The Macedonian Art of Warfare
The Macedonian Art of Warfare
The Outsiders . To many Greeks, Macedon was not part of the Greek world. Most of the Macedonians did not speak Greek, and their social organization was closer to that of the Homeric world, with its hereditary kingships and clan chiefs, than it was to the contemporary world of the Greek polis. Macedon was an area rich in timber and metals. As far as the Greeks were concerned, its people simply provided a buffer between themselves and the even less civilized people who lived beyond Macedon. However, a Macedonian, Philip II, organized a formidable army that not only conquered the Greek city-states but also represented one of the most powerful military machines in Western society before the advent of firearms.
War Machine . As a young boy, Philip of Macedon lived in Thebes and observed how military power functioned. He was a great admirer of the strategic and tactical ideas of the general Epaminondas, including his use of the hoplite phalanx. During the early part of his reign, Philip devoted himself to reorganizing his army, instilling greater discipline, and modifying its fighting style and equipment. First of all he introduced selective conscription for set periods of time that allowed him to conduct year-round campaigns. Besides the deeper phalanx (sixteen ranks), Philip introduced the use of the sarissa, a much longer spear (approximately fifteen feet long) than that used by the other Greek hoplites. It gave his men the advantage of striking their opponents first as their phalanxes clashed. The sarissa required both hands, however, so Philip’s soldiers had to use a different sort of shield, one that rested on the upper left arm without needing the left hand for support. His soldiers had no breastplate. By combining the best attributes of the hoplite and the peltast (a lightly armed soldier), Philip blurred the lines between citizen and noncitizen soldier. His soldiers could also be much less expensively armed.
The Companions . Since Macedonia was a much wider, more open area than most Greek centers, there were also many more horses available for cavalry. The Companions were elite cavalrymen composed of some two thousand landholding aristocrats; they represented the main striking force of the army. Other units in the
Macedonian army included mercenary cavalry from Thessaly and slingers and javelin throwers from Crete. Philip also employed the torsion catapult, a missile weapon capable of throwing a sixty-pound stone four hundred yards.
Integration . Philip integrated all these different elements into a fighting force not seen since the Assyrians. Units of the Macedonian army acted in close coordination: while the phalanx engaged the enemy head-on, the cavalry and light troops would attack the rival army’s flanks and rear, weakening its resistance until it fled the field.
Logistics . The Macedonian army could also travel farther than other armies. Philip reduced his army’s dependence on wagons and carts by making his men carry their own arms, armor, personal possessions, and rations. Only one pack animal was allowed for every fifty soldiers, and as a result, the soldiers could make longer strategic marches.
Victories . The Macedonian military machine developed by Philip enabled him by 346 b.c.e. to gain control of Thessaly, Thrace, the straits at the Bosphorus, and the strategic pass at Thermopylae. He invaded Boeotia in 338 and won his most famous victory at Chaeronea, defeating a combined Athenian-Theban army and becoming ruler of all the Greek city-states.
Alexander the Great . Philip was planning to liberate Ionia from Persian rule when he was assassinated in 336. His son, Alexander III , or Alexander the Great, accomplished that feat in his stead. In fact, Alexander, in many regards, perfected the army created by his father. He defeated the Persians in a series of battles at the Granicus River (334), Issus (333), and Gaugamela (331), and campaigned as far east as Parthia, Margiana, Sogdiana, and Bactria (present-day Iran, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan).
Sources
Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War through the Eighteenth Century (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990).
Eugene N. Borza, In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
A. B. Bosworth, Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
George Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon (London & Boston: Faber &. Faber, 1978).
John R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism (London: Thames & Hudson, 1976).
Donald W. Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
Richard A. Preston, and others, Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society (Fort Worth, Tex.: Holt, Rinehart& Winston, 1991).