure that someone not traveling with you is aware of your itinerary. Resist the temptation to stay in hotels that do not have adequate security. Travel after dark anywhere in Guatemala is extremely dangerous. It is preferable to stay in the main tourist destinations. Do not explore back roads or isolated paths near tourist sites. Pay close attention to your surroundings, especially when walking or when driving in Guatemala City. Refrain from displaying expensive-looking jewelry, large amounts of money, or other valuable items. Finally, if confronted by criminals, be aware that resistance may provoke a more violent response.

Additional Information: In recent months there has been an increasing number of carjacking incidents and armed robberies near the airport, most frequently between 6:00 and 10:00 am. In the most common scenario tourists or business travelers who land at the airport around 7:00 am are held up by armed men as their vehicle departs the airport. Private vehicles, taxis and shuttle buses have been attacked. Typically, the assailants steal money, passports, and luggage, and in some but not all cases, the assailants steal the vehicle as well. Victims who did not resist the attackers were not physically injured. The Embassy advises its own employees to seek alternative routes for exiting the airport.

Pickpockets and purse-snatchers are active in all major cities and tourist sites, especially the central market and other parts of Zone 1 in Guatemala City and the city of Antigua. In a common scenario, an accomplice distracts the victim, while an assailant slashes or simply steals a bag or backpack while the victim’s attention is diverted.

As in other countries, criminals also use a number of scams to steal money and possessions from tourists in Guatemala. In one popular scam, robbers place a nail in a parked vehicle’s tire. The vehicle is then followed by the robbers who pose as “good Samaritans” when the tire becomes flat and the victims pull to the side of the road. While “help” is being rendered, the contents of the car are stolen, often without the knowledge of the victims. However, in some cases, the robbers have threatened the tourists with weapons. Parking areas in and around the Guatemala City International Airport are particularly prone to this crime. In another scam, victims are approached in a hotel, restaurant or other public place by an individual claiming there is some sort of problem with his or the would-be victim’s automobile in the parking lot. On the way to investigate the “problem,” usually in a remote or concealed area near the parking lot, the robber pulls a gun on the victim demanding cash, credit cards and other valuables. A third popular scam involves various attempts to acquire a victim’s ATM card and PIN number. Some sophisticated criminals have even placed boxes outside ATM kiosks that record PIN numbers when unsuspecting victims believe they must enter their PIN number to gain entry to the ATM foyer. After recording PIN numbers, robbers then steal the owner’s ATM card to complete their crime. There are dozens of techniques scammers can use to rob victims of money and possessions. While most people mean no harm, always be cautious when strangers approach you for any reason or make unusual requests.

Parents adopting children in Guatemala have also been victimized in public places and at their hotels by police (or individuals dressed as police) who have threatened to arrest foster mothers and turn adoptive children over to orphanages, but released them in exchange for significant payments, often approaching $1000. Such threats have no basis in Guatemalan law, and should be immediately reported to the Embassy.

For security reasons, the Embassy does not allow U.S. government employees to stay in hotels in Zone 1 in Guatemala City and urges private travelers to avoid staying in this area.

Avoid low-priced intra- and inter-city buses (recycled U.S. school buses); they are often attacked by armed robbers and are poorly maintained and dangerously driven. The use of modern inter-city buses somewhat improves security and safety. There have been, however, several attacks on travelers on first-class buses on highway CA-2 near the border areas with both Mexico and El Salvador and on highways CA-1 and CA-9 near the El Salvador border and in the highlands between Quetzaltenango and Solola. Be cautious with personal items such as backpacks and fanny packs while riding buses, because tourists’ possessions are a favorite target of thieves.

Do not hail taxis on the street in Guatemala City. Use radio-dispatched taxis or taxis from major hotels instead.

The main road to Lake Atitlan via the Inter-American Highway (CA-1) and Solola is safer than the alternatives, though attacks in recent years have made traveling in a caravan highly recommended, even on the Inter-American Highway. Robbery and assault have been frequently reported on secondary roads near the lake with the highest number of incidents occurring on the RN-11 (Las Trampas road) parallel to the east side of the lake. Robbers have used mountain roads advantageously to stop buses, vans and cars in a variety of ways.

Armed attacks have occurred on roads from Guatemala City to the Peten. Visitors to the Mayan ruins at Tikal are urged to fly to nearby Flores and then travel by bus or tour van to the site.

Violent attacks have occurred in the Mayan ruins in the Peten, including in the Cerro Cahui Conservation Park, Yaxha, the road to and inside Tikal Park, and in the Tikal ruins. Tourist police (POLITUR) patrols inside the park have significantly reduced the violent crime incidents inside the park, but travelers should nevertheless remain in groups and on the principal trails leading to the Central Plaza and the Temple IV complex, and avoid remote areas of the park.

POLITUR (a joint police/Guatemalan Tourism Institute initiative) is present in all major tourist destinations. They should be contacted in case of any criminal incident in such areas, even if minor.

Foreign residents of Guatemala have special concerns. Twenty American citizen residents and five American citizen tourists have been murdered since December 1999, and suspects have been convicted in only two cases. There have been “express” kidnappings in recent years, primarily in Guatemala City, in which a relatively small ransom that can be quickly gathered is demanded. U.S. citizens have been kidnapped in recent years. At least one incident of a random kidnapping, in which the victim was grabbed off the street in an affluent neighborhood of the city, occurred in December 2003 and resulted in a physical and sexual assault.

Information for Victims of Crime: The loss or theft abroad of a U.S. passport should be reported immediately to the local police and the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate. If you are the victim of a crime while overseas, in addition to reporting to local police, please contact the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate for assistance. The Embassy/Consulate staff can, for example, assist you to find appropriate medical care, contact family members or friends and explain how funds could be transferred. Although the investigation and prosecution of the crime is solely the responsibility of local authorities, consular officers can help you to understand the local criminal justice process and to find an attorney if needed.

Medical Facilities and Health Information: A full range of medical care is available in Guatemala City, but medical care outside the city is limited. Guatemala’s public hospitals frequently experience serious shortages of basic medicines and equipment. Care in private hospitals is generally adequate for most common illnesses and injuries, and many of the medical specialists working in them are U.S. trained and certified.

Information on vaccinations and other health precautions, such as safe food and water precautions and insect bite protection, may be obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s hotline for international travelers at 1-877-FYI-TRIP (1-877-394-8747) or via the CDC’s Internet site at http://www.cdc.gov/travel. For information about outbreaks of infectious diseases abroad consult the World Health Organization’s (WHO) website at http://www.who.int/en. Further health information for travelers is available at http://www.who.int/ith.

Medical Insurance: The Department of State strongly urges Americans to consult with their medical insurance company prior to traveling abroad to confirm whether their policy applies overseas and whether it will cover emergency expenses such as a medical evacuation.

Traffic Safety and Road Conditions: While in a foreign country, U.S. citizens may encounter road conditions that differ significantly from those in the United States. The information below concerning Guatemala is provided for general reference only, and may not be totally accurate in a particular location or circumstance.

Driving in Guatemala requires one’s full attention, and safe drivers must take extraordinary efforts to drive defensively to avoid dangerous situations.

Traffic rules are only casually observed. Many drivers do not use their turn signals to alert other drivers. Instead, a common custom is for a driver or passenger to stick a hand out the window and wave it to indicate that they will be taking an unspecified action. Speed limits, lane markings and stop signs are frequently ignored. Passing blindly on winding and/or steep mountain roads, poorly designed surfaces, and unmarked hazards, including frequent landslides and precarious temporary highway repairs, present additional risks to motorists.

Common public transportation is by local recycled school busses, which serve every town in the country. Criminal activity and frequent fatal accidents, however, make the low-priced inter-city buses particularly dangerous. Modern inter-city buses offer some security from highway violence, but armed attacks are increasing, showing that all buses are vulnerable.

Although city streets are lit, secondary and rural roads have little to no illumination. Driving outside of urban areas at night is dangerous and not recommended. The Inter-American Highway (CA-1) and the road from Guatemala City to the Caribbean coast (CA-9) are especially dangerous due to heavy traffic, including large trucks and trailers. There are no roadside assistance clubs, however a roadside assistance force (PROVIAL) patrols most of the major highways in the country. PROVIAL can be contacted by calling 2422-7878. Their vehicles are equipped with basic tools and first aid supplies, and their services are free. Police patrol the major roadways and may assist travelers, but the patrols are sporadic and may be suspended due to budget restraints. For roadside assistance, travelers may call the police by dialing 120 or the fire department by dialing 122 or 123. Cellular telephone service covers most areas frequented by tourists.

Valid U.S. driver’s licenses are accepted for the first 30 days of a visit, and international driving permits are accepted in Guatemala for extended stays. Guatemala’s road safety authorities are the Department of Transit and the Joint Operations Center of the National Police. Drivers use the right-hand side of the road in Guatemala, and speed limits are posted (in kilometers) depending on the condition of the road. Speed limits are different in rural and urban areas, but are rarely enforced. Drivers often drive at the absolute maximum speed possible for the particular vehicle at the time. These drivers share the road with slow vehicles, some barely able to manage 20 miles per hour, creating a hazardous mix of velocities. Turning right on red is not permitted unless otherwise posted, and drivers must yield when entering a traffic circle. Seat belts must be worn in Guatemala, but there are no laws regarding the use of child safety seats. It is against the law for drivers to operate cellular phones while driving.

People found driving under the influence of alcohol or other drugs are arrested and may serve jail time. In an accident resulting in injury or death, every driver involved is taken into custody and the vehicle(s) impounded until a judge determines responsibility in a re-enactment of the accident.

Visit the website of Guatemala’s national tourist office and national authority responsible for road safety at http://www.inguat.gob.gt or via email at asistur@inguat.gob.gt or info@inguat.gob.gt.

Aviation Safety Oversight: The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has assessed the Government of Guatemala’s Civil Aviation Authority as not being in compliance with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) aviation safety standards for the oversight of Guatemala’s air carrier operations. For more information, travelers may visit the FAA’s Internet website at http://www.faa.gov.

Special Circumstances: A major renovation of the international terminal at La Aurora International Airport in Guatemala City is currently under way. Until completion in late 2006 or early 2007, there is a temporary reconfiguration of arrival and departure vehicle traffic and major construction works inside the terminal.

Guatemalan customs authorities may enforce strict regulations concerning temporary importation into or export from Guatemala of items such as antiquities and other cultural property. It is advisable to contact the Embassy of Guatemala in Washington or one of Guatemala’s consulates in the United States for specific information regarding customs requirements. In many countries around the world, counterfeit and pirated goods are widely available. Transactions involving such products are illegal and bringing them back to the United States may result in forfeitures and/or fines.

Non-Guatemalan citizens who wish to marry in Guatemala are required to provide proof of identity and civil status (indicating whether they are single or divorced). Prior notice of the marriage must be given in the Diario de Centro America (Guatemala’s Official Record) and any large circulation daily newspaper for fifteen days. The marriage must take place within six months of the publication of the notice.

Disaster Preparedness: Guatemala is a geologically active country. Visitors should be aware of the possibility of earthquakes at any time and the need for contingency plans. There are also four active volcanoes. Volcanic activity, such as that of Fuego Volcano near Antigua in January 2003, and again in January 2006, has on occasion forced evacuations of nearby villages; the January-February 2000 activity of Pacaya Volcano near Guatemala City also briefly closed Guatemala City’s international airport. Both the Caribbean and Pacific coasts of Guatemala are also vulnerable to hurricanes and tropical storms from June through November. Mudslides and flooding during the May to November rainy season often kill dozens of people and close roads. In October 2005 Hurricane Stan caused widespread flooding and landslides on Guatemala’s Pacific coast and in many parts of the Highlands. Over 1000 Guatemalans died, and many highways across the affected regions were closed for days. All highways have now reopened. Temporary repairs are still in place; some have already been washed out and others will likely fail during the current rainy season. General information about natural disaster preparedness is available via the Internet from the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) at http://www.fema.gov/.

Criminal Penalties: While in a foreign country, a U.S. citizen is subject to that country’s laws and regulations, which sometimes differ significantly from those in the United States and may not afford the protections available to the individual under U.S. law. Penalties for breaking the law can be more severe than in the United States for similar offences. Persons violating Guatemalan laws, even unknowingly, may be expelled, arrested or imprisoned. Penalties for possession, use, or trafficking in illegal drugs in Guatemala are severe, and convicted offenders can expect long jail sentences and heavy fines. Engaging in sexual conduct with children or using or disseminating child pornography in a foreign country is a crime, prosecutable in the United States.

Children’s Issues: For information on international adoption of children and international parental child abduction, see the Office of Children’s Issues website at http://travel.state.gov/family/family_1732.html.

Registration/Embassy Location: Americans living or traveling in Guatemala are encouraged to register with the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate through the State Department’s travel registration website and to obtain updated information on travel and security within Guatemala. Americans withoutInternet access may register directly with the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate. By registering, American citizens make it easier for the Embassy or Consulate to contact them in case of emergency.

The latest security information is available from the Embassy, including its website, http://guatemala.usembassy.gov

The Consular Section is open for citizen services, including registration, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon and 1:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. Monday through Thursdays and 7:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. Fridays, excluding U.S. and Guatemalan holidays. The second and last Friday of each month are reserved for administrative matters; therefore, routine citizen services are not provided. Emergency services are available at all times. The U.S. Embassy is located in Guatemala City at Avenida La Reforma 7-01, Zone 10; telephone (502) 2-326-4000 during Embassy business hours (8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.), or (502) 2-331-2354 for emergencies during non-business hours; fax (502) 2-332-4353; Internet web site http://guatemala.usembassy.gov.

International Adoption : February 2007

The information below has been edited from a report of the State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Overseas Citizens Services. For more information, please read the International Adoption section of this book and review current reports online at www.travel.state.gov/family.

Disclaimer: The information in this flyer relating to the legal requirements of specific foreign countries is based on public sources and current understanding. Questions involving foreign and U.S. immigration laws and legal interpretation should be addressed respectively to qualified foreign or U.S. legal counsel.

Alert: The U.S. Embassy in Guatemala has occasionally received reports of Guatemalan police in and around some of the major hotels in Guatemala City attempting to extort money from adopting parents by threatening to take the biological or foster mother and the prospective or adopted child into custody. We know of no legal basis under local Guatemalan law for such actions and encourage all U.S. citizens who encounter similar experiences to report them immediately to their local lawyer and the American Citizens Services section at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City.

Please read the Guatemala Consular Information Sheet at: http://travel.state.gov for updated information about security and other local conditions.

Please Note: The U.S. Embassy in Guatemala schedules specific immigrant visa appointment dates and times for all adoption cases and issues “Pink Slips” that contain this information. Prospective adoptive parents are urged not to travel to Guatemala until the “Pink Slip” has been issued.

Patterns of Immigration: Please review current reports online at www.travel.state.gov/family.

Adoption Authority: The Guatemalan Solicitor General’s Office (Procuradoría General de la Nación, PGN) is the adoption authority in Guatemala. Adoptions must be finalized through the PGN.

Eligibility Requirements for Adoptive Parents: Under Guatemalan law, prospective adoptive parents may be married or single and must be at least 18 years old. There are no requirements for an age-difference between the prospective adoptive parent and the child. There are also no disqualifying medical ineligibilities.

Residency Requirements: The Government of Guatemala has no residency requirements for prospective adoptive parents.

Time Frame: Based on the results of a survey conducted by the U.S. Embassy in 2005 of prospective adoptive parents, an adoption of a Guatemalan child takes on average 9 and a half months from start to finish.

