ROUSSEAU, JEAN-JACQUES

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), who was born in Geneva on June 28 and died on July 2 in Paris, was a self-taught genius who became the leading critic of the Enlightenment vision of an essential harmony between science and society, technology and ethics. As a mid-century member of a circle of intellectuals working on the Encyclopédie, a comprehensive attempt to synthesize scientific knowledge and technological skills for social utility, Rousseau's questioning nevertheless had the effect of contributing to the French Revolution and extending modernity.

Brilliant, intellectually disciplined, independent minded, and well-educated, Rousseau arrived in Paris in 1741 and proceeded to impress and become friends with some of the notable Enlightenment intellectuals, especially Denis Diderot (1713–1784) and Jean le Rond d'Alembert (1717–1783). Yet his independent free-thinking temperament found outlet in two prize-winning essays that attacked modern science, technology, enlightenment, and early modern political philosophy as undermining virtue and happiness: The Discourse on the Arts and Sciences (1750) subsequently called The First Discourse; and The Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality Among Men (1753), subsequently called The Second Discourse.

The First Discourse waged war against the modern project as a dangerous dream, corrupt and corrupting in its origin, means, ends, and consequences. The essential features of the dream are fundamental yet simple: The universe is matter in motion, neutral, even hostile to humankind: It was neither created by God for, nor naturally ordered to, human good. Yet knowledge of a certain kind is possible (mathematical physics) and can constitute power over nature, render it predictable and hence controllable for human ends. The pursuit of human good, in turn, is to be guided by calculative, rational, enlightened self-interest ultimately oriented to peace, health, material prosperity, comfort, and bodily pleasure. The climactic scene is to be life in healthful longevity and pleasurable prosperity. There looms on the horizon the specter of universal gratification, even if by means of the scientific manipulation of human nature itself.

The core of Rousseau's response is that because scientific knowledge can be useful, the talented few may seek it with different motives and purposes. Some will be moved by pride, seeking honor, glory, and even tyranny. Others are ultimately moved by fear, especially of death as well as of pain and suffering. Yet desires for peaceful prosperity are but vain diversions from the hard facts of life, recognition of which is required for the possible achievement of true virtue and happiness.

The Second Discourse deepens the argument by suggesting that the root of the problem is reason itself. First, reason includes the human ability to compare oneself with others. This capacity makes possible pride, the love of self over all others. Thus reason contributes to the human selfishness that engenders tyranny. Second, reason can also construct ideas, even of time, and hence of the future. This ability of reason brings the idea of one's ultimate future to mind—that is, death and its terrors—and hence breeds the fear of death. Whereas reason had been previously considered natural to human beings and good, Rousseau argues that in some way it is neither.

Rousseau's argument rests on a reinterpretation of human history. Whereas Aristotle (384 b.c.e.–322 b.c.e.), for instance, considered human history to be cyclical, believers in the Bible saw history as providentially headed toward the end-time, and the moderns argued for history as human progress, Rousseau proposed that human history is in large measure decay from the natural goodness of an early time. From Rousseau's perspective, reason itself is an accidental, artificial acquisition that separates humans from our natural goodness, so that nurture becomes opposed to nature.

In this way Rousseau raised the question, Why reason or science? After all, he claimed, the purpose of science cannot be known by science. Neither can science answer the most important questions—Is life good and What is the good life?

Rousseau's own answer to this fundamental question may be sketched as follows: Tyranny not death is the greatest preventable evil; hence issues of justice and political philosophy are more important than science. Additionally, human sociability, virtue, and happiness are rooted less in reason than in the passions, particularly sentiments such as love, beauty, romance, and pity or sympathy and compassion. Hence, Rousseau's novels and memoirs such as Julie, Or, The New Heloise (1761) and Emile: Or, On Education (1762) contain striking portraits of the loving, romantic couple; the joys of family life; the sense of community in the tribe or nation; as well as the pleasing sentiment associated with life itself.

As fundamental and coherent as Rousseau's attack on and attention to science and enlightenment may be, he was—and remains—a paradoxical, if not contradictory, teacher. Alongside attacks on reason are to be found high praise of Isaac Newton (1642–1727), René Descartes (1596–1650), and especially Francis Bacon (1561–1626) as the preceptors of the human race. Socrates (c. 470 b.c.e.–399 b.c.e.) (or Plato [428 b.c.e.–347 b.c.e.]) is his self-proclaimed master, as a genius moved by pure not vain curiosity. Moreover, Rousseau did not live the life he taught as good. He philosophized while directing others to find happiness in noble sentiments.

Perhaps these tensions may be explained by Rousseau's vision of the human as a complex being oriented to conflicting goods: the goods of the body and of the soul, of the community and the individual, of life and truth, and, moreover, of the good of the few, theoretical pursuits, and the good of all others, practical pursuits, of theory and practice. The least one can conclude is that perhaps Rousseau took his stand as a middle-man, as the in-between being, as philosopher also concerned with the happiness of humankind, and, as such, forged his own place among the future teachers of the human race. Certainly many of the questions he raised have subsequently become themes in on-going discussions of science, technology, and ethics, even when they are not always explicitly referenced to Rousseau.

LEONARD R. SORENSON

SEE ALSO Education;French Persepctives;Nature;Social Contract.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Masters, Roger D. (1968). The Political Philosophy of Rousseau. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. A comprehensive account of Rousseau's complexity through the lens of his political philosophy.

Masters, Roger, and Christopher Kelly, eds. (1990–present). The Collected Writings of Rousseau. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.

Melzer, Arthur M. (1990). The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau's Thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Argues for the unity of Rousseau's thought in his notion of natural goodness.

Scott, John T. (1992). "The Theodicy of the Second Discourse: The Pure State of Nature and Rousseau's Political Thought." American Political Science Review 81: 696–711.

Sorenson, Leonard R. (1990). "Natural Inequality and Rousseau's Political Philosophy in his Discourse on Inequality." The Western Political Quarterly 763–788. Proposes that Rousseau cannot be understood without a full account of his vision of philosophy.

Sorenson, Leonard R. (1992–1993). "Rousseau's Socratism." Interpretation 20: 135–155.

Strauss, Leo. (1947). Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Explains the practical intent and consequences of Rousseau's teaching.

Strauss, Leo. (1947). "On the Intention of Rousseau." Social Research 14: 455–487. Explores the theoretical intention of Rousseau.

Velkley, Richard, L. (2002). Being After Rousseau: Philosophy and Culture in Question. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. A fine account of Rousseau's influence on Kant and Heidegger.