Al-Qaeda and the Reachof Terror

The Conflict

The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, underscored the significance of and threat posed by the al-Qaeda terrorist network, comprised of individuals and groups in approximately 50 countries worldwide. The organizational sophistication of the simultaneous airliner hijackings is unparalleled in the modern history of terrorism, which includes a series of major terrorist attacks attributed to al-Qaeda dating back to 1993, and it was a testament to the network's strength and dangerous capabilities.

Political

• Osama bin Laden, the most prominent leader of al-Qaeda, has issued many statements indicating political grievances. These include the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia; U.S. sanctions against Iraq; and U.S. assistance to Israel.
• Bin Laden has also often employed more rhetorical language describing what he refers to as a history of "U.S. terrorism," including the atomic bombings in Japan during World War II, the treatment of native Americans during the settlement of the United States, etc.
• Bin Laden has not made specific demands to the United States or to any other country, but instead has issued accusations and complaints, giving the impression that justification for terrorist acts can always be created.

Ideological

• Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden have displayed a militant, cult-like ideology that employs Islamic religious ideas to justify the violence they propagate, albeit at the extreme fringes of this belief system and commonly unacceptable within Islam.
• Although the members of the group and associated organizations represent a number of politico-ideological backgrounds ranging from far-right nationalism to far-left communism, al-Qaeda members and associates share anti-West and anti-U.S. sentiments. Only through violence and terrorism, they believe, can they oust Western influence and cease U.S. support for their own governments that they wish to overthrow and replace with strict Islamic regimes.

Al-Qaeda (Arabic for "the base") is a worldwide terrorist network of organizations and individuals dedicated to jihad ("struggle" or "holy war") for the cause of Islam. According to various estimates, there are anywhere from 5,000 to 15,000 individuals active in al-Qaeda cells in as many as 60 countries across the globe in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, North America, and South America (see map). Terrorist and insurgency groups closely linked with al-Qaeda include the Egyptian al Jihad al Islami and al Gamaa al Islamiyya, Pakistan's Harakat ul Mujahidin, Algeria's Groupe Islamique Armée, the Phillippines' Abu Sayyaf, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. While most of the individual groups associated with al-Qaeda have local-or regional-specific goals to establish Islamic governments that would enforce sharia (Islamic law) in their countries of origin, the broader network of terrorist cells is responsible for acts of violence on an international scale, targeted primarily at the United States.

Much of the attention on al-Qaeda has centered on its founder and leader, Osama bin Laden. Information regarding bin Laden's involvement in international terrorism dates back as early as 1993, when the first terrorist attack on New York City's World Trade Center took the lives of six people and injured 1,042. Although there is no documented proof that bin Laden was involved directly in the planning of the attack, it was orchestrated by an associate of his, Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf, who had previously taken refuge with bin Laden. The U.S. government began to publicly identify bin Laden as an international terrorist in the mid-1990s, when revelations surfaced concerning his connection to attacks on U.S. military personnel and assets in Somalia (1992) and Saudi Arabia (1995—96). In addition, bin Laden was tied to several unsuccessful plots to commit terrorist attacks, including plans to assassinate the Pope on a trip to the Philippines in 1994 and U.S. president Bill Clinton (1993-2001) on his visit there in 1995. Significantly, it was actually the United States that began identifying bin Laden's loose network as "al-Qaeda," a development that helped bin Laden to consolidate his organization under one umbrella. By bestowing upon this loose organization a name, the United States actually helped bin Laden achieve a level of fame and unit cohesion that might have otherwise been impossible.

On August 20, 1998, in the wake of the near-simultaneous U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 224 people and injured thousands, President Clinton amended Executive Order 12947 to include al-Qaeda as a "Foreign Terrorist Organization" (FTO). This order effectively banned U.S. financial transactions with bin Laden and al-Qaeda, allowed law enforcement to freeze any of their assets in the United States, and named bin Laden a "Specially Designated Terrorist" (SDT). On June 7, 1999, bin Laden was added to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) "Ten Most Wanted List," with a $5 million reward offered for his capture. The U.S. government displayed his picture on wanted posters, matchbooks, and leaflets distributed worldwide in nearly a dozen languages, making him a hero among his supporters internationally. It appeared that bin Laden was single-handedly taking on the most powerful country in the world, a perception that raised his profile significantly.