Adoption Agencies and Attorneys: Since 1977, adoptions are handled as an administrative matter and attorneys and notaries participate in all aspects of the adoption process within Guatemala. The U.S. based adoption agency serves as the adoptive family’s agent, and the Guatemalan attorney serves as an agent for the adoptive family’s agency. Therefore, prospective adoptive parents should be kept informed of all aspects of the identification, care, and adoption process of their prospective adoptive children by the U.S. based adoption agency or agent.

If prospective adoptive parents have hired an agency in the United States to assist in the adoption, the agency is responsible for keeping them informed about their case. Prospective adoptive parents should ask their agency for the name(s) of their attorney(s) and whether anyone in the attorney’s office speaks English, etc. The United States Government is not in a position to inquire on individual adoption cases from the Guatemalan authorities.

Some families have worked directly with an attorney in Guatemala instead of an intermediary agency in the United States. While these prospective adoptive parents may face certain risks and forego the support of organizations with intercountry adoption experience, if they choose competent, experienced attorneys they can have satisfactory experiences. Unfortunately, some parents have experienced problems working directly with Guatemalan attorneys, and prospective adoptive parents are encouraged to research their options before selecting an attorney. The U.S. Embassy in Guatemala maintains a list of Guatemalan English speaking attorneys on their website at: http://guatemala.usembassy.gov/acs_legal_information.html. This list, however, does not indicate those attorneys’ areas of specialization. The best method of finding a competent attorney is to obtain referrals from families who have had satisfactory experiences working with a specific attorney. The U.S. Government cannot assume responsibility for the professional ability or personal integrity of Guatemalan attorneys.

Adoption Fees: The Solicitor General’s office (PGN) does not charge any fees for adoptions. Based on the results of a survey of prospective adoptive parents conducted by the U.S. Embassy in 2005, families should expect to pay an average of $27,000 (in a range from $17,300 to $45,000) to adopt a Guatemalan child. According to Guatemalan press reports, some Guatemalan lawyers charge up to $35,000 for each adoption. One lawyer quoted in the local press said that he earns between $15,000 and $20,000 per adoption.

Adoption Procedures: Intercountry adoptions in Guatemala are processed under a “notarial” system. In many cases, Guatemalan attorneys personally take physical custody of and propose potential orphans to U.S. adoption service providers, who in turn offer the child/ren to their American client prospective adoptive parents. If the prospective adoptive parents accept the referral they receive from their U.S. agency, the prospective adoptive parents must provide the attorney with a “power of attorney” to act on their behalf to complete the adoption.

In most cases the same attorney represents the birth parent(s), the adopting parent(s) and the child(ren) in the Guatemalan government proceedings. When viewed in comparison to normal U.S. legal procedures, this appears to be a conflict of interest, and prospective adoptive parents should take that into consideration when initiating a Guatemalan adoption.

Prospective adoptive parents must receive receipt of “pre-approval” from the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS/USCIS) office in Guatemala before their attorney can submit their dossier to the Guatemalan authorities. After obtaining clearance from a social worker under the supervision of a family court to proceed with a potential adoption case, the attorney submits the case to the Guatemalan Solicitor General’s Office (Procuradoría General de la Nación, PGN) for review.

Once the PGN approves the case, the Guatemalan attorney (the notary) authorizes the adoption deed and registers it at the Civil Registrar where the child’s birth was registered. The Guatemalan birth mother needs to provide final approval for the adoption at the time of the adoption deed. Upon registration of the adoption deed with the Civil Registrar, the adoptive parents in the U.S. are legally responsible for their child(ren). Finally, the Guatemalan attorney requests a birth certificate listing the adoptive parents as the parents of the adopted child. Following issuance of the new birth certificate, the attorney then requests and receives, normally on the same day, the child’s Guatemalan passport. With these final documents, the attorney submits the complete case file, including the I-600 orphan visa petition, to DHS/USCIS in Guatemala.

Documentary Requirements: The Government of Guatemala reviews adoptions on a case-by case basis and will provide information on necessary documents to the U.S. based adoption agency and/or attorney. The Department of State is not in a position to provide a definitive list of requirements at this time.

Embassy of Guatemala:
2220 R Street, N.W.
Washington, DC. 20008
Tel (202) 745-4952
Fax (202) 745-1908
consul@guatemala-embassy.org

Guatemala also has consulates in Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and San Francisco.

U.S. Immigration Requirements: Prospective adoptive parents are strongly encouraged to consult USCIS publication M-249, The Immigration of Adopted and Prospective Adoptive Children, as well as the Department of State publication, International Adoptions. Please see the International Adoption section of this book for more details and review current reports online at www.travel.state.gov/family.

DHS/USCIS Review of Birth Mother Information and DNAT-esting: Problems occur when U.S. citizens are encouraged to adopt children who do not meet the U.S. immigration definition of “orphan.” In some cases, these children may have been obtained by illegal means, perhaps even stolen. The DHS/USCIS office at the U.S. Embassy requires DNA testing in all cases where an identifiable birth mother is alleged to have released the child, because the use of a false birth mother to release “her child” is the usual method chosen by unscrupulous operators to create a paper trail for an illegally obtained child. Occasionally DHS/USCIS must also interview and investigate the birth mother. These problematic cases are further complicated by the high incidence of corruption and civil document fraud in Guatemala.

For more detailed information on DHS/USCIS requirements, Please review current reports online at www.travel.state.gov/family.

Before Traveling to Guatemala: Before adoptive parents make airline reservations for themselves or for an escort and the child, they should confirm with their Guatemalan attorney or U.S. adoption agency that the consular section has issued the appointment letter (“Pink Slip”) with a specific immigrant visa interview appointment date and time. They should also confirm that:

1. If the paperwork was filed in the United States, that the Consular section has received a notice of approval of the I-600 petition (visas 38 or 39 cable), and the adoptive parent has all required documents for the interview, including the child’s Guatemalan passport and has or can obtain prior to the appointment date the medical exam results.

2. If the I-600 will be filed in Guatemala, that the Consular section has received a notice of approval of the I-600A application (visas 37 cable), and that the DHS/USCIS office has approved the adoption documents and cleared the adoptive family for the appointment (after review of the Guatemalan adoption paperwork).

Prospective adoptive parents should review the list of required documents to ensure that they are available for the visa interview, including the child’s Guatemalan passport and has or can obtain prior to the appointment date the medical exam results.

Escorts: If neither adoptive parent plans to travel to Guatemala and the child will be escorted by a third party for the visa interview, the I-600 Petition to Classify Orphan as an Immediate Relative must be filed in the United States and the Consular section must have the official internal transmission (called the Visas 38 or 39) from DHS indicating its approval of the I-600 petition. The escort is required to present to the consular officer at the visa interview a recently executed power of attorney that specifically indicates that the power of attorney is for any and all documentation and procedures involved in the adoption and immigration of a named child. A statement from the adoptive parents authorizing the escort to take the child to the United States for the purpose of placing him/her with the adoptive parent(s) can also be included in the judge’s authorization for the child to leave Guatemala. Please see the International Adoption section of this book for more details and review current reports online at www.travel.state.gov/family.

U.S. Embassy:
Avenida Reforma 7-01, Zona 10
Guatemala City, Guatemala
Email: adoptguatemala@state.gov
Fax at: 011-502-2326-4674
Website: http://guatemala.usembassy.gov/

Additional Information: Specific questions about adoption in Guatemala may be addressed to the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala. General questions regarding intercountry adoption may be addressed to the Office of Children’s Issues, U.S. Department of State, CA/OCS/CI, SA-29, 4th Floor, 2201 C Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20520-4818, toll-free Tel: 1-888-407-4747.

Guatemala

Compiled from the January 2008 Background Note and supplemented with additional information from the State Department and the editors of this volume. See the introduction to this set for explanatory notes.

Official Name:

Republic of Guatemala

PROFILE

Geography

Area: 108,890 sq. km. (42,042 sq.mi.); about the size of Tennessee.

Cities: Capital—Guatemala City (metro area pop. 2.5 million). Other major cities—Quetzaltenango, Escuintla.

Terrain: Mountainous, with fertile coastal plain.

Climate: Temperate in highlands;tropical on coasts.

People

Nationality: Noun and adjective—Guatemalan(s).

Population: (2007 est.) 13.3 million.

Annual population growth rate: (2006 est.) 2.4%.

Ethnic groups: Mestizo (mixed Spanish-Indian), indigenous.

Religions: Roman Catholic, Protestant, traditional Mayan.

Languages: Spanish, 24 indigenous languages (principally Kiche, Kaqchikel, Q’eqchi, and Mam).

Education: Years compulsory—6. Attendance—41%. Literacy—70.6%.

Health: Infant mortality rate (2005)—32/1,000. Life expectancy (2005)—69 yrs.

Work force: Services—40%; industry and commerce—37%; agriculture—15%; construction, mining, utilities—4%. Fifty percent of the population engages in some form of agriculture, often at the subsistence level outside the monetized economy.

Government

Type: Constitutional democratic republic.

Constitution: May 1985; amended November 1993.

Independence: September 15, 1821.

Government branches: Executive—president (4-year term; 1 term limit). Legislative—unicameral 158-member Congress (4-year term). Judicial—13-member Supreme Court of Justice (5-year term).

Political subdivisions: 22 departments (appointed governors); 331 municipalities with elected mayors and city councils.

Political parties: National Union for Hope (UNE), Grand National Alliance (GANA), Patriot Party (PP), Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), National Advancement Party (PAN), Unionists (Unionistas), Encounter for Guatemala (EG).

Suffrage: Universal for adults 18 and over who are not serving on active duty with the armed forces or police. A variety of procedural obstacles have historically reduced participation by poor, rural, and indigenous people, but implementation in 2007 of voting reform legislation nearly doubled the number of voting tables, resulting in higher participation in rural areas, including among indigenous people.

Economy

Real GDP: (2007 est.) $24.13 billion.

Real GDP growth: (2007 est.) 5.7%.

Per capita GDP PPP: (2006) $4,317.

Natural resources: Oil, timber, nickel, gold.

Agriculture: (13.3% of GDP) Products—coffee, sugar, bananas, cardamom, vegetables, flowers and plants, timber, rice, rubber.

Manufacturing: (18% of GDP) Types—prepared food, clothing and textiles, construction materials, tires, pharmaceuticals.

Trade: (2006 est.) Exports—$6.0 billion: coffee, bananas, sugar, crude oil, chemical products, clothing and textiles, vegetables. Major markets-U.S. 46.2%, Central American Common Market (CACM) 27.2%, Mexico 5.9%. Imports—$11.9 billion: machinery and equipment, fuels, mineral products, chemical products, vehicles and transport materials, plastic materials and products. Major suppliers—U.S. 34.5%, CACM 9.7%, Mexico 7.9%, Japan 2.7%, Germany 1.7%.

PEOPLE

More than half of Guatemalans are descendants of indigenous Mayan peoples. Westernized Mayans and mestizos (mixed European and indigenous ancestry) are known as Ladinos. Most of Guatemala's population is rural, though urbanization is accelerating. The predominant religion is Roman Catholicism, into which many indigenous Guatemalans have incorporated traditional forms of worship. Protestantism and traditional Mayan religions are practiced by an estimated 40% and 1% of the population, respectively. Though the official language is Spanish, it is not universally understood among the indigenous population. The peace accords signed in December 1996 provide for the translation of some official documents and voting materials into several indigenous languages.

HISTORY

The Mayan civilization flourished throughout much of Guatemala and the surrounding region long before the Spanish arrived, but it was already in decline when the Mayans were defeated by Pedro de Alvarado in 1523-24. The first colonial capital, Ciudad Vieja, was ruined by floods and an earthquake in 1542. Survivors founded Antigua, the second capital, in 1543. Antigua was destroyed by two earthquakes in 1773. The remnants of its Spanish colonial architecture have been preserved as a national monument. The third capital, Guatemala City, was founded in 1776.

Guatemala gained independence from Spain on September 15, 1821; it briefly became part of the Mexican Empire, and then for a period belonged to a federation called the United Provinces of Central America. From the mid-19th century until the mid-1980s, the country passed through a series of dictatorships, insurgencies (particularly beginning in the 1960s), coups, and stretches of military rule with only occasional periods of representative government.

1944 to 1986

In 1944, Gen. Jorge Ubico's dictatorship was overthrown by the “October Revolutionaries,” a group of dissident military officers, students, and liberal professionals. A civilian President, Juan Jose Arevalo, was elected in 1945 and held the presidency until 1951. Social reforms initiated by Arevalo were continued by his successor, Col. Jacobo Arbenz. Arbenz permitted the communist Guatemalan Labor Party to gain legal status in 1952. The army refused to defend the Arbenz government when a U.S.-backed group led by Col. Carlos Castillo Armas invaded the country from Honduras in 1954 and quickly took over the government. Gen. Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes took power in 1958 following the murder of Colonel Castillo Armas.

In response to the increasingly autocratic rule of Ydigoras Fuentes, a group of junior military officers revolted in 1960. When they failed, several went into hiding and established close ties with Cuba. This group became the nucleus of the forces that were in armed insurrection against the government for the next 36 years. Four principal leftwing guerrilla groups—the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of Armed People (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT)—conducted economic sabotage and targeted government installations and members of government security forces in armed attacks. These organizations combined to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in 1982.

Shortly after President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro took office in 1966, the army launched a major counterinsurgency campaign that largely broke up the guerrilla movement in the countryside. The guerrillas then concentrated their attacks in Guatemala City, where they assassinated many leading figures, including U.S. Ambassador John Gordon Mein in 1968. Between 1966 and 1982, there was a series of military or military-dominated governments.

On March 23, 1982, army troops commanded by junior officers staged a coup to prevent the assumption of power by Gen. Angel Anibal Guevara, the hand-picked candidate of outgoing President and Gen. Romeo Lucas Garcia. They denounced Guevara's electoral victory as fraudulent. The coup leaders asked retired Gen. Efrain Rios Montt to negotiate the departure of Lucas and Guevara.

Rios Montt was at this time a lay pastor in the evangelical protestant “Church of the Word.” He formed a three-member military junta that annulled the 1965 constitution, dissolved Congress, suspended political parties, and canceled the electoral law. After a few months, Rios Montt dismissed his junta colleagues and assumed the de facto title of “President of the Republic.”

Guerrilla forces and their leftist allies denounced Rios Montt. Rios Montt sought to defeat the guerrillas with military actions and economic reforms; in his words, “rifles and beans.” The government began to form local civilian defense patrols (PACs). Participation was in theory voluntary, but in reality, many Guatemalans, especially in the heavily indigenous northwest, had no choice but to join either the PACs or the guerrillas. Rios Montt's conscript army and PACs recaptured essentially all guerrilla territory—guerrilla activity lessened and was largely limited to hit-and-run operations. However, Rios Montt won this partial victory at an enormous cost in civilian deaths, in what was probably the most violent period of the 36-year internal conflict, resulting in about 200,000 deaths of mostly unarmed indigenous civilians.

On August 8, 1983, Rios Montt was deposed by his own Minister of Defense, Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores, who succeeded him as de facto President of Guatemala. Rios Montt survived to found a political party (the Guatemalan Republic Front) and to be elected President of Congress in 1995 and 2000. Awareness in the United States of the conflict in Guatemala, and its ethnic dimension, increased with the 1983

publication of the book I, Rigoberta Menchu, An Indian Woman in Guatemala.

General Mejia allowed a managed return to democracy in Guatemala, starting with a July 1, 1984 election for a Constituent Assembly to draft a democratic constitution. On May 30, 1985, after 9 months of debate, the Constituent Assembly finished drafting a new constitution, which took effect immediately. Vinicio Cerezo, a civilian politician and the presidential candidate of the Christian Democracy Party, won the first election held under the new constitution with almost 70% of the vote, and took office on January 14, 1986.

1986 to 2007

Upon its inauguration in January 1986, President Cerezo's civilian government announced that its top priorities would be to end the political violence and establish the rule of law. Reforms included new laws of habeas corpus and amparo (court-ordered protection), the creation of a legislative human rights committee, and the establishment in 1987 of the Office of Human Rights Ombudsman. Cerezo survived coup attempts in 1988 and 1989, and the final 2 years of Cerezo's government were also marked by a failing economy, strikes, protest marches, and allegations of widespread corruption.

Presidential and congressional elections were held on November 11,1990. After a runoff ballot, Jorge Serrano was inaugurated on January 14,1991, thus completing the first transition from one democratically elected civilian government to another.

The Serrano administration's record was mixed. It had some success in consolidating civilian control over the army, replacing a number of senior officers and persuading the military to participate in peace talks with the URNG. Serrano took the politically unpopular step of recognizing the sovereignty of Belize. The Serrano government reversed the economic slide it inherited, reducing inflation and boosting real growth.

On May 25, 1993, Serrano illegally dissolved Congress and the Supreme Court and tried to restrict civil freedoms, allegedly to fight corruption. The “autogolpe” (or self-initiated coup) failed due to unified, strong protests by most elements of Guatemalan society, international pressure, and the army's enforcement of the decisions of the Court of Constitutionality, which ruled against the attempted takeover. Serrano fled the country.

On June 5, 1993, the Congress, pursuant to the 1985 constitution, elected the Human Rights Ombudsman, Ramiro De Leon Carpio, to complete Serrano's presidential term. De Leon, not a member of any political party and lacking a political base but with strong popular support, launched an ambitious anticorruption campaign to “purify” Congress and the Supreme Court, demanding the resignations of all members of the two bodies.

Despite considerable congressional resistance, presidential and popular pressure led to a November 1993 agreement brokered by the Catholic Church between the administration and Congress. This package of constitutional reforms was approved by popular referendum on January 30, 1994. In August 1994, a new Congress was elected to complete the unexpired term.

Under De Leon, the peace process, now brokered by the United Nations, took on new life. The government and the URNG signed agreements on human rights (March 1994), resettlement of displaced persons (June 1994), historical clarification (June 1994), and indigenous rights (March 1995). They also made significant progress on a socioeconomic and agrarian agreement. National elections for president, the Congress, and municipal offices were held in November 1995. With almost 20 parties competing in the first round, the presidential election came down to a January 7, 1996 runoff in which National Advancement Party (PAN) candidate Alvaro Arzu defeated Alfonso Portillo of the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) by just over 2% of the vote. Under the Arzu administration, peace negotiations were concluded, and the government signed peace accords ending the 36-year internal conflict in December 1996. The human rights situation also improved during Arzu's tenure, and steps were taken to reduce the influence of the military in national affairs.

In a December 1999 presidential runoff, Alfonso Portillo (FRG) won 68% of the vote to 32% for Oscar Berger (PAN). Portillo's impressive electoral triumph, with two-thirds of the vote in the second round, gave him a claim to a mandate from the people to carry out his reform program.

Oscar Berger of the Grand National Alliance (GANA) party won the November 9, 2003 presidential election, receiving 54.1% of the vote. His opponent, Alvarado Colom Caballeros of the National Unity for Hope (UNE) party, received 45.9% of the vote.

Alvaro Colom of the National Unity for Hope (UNE) party won the November 4, 2007 presidential election against retired General Otto Perez Molina with 52.8% of the vote versus 47.2%.

GOVERNMENT

Guatemala's 1985 constitution provides for a separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. The 1993 constitutional reforms included an increase in the number of Supreme Court justices from 9 to 13. The reforms reduced the terms of office for president, vice president, and congressional representatives from 5 years to 4 years, and for Supreme Court justices from 6 years to 5 years; they increased the terms of mayors and city councils from 2-1/2 years to 4 years.

The president and vice president are directly elected through universal suffrage and limited to one term. A vice president can run for president after 4 years out of office. Supreme Court justices are elected by the Congress from a list submitted by the bar association, law school deans, a university rector, and appellate judges. The Supreme Court and local courts handle civil and criminal cases. There also is a separate Constitutional Court.

Guatemala has 22 administrative subdivisions (departments) administered by governors appointed by the president. Guatemala City and 331 other municipalities are governed by popularly elected mayors or councils.

Principal Government Officials

Last Updated: 2/1/2008

Pres.: Oscar BERGER Perdomo

Vice Pres.: Eduardo STEIN Barillas

Min. of Agriculture: Bernardo de Jesus LOPEZ Figueroa

Min. of Communication & Public Works: Francisco UNDA

Min. of Culture & Sports: Manuel SALAZAR Tezaguic

Min. of Defense: Ronaldo Cecilio LEIVA Rodriguez, Maj. Gen.

Min. of Economy: Luis Oscar ESTRADA

Min. of Education: Maria ACENA del Carmen

Min. of Energy & Mines: Carmen URIZAR

Min. of Environment & Natural Resources: Juan Mario DARY Fuentes

Min. of External Relations: Gert ROSENTHAL Koenigsberger

Min. of Finance: Mefi Eliud RODRIGUEZ Garcia

Min. of Government: Adela Camacho Sinibaldi de TORREBIARTE

Min. of Labor: Rodolfo COLMENARES Arandi

Min. of Public Health & Social Assistance: Alfredo PRIVADO

Attorney Gen.: Juan Luis FLORIDO

Solicitor Gen.: Luis Alfonso ROSALES

Sec. Gen. of the Presidency: Jorge Raul ARROYAVE Reyes

Pres., Bank of Guatemala: Maria Antonieta del Cid de BONILLA

Ambassador to the US: Guillermo CASTILLO

Permanent Representative to the UN, New York: Jorge SKINNER-KLEE Arenales

The Guatemalan embassy is located at 2220 R Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel. 202-745-4952; email: INFO@Guatemala-Embassy.org). Consulates are in Washington, New York, Miami, Chicago, Houston, San Francisco, Denver, and Los Angeles, and honorary consuls in Montgomery, San Diego, Ft. Lauderdale, Atlanta, Leavenworth, Lafayette, New Orleans, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Juan, Providence, Memphis, San Antonio, and Seattle.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Congressional, municipal, and first-round presidential elections took place on September 9, 2007. The final round of presidential elections took place on November 4, 2007. Inauguration for the new president and the new Congress took place on January 14, 2008.

Common and violent crime, aggravated by a legacy of violence and vigilante justice, presents a serious challenge. Impunity remained a major problem, primarily because democratic institutions, including those responsible for the administration of justice, have developed only limited capacity to cope with this legacy. Guatemala's judiciary is independent; however, it suffers from inefficiency, corruption, and intimidation. In early December 2006, the government and the UN agreed to the creation of the joint International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). On August 1, 2007, the Guatemalan Congress approved the agreement, and on January 11, 2008, Guatemala and the United Nations inaugurated the work of CICIG. An earlier Guatemala-UN agreement was ruled unconstitutional in 2004 before it was acted upon by the Guatemalan Congress. The UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) ceased its 10-year project of monitoring peace accord implementation and human rights problems in November 2004 with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan declaring Guatemala had made “enormous progress in managing the country's problems through dialogue and institutions.”

ECONOMY

After the signing of the final peace accord in December 1996, Guatemala was well-positioned for rapid economic growth over the next several years, until a financial crisis in 1998 disrupted the course of improvement. The subsequent collapse of coffee prices left what was once the country's leading export sector in depression and had a severe impact on rural incomes. On a more positive note, Guatemala's macroeconomic management is sound and its foreign debt levels are modest. The Berger administration (2004-2007) made promotion of foreign investment and competitiveness a priority and implemented a series of reforms to improve transparency, combat corruption, and spur economic growth. As a result of the reforms and implementation of the U.S.Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows increased from $353 million in 2006 to $535 million in 2007.

Guatemala's economy is dominated by the private sector, which generates about 85% of GDP. Agriculture contributes 13.3% of GDP and accounts for 75% of exports. Most manufacturing is light assembly and food processing, geared to the domestic, U.S., and Central American markets. Over the past several years, tourism and exports of textiles, apparel, and nontraditional agricultural products such as winter vegetables, fruit, and cut flowers have boomed, while more traditional exports such as sugar, bananas, and coffee continue to represent a large share of the export market.

The United States is the country's largest trading partner, providing 34.5% of Guatemala's imports and receiving 46.2% of its exports. The government's involvement is small, with its business activities limited to public utilities—some of which have been privatized—ports and airports, and several development-oriented financial institutions.

Guatemala ratified the U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement, commonly known as CAFTA, on March 10, 2005, and the agreement entered into force between Guatemala and the U.S. on July 1, 2006. CAFTA eliminates customs tariffs on as many categories of goods as possible; opens services sectors; and creates clear and readily enforceable rules in areas such as investment, government procurement, intellectual property protection, customs procedures, electronic commerce, the use of sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures to protect public health, and resolution of business disputes.

Other priorities include increasing transparency and accountability in Guatemala's public finances, broadening the tax base, and completing implementation of financial sector reforms. These measures attempt to ensure that Guatemala can comply with the standards of the international Financial Action Task Force for detecting and preventing money laundering.

The United States, along with other donor countries—especially France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and Japan—and the international financial institutions, have increased development project financing since the signing of the peace accords. However, donor support remains contingent upon Guatemalan Government reforms and counterpart financing.

According to the World Bank, Guatemala has one of the most unequal income distributions in the hemisphere. The wealthiest 10% of the population receives almost one-half of all income; the top 20% receives two-thirds of all income. As a result, about 32% of the population lives on less than $2 a day and 13.5% on less than $1 a day. Guatemala's social development indicators, such as infant mortality and illiteracy, are among the worst in the hemisphere. Chronic malnutrition among the rural poor worsened with the onset of the crisis in coffee prices. The United States has provided disaster assistance and food aid in response to natural disasters including Hurricane Stan, which caused extensive mudslides in Guatemala in October 2005.

NATIONAL SECURITY

Guatemala is a signatory to the Rio Pact and is a member of the Conference of Central American Armed Forces (CFAC). Guatemala has deployed its troops to UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti and the Congo and has observers in several other locations. The president is commander in chief. The defense minister is responsible for policy. Day-to-day operations are the responsibility of the military chief of staff and the national defense staff.

An agreement signed in September 1996, which is one of the substantive peace accords, mandated that the mission of the armed forces change to focus exclusively on external threats. However, Presidents Berger, Portillo, and Arzu used a constitutional clause to order the army to temporarily support the police in response to a nationwide wave of violent crime.

The accord calls for a one-third reduction in the army's authorized strength and budget—achieved under President Berger—and for a constitutional amendment to permit the appointment of a civilian Minister of Defense. A constitutional amendment to this end was defeated as part of a May 1999 plebiscite, but discussions on how to achieve this objective continue between the executive and legislative branches. The army has gone beyond its accord-mandated target of reducing its strength to 28,000 troops, and numbered 15,500 troops as of June 2004. Not only was this the most profound transformation of any Central American military in the last 50 years, it also illustrates the effective control the civilian government has over the military. President Berger tasked the Defense Ministry with increasing the professional skills of all soldiers. As part of the army downsizing, the operational structure of 19 military zones and three strategic brigades were recast as several military zones are eliminated and their area of operations absorbed by others. The air force operates three air bases; the navy has two port bases. Additionally, recent steps have been taken to redefine the military's mission—the military doctrine has been rewritten, and there has been an increase in cooperation with civil society to help bring about this reform.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Guatemala's major diplomatic interests are regional security and, increasingly, regional development and economic integration. Guatemala participates in several regional groups, particularly those related to trade and the environment.

The Council of Central American Ministers of Trade meets on a regular basis to work on regional approaches to trade issues. The council signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the U.S. in 1998, and was part of the negotiations that led to the creation of CAFTA. Guatemala joined Honduras and El Salvador in signing a free trade agreement with Mexico in 2000, which went into effect the following year. Guatemala also originated the idea for, and is the seat of, the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN). The U.S and Central American countries signed the CON-CAUSA (Conjunto Centroamerica-USA) agreement at the Summit of the Americas in December 1994. CONCAUSA is a cooperative plan of action to promote clean, efficient energy use; conserve the region's biodiversity; strengthen legal and institutional frameworks and compliance mechanisms; and improve and harmonize environmental protection standards.

Guatemala has a long-standing claim to a large portion of Belize; the territorial dispute caused problems with the United Kingdom and later with Belize following its 1981 independence from the U.K. In December 1989, Guatemala sponsored Belize for permanent observer status in the Organization of American States (OAS). In September 1991, Guatemala recognized Belize's independence and established diplomatic ties, while acknowledging that the boundaries remained in dispute. In anticipation of an effort to bring the border dispute to an end in early 1996, the Guatemalan Congress ratified two long-pending international agreements governing frontier issues and maritime rights.

In 2001, Guatemala and Belize agreed to a facilitation process led by the OAS to determine the land and maritime borders separating the two countries. National elections in Guatemala put a temporary halt to progress, but discussions resumed in November 2005. After being named Foreign Minister in early August 2006, Gert Rosenthal reinvigorated discussions with Belize.

U.S.-GUATEMALAN RELATIONS

Relations between the United States and Guatemala traditionally have been close, although at times strained by human rights and civil/military issues. U.S. policy objectives in Guatemala include:

• Supporting the institutionalization of democracy and implementation of the peace accords;
• Encouraging respect for human rights and the rule of law, and implementation of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG);
• Supporting broad-based economic growth and sustainable development and maintaining mutually beneficial trade and commercial relations, including ensuring that benefits of CAFTA-DR reach all sectors of the Guatemalan populace;
• Cooperating to combat money laundering, corruption, narcotics trafficking, alien-smuggling, and other transnational crime; and
• Supporting Central American integration through support for resolution of border/territorial disputes.

The United States, as a member of “the Friends of Guatemala,” along with Colombia, Mexico, Spain, Norway, and Venezuela, played an important role in the UN-moderated peace accords, providing public and behind-the-scenes support. The U.S. strongly supports the six substantive and three procedural accords, which, along with the signing of the December 29, 1996 final accord, form the blueprint for profound political, economic, and social change. To that end, the U.S. Government has committed over $500 million to support peace implementation since 1997.

Violent criminal activity continues to be a problem in Guatemala, including murder, rape, and armed assaults against persons of all nationalities. In recent years the number of violent crimes reported by U.S. citizens has steadily increased, though the number of Americans traveling to Guatemala has also increased. Most U.S. assistance to Guatemala is provided through the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) offices for Guatemala. USAID/Guatemala's current program builds on the gains of the peace process that followed the signing of the peace accords in December 1996, as well as on the achievements of its 1997-2004 peace program. The current program works to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives by focusing on Guatemala's potential as Central America's largest economy and trading partner of the United States, but also recognizes the country's lagging social indicators and high rate of poverty. The three areas of focus for USAID/Guate-mala's program are modeled after the Millennium Challenge Account areas—ruling justly, economic freedom, and investing in people, and are as follows:

More responsive, transparent governance, through:

• Strengthened justice; and
• Greater transparency and accountability of governments.

Open, diversified and expanding economies, through:

• Laws, policies, and regulations that promote trade and investment;
• More competitive, market-oriented private enterprises; and
• Broader access to financial markets and services.

Healthier, better educated people, through:

• Increased and improved quality of social sector (health and education) investments; and
• Increased use of quality maternal-child and reproductive health services, particularly in rural areas.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials

Last Updated: 2/19/2008

GUATEMALA (E) Ave. Reforma 7-01, Zona 10, APO/FPO APO AA 34024, (502) 2326-4000, Fax (502) 2326-4658, INMARSAT Tel 683133345, Workweek: Mon-Thu: 7:30 to 5:00 p.m.; Fri: 7:30 to 12:30, Website: http://guatemala.usembassy.gov.

Other Contact Information

U.S. Department of Commerce
International Trade
Administration
Trade Information Center

14th and Constitution, NW
Washington, DC 20230
Tel: 800-USA-TRADE
Internet: http://trade.gov.

American Chamber of Commerce in Guatemala
5a avenida 5-55 zona 14 Europlaza,
Torre I Nivel 5
01014 Guatemala City, Guatemala
Tel: (502) 2333-3899
Fax: (502) 2368-3536
E-Mail: trade@amchamguate.com

Caribbean/Latin American Action (C/LAA)
1818 N Street, NW, Suite 310
Washington, DC 20036
Tel.: 202-466-7464

TRAVEL

Consular Information Sheet

October 12, 2007

Country Description: Guatemala has a developing economy, characterized by wide income disparities. Hotels and other tourist facilities in the principal tourist sites most frequented by visitors from the United States are generally good to excellent. A peace accord, signed in 1996, ended a 36-year armed conflict. Violent crime, however, is a serious concern due to endemic poverty, an abundance of weapons, a legacy of societal violence, and dysfunctional law enforcement and judicial systems.

Entry Requirements: A valid U.S. passport is required for all U.S. citizens, regardless of age, to enter Guatemala and to depart Guatemala for return to the U.S. Even if dual nationals are permitted to enter Guatemala on a second nationality passport, U.S. citizens returning to the United States from Guatemala are not allowed to board their flights without a valid U.S. passport. Certificates of Naturalization, birth certificates, driver's licenses, and photocopies are not accepted by Guatemalan authorities as alternative travel documents. While in Guatemala, U.S. citizens should carry their passports, or a photocopy of their passports, with them at all times.

An exit tax must be paid when departing Guatemala by air. The exit tax (currently $30) is generally included in an airline ticket price, but may be charged separately. There is an additional airport security fee (20 Quetzales, approximately $2.50) that all travelers must pay at the airport.

Minors under 18 traveling with a valid U.S. passport need no special permission from their parents to enter or leave Guatemala. U.S. citizens do not need a visa for a stay of 90 days or less (that period can be extended for an additional 180 days upon application to Guatemalan immigration). A U.S. citizen whose passport is lost or stolen in Guatemala must obtain a new passport at the U.S. Embassy as soon as possible and present it, together with a police report of the loss or theft, to the Dirección de Migración (Guatemalan immigration agency), Sub-director de Control Migratorio (Sub-director for Migratory Control), to obtain permission to depart Guatemala. The agency is located in Guatemala City at 6 Avenida 3-11, Zone 4, Guatemala City. Office hours are weekdays from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.; telephone 2411-2411. No fee is charged by Guatemalan immigration for this service.

In June 2006, Guatemala entered a “Central America-4 (CA-4) Border Control Agreement” with El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Under the terms of the agreement, citizens of the four countries may travel freely across land borders from one of the countries to any of the others without completing entry and exit formalities at Immigration checkpoints. U.S. citizens and other eligible foreign nationals, who legally enter any of the four countries, may similarly travel among the four without obtaining additional visas or tourist entry permits for the other three countries. Immigration officials at the first port of entry determine the length of stay, up to a maximum period of 90 days. Foreign tourists who wish to remain in the region beyond the period initially granted for their visit are required to request a one-time extension of stay from local Immigration authorities in the country where the traveler is physically present, or travel outside the CA-4 countries and reapply for admission to the region. Foreigners “expelled” from any of the four countries are excluded from the entire “CA-4” region. In isolated cases, the lack of clarity in the implementing details of the CA-4 Border Control Agreement has caused temporary inconvenience to travelers.

For further information regarding entry, exit and customs requirements, travelers should contact the Guatemalan Embassy at 2220 R Street NW, Washington, DC 20008; telephone (202) 745-4952, extension 102; fax (202) 745-1908; email at info@guatemala-embassy.org or contact the nearest Guatemalan consulate (Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, or San Francisco).

Safety and Security: Violent criminal activity continues to be a problem in Guatemala, including murder, rape, and armed assaults against foreigners. The police force is inexperienced and under-funded, and the judicial system is weak, overworked, and inefficient. Well-armed criminals know there is little chance they will be caught or punished. Traditionally, Guatemala experiences increases in crime before and during the Christmas and Easter holiday seasons.

Large demonstrations occur throughout Guatemala, often with little or no notice, and can cause serious traffic disruptions. Although most demonstrations are peaceful, they can turn violent, and travelers should avoid areas where demonstrations are taking place. The use of roadblocks and/ or blocking of public facilities, including the international airport, has increased and demonstrators may prevent tourists caught behind the blockades from leaving. In 2007 particularly virulent rumors of child stealing and of murder for organ harvesting have been reported in several different areas of Guatemala frequented by American tourists. This year numerous Guatemalan citizens have been lynched for suspicion of child stealing, and three local women who allegedly facilitated foreign adoptions were attacked by a mob that accused them of kidnapping and killing a girl whose mutilated remains were found near Camotan, Chiquimula (near the Honduran border on the main road leading to the Copan Mayan ruins). In reaction to unconfirmed reports of babies being kidnapped in the El Golfete area of the Rio Dulce (near Livingston, Iza-bal), residents of small villages in the area remain mobilized and suspicious of all outsiders, including foreigners.

Also in 2007, two foreigners (including an American citizen) and a Guatemalan kayaking on a river near Chicaman, Quiche were accused of stealing children and seized by a mob estimated at 500 persons. Although threatened, the individuals were not physically attacked. The incident occurred after the group talked and joked with a local boy on the river bank. In Sayaxche, Petén, child stealing rumors escalated into mob action against a Guatemalan couple believed to be involved in child stealing. The husband was beaten and burned to death, and the wife threatened, but eventually turned over to the police. A local American resident was also seized and threatened with death when he tried to intervene with the mob. A family of American tourists, along with several Guatemalan motorists, was held overnight at a road blockade in the same area for possible use as human shields. Mobs have also targeted police, resulting in delayed or ineffective responses by law enforcement.

Due to uncontrolled drug and alien smuggling, the Guatemalan border with Mexico is a relatively high-risk area, in particular in the northern Peten Department. The most dangerous area in that region is on the northwestern border in the area that includes the Sierra de Lacandon and Laguna del Tigre National Parks. Extra precautions are required when U.S. Government personnel travel to the region.

The following recommendations will help residents and visitors alike to increase their safety:

• Avoid gatherings of agitated people. Frustration over crime and a lack of appropriate judicial remedies has led to violent incidents of vigilantism, including lynchings, especially in more isolated, rural areas. Attempting to intervene may put you at risk of attacks from mobs.
• Avoid close contact with children, including taking photographs, especially in rural areas. Such contact can be viewed with deep alarm and may provoke panic and violence.
• Keep informed of possible demonstrations by following the local news and consulting hotel personnel and tour guides. Avoid areas where demonstrations are occurring.
• Beware of strong currents, riptides, and undertow along Guatemala's Pacific Coast beaches. They pose a serious threat to even the strongest swimmers. Signs warning of treacherous surf are rare and confined mostly to private beaches owned by hotels. Lifeguards are rarely present on beaches.

Tourists planning to climb Pacaya and Agua volcanoes during Guatemala's rainy season (May through October) should plan their climb for the morning hours, when it is less likely that thunderstorms will occur. Climbers should monitor the weather situation and return to the base of the volcano as quickly as safely possible if thunderstorms gather. In 2003, a Canadian tourist was killed by lightning while climbing Pacaya. INGUAT, the Guatemalan Tourist Institute, has organized an active community-based tourism program in San Vicente Pacaya to minimize the risk of armed robbery on Pacaya. Climbing in groups is still highly advisable for any volcano climb to reduce the risk of assault.

Security escorts for tourist groups and security information are available from the Tourist Assistance Office of INGUAT (the Guatemalan Tourist Institute) at 7a Avenida 1-17, Zona 4 Centro Civico, Ciudad de Guatemala. INGUAT's ASISTUR division has 24 hour/seven days per week direct telephone numbers for tourist assistance and emergencies, which are (502) 2421-2810 and (502) 5578-9836 and the fax is (502) 2421-2891. ASISTUR also maintains regional offices in all major tourist destinations in Guatemala, and the regional delegates provide rapid and appropriate assistance to crime and accident victims. INGUAT may be reached by its toll free number within the United States at 1-888-464-8281. You may also simply dial 1500 in Guatemala to reach INGUAT Tourist Assistance. The e-mail address is asistur@ inguat.gob.gt. Travelers may also wish to visit INGUAT's web site at http://visitguatemala.com. Tourist groups are advised to request security escorts from INGUAT, Attention: Coordinator of the National Tourist Assistance Program. There have been no incidents of armed robbery of groups escorted through the Tourist Protection Program. The request should be submitted by mail, fax or email and should arrive at INGUAT at least three business days in advance of the proposed travel, giving the itinerary, names of travelers, and model and color of vehicle in which they will be traveling. Travelers should be aware that INGUAT might not be able to accommodate all requests.

For the latest security information, Americans traveling abroad should regularly monitor the Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affair's Internet site at http://travel.state.gov, where the current Travel Warnings and Travel Alerts, including the Worldwide Caution Travel Alert, can be found. Up-to-date information on safety and security can also be obtained by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the U.S., or for callers outside the U.S. and Canada, a regular toll-line at 1-202-501-4444.

Crime: The number of violent crimes reported by U.S. citizens and other foreigners has remained high in recent years. Incidents include, but are not limited to, assault, theft, armed robbery, carjacking, rape, kidnapping, and murder. Criminals often operate in groups of four or more and are confrontational and violent. Gangs are a growing concern in Guatemala City and rural Guatemala. Gang members are often well armed with sophisticated weaponry and they sometimes use massive amounts of force. Emboldened armed robbers have attacked vehicles on main roads in broad daylight. Travel on rural roads always increases the risk of a criminal roadblock or ambush. Widespread narcotics and alien smuggling activities can make remote areas especially dangerous. Though there is no evidence that Americans are particularly targeted, criminals look for every opportunity to attack, so all travelers should remain constantly vigilant.

Most tourists and visitors travel throughout Guatemala without mishap. However, violent criminal activity on the highways continues, and tourists, among others, have been targeted. Many of the robbery attempts have occurred in daylight hours on main highways. Carjacking incidents and highway robberies are often violent. Four Americans were killed in highway robbery attempts in 2002 and three killed and one wounded in 2003. In 2004 one American tourist was murdered, and women and children were raped in highway assaults. Several highway assaults of American citizens also took place in 2005, but without serious injury to the victims. In 2006, there were 19 incidents of assault against Americans in motor vehicles reported to the Embassy, none of which involved death or injury. In nine of these incidents, the victims were arriving at Guatemala City's airport.

In 2007 there has been an increasing number of carjacking incidents and armed robberies of travelers who have just arrived on international flights, most frequently between 6:00 a.m and 10:00 am, but also in the evening. In the most common scenario tourists or business travelers who land at the airport around 7:00 am are held up by armed men as their vehicle departs the airport. Private vehicles, taxis and shuttle buses have been attacked. Typically, the assailants steal money, passports, and luggage, and in some but not all cases, the assailants steal the vehicle as well. Recently, many of these attacks have taken place far from the airport, just as travelers arrived at their homes, or in less busy areas of the city. Laptops are frequently targeted, so carry them inconspicuously in a backpack or other carryon luggage. Victims who did not resist the attackers were not physically injured. The Embassy advises its own employees to seek alternative routes for exiting the airport.

In some cases, assailants have been wearing full or partial police uniforms and have used vehicles that resemble police vehicles, indicating that some elements of the police might be involved. Armed robberies have occurred within minutes of the tourist's vehicle being stopped by the police. U.S. Embassy personnel continue to observe heightened security precautions in Guatemala City and on the roads outside the capital city. U.S. tourists are urged to be especially aware of safety and security concerns when traveling on the roads in Guatemala. Rather than traveling alone, use a reputable tour organization. Stay in groups; travel in a caravan consisting of two or more vehicles; and, stay on the main roads. Ensure that someone not traveling with you is aware of your itinerary. Resist the temptation to stay in hotels that do not have adequate security. Travel after dark anywhere in Guatemala is extremely dangerous. It is preferable to stay in the main tourist destinations. Do not explore back roads or isolated paths near tourist sites. Pay close attention to your surroundings, especially when walking or when driving in Guatemala City. Refrain from displaying expensive-looking jewelry, large amounts of money, laptop computers, or other valuable items. Finally, if confronted by criminals, be aware that resistance may provoke a more violent response.

Avoid low-priced intra-and inter-city buses (recycled U.S. school buses); they are often attacked by armed robbers and are poorly maintained and dangerously driven. More than 100 bus drivers and passengers died in 2006 in robberies staged by holdup gangs that target public transportation, both urban and inter-city. The use of modern inter-city buses some-what improves security and safety. There have been, however, several attacks on travelers on first-class buses on highway CA-2 near the border areas with both Mexico and El Salvador and on highways CA-1 and CA-9 near the El Salvador border and in the highlands between Quetzalt-enango and Sololá. Be cautious with personal items such as backpacks, fanny packs, and passports while riding buses, because tourists’ possessions are a favorite target of thieves.

Foreign residents of Guatemala have special concerns. Since December 1999, when the Government of Guatemala appointed a Special Prosecutor to investigate all American citizen murders, twenty-four American citizen residents and six American citizen tourists have been murdered, and suspects have been convicted in only two cases. There have been “express” kidnappings in recent years, primarily in Guatemala City, in which a relatively small ransom that can be quickly gathered is demanded. U.S. citizens have been kidnapped in recent years. At least one incident of a random kidnapping, in which the victim was grabbed off the street in an affluent neighborhood of the city, occurred in December 2003 and resulted in a physical and sexual assault.

Pickpockets and purse-snatchers are active in all major cities and tourist sites, especially the central market and other parts of Zone 1 in Guatemala City and the city of Antigua. In a common scenario, an accomplice distracts the victim, while an assailant slashes or simply steals a bag or backpack while the victim's attention is diverted.

As in other countries, criminals also use a number of scams to steal money and possessions from tourists in Guatemala. In one popular scam, robbers place a nail in a parked vehicle's tire. The vehicle is then followed by the robbers who pose as “good Samaritans” when the tire becomes flat and the victims pull to the side of the road. While “help” is being rendered, the contents of the car are stolen, often without the knowledge of the victims. However, in some cases, the robbers have threatened the tourists with weapons. Parking areas in and around the Guatemala City International Airport are particularly prone to this crime. In another scam, victims are approached in a hotel, restaurant or other public place by an individual claiming there is some sort of problem with his or the would-be victim's automobile in the parking lot. On the way to investigate the “problem,” usually in a remote or concealed area near the parking lot, the robber pulls a gun on the victim demanding cash, credit cards and other valuables. A third popular scam involves various attempts to acquire a victim's ATM card and PIN number. Some sophisticated criminals have even placed boxes outside ATM kiosks that record PIN numbers when unsuspecting victims believe they must enter their PIN number to gain entry to the ATM foyer. After recording PIN numbers, robbers then steal the owner's ATM card to complete their crime. There are dozens of techniques scammers can use to rob victims of money and possessions. While most people mean no harm, always be cautious when strangers approach you for any reason or make unusual requests.

Parents adopting children in Guatemala have also been victimized in public places and at their hotels by police (or individuals dressed as police) who have threatened to arrest foster mothers and turn adoptive children over to orphanages, but released them in exchange for significant payments, often approaching $1000. Such threats have no basis in Guatemalan law, and should be immediately reported to the Embassy.

For security reasons, the Embassy does not allow U.S. government employees to stay in hotels in Zone 1 in Guatemala City and urges private travelers to avoid staying in this area Do not hail taxis on the street in Guatemala City. Use radio-dispatched taxis or taxis from major hotels instead.

The main road to Lake Atitlan via the Inter-American Highway (CA-1) and Solola is safer than the alternatives, though attacks in recent years have made traveling in a caravan highly recommended, even on the Inter-American Highway. Robbery and assault have been frequently reported on secondary roads near the lake with the highest number of incidents occurring on the RN-11 (Las Trampas road) parallel to the east side of the lake. Robbers have used mountain roads advantageously to stop buses, vans and cars in a variety of ways.

Armed attacks have occurred on roads from Guatemala City to the Peten. Visitors to the Mayan ruins at Tikal are urged to fly to nearby Flores and then travel by bus or tour van to the site. Violent attacks have occurred in the Mayan ruins in the Peten, including in the Cerro Cahui Conservation Park, Yaxha, the road to and inside Tikal Park, and in the Tikal ruins. Tourist police (POLI-TUR) patrols inside the park have significantly reduced the violent crime incidents inside the park, but travelers should nevertheless remain in groups and on the principal trails leading to the Central Plaza and the Temple IV complex, and avoid remote areas of the park.

POLITUR (a joint police/Guatemalan Tourism Institute initiative) is present in all major tourist destinations. They should be contacted in case of any criminal incident in such areas, even if minor.

Information for Victims of Crime: The loss or theft abroad of a U.S. passport should be reported immediately to the local police and the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate. If you are the victim of a crime while overseas, in addition to reporting to local police, please contact the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate for assistance. The Embassy/Consulate staff can, for example, assist you to find appropriate medical care, contact family members or friends and explain how funds could be transferred. Although the investigation and prosecution of the crime is solely the responsibility of local authorities, consular officers can help you to understand the local criminal justice process and to find an attorney if needed.

Medical Facilities and Health Information: A full range of medical care is available in Guatemala City, but medical care outside the city is limited. Guatemala's public hospitals frequently experience serious short-ages of basic medicines and equipment. Care in private hospitals is generally adequate for most common illnesses and injuries, and many of the medical specialists working in them are U.S. trained and certified.

Information on vaccinations and other health precautions, such as safe food and water precautions and insect bite protection, may be obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's hotline for international travelers at 1-877-FYI-TRIP (1-877-394-8747) or via the CDC's Internet site at http://www.cdc.gov/travel/default.aspx. For information about outbreaks of infectious diseases abroad consult the World Health Organization's (WHO) web site at http://www.who.int/en. Further health information for travelers is available at http://www.who.int/ith.

Medical Insurance: The Department of State strongly urges Americans to consult with their medical insurance company prior to traveling abroad to confirm whether their policy applies overseas and whether it will cover emergency expenses such as a medical evacuation.

Traffic Safety and Road Conditions: While in a foreign country, U.S. citizens may encounter road conditions that differ significantly from those in the United States. The information below concerning Guatemala is provided for general reference only, and may not be totally accurate in a particular location or circumstance. Driving in Guatemala requires one's full attention, and safe drivers must take extraordinary efforts to drive defensively to avoid dangerous situations.

Traffic rules are only casually observed. Many drivers do not use their turn signals to alert other drivers. Instead, a common custom is for a driver or passenger to stick a hand out the window and wave it to indicate that they will be taking an unspecified action. Speed limits, lane markings and stop signs are frequently ignored. Passing blindly on winding and/or steep mountain roads, poorly designed surfaces, and unmarked hazards, including frequent landslides and precarious temporary highway repairs, present additional risks to motorists.

Common public transportation is by local recycled school busses, which serve every town in the country. Criminal activity and frequent fatal accidents, however, make the low-priced inter-city buses particularly dangerous. Modern inter-city buses offer some security from highway violence, but armed attacks are increasing, showing that all buses are vulnerable.

Although city streets are lit, secondary and rural roads have little to no illumination. Driving outside of urban areas at night is dangerous and not recommended. The Inter-American Highway (CA-1) and the road from Guatemala City to the Caribbean coast (CA-9) are especially dangerous due to heavy traffic, including large trucks and trailers. There are no roadside assistance clubs, however a roadside assistance force (PROVIAL) patrols most of the major highways in the country. PROVIAL can be contacted by calling 2422-7878. Their vehicles are equipped with basic tools and first aid supplies, and their services are free. Police patrol the major roadways and may assist travelers, but the patrols are sporadic and may be suspended due to budget restraints. For roadside assistance, travelers may call the police by dialing 120 or the fire department by dialing 122 or 123. Cellular telephone service covers most areas frequented by tourists.

Valid U.S. driver's licenses are accepted for the first 30 days of a visit, and international driving permits are accepted in Guatemala for extended stays. Guatemala's road safety authorities are the Department of Transit and the Joint Operations Center of the National Police. Drivers use the right-hand side of the road in Guatemala, and speed limits are posted (in kilometers) depending on the condition of the road. Speed limits are different in rural and urban areas, but are rarely enforced. Drivers often drive at the absolute maximum speed possible for the particular vehicle at the time. These drivers share the road with slow vehicles, some barely able to manage 20 miles per hour, creating a hazardous mix of velocities. Turning right on red is not permitted unless otherwise posted, and drivers must yield when entering a traffic circle. Seat belts must be worn in Guatemala, but there are no laws regarding the use of child safety seats. It is against the law for drivers to operate cellular phones while driving.

People found driving under the influence of alcohol or other drugs are arrested and may serve jail time. In an accident resulting in injury or death, every driver involved is taken into custody and the vehicle(s) impounded until a judge determines responsibility in a re-enactment of the accident.

Visit the web site of Guatemala's national tourist office and national authority responsible for road safety at http://www.inguat.gob.gt or via e-mail at asistur@inguat.gob.gt or info@inguat.gob.gt.

Aviation Safety Oversight: TheU.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has assessed the Government of Guatemala's Civil Aviation Authority as being in compliance with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) aviation safety standards for the oversight of Guatemala's air carrier operations. For more information, travelers may visit the FAA's Internet web site at http://www.faa.gov.

Special Circumstances: A major renovation of the international terminal at La Aurora International Airport in Guatemala City is currently under way. Until completion in late 2007 or early 2008, there is a temporary reconfiguration of arrival and departure vehicle traffic and major construction works inside the terminal.

Guatemalan customs authorities may enforce strict regulations concerning temporary importation into or export from Guatemala of items such as antiquities and other cultural property. It is advisable to contact the Embassy of Guatemala in Washington or one of Guatemala's consulates in the United States for specific information regarding customs requirements. In many countries around the world, counterfeit and pirated goods are widely available. Transactions involving such products are illegal and bringing them back to the United States may result in forfeitures and/ or fines. Non-Guatemalan citizens who wish to marry in Guatemala are required to provide proof of identity and civil status (indicating whether they are single or divorced). Prior notice of the marriage must be given in the Diario de Centro America (Guatemala's Official Record) and any large circulation daily newspaper for fifteen days. The marriage must take place within six months of the publication of the notice.

Disaster Preparedness: Guatemala is a geologically active country. Visitors should be aware of the possibility of earthquakes at any time and the need for contingency plans. There are also four active volcanoes. Volcanic activity, such as that of Fuego Volcano near Antigua in January 2003, and again in January 2006, has on occasion forced evacuations of nearby villages; the January-February 2000 activity of Pacaya Volcano near Guatemala City also briefly closed Guatemala City's international airport. Both the Caribbean and Pacific coasts of Guatemala are also vulnerable to hurricanes and tropical storms from June through November. Mudslides and flooding during the May to November rainy season often kill dozens of people and close roads. General information about natural disaster preparedness is available via the Internet from the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) at http://www.fema.gov.

Criminal Penalties: While in a foreign country, a U.S. citizen is subject to that country's laws and regulations, which sometimes differ significantly from those in the United States and may not afford the protections available to the individual under U.S. law. Penalties for breaking the law can be more severe than in the United States for similar offences. Persons violating Guatemalan laws, even unknowingly, may be expelled, arrested or imprisoned. Penalties for possession, use, or trafficking in illegal drugs in Guatemala are severe, and convicted offenders can expect long jail sentences and heavy fines.

Engaging in sexual conduct with children or using or disseminating child pornography in a foreign country is a crime, prosecutable in the United States.

Children's Issues: For information on international adoption of children and international parental child abduction, see the Office of Children's Issues website at http://travel.state.gov/family.

Registration and Embassy Locations: Americans living or traveling in Guatemala are encouraged to register with the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate through the State Department's travel registration web site and to obtain updated information on travel and security within Guatemala. Americans without Internet access may register directly with the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate. By registering, American citizens make it easier for the Embassy or Consulate to contact them in case of emergency.

The latest security information is available from the Embassy, including its web site, http://guatemala.usembassy.gov. The Consular Section is open for citizen services, including registration, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon and 1:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. Monday through Thursdays and 7:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. Fridays, excluding U.S. and Guatemalan holidays. The second and last Friday of each month are reserved for administrative matters; therefore, routine citizen services are not provided. Emergency services are available at all times. The U.S. Embassy is located in Guatemala City at Avenida La Reforma 7-01, Zone 10; telephone (502) 2-326-4000 during Embassy business hours (8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.), or (502) 2-331-2354 for emergencies during non-business hours; fax (502) 2-332-4353; Internet web site: http://guatemala.usembassy.gov.

International Adoption

September 2007

The information in this section has been edited from a report of the State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Overseas Citizens Services. For more information, please read the International Adoption section of this book and review current reports online at http://travel.state.gov/family.

Disclaimer: The information in this flyer relating to the legal requirements of specific foreign countries is based on public sources and current understanding.

Questions involving foreign and U.S. immigration laws and legal interpretation should be addressed respectively to qualified foreign or U.S. legal counsel.

Alert: The U.S. Embassy in Guatemala has occasionally received reports of Guatemalan police in and around some of the major hotels in Guatemala City attempting to extort money from adopting parents by threatening to take the biological or foster mother and the prospective or adopted child into custody. We know of no legal basis under local Guatemalan law for such actions and encourage all U.S. citizens who encounter similar experiences to report them immediately to their local lawyer and the American Citizens Services section at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City. Please read the Guatemala Country Specific Information at: http://travel.state.gov/ for updated information about security and other local conditions.

Please Note: The U.S. Embassy in Guatemala schedules specific immigrant visa appointment dates and times for all adoption cases and issues “Pink Slips” that contain this information. Prospective adoptive parents are urged not to travel to Guatemala until the “Pink Slip” has been issued.

Patterns of Immigration: Please review current reports online at http://travel.state.gov/family.

Adoption Authority: The Social Services Agency Bienestar Social has been named Hague Convention Central Authority for Guatemala. The Guatemalan Solicitor General's Office (Procuradoría General de la Nación, PGN) is also an adoption authority in Guatemala. Adoptions must be finalized through the PGN.

Eligibility Requirements for Adoptive Parents: Under Guatemalan law, prospective adoptive parents may be married or single and must be at least 18 years old. There are no requirements for an age-difference between the prospective adoptive parent and the child. There are also no disqualifying medical ineligibilities.

Residency Requirements: The Government of Guatemala has no residency requirements for prospective adoptive parents.

Time Frame: Based on the results of a survey conducted by the U.S. Embassy in 2005 of prospective adoptive parents, an adoption of a Guatemalan child takes on average 9 and a half months from start to finish. Since the introduction of the requirement for a second DNA test in August, 2007, up to two weeks of additional processing time should be expected.

Adoption Agencies and Attorneys: Since 1977, adoptions are handled as an administrative matter and attorneys and notaries participate in all aspects of the adoption process within Guatemala. The U.S. based adoption agency serves as the adoptive family's agent, and the Guatemalan attorney serves as an agent for the adoptive family's agency. Therefore, prospective adoptive parents should be kept informed of all aspects of the identification, care, and adoption process of their prospective adoptive children by the U.S. based adoption agency or agent. If prospective adoptive parents have hired an agency in the United States to assist in the adoption, the agency is responsible for keeping them informed about their case. Prospective adoptive parents should ask their agency for the name(s) of their attorney(s) and whether anyone in the attorney's office speaks English, etc. The United States Government is not in a position to inquire on individual adoption cases from the Guatemalan authorities.

Some families have worked directly with an attorney in Guatemala instead of an intermediary agency in the United States. Unfortunately, some parents have experienced problems working directly with Guatemalan attorneys, and prospective adoptive parents are encouraged to research their options before selecting an attorney. The best method of finding a competent attorney is to obtain referrals from families who have had satisfactory experiences working with a specific attorney. The U.S. Government cannot assume responsibility for the professional ability or personal integrity of Guatemalan attorneys.

Adoption Fees: The Solicitor General's office (PGN) does not charge any fees for adoptions. Based on the results of a survey of prospective adoptive parents conducted by the U.S. Embassy in 2005, families should expect to pay an average of $27,000 (in a range from $17,300 to $45,000) to adopt a Guatemalan child. According to Guatemalan press reports, some Guatemalan lawyers charge up to $35,000 for each adoption. One lawyer quoted in the local press said that he earns between $15,000 and $20,000 per adoption.

Adoption Procedures: (The following applies to adoption procedures before the Hague Adoption Convention comes into force in Guatemala on January 1, 2008): Intercountry adoptions in Guatemala are currently processed under a “notarial” system. Please see the Warning above about processing intercountry adoptions in Guatemala at this time. In many cases, Guatemalan attorneys personally take physical custody of and propose potential orphans to U.S. adoption service providers, who in turn offer the child or children to their American client prospective adoptive parents. If the prospective adoptive parents accept the referral they receive from their U.S. agency, the prospective adoptive parents must provide the attorney with a “power of attorney” to act on their behalf to complete the adoption.

In most cases the same attorney represents the birth parent(s), the adopting parent(s) and the child(ren) in the Guatemalan government proceedings. When viewed in comparison to normal U.S. legal procedures, this is a conflict of interest, and prospective adoptive parents should take that into consideration when initiating a Guatemalan adoption.

Prospective adoptive parents must receive receipt of “pre-approval” from the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS/USCIS) office in Guatemala before their attorney can submit their dossier to the Guatemalan authorities. After obtaining clearance from a social worker under the supervision of a family court to proceed with a potential adoption case, the attorney submits the case to the Guatemalan Solicitor General's Office (Procuradoría General de la Nación, PGN) for review.

The PGN reviews the adoption case for signs of fraud or irregularities before providing its approval for the adoption to proceed. Once the PGN approves the case, the Guatemalan attorney (the notary) authorizes the adoption deed and registers it at the Civil Registrar where the child's birth was registered. The Guatemalan birth mother needs to provide final approval for the adoption at the time of the adoption deed. Upon registration of the adoption deed with the Civil Registrar, the adoptive parents in the U.S. are legally responsible for their child(ren). Finally, the Guatemalan attorney requests a second birth certificate listing the new adoptive parents as the legal parents of the child based upon the final adoption. Following issuance of the new birth certificate and submission of other documents, the attorney then requests and receives, normally on the same day, the child's Guatemalan passport. With these final documents, the attorney submits the complete case file, including the 1-600 orphan visa petition, to DHS/USCIS in Guatemala.

Required Documents: The Government of Guatemala reviews adoptions on a case-by case basis and will provide information on necessary documents to the U.S. based adoption agency and/or attorney. The Department of State is not in a position to provide a definitive list of requirements at this time.

Embassy of Guatemala:
2220 R Street, N.W.
Washington, DC. 20008
Tel (202) 745-4952
Fax (202) 745-1908
consul@guatemala-embassy.org

Guatemala also has consulates in Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and San Francisco.

U.S. Immigration Requirements: Prospective adopting parents are strongly encouraged to consult USCIS publication M-249, The Immigration of Adopted and Prospective Adoptive Children, as well as the Department of State publication, International Adoptions. Please see the International Adoption section of this book for more details and review current reports online at http://travel.state.gov/family.

DHS/USCIS Review Of Birth Mother Information And DNA Testing: Problems occur when U.S. citizens are encouraged to adopt children who do not meet the U.S. immigration definition of “orphan.” In some cases, these children may have been obtained by illegal means, perhaps even stolen. The DHS/USCIS office at the U.S. Embassy requires DNA testing in all cases where an identifiable birth mother is alleged to have released the child, because the use of a false birth mother to release “her child” is one method used to circumvent proper relinquishment procedures. Occasionally DHS/USCIS must also interview and investigate the birth mother. DNA tests must be performed by one of the laboratories in the United States approved by DHS. The Embassy contracts with Guatemalan doctors, referred to as panel physicians, to take the samples necessary for the test. Fees for the DNA analysis differ among the laboratories, but range from approximately $400 to $600. Results are generally available within two weeks. After receiving the results, it can take up to 6 weeks for DHS/USCIS to approve the case. The fee for taking the DNA samples is approximately $140, which includes packaging of the samples and courier shipment to the laboratory in the United States.

Effective August 6, 2007, the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala requires a second DNA test, to verify that the adopted child for whom an immigrant visa is being requested is the same child matched at the beginning of the adoption process with the birth parent.

The Embassy is taking this step in response to concerns about the unregulated adoption process in that country. The Embassy already requires one DNA match between a relinquishing parent and prospective adoptive child as part of the immigrant visa process for Guatemalan children adopted by American citizens. This new procedure applies to adoption cases finalized by Guatemalan authorities and submitted to the Embassy on or after August 6, 2007. If the result of the DNA examination results in a negative match, the case will be terminated immediately.

Before Traveling To Guatemala: Before adoptive parents make airline reservations for themselves or for an escort and the child, they should confirm with their Guatemalan attorney or U.S. adoption agency that the consular section has issued the appointment letter (“Pink Slip”) with a specific immigrant visa interview appointment date and time. They should also confirm that:

• If the paperwork was filed in the United States, that the Consular section has received a notice of approval of the 1-600 petition, and the adoptive parent has all required documents for the interview, including the child's Guatemalan passport and has or can obtain prior to the appointment date the medical exam results.
• If the 1-600 will be filed in Guatemala, that the Consular section has received a notice of approval of the I-600A application, and that the DHS/USCIS office has approved the adoption documents and cleared the adoptive family for the appointment (after review of the Guatemalan adoption paperwork). Prospective adoptive parents should review the list of required documents to ensure that they are available for the visa interview, including the child's Guatemalan passport and has or can obtain prior to the appointment date the medical exam results.

U.S. Embassy
Avenida Reforma 7-01, Zona 10
Guatemala City, Guatemala
Email: adoptguatemala@state.gov
Fax at: 011-502-2326-4674
Website:
http://guatemala.usembassy.gov

Additional Information: Specific questions about adoption in Guatemala may be addressed to the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala. General questions regarding intercountry adoption may be addressed to the Office of Children's Issues, U.S. Department of State, CA/OCS/CI, SA-29, 4th Floor, 2201 C Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20520-4818, toll-free Tel: 1-888-407-4747.

Guatemala

The modern republic of Guatemala occupies but a small part of what was the Spanish dominion of that name from the early sixteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth. The colonial Kingdom of Guatemala included several diverse provinces that were often remote from and resentful toward the commercial and bureaucratic elites of the capital. The 1773 destruction by earthquake of the capital city, Antigua Guatemala, and the establishment of a new capital some twenty-five miles away coincided with the emergence of new economic and political forces that would characterize independent Guatemala.

The fragmentation that occurred with independence in 1821 left the state of Guatemala with boundaries approximating the present-day republic, bounded on the west by Mexico, on the south by the Pacific Ocean, on the east by El Salvador and Honduras, and on the north by Mexico, Belize, and the Caribbean Sea.

From a population of less than a million at the time of independence, Guatemala grew at the rate of about 1.3 percent annually during the nineteenth century, and then at rates between 2 and 3 percent annually during the twentieth century. By 2007 its population was more than 12.5 million. Guatemala has always been ethnically diverse, with a substantial indigenous majority, especially Mayas, who have generally been reported at about 60 percent of the total population during the second half of the twentieth century. Spanish is the first language for 56 percent of the population, an indigenous language is the first language for 44 percent. Careful demographic research has suggested that the indigenous population has been undercounted in modern Guatemalan censuses and that in the twentieth century the Indian population grew somewhat more rapidly than the mestizo (Ladino) population.

Guatemala is third in area (42,042 square miles) among the five Central American states, but it has always been the most populous. It has a population density of about 297 inhabitants per square mile with an annual population growth rate of 2.3 percent. In 2002 43 percent of the population was under age fifteen. The literacy rate was about 70 percent, urban population was 42 percent, and annual per capita gross national income was about $2,400.

INDEPENDENCE TO 1850

Guatemala remained loyal to the Spanish crown throughout the difficult years of the Napoleonic wars and their aftermath. The Spanish Constitution of 1812, which allowed more political participation by the creoles of Guatemala City, paved the way for independence. The repressive ruler Captain General José de Bustamante y Guerra (1811–1818) sought to insulate the Kingdom of Guatemala from the war for independence in neighboring Mexico, but a pro-independence sentiment became more open after the restoration of the constitution in 1820. The fiery Pedro Molina led those favoring independence, and when news arrived of the Mexican Plan of Iguala (a plan engineered by Agustín Iturbide for the independence of New Spain), a council of notables in Guatemala City declared the independence of the kingdom on September 15, 1821. Guatemalan conservatives then succeeded in incorporating Guatemala and the other Central American states within Agustín de Iturbide's Mexican Empire in January 1822. When that empire fell little more than a year later, a Central American congress meeting in Guatemala declared its independence and established the United Provinces of Central America. In this turbulent period, however, the province of El Salvador had separated itself from Guatemala, and the state of Chiapas decided to remain with Mexico, leaving the state of Guatemala with approximately its present territorial configuration. (There would be a number of subsequent minor adjustments to its boundaries, most notably the loss of Soconusco to Mexico.)

As the most populous province, Guatemala played a leading role in the Central American federation. It became embroiled in a bitter civil war (1827–1829) when the federal president, Manuel José Arce, a Salvadoran, intervened in the Guatemalan state government, removing its liberal governor, Juan Barrundia, and replacing him with the conservative Mariano Aycinena. When Aycinena usurped the power of the federal government in 1827, Arce resigned and was succeeded by vice president Mariano Beltranena, a Guatemalan and a kinsman of Aycinena. The civil war especially pitted Guatemala against El Salvador, but in the end liberal forces under Honduran General Francisco Morazán triumphed and dealt vindictively with the conservative Guatemalans, exiling most of the leading figures. Barrundia reclaimed the governorship of Guatemala. He was succeeded by Dr. Mariano Gálvez (1831–1838), who, more than any other individual, established the liberal agenda for nineteenth-century Guatemala.

Morazán moved the federal capital to San Salvador in 1834. Under Gálvez, the state of Guatemala launched major liberal reforms consistent with Morazán's policy against the conservative Creole elite of the Guatemalan capital that had inherited much of the economic and social power of the Spanish colony. Strong anticlerical measures reduced the power of the clergy, and the state auctioned off much of the church's land to encourage more rapid export-led economic development. Cochinea, a crimson dye produced mainly around Antigua and Amatitlán, was the leading export, as the British demand for imports for its growing textile industry tied the Guatemalan economy closely to Belize and England. Gálvez also encouraged immigration, and his friendly policy toward northern Europeans, including a massive land grant for an English colonization scheme, caused opponents to charge that he was more sympathetic to foreign than to national interests. Political and judicial reform, notably the adoption of the Livingston civil and penal codes in 1834, in a misguided attempt to replace the traditional Spanish legal system with a modern, English-based system, brought further opposition from lawyers and others. These reforms had created widespread opposition among both the Guatemala City elite and country people by 1836, when a serious cholera epidemic swept the country.

The government's well-intentioned efforts to control the cholera epidemic aroused the rural population, already aggrieved by the liberal reforms and encouraged by an irate clergy. Under the leadership of José Rafael Carrera, a Ladino from Guatemala City who had settled in Mataquescuintla after the civil war, isolated armed uprisings united into a powerful guerrilla insurgency that brought down the Gálvez government on February 1, 1838. Divisions between the liberals hastened the downfall of Gálvez, and when the successor government—strongly influenced by the more radical liberals José Francisco Barrundia and Pedro Molina—failed to meet the expectations of Carrera and his peasant guerrillas, it, too, fell. Carrera imposed a conservative government under Mariano Rivera Paz, who ruled most of the time between 1839 and 1844 and presided over a strong conservative reaction against the liberalism that had followed independence.

Carrera, meanwhile, supported by much of the conservative clergy, built a strong army. He was the real master of the country from 1839 until his death in 1865. While generally insisting on conservative policy, during the 1840s he trusted neither the liberal nor the conservative elites of the capital and tried to rule by using politicians from both factions. He became president of the State of Guatemala in December 1844, and in March 1847, strongly influenced by both conservative states' rights interests and British interests (represented by diplomat Frederick Chatfield), he established the Republic of Guatemala. The other states soon followed in declaring their absolute independence from the now defunct Central American federation.

Liberal ascendancy in the legislature, however, combined with growing popular resistance, forced Carrera from office and into exile in Chiapas in August 1848. Unable to provide effective government or to quell the rural insurgency, the liberals soon turned power over to the military under Colonel Mariano Paredes. Carrera then returned to highland Guatemala with a military force composed mainly of Indians. He quickly regained control of the country and on August 3, 1849, became commander in chief of the Guatemalan army. He consolidated his power in Guatemala with the unequivocal support of the conservatives while pursuing an aggressive policy against other Central American liberals, an effort that culminated in his stunning military victory over the National Army—composed of liberals from all of the states, but among whom José Francisco Barrundia was highly influential—at La Arada on February 2, 1851. On November 6, 1851, Carrera resumed the presidency and on October 21, 1854, formally became president for life, a virtual monarch with few restrictions on his power.

1850 TO 1900

Although strongly conservative and characterized by the active participation of the clergy in the government and legislature, after 1850 Guatemala adopted more liberal economic policies as it accelerated its dependence on agricultural exports and began to pay more attention to infrastructure development. Coffee replaced cochineal as the principal export, and by the end of the conservative era it amounted to 50 percent of all Guatemalan exports. Until his death in 1865, however, Carrera prevented large-scale alienation of Indian lands for the coffee expansion.

Carrera also had a heavy hand in the affairs of his Central American neighbors, intervening directly in Honduras and El Salvador to maintain governments friendly to Guatemalan interests. In 1856–1857 Guatemala sent the largest number of troops to the National War, a campaign in which Guatemala and the other Central American states combined forces to oust the North American freebooter William Walker from Nicaragua. In 1863, in Carrera's final military adventure, Guatemala put down the rising Gerardo Barrios and restored more conservative rule to El Salvador. By 1865 Guatemala had achieved considerable stability and prosperity, but military repression and dictatorial rule had become characteristic of its government.

General Vicente Cerna (1865–1871) succeeded Carrera. He continued Carrera's conservative rule but was less concerned about protecting Indian land and labor from exploitation by coffee and other producers. Thus, the Cerna administration was a transition—especially in economic and social terms—to the period known as la Reforma Liberal that began in 1871.

Liberal opposition to the conservative dictatorship had been largely driven into exile under Carrera except for the presence of Miguel García Granados in the weak Guatemalan legislature. García Granados came from a prominent capital family, so the government tolerated his eloquent liberal oratory, but he could not rally much support in the otherwise repressive environment of Carrera's Guatemala. After Carrera's death, however, more violent opposition began to emerge, especially from Serapio Cruz, who had expected to succeed Carrera, and from coffee planters and liberals in the populous highlands of western Guatemala. After the death of Cruz in 1870, Justo Rufino Barrios emerged as the military leader of the rebellion and Miguel García Granados finally joined it to form a provisional government in March 1871. The rebels defeated Cerna's army at San Lucas Sacatepéquez on 29 June 29, 1871, and marched into the capital on the following day. García Granados became president, but his close ties to the elite of the capital led to a break with Barrios and other highlanders who wanted more sweeping reforms. In the election of 1873 Barrios won the presidency and became the first of a series of strong liberal dictators.

Barrios emphasized economic growth and courted foreign investment to begin the development of railroads and modern ports while greatly expanding the coffee industry. He began the modernization of Guatemala City and Quetzaltenango and represented the coming to power in Guatemala of the liberal-positivist philosophy that would remain dominant until at least 1944. Barrios promoted strongly anticlerical legislation, suppressed the tithe, abolished the regular orders, expropriated church property, and vastly reduced the number of priests in the country; he also established religious liberty, civil marriage and divorce, and state collection of vital statistics. He launched a public education system at all levels and took theUniversity of San Carlos out of the control of the Church, making it the state university and establishing other secondary and normal schools. His educational reforms, however, benefited primarily the upper and middle sectors of Guatemala City and Quetzaltenango. Most rural Guatemalans continued to have little access to education and often now lost their village priests, who formerly had provided some education to parishioners. His restructuring of the university emphasized professional and technical education at the expense of the humanities and liberal arts, another reflection of positivist thinking.

Coffee exports soared as Barrios encouraged the encroachment of Ladino planters on Indian communal lands and made their labor more accessible to planters. He improved the transportation infrastructure for overseas trade and facilitated the formation of banks and other financial institutions to provide credit for economic development and modernization. New ministries of agriculture, development, and education reflected his emphasis on economic growth as well as the increased role of the state. He attracted foreign immigration and investment as German and U.S. influence increased significantly. His administration also codified the laws and promulgated a new constitution in 1879, under which he won reelection in 1880.

In foreign affairs Barrios played an important role in the neighboring states of El Salvador and Honduras, and he settled differences with Mexico at the cost of giving up Guatemalan claims to Soconusco and other parts of Chiapas. He renewed the Guatemalan claim to Belize, however, repudiating the Wyke-Aycinena treaty of 1859 with Great Britain. He also tried to revive the unionist spirit of Francisco Morazán and to reestablish the Central American federation by means of Guatemalan military power. That effort, however, ended abruptly in 1885, when Salvadoran forces defeated the Guatemalan army at Chalchuapa, where Barrios died in battle.

Barrios established a new coffee elite, whose economic base was centered in the western highlands around Quetzaltenango, reducing the power of the Guatemala City merchant elite that had dominated the country since the late colonial period. At the same time, he greatly accelerated exploitation of the indigenous population and moved Guatemala more rapidly into an export-led economy dependent on foreign markets and investment. Although Barrios was celebrated in Guatemalan history as the reformer who ended the long conservative dictatorships of Rafael Carrera and Vicente Cerna, his own dictatorial rule and strengthening of the military established a pattern for subsequent liberal governments that made repression a characteristic of government in Guatemala extending into the twenty-first century. Barrios's personal wealth increased enormously during his rule, especially in comparison with earlier Guatemalan presidents. In this, too, he set a pattern that many of his successors would emulate.

General Manuel Lisandro Barillas (1885–1892), a political favorite from Quetzaltenango, succeeded Barrios and continued most of his development policies. Barrios's nephew, José María Reyna Barrios, succeeded to the presidency in 1892. When he was assassinated in 1898, another Quetzaltenango liberal, Manuel Estrada Cabrera, came to power and remained in office until 1920, his twenty-two-year rule being the longest uninterrupted presidency in Guatemalan history.

1900 TO 1950

Under Estrada Cabrera the liberal emphasis on economic development surged forward, while the political idealism of earlier liberals all but disappeared. Coffee exports continued to expand, but the most notable economic development was the rise of the United Fruit Company (UFCO), which developed the banana industry in Guatemala's lowlands. Its subsidiary, the International Railways of Central America, completed the railway from Guatemala City to the Caribbean, as well as other lines, and developed Puerto Barrios as Guatemala's leading port. UFCO, with its transport subsidiaries, thus achieved the dominant position not only in banana production but also in Guatemala's internal and external transportation systems. While UFCO gave Guatemala much of the material progress that liberals had advocated since the 1820s, its enormous economic strength, its abuses of its power, its virtual monopoly over Guatemalan overseas transport, and its obviously foreign character made many Guatemalans resentful throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

Despite great economic advancement, the harsh repression, uneven economic gains, and corrupt government under Estrada Cabrera exposed his regime to rising opposition. His mental deterioration after 1918 contributed to the success of a plot that forced him from office in April 1920. The new Unionist Party took power under the presidency of a leading businessman, Carlos Herrera, but in 1921 that government fell and Liberal Party generals José María Orellana (1921–1926) and Lázaro Chacón (1926–1930) ruled Guatemala for the remainder of the decade.

Despite their military appearance, the governments of the 1920s were more open and democratic than the Estrada Cabrera dictatorship that preceded them. For the most part, political participation was limited to rivalry among different segments of the elite, but labor unions and leftist parties, although not free from some repression, began to organize and gain some adherents. There was also continued economic growth, although most rural Guatemalans saw little of it, and as coffee and other agricultural exports expanded along with a more rapidly rising population, there began to be shortages of land for food production in some areas. The coffee elite retained strong control through alliance with the military, and fear of the major revolution taking place in adjacent Mexico kept them on guard against any genuine transfer of political power from the elite to the middle or working classes.

The Great Depression sharply arrested the modest progress of the 1920s. The value of coffee exports plummeted from $34 million in 1927 to $9.3 million in 1932. By 1931 there were serious economic and social problems arising from declining exports and insufficient attention to subsistence agriculture. President Chacón became gravely ill, and upon his death in December 1930 the Assembly designated a civilian, Baudilio Palma, to succeed him. Palma served only four days, however, before a military coup replaced him with General Manuel Orellana on December 16. In an effort to restore at least a semblance of constitutional government, however, Orellana resigned on January 2, 1931, turning the office over to José María Reina Andrade, who had been one of Estrada Cabrera's ministers and was now serving as president of the Assembly. Reina Andrade served until a pro forma election could be held; the Liberal Party candidate General Jorge Ubico y Castañeda was overwhelmingly elected and took office on February 14, 1931.

Ubico built a strong political machine based not only on his military command but also on close alliance with the giant UFCO and with German coffee interests, at least until the outbreak of World War II, when he quickly abandoned his pro-German stance and made Guatemala the first Latin American country to join the United States in declaring war against Germany. He began this regime with a strong crackdown on communist and other leftist labor and political groups, assuring the elite that he was protecting them from the kind of revolution that was occurring in Mexico or the brief communist uprising that had occurred in El Salvador in January 1932. A ruthless purge of these opposition political parties rendered them impotent during Ubico's thirteen-year rule as their leaders suffered execution or exile. Ubico also strongly supported the system of ensuring the coffee planters an adequate supply of cheap Indian labor for their harvests. He abolished debt peonage in 1934, but replaced it with a system based on a vagrancy law that required the peasants to work on the coffee farms in a system resembling the colonial repartimiento. It also provided workers for Ubico's ambitious road-building program. He reduced Indian autonomy by a new system of municipal government that replaced the Indian mayors with presidential appointees.

THE GUATEMALAN REVOLUTION

Opposition to the dictatorship began to surface during World War II. A strong anti-Fascist U.S. propaganda program attacking antidemocratic regimes, although directed against the Axis powers, had the effect of undermining the Ubico dictatorship in Guatemala. In addition, Ubico's expropriation of German-owned property in collaboration with the United States, although applauded by many Guatemalans who benefited by acquiring those properties and who had found the German "gringos" overbearing, nevertheless cost Ubico the support of a significant part of the coffee elite and resulted in a decline in Guatemalan coffee production. Moreover, wartime inflation hit the middle class hard. It was from this class, especially in the capital, that the most vocal opposition came, as university students began to stage demonstrations against the regime.

Opposition from students and intellectuals and other middle-class interests in the capital began to appear in 1942. After some street violence, Ubico, in ill health, stepped down on July 1, 1944, and turned power over to a loyal military junta. The Congress subsequently elected the head of the junta, General Federico Ponce Vaides, as provisional president. When Ponce could not check the rising opposition, a band of civilians and middle-grade military officers forced the downfall of the regime on October 20, 1944. Major Francisco Arana, Captain Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, and a civilian, Jorge Toriello, formed a junta that presided over the country until the inauguration of the new president, elected in December 1944. In the meantime, a constituent assembly wrote a modern constitution that codified the ideals of the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944.

In the last years of Ubico's rule, in the more complex Guatemalan socioeconomic environment that the liberal economic growth had fostered, several new political parties representing disgruntled elite as well as middle-class and working-class interests formed underground. Most of these parties agreed on the candidacy of Juan José Arévalo, a young philosophy professor who had left Guatemala in protest against the Ubico dictatorship in 1934, soon after receiving his doctorate in Argentina. He had returned to Argentina and spent little of his adult life in Guatemala, but he had established a reputation as a learned man and one who had broken with Ubico. He won the 1944 presidential election in a landslide and began a six-year term dedicated to reforms that reflected both his Argentine experience and some obvious influence from the Mexican Revolution.

As had been the case in Mexico, the Guatemalan Revolution called for a return to the more idealistic liberalism of the early nineteenth century. It emphasized broader political participation, particularly of the middle and working classes, and was therefore friendly to renewed labor organization and a broad spectrum of political parties. It emphasized constitutional government, and the Constitution of 1945 was a twentieth-century charter that included many of the earlier liberal political guarantees while adding substantial social guarantees drawn from the Mexican Constitution of 1917. No reelection of the president and popular suffrage were important principles in reaction to the practice of continuismo under Estrada Cabrera and Ubico. Its strong support of labor required implementation of a modern labor code. There was also a hint of anticlericalism, bringing the opposition of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, which had begun to enjoy something of a rapprochement with the state under Ubico. The Church would become one of the most important opponents of the revolutionary governments of Arévalo and Arbenz.

Arévalo idealistically described his ideology as "spiritual socialism." Opponents railed against the revolutionary government as communist, but more accurately it was an attempt to encourage enlightened capitalism in Guatemala with adequate provision for social justice and a healthier distribution of wealth. Its duration under Arévalo (1945–1950) and his successor, Jacobo Arbenz (1951–1954), nevertheless represented a revolution in the sense of challenging the exclusive power of the coffee and military elites that had ruled since 1871. The phrase "Ten Years of Spring" has become common among those who have written on the period to reflect the emphasis on popular participation and social benefits in comparison with the periods both before and after.

Labor especially benefited from the revolution. The assembly abolished the vagrancy law of 1934. The new labor code provided a broad range of progressive rights to workers and their unions, but tangible benefits were much greater for urban than for rural workers. Marxists were in the vanguard of urban labor unions. Although Arévalo tolerated them, he made it clear that he was not their leader as he resisted Marxist attempts to establish a formal Communist Party. Arévalo, in fact, was one of a number of noncommunist social democratic leaders in the Caribbean region after World War II who represented what was often called the "democratic Left" in attempting to bring the emerging middle classes into more active participation in government and to provide a better distribution of wealth in their countries. Other notable members of this generation included José Figueres of Costa Rica, Juan Bosch of the Dominican Republic, and Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela.

THE ARBENZ PRESIDENCY

A struggle over succession in the election of 1950 moved Guatemala more sharply to the left and led ultimately to the downfall of the revolution. Rivals for the presidency were the two military leaders of the 1944 revolt, Francisco Arana and Jacobo Arbenz. The more conservative Arana commanded the army and had protected the revolution by putting down a score of attempted coups. Arbenz, more to the left, was minister of defense and closer to Arévalo. When Arévalo and Arbenz suspected Arana of plotting a coup of his own, the assassination of Arana at Amatitlán in July 1949 paved the way for Arbenz's easy victory in the 1950 election. But Arana's murder also triggered the most serious military coup attempt of Arévalo's administration. The growth of organized labor played a significant role here as a general strike in support of the government contributed to the coup's failure. In the election, Arbenz defeated General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, Ubico's minister of public works, who felt forced to flee the country in the face of rising violence during the election campaign.

Arbenz's election shifted the revolution markedly toward the left, especially with his strong rhetoric against UFCO and his talk of land reform. UFCO had responded to the threat with an active public relations campaign that marshaled U.S. public and government opposition to the Arbenz administration. Arbenz, much influenced by his wife, María Christina Vilanova de Arbenz, played into the hands of those opposing him by allowing communists openly to organize a party and by establishing a close relationship with the Marxist labor unions. The Guatemalan communist newspaper, Octubre, added fuel to the fire with its blatantly pro-Soviet and Marxist reporting. All this coincided with the election to the U.S. presidency of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who appointed the zealous anticommunist John Foster Dulles as secretary of state.

Arbenz's agrarian reform act of June 27, 1952, Decree 900, laid the foundation for a program of expropriation of large landholdings that seemed to be aimed especially at UFCO, although it focused primarily on distributing public lands. Virtually no land in the highlands was touched by the act. Only 15 percent of the 650,000 acres owned by UFCO was marked for expropriation, but there was immediately a major dispute over Guatemalan compensation for this land, the government offering little more than $600,000 and the company claiming a value of almost $16 million.

The United States launched a diplomatic offensive against the Arbenz government in 1953, followed by a covert scheme of the Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow the regime in 1954 through its support of a small Guatemalan exile force commanded by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. Opposition to Arbenz within Guatemala was on the rise, although he still enjoyed wide popularity among urban labor and some elements of the middle class, despite his resort to widespread repression of opponents after 1953. Success of the CIA scheme, however, depended on the refusal of the Guatemalan army to defend the Arbenz regime. The army thus remained the arbiter of Guatemalan politics, as it had been since the 1840s, but in this case it was strongly supported by the agricultural and commercial elite and the Roman Catholic hierarchy.

THE 1960S

The overthrow of Arbenz marked the beginning of one of the darkest periods in Guatemalan history, as a strong reaction against the revolutionary reforms under the presidency of Castillo Armas (1954–1957) resulted in the suppression of the labor movement and the repeal or non-enforcement of much of the social reform legislation, including agrarian reform. With strong U.S. backing, Castillo Armas and his National Democratic Movement (MDN) set the tone for the next thirty years of military rule. The communists and other leftists, to some degree united in the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), were outlawed and went underground. Divisions among the military, however, hindered the stability that might have been expected. After Castillo Armas was assassinated in July 1957, intense rivalry among the various military factions was accompanied by considerable corruption. Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes finally emerged triumphant with hisNational Redemption Party in the election of 1958. Ydígoras served until 1963.

Ydígoras attempted to restore the traditional Liberal Party oligarchy—greatly expanded with new agricultural and industrial enterprises resulting from large-scale U.S. investment encouraged by the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations—while paying lip service to the middle-class and working-class interests stimulated by the Arévalo and Arbenz policies. He cooperated in the establishment of the Central American Common Market (CACM), which served the Guatemalan economy well. Less repressive than Castillo Armas, Ydígoras ran into difficulty when the Cuban Revolution alarmed right-wing Guatemalans. Ydígoras personally led the troops in putting down a Cuban-supported revolt in November 1960, but remnants of those insurgents escaped into the hills of eastern Guatemala, organized the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and launched a guerrilla war that continued into the 1990s. This activity, together with Ydígoras's apparent willingness to allow Arévalo's candidacy in the approaching 1963 presidential election, led to his overthrow by Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, who ruled the country from 1963 to 1966.

Peralta attempted to create a broader base of support for his Democratic Institutional Party (PID), which he compared to the corporate Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). He also intensified the anticommunism campaign and became heavily involved in efforts to suppress the leftist guerrillas. Peralta's Constitution of 1965 provided a framework for cooperation between the PID and Mario Sandoval Alarcón's National Liberation Movement (MLN)—successor to Castillo Armas's MDN—on the right and the Revolutionary Party (PR)—successor to Arévalo's Revolutionary Action Party (PAR)—on the moderate left. Out of this arrangement came a relatively free election, although it was restricted to those three parties. Violence soared as right-wing death squads murdered labor and leftist leaders and the guerrillas stepped up their campaign against government forces.

Not long before the election, the PR candidate, Mario Méndez Montenegro, was probably assassinated (although his death appeared to be a suicide). His brother, Julio César Méndez Montenegro, succeeded him as the PR candidate and with strong reformist support won the election. Widespread popular demonstrations were expected if he were not allowed to take office. The PID accepted his presidency after Méndez gave secret assurance that the army leaders would retain their power, thereby precluding any real change. The repression thus continued, with strong U.S. counterinsurgency support in an effort to defeat the guerrillas, who were gaining adherents in the countryside although they controlled relatively little territory. A campaign of calculated terror led by Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio spread violence and lack of respect for human rights over the land as the army murdered thousands of people suspected of aiding the guerrillas. While Méndez enjoyed the distinction of completing his four-year term as the only civilian president of Guatemala between 1950 and 1985, he was unable to change the basic pattern of military rule and growing violations of human rights.

The FAR, led by Luis Turcios Lima until his death in a car accident in 1966, was the principal guerrilla group, but in 1965 it divided, with Marco Antonio Yon Sosa breaking away to form the November 13 Revolutionary Movement (MR-13). Yon Sosa died in a clash with Mexican troops in 1970, but both groups continued to harass the army. Some believed the army would not completely destroy the guerrillas because their presence justified continued high appropriations and other benefits for the military. In the 1970s two new guerrilla groups emerged: the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), which tended to replace the FAR, especially in the western highlands where it tried to mobilize the indigenous peoples, and the Organization of the People in Arms (OPRA).

1970–1985

Arana Osorio, the PID candidate in 1970, campaigned openly on an anticommunist platform that promised more repression. With the PR discredited, the Guatemalan Christian Democratic Democracy party (DCG) became the principal legal opposition to the military but was still too weak to have much of a chance; the PID easily won a controlled election in which fewer than half the registered voters participated. In the 1974 election General Kjell Laugerud continued PID domination of the country but faced a stiff challenge from a DCG-led coalition that nominated a conservative military officer, General Efraín Ríos Montt. Confronted with obvious and widespread electoral fraud, the DCG claimed to have won, but the official results gave Laugerud the victory. Laugerud, the son of a Norwegian immigrant, had been Arana's chief of staff. He moderated the repressive appearance of the previous administration somewhat, although it remained a military dictatorship. There was some increase in labor union organization and opposition political activity, allowing the Christian Democrats in particular to gain ground. A devastating earthquake in February 1976 created special problems for his administration, but he met the opposition's political activities with new repressive tactics.

In 1978 General Romeo Lucas García of the PID succeeded to the presidency in another fraudulent election in which voter abstention reached new heights (see Table 1). Although by the early 1970s the expanding population and increased agricultural export production were contributing to rising poverty in Guatemala, the economy also made impressive gains owing to diversification of agricultural export production and industrial expansion. In Guatemala City business continued to expand and the growing middle class enjoyed affluence despite serious inflation. The petroleum crisis of the 1970s was less damaging to Guatemala than to many other Latin American states because of the exploitation of small but significant oil reserves in the Petén.

The military elite had begun to enter the economy in a major way. Not only did the generals receive enormous salaries when they served as president, but they used their position to acquire private companies, large landholdings, and monopolistic concessions. They established their own bank (Banco del Ejército) as another institutional base for their economic interests. The corruption associated with this economic expansion and the wealth of these military officers reached obscene proportions in a country beset with staggering poverty among the majority of its population. Combined with the earthquake, the general downturn in the international economy had by the early 1980s caused falling prices for Guatemalan coffee, cotton, and sugar exports, while domestic inflation increased. Guatemala's trade deficit rose from $63 million in 1980 to $409 million in 1981.

Meanwhile, Lucas and the right-wing death squads launched a brutal policy of genocide against indigenous peoples suspected of supporting or joining the guerrillas, as Guatemala became notorious for its human rights violations. As the generals continued to seize large tracts of land, thousands of Indians fled to large refugee camps in Chiapas. All this focused unfavorable attention on Guatemala and damaged the important tourist trade. President Jimmy Carter sought to distance the United States from the Guatemalan military, ending official military aid altogether. Yet Carter's human rights policy only hardened the resolve of the Guatemalan officers to deal violently with the Left and even with moderate progressives such as the Christian Democrats. Guatemala simply made up for a partial cutoff of U.S. arms sales with arms and advisers from Israel. Terror and assassination took a horrifying toll among labor leaders and University of San Carlos students and faculty. Meanwhile, the general economic level of the population worsened. Following the 1982 rigged election of another PID general, Ángel Aníbal Guevara, several younger officers, supported by elements in both the extreme right-wing MLN and the DCG, engineered a coup that prevented him from taking office, ousting Lucas during the last days of his term and replacing him with a junta headed by General Ríos Montt. The elevation of Ríos Montt to the presidency reflected not only an end to the long domination by the PID but also the phenomenal rise of evangelical Protestantism in Guatemala, for General Ríos Montt was a minister of the California-based evangelical Church of the Word. Evangelical Protestantism had grown remarkably since about 1960, and an estimated 20 percent of Guatemala's population were Protestants by 1980. In contrast to the new Catholic evangelism in the country, often associated with "liberation theology" and the political Left, most of the Protestants were conservative and identified with pro-U.S. policies.

Ríos Montt's brief presidency served as a transition away from direct military rule. Superficially there was a noticeable effort to curb corruption and to encourage a higher degree of ethics in government. More impressive was the decline of death-squad activities and the restoration of security and peace in the central highlands. Political assassinations in the cities virtually ceased and the decline of tourism, to which the violence had contributed, was reversed for a time. Yet the economic and military strength of the powerful generals who had ruled the country since 1954 could not be easily turned back. Ríos Montt was in no sense sympathetic to leftist interests. He and the officers he represented were concerned with preserving the privileged position of the military and perceived that military abuses and corruption threatened the institution. In the countryside, Ríos Montt stepped up efforts to defeat the guerrillas. Massacres of Indian communities continued, as did the flow of refugees into Mexico. His government inaugurated a system of civil patrols, requiring Indians to serve, usually without firearms, as guardians against the guerrillas. Those who refused were killed. Ríos Montt also suspended the constitution, restricted labor unions, and prohibited the functioning of political parties in his effort to maintain order. In response, the leftists united in the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG), an umbrella organization for the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), FAR, EGP, and OPRA.

Ríos Montt's challenge to the military oligarchy, his constant moralistic preaching, the excessively large role of North American Protestants in his advisory councils, the imposition of a sales tax, and his meddling with powerful economic interests ensured that his regime was short-lived. In August 1983 another coup replaced him with defense minister General Óscar Humberto Mejía Victores. Cynicism, corruption, and anticommunismwere themost conspicuous characteristics of the Mejía government, with commitment to the same neoliberal policies on behalf of the elites that had characterized Guatemalan governments since 1954. However, concerned over their image and dismayed at their failure to manage the complex economic and social problems besetting the country, the military officers decided to turn the government over to civilians. International pressure from human rights activists, a sharp decline in tourism, falling coffee prices, and the military government's inability to solve Guatemala's severe economic problems all contributed to the army's decision to permit a free election and to turn over the presidency to a civilian.

Elections for a constitutional convention on July 1, 1984, again reflected widespread voter apathy, despite the participation of seventeen political parties. Under the resulting 1985 constitution, a free election was held and Guatemala was hailed for its "conversion" to civilian democracy after some three decades of military domination. A multitude of political parties ranging from extreme right to center vied for the presidency, while the left remained outside the legal political spectrum. A runoff between the top contenders resulted in the victory of a center-right and U.S.-backed Christian Democrat, Vinicio Cerezo. Popular participation in the election surged upward after years of declining voter turnout under the military regimes. A wave of optimism accompanied Cerezo's inauguration in January 1986, even though it was understood that he was strictly limited in his approach to the state's socioeconomic problems by the ultimate authority of the army.

1986–2007

Cerezo achieved some foreign policy successes as he established himself as a leader in the Central American peace process in alliance with Costa Rican president Óscar Arias. These efforts helped to end Nicaragua's civil war and bring about a free election there in 1990, opened talks between the governments and guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala, and laid the foundations for the Central American Parliament and a Central American summit conference to foster greater economic and political integration of the isthmus. Cerezo also moved toward resolution of Guatemala's long-smoldering dispute over sovereignty in neighboring Belize.

In domestic affairs, however, Cerezo ran into formidable obstacles. The new constitution emphasized open political dialogue and freedom of the press, yet the real power remained with the military. Furthermore, Cerezo not only failed to solve serious socioeconomic ills but saw them worsen considerably. During his administration labor and peasant participation in the political process remained weak. The deteriorating economy contributed to an increase in the level of violence, not only from the guerrillas but also from right-wing death squads, the military, personal vendettas, and rising common crime. Declining prices for Guatemalan exports, especially coffee, exacerbated the economic decline until a freeze in Brazil reversed the downward trend. The heavy foreign debt made balancing the budget impossible, especially when the government expanded the bureaucracy and appeared to tolerate widespread corruption and scandal.

Devaluation of the currency contributed to greater poverty during Cerezo's administration as inflation outran wages. Strikes and other work stoppages, especially in the public sector, seriously damaged government services. The Christian Democrats had appealed to middle-class and lower-class voters with promises of more social and economic benefits, but Cerezo's government carefully catered more to business interests, the military, and U.S. and international banking interests regarding the debt. Although it refused to turn over as much of the national resources to private ownership as U.S. advisers recommended, it privatized the national airline, Aviateca, and generally pursued conservative austerity programs in which the gap between rich and poor widened without reducing the debt significantly.

Ineligible for reelection (a legacy of the 1944 reaction to long dictatorships of the past), Cerezo left office in 1991. Popular rejection of his Christian Democratic administration was obvious when the DCG received but a small minority of the popular vote in the November 1990 election. In a runoff between two conservative candidates on January 6, 1991, Jorge Serrano Elías won in a landslide, defeating newspaper editor Jorge Carpio Nicolle by a two-to-one majority. Serrano, of the relatively unknown Solidarity Action Movement (MAS), gained many votes from those supporting Ríos Montt, who had been ruled ineligible because of the constitutional ban on candidates who had participated in a military revolt. A born-again Christian like Ríos Montt, Serrano became the first Protestant elected president in Latin American history. He promised to establish a social pact involving business, government, and labor. Voter apathy was again high, however, with 44 percent of the 3.2 million registered voters refusing to cast ballots in the November election and 54 percent abstaining in the runoff.

Serrano was careful not to antagonize the military, but as violence rose from both left and right, there was growing pessimism about his chances for success. In September 1991 a devastating earthquake, killing fifty-three and leaving thirty thousand homeless, aggravated the socioeconomic problems. Serrano, an industrial engineer, pursued neoliberal economic policies and was more acceptable to the conservative power structure than Cerezo, but was unable to cope with the rising opposition. In May 1993 he seized dictatorial power in what some called a "self-coup," disbanding the Congress and all political parties. Massive protests followed and the Congress refused to disband. When the army failed to back Serrano, he resigned on June 1. Congress chose Ramiro de León Carpio, the human rights ombudsman, as interim president. The military accepted this but insisted on their right to choose the minister of defense, making clear that the army still held ultimate authority in Guatemala. The military was suspected in the subsequent assassination of León Carpio's cousin, Jorge Carpio, the former presidential candidate.

Shifting political alliances brought new political coalitions in the 1990s that reduced the DCG and the Union of the National Center (UCN) to minor party status. Under the leadership of Álvaro Arzú, the neoliberal National Advancement Party (PAN) won the support of several center-right parties to form a congressional majority in 1995. Arzú had been popular as mayor of Guatemala City and was foreign minister under Serrano until he resigned in protest against Serrano's efforts to normalize relations with Belize. More extreme right-wing parties, meanwhile, joined with Ríos Montt and his Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG). Once again the courts denied Ríos Montt's eligibility to run for president, so Alfonso Portillo took his place as the FRG candidate in the November 1995 election. In a runoff the following January, Arzú narrowly defeated Portillo to become the new president. Voter abstention had again become serious as only about a third of the registered voters participated in this election.

Arzú's government followed strongly neoliberal policies with significant economic growth and the rejuvenation of the Central American Common Market, but his principal achievement was the conclusion of agreements with the guerrillas to end Guatemala's long civil war. The formal peace accord was signed in Guatemala City on December 29, 1996, although implementation of its provisions dragged on for years. The army accepted the accords along with dismissal of military officers accused of human rights violations. Yet the 1998 assassination of Bishop Juan Gerardi, who had published a detailed account of the atrocities committed during the thirty-six-year civil war and the failure of the government to stem the continued violence, highlighted the persistence of human rights abuses.

As Guatemala entered the twenty-first century violence and human rights abuses still haunted the country. Indigenous Guatemalans, however, had notably increased their representation in the government and had formed their own political party, the National Civic Political Forum of Mayan Unity and Fraternity (EPUM). It was the compassionate voice of an indigenous Quiché woman, Rigoberta Menchú, that brought the plight of the Guatemalan people to worldwide attention, increasing international pressure on the Guatemalan government to end the conflict by negotiating with the rebels. Menchú received the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize "in recognition of her work for social justice and ethno-cultural reconciliation." Menchú led efforts to prosecute those guilty of human-rights abuses and in 2007 she would declare her candidacy for the presidency of Guatemala.

In 1999 Portillo was again the candidate of the FRG and with Ríos Montt's backing defeated Guatemala City mayor Óscar Berger (PAN), winning 68 percent of the vote in the December 26 runoff and taking office in January 2000. Despite economic growth, the violence and widespread poverty in the country contributed to increased emigration to Mexico and the United States. Remittances to relatives remaining in Guatemala came to be a major source of foreign exchange for the country, second only to coffee export income. During Portillo's administration Guatemala also became a major clandestine exporter of illegal drugs to the United States. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency repeatedly claimed that Guatemala was a transfer point for Colombian heroin and cocaine, and Portillo agreed to allow U.S. military and other special agents to operate within Guatemala against the drug dealers.

Reports of corruption eroded support for Portillo, especially a legislative report in 2001 known as Guategate that resulted in twenty-four indictments, including one against Ríos Montt. Although the courts later exonerated Ríos Montt, there continued to be charges of government corruption and financial mismanagement. Attention to these problems as at least temporarily diverted by the visit of Pope John Paul II to Guatemala in July 2002, when he canonized the seventeenth-century friar, Pedro de San José Betancur, the only Central American ever to achieve sainthood in the Roman Catholic Church.

The FRG had little credibility left by the November 2003 election, but the Court of Constitutionality had finally ruled that Ríos Montt could be a candidate for the presidency. He was unable, however, to overcome the failing reputation of his FRG party and he finished well behind óscar Berger of the rightist coalition Grand National Alliance (GANA) and Álvaro Colom of the leftist coalition National Unity of Hope (UNE). In the December runoff, Berger won with 54 percent of the votes and took office on January 14, 2004. Berger continued the neoliberal agenda and promised greater productivity and a pledge to increase employment, emphasizing the need to improve the lot of Guatemala's indigenous majority. He recognized former governments' responsibility for much of the country's violence when he ordered compensation to peasants for lands and lives lost during the civil war, and he named Rigoberta Menchú to supervise implementation of the 1996 peace accords. He also reduced the size of the army, shifting some military personnel to the National Police in an effort to attack the continuing high rates of murder, violence against women, kidnappings, and violations of civil rights.

Rising coffee prices by 2005 and more diversification in manufacturing and agriculture created new jobs and more economic activity. There were improvements, too, in public health, thanks especially to considerable aid from the Cuban government, which equipped six new hospitals in Guatemala and sent physicians and other medical personnel to staff them. Cuba also provided scholarships for hundreds of Guatemalans to study medicine in Havana. The infant mortality rate in Guatemala dropped sharply and the occurrences of many epidemic diseases was significantly reduced. The neoliberal policies of the government, while controversial, moved Guatemala into a globalized economy, while the traditional dominance of the military in Guatemalan history appeared to be diminishing.

See alsoArana, Francisco J; Arana Osorio, Carlos; Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo; Arce, Manuel José; Arévalo Bermejo, Juan José; Aycinena, Mariano de; Barrundia, José Francisco; Bustamante y Guerra, José; Carrera, José Rafael; Castillo Armas, Carlos; Central America; Central American Common Market (CACM); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Cerezo Arévalo, Marco Vinicio; Cerna, Vicente; Chacón, Lázaro; Cruz, Serapio; Estrada Cabrera, Manuel; Galván Rivera, Mariano; García Granados, Miguel; Guatemala, Audiencia of; Iturbide, Agustín de; Lucas García, Fernando Romeo; Mejía Victores, Oscar Humberto; Menchú Tum, Rigoberta; Méndez Montenegro, Julio César; Molina, Pedro; Morazán, Francisco; North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Orellana, José María; Paredes, Mariano; Peralta Azurdia, Enrique; Plan of Iguala; Reyna Barrios, José María; Ríos Montt, José Efraín; Serrano Elías, Jorge Antonio; Ubico y Castañeda, Jorge; United Fruit Company; Wyke-Aycinena Treaty (1859); Ydígoras Fuentes, Miguel; Yon Sosa, Marco Antonio.

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                                Ralph Lee Woodward Jr.