Several al-Qaeda suspects were arrested and tried for various terrorist attacks and plots both in the United States and abroad throughout the 1990s. On August 20, 1998, President Clinton, in response to the embassy bombings in Africa just 13 days prior, commanded air strikes against a bin Laden camp in Khost, Afghanistan, as well as what was believed to be an al-Qaeda chemical weapons facility in Sudan (although, in the end, there was no conclusive evidence of this). Nevertheless, bin Laden himself evaded capture and continued his campaign of terror from his base and safe haven as a guest to the tyrannical Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Attacks continued. Nineteen U.S. servicemen and women were killed when the USS Cole was bombed in the harbor of Aden, Yemen, in October 2000. Finally, on September 11, 2001, 19 al-Qaeda members committed the worst single terrorist atrocity in modern human history: the multiple suicide airliner hijackings in the United States killed approximately 3,000 people in New York, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania combined.

Historical Background

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, Muslim scholars and leaders around the world were outraged and began to call for a jihad against the invading superpower. As a result, thousands of Muslim men primarily of Arab origin volunteered their service to assist the Afghan resistance fighters against Soviet troops. With logistical and material assistance from the United States (mainly through covert operations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency), Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, the Afghans and foreign fighters—or mujahideen (holy warriors) as they came to be known—eventually defeated the Soviet Union and it retreated in February 1989. This defeat was a catalyst for the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991. The victory was celebrated as a triumph for God against the atheist superpower by the "Afghan Arabs" who had traveled to Afghanistan and joined the war in their duty to serve Islam. This motivation contrasts with the national and territorial defense motivations of the Afghans themselves and would later become significant in the development of al-Qaeda.

Rise of a Leader: Osama bin Laden

Osama bin Laden was among the thousands of mujahideen that fought in Afghanistan. From a wealthy and prominent Saudi family of Yemeni origins, bin Laden brought not only himself to the cause but also significant financial support. According to Abdullah Anas, an Algerian who knew bin Laden at the time, he was heralded among the mujahideen as one who had given up a luxurious lifestyle back in Saudi Arabia to commit his life to the jihad against the Soviet Union. And while the main organizer of Arab support for the Afghans, radical Palestinian scholar Abdullah Azzam, was focused on the single task of driving out the Soviet troops, Osama bin Laden had a grander scheme in mind that would eventually lead him to split with Azzam and develop his own recruitment and training camps, an important factor in the development of al-Qaeda.

Bin Laden believed that defeating the Soviet Union would be just the first step in a worldwide jihad campaign to eradicate the oppression of Muslims by repressive regimes everywhere. In Afghanistan, bin Laden's early jihad supporters included individuals from the radical militant Egyptian group, al Jihad al Islami, which was implicated in the assassination of Egypt's President Anwar el Sadat in 1981. One of al Jihad's prominent leaders, Ayman al Zawahiri, would later form part of al-Qaeda's leadership with bin Laden and commit one of his lieutenants, Muhammed Atef, as a military commander to the organization. Significantly, al Jihad favored terrorism and violence as the means by which to wage this international jihad, a characteristic that influenced bin Laden's development.

Bin Laden's camp, referred to as al Masadah (the Lion's Den), developed into the base from which bin Laden recruited and trained his own fighters loyal to him and his cause. Living and training apart from the other Afghan fighters, bin Laden's initial group of about 50 mainly Persian Gulf Arabs operated entirely separate from Azzam's organization and headquarters, Makhtab al Khadimat (Office of Services). According to the Federation of American Scientists profile of al-Qaeda, other names attributed to the group have included: Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, World Islamic Front for the Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, Islamic Salvation Foundation (a charitable foundation set up to raise funds for the organization), and the Osama bin Laden Network. The president of the German Criminal Justice Ministry, Ulrich Kersten, stated in an interview with the daily Die Zeit that at least seventy thousand fighters from over 50 countries had been trained in al-Qaeda camps. Although this figure appears to be exaggerated and likely includes individuals who returned home to continue normal lives after the Afghan War, it depicts the influence that bin Laden and the al-Qaeda phenomenon have had.

Development of the al-Qaeda Network

Many "Arab Afghans" returned home after the retreat of the Soviet Union ready to spark jihad in their own societies. Groups formed and consolidated in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, among other countries. Bin Laden returned home to Saudi Arabia for a short period but left the country in 1991 and was eventually stripped of his Saudi citizenship in 1994, due to his extremist views and attempts to radicalize Muslims there and in the region at large. He moved on to Sudan, where he set up a network of charitable organizations and businesses, including a bank, in order to raise finances for the jihad. Pressure on the government of Sudan to crack down on terrorist developments in that country forced bin Laden on the run again. He moved onto Afghanistan in 1996, where he was sheltered by the Taliban and set up training camps for militant recruits from all over the world.

In addition to the remaining loyal Afghan Arabs, young men were recruited from the Middle East; European countries such as Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, and the province of Chechnya in Russia; and Central, East, and South Asian states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Uzbekistan, and the Xinjiang province of China. Many flocked to bin Laden from what is called the "Arab street," which refers to poverty-stricken Arabs whose discontentment is ignored by oppressive governments. Some, however, were well educated, middle to upper class individuals raised in a variety of different societies and cultures, including the West. These intellectuals represented extremes of the political and ideological spectrum, from the right-wing nationalism associated with their lands of origin to left-wing communism.

A Radical, Militant Ideology

Although al-Qaeda members came from quite a variety of backgrounds, they all shared a belief that the West, especially the United States, was responsible for the power grip of illegitimate and oppressive governments in their homelands. By supporting governments that were either "comprising Islamic ideals or interests" or "oppressing and repressing their Muslim populace," the United States was an implicit enemy. Only through violence and terrorism, in their opinion, could they oust Western influence and overthrow those governments, replacing them with Islamic regimes that would uphold the sharia.

Bin Laden and al-Qaeda represent a militant, cult-like ideology that employs religious ideas, but remains at the extreme fringes of that belief system. Some scholars have linked al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden's brand of Islam with Wahhabism, an austere, purist branch of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia, which influenced bin Laden in his own religious development. In broad terms, Wahhabism seeks to create a society based on strict adherence to the Qur'an. Other views liken al-Qaeda to a religious cult. Indeed, the terrorists' versions of some of the fundamental Qur'anic teachings demonstrate a radical divergence from mainstream interpretations. For example, Osama bin Laden has misrepresented the concept of fatwah (a formal legal opinion), as it is devised in all Islamic schools of jurisprudence. In Islam, believers are encouraged to seek answers to questions they have about Islam by submitting them to an Islamic cleric, or teacher. The teacher, possibly in consultation with other Islamic teachers and scholars, issues a fatwah in response to the question, clarifying the issue based on the writings of the Qur'an. Bin Laden misused this concept by issuing his own "fatwas," which were neither responses to questions nor issued by Islamic leaders. The definition of jihad has also been tainted; it is in fact translated literally as "struggle," not "holy war." Above all, Islam teaches that individual human beings should struggle to be better Muslims for God. This is the greatest jihad to be achieved in life. Additionally, suicide is glamorized by al-Qaeda in spite of being forbidden by Islam.

Scholar Olivier Roy differentiates the Islamic radicalism embodied in al-Qaeda from that of other groups past and present. Roy argues that "there is a fundamental difference that marks a break between the activities of bin Laden's networks and previous Islamic radicalism: no political strategy whatsoever underlies these activities." Until the development of al-Qaeda, groups were primarily focused on achieving specific political goals. Roy maintains that al-Qaeda is "de-territorialized" and actually exemplifies the unprecedented globalization that began in the latter part of the twentieth century. Attracted to "the myth of the reconstruction of an imaginary umma (a Muslim community)," its followers have joined in bin Laden's jihad against the world without having a clear sense of purpose. In this way, the enemy is undefined with respect to a set belief system or political circumstances and may therefore shift over time. Most importantly, with no goal or set of goals to be achieved, the terrorist remains perpetually disenfranchised and disgruntled. Reconciliation is not desirable and is, therefore, impossible. Terrorists act for the sake of terrorism itself, and al-Qaeda leaders continually fuel the flames of hatred.

Declaration of Jihad against the United States

Bin Laden has acted more as a symbolic figurehead, attracting individuals to himself and the network via his charismatic personality, than an actual commander of terrorist units. Still, he has enunciated a number of political ideas and demands which connect him and al-Qaeda to past terrorist phenomena. The U.S.-led Gulf War (1991) against Iraq and the establishment of U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia during that conflict formed the turning point at which bin Laden began to oppose his former ally in Afghanistan, the United States. In his view, the United States was "occupying" the holy land of Islam in Arabia, where the holy Islamic sites of Mecca and Medina are located. To add insult to injury, he increasingly saw the U.S. presence as a security force for the Saudi regime, which he viewed as inherently illegitimate as a representation of Islam.

On August 23, 1996, bin Laden issued his first "fatwa" identifying the United States as an enemy and urging Muslims to kill American military personnel abroad. As described in U.S. indictment S(2)98 Cr. 1023, he stated from his base in the Hindu Kush Mountains of Afghanistan: " … to His Muslim Brothers in the Whole World and Especially in the Arabian Peninsula: Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques [Mecca and Medina]; Expel the Heretics from the Arabian Peninsula."

He declared a second fatwa, this time in the name of the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders, on February 23, 1998, shifting his focus to include not only U.S. military personnel and assets but also civilians. According to al Quds al Arabi, bin Laden avowed:

… for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples …these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on Allah, his messenger, and Muslims. And ulema [religious scholars] have throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries … On that basis, and in compliance with Allah's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it …

Bin Laden's "Policy Goals"

Through many statements to the press since his two fatwa declarations, bin Laden has enunciated a number of vague "policy goals" and complaints against the United States. They can be summarized as follows in order of assessed importance and specificity, according to his emphasis and repetition in statements:

• The United States must leave the Islamic holy land (the Arabian Peninsula).
• The United States is causing widespread suffering of innocent Muslims in Iraq through its continued sanctioning of that country.
• The United States supports Israel and is therefore responsible for the suffering of the Palestinians (a cause bin Laden began to champion only after September 11, when he received some support among the Palestinian population for the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington).
• The United States is a "terrorist nation." Bin Laden refers to past acts such as the U.S. atomic bombings in Japan during World War II (1939-45) as evidence.
• An "Islamic nation" must be established. This was alluded to in a reference to the Ottoman Empire (1281-1924) that stretched from Eastern Europe to Western Asia.

Bin Laden's political ideas and demands may be convoluted and vague, but taken as a whole they do add up to a kind of political platform. Still, many scholars question whether bin Laden would be satisfied and halt his terror campaign even if the United States were to change its policies or help to resolve some of the issues above in his favor. It is possible that al-Qaeda would only turn to other grievances and continue to find reasons to justify terror.

Operations and Capabilities

Al-Qaeda's operations and capabilities have proven to be complex and increasingly deadly—culminating, of course, with September 11. Many factors combined contributed to al-Qaeda's ability to achieve this sophistication, including fundraising and financial resources, organizational structure, technology and communications, and military training and innovation.

Perhaps even more significant than bin Laden's roles as figurehead and spokesperson for al-Qaeda has been his ability to establish a sophisticated financial system to raise funds. Bin Laden's personal wealth inherited from his father was alone estimated at US$250-300 million. In addition, he utilized his university business education and practical engineering experience to cultivate a wide range of businesses, charities, and wealthy individual contributors (including some government figures from countries such as Saudi Arabia and Sudan). Businesses that bin Laden built during his time in Sudan (1991-96), for example, included construction and transportation firms, manufacturers of sweets and honey, a tannery, banks, agricultural manufacturers, and camel breeders. In addition, he reportedly conducted business in diamonds in Tanzania and the semi-precious stone lapis lazuli in Uganda. In order to collect money under the guise of religious purposes, bin Laden also set up a number of Muslim charities around the world, including in the United States. Individuals, assuming that their money was used for benign charitable causes, often had no idea that they were in fact supporting a vast terrorist network. Lastly, al-Qaeda was heavily involved in the lucrative drug trade in Afghanistan, where the cultivation of poppies for this purpose was extensive. All of these elements together provided the organization with a considerable amount of wealth.

Along with the substantial financial resources available to al-Qaeda, its unique organizational structure allowed the network an upper hand visà-vis U.S. and other intelligence agencies. There was a vertical aspect to the organization, as Rohan Gunaratna has described, with bin Laden at the top of an hierarchy that included other primary leaders, including al Zawahiri and Atef. Below the main leadership was a Shura majlis (consultative council), to which four committees reported: military, religious/legal (to develop al-Qaeda positions on such matters), financial, and communications/media. While these were likely not as formal as one would find within a business corporation or an actual country, the very fact that bin Laden and the leaders organized along these lines reflects a sophistication of thought and planning.

More important was the horizontal nature of al-Qaeda. It is a worldwide conglomeration or network of organizations, cell groups, and individuals—a characteristic which makes it next to impossible to infiltrate and track down every al-Qaeda element. Gunaratna points out that "to preserve operational effectiveness at all levels, compartmentalization and secrecy are paramount." While military training was centralized within the camps in Afghanistan and apparently systematized according to a written manual (much of which was published by the U.S. Department of Justice on its website in January 2002), terrorist attacks were planned, organized, and perpetrated by very small groups of individuals. Most of these groups, referred to as "sleeper cells," remain dormant in the societies in which they live and operate for a substantial period of time. Some of the September 11 hijackers, for example, lived in the United States for several years, using the time to plan the attack and learn the skills they needed (in this case, piloting a commercial aircraft). It is highly probable that bin Laden himself most often had no prior knowledge about the logistics and timing of attacks. Many have also argued, for example, that the four (or possibly five) separate September 11 hijacking groups, consisting of four or five people each, were only connected through their leaders. By maintaining secrecy and group exclusivity and cohesion in this way, al-Qaeda has been able to operate underground and evade intelligence and law enforcement counterterrorism efforts.

In addition to organizational ingenuity, al-Qaeda has used modern technology and communications, including the media, in a limited but effective way. Although bin Laden's base and main training camps were located in countries lacking a sophisticated infrastructure (Sudan and then Afghanistan), important technologies were adapted to the environment. Satellite communications have allowed al-Qaeda to speak with members and contacts throughout the world, to have access to modern computer technology and applications (including the Internet and electronic mail), to access international media (television, radio, etc.) in order to monitor current events in the world, and to maintain bin Laden and the group's international financial dealings. An official al-Qaeda press office reportedly existed in London until the man who ran it, Khaled al Fawwaz, was arrested in relation to the 1998 embassy bombings. Nonetheless, bin Laden has used the international media selectively to voice his beliefs and "policy goals" to the world and, most importantly, to gain attention for al-Qaeda and its jihad. Some have even alleged that bin Laden has employed hidden messages in media statements to communicate to al-Qaeda cells abroad awaiting instructions or information.

At the same time, the rugged and isolated terrain and lifestyle in Afghanistan—not to mention al-Qaeda's special "above-the-law" status in that country—provided the ideal, safe environment to train recruits and operate, despite its worldwide notoriety as a terrorist organization. Special terrorism training camps provided instruction in everything from military-style physical and weapons exercises to how to adapt to Western cultures so as to go undetected.

Al-Qaeda has displayed a notable level of innovation in its military strategy and tactics. Simultaneously orchestrated attacks, such as the 1998 embassy bombings and the suicide hijackings of September 11, served to compound the effects—material and psychological—of each unique incident. September 11 witnessed a level of sophistication and originality previously unseen in the history of terrorism. The use of civilian airliners to destroy buildings was unprecedented and caused devastating results. Moreover, by striking both military and civilian targets, counterterrorism efforts were confused, and fear—both public and governmental—increased all the more with each attack.

Last but not least, bin Laden's interest in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has raised his profile internationally and boosted al-Qaeda's notoriety to new heights. Al-Qaeda has allegedly attempted to acquire WMD of all kinds: nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical (see chronology). When asked in an interview with Time on December 24, 1998, whether he was seeking to obtain chemical or nuclear weapons, bin Laden replied that "acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so." And in a November 7, 2001, interview with Pakistan's Dawn newspaper, bin Laden claimed that al-Qaeda possessed chemical and nuclear weapons as a "deterrent" against its enemies. While findings during the war against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan revealed that the network was in the beginning, experimental stages of attempting to develop biological and chemical weapons, there was no evidence that it had acquired any nuclear materials. Of course, many questions—including the unknown identity of the perpetrator(s) of the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States—remain unanswered. In the end, the mere possibility that al-Qaeda had WMD was enough to spark widespread fear, as well as the diversion of significant amounts of resources to combat the threat of WMD terrorism.

Recent History and the Future

Since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, many new developments with regard to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda have taken place. On October 7, 2001, nearly a month after the attacks, U.S. president George W. Bush (2001-) directed military strikes against al-Qaeda camps and other targets in Afghanistan. As a result of this intensive international military campaign, dubbed "Operation Enduring Freedom" by the U.S. Department of Defense, al-Qaeda was in large part forced out of its safe haven in Afghanistan, and the Taliban regime was forced from power. As of May 2002, an undisclosed number of al-Qaeda fighters were killed, and over 330 were captured and detained by the United States in a facility (first dubbed "Camp X-Ray" and then renamed "Camp Delta" after renovation of the facilities) at a military base in Guantanamo, Cuba. The United States believed that one of the primary al-Qaeda leaders, Muhammed Atef, was killed in Kabul during the fighting. Other leaders, however, including bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, remain missing. Virtually all al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan—including those located in caves in Tora Bora—were destroyed by aerial bombing.

While these developments have certainly damaged the cohesion and operational capabilities of al-Qaeda, there are many reasons to fear that this network will be difficult to eradicate entirely in the near future. These include:

• The loose, but internationally pervasive network character of the organization makes it difficult to keep track of the identity and whereabouts of al-Qaeda members.
• The fate of al-Qaeda leaders, including bin Laden and al Zawahiri, remains unknown.
• Individual cells worldwide are secret and self-sufficient.
• International financial assets potentially remain in the hands of al-Qaeda members and cells.
• Political and social conditions around the world continue to produce anger and resentment against the West.

Whether al-Qaeda can again mount a concerted and sophisticated campaign of violence depends on its ability to reconsolidate its capabilities and reestablish training camps and some sort of central base of operations. In this context, it is necessary that the United States and the international community work to eradicate the existence of lawless and failing states. Even though the Taliban has been ousted from power in Afghanistan, for example, the United States and its allies should support the creation of a viable and lawful government so that al-Qaeda (or other terrorist organizations) is not able to take root there again. Other unstable countries and regions such as Somalia and Chechnya could also prove to be future safe havens for al-Qaeda or other transstate terrorist organizations and networks.

While al-Qaeda has apparently had some contact with governmental officials from countries such as Iraq, Sudan, and possibly even Iran, there is no conclusive evidence that shows strong state involvement. Nonetheless, states looking to counter the United States or other countries might turn increasingly to terrorism in the future, given the relative success of al-Qaeda's operations. In light of the proliferation of WMD among hostile states, this could prove to be cataclysmic for the United States.

The degree to which al-Qaeda—or a potential future offshoot organization—will be able to surmount the ongoing U.S.-sponsored offensive against it remains to be seen. The following passage from a recent book attributed to Ayman al Zawahiri, however, indicates that these terrorists are not likely to give up easily:

Liberating the Muslim nation, confronting the enemies of Islam, and launching jihad against them require a Muslim authority, established on a Muslim land, that raises the banner of jihad and rallies the Muslims around it. Without achieving this goal our actions will mean nothing more than mere and repeated disturbances that will not lead to the aspired goal … the dismissal of the invaders from the land of Islam …This goal must remain the basic objective of the Islamic jihad movement, regardless of the sacrifices and the time involved.

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Kimberly A. McCloud

Chronology

February 26, 1993 The first bombing of the WorldTrade Center occurs in New York City. Six people are killed and 1,042 are injured.

October 3-4, 1993 Eighteen U.S. servicemen are killed by al-Qaeda-trained fighters in a firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia.

November 13, 1995 The National Guard Communications Centre in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, is bombed. Two Indians and five U.S. servicemen are killed.

June 25, 1996 A bombing of the U.S. military housing complex, Khobar Towers, in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, kills 19 U.S. servicemen.

August 7, 1998 Near simultaneous bombing of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar al Salaam, Tanzania, kills 224 people, including 12 Americans and 38 Foreign Service Nationals. More than 4,585 people are injured.

October 12, 2000 A bombing of the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, results in the deaths of 17 U.S. servicemen.

September 11, 2001 Four suicide airline hijackings occur in the United States. Two planes are flown into New York City's World Trade Center, precipitating the collapse of all 7 towers. Another plane hits the Pentagon; the last, believed to be heading for Washington, DC, crashes in Pennsylvania due to a passenger revolt against the hijackers. Including those who died in the airplanes, an estimated 3,000 people are killed. Thousands are injured.

Alleged al-Qaeda Attempts to Acquire WMD

October 31, 1997 The Arabic news magazine al Watan al Arabi reports that a "secret and dangerous meeting" took place in Sudan between bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, Hasan al Turabi (leader of Sudan's National Islamic Front Regime), and others about the potential construction of a chemical and biological weapons (CBW) factory.

July 1998 The Italian newspaper Corriere della Serra alleges that members of bin Laden's "World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders" purchased three CBW factories in the former Yugoslavia in May 1998.

August 16, 1998 An Israeli military intelligence report is leaked that alleges bin Laden paid over £2 million to a middle-man in Kazakhstan, who promised to deliver a "suitcase" bomb to bin Laden.

September 25, 1998 A bin Laden aide, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, is arrested in Munich, Germany, on charges of trying to obtain nuclear materials, particularly highly enriched uranium.

October-December 1998 Several reports surface that bin Laden was forging contacts with Iraqi intelligence officials, and that this contact potentially led to special Iraqi-sponsored al-Qaeda CBW exercises, such as training in the use of chemicals and toxins for assassination.

November 13, 1998 Al Watan al Arabi states that Osama bin Laden was engaged in a comprehensive plan to acquire nuclear weapons and reportedly gave a group of Chechens $30 million in cash and two tons of opium in exchange for approximately 20 nuclear warheads. This claim was uncorroborated.

December 24, 1998 In an interview with Time, bin Laden asserts that acquiring weapons of any type, including chemical and nuclear, is a Muslim "religious duty."

June 16, 1999 ABC News correspondent John McWethy writes that Osama bin Laden had constructed "crude" CBW laboratories in Khost and Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

February 2001 A key witness in the New York trial of the U.S. embassy bombing suspects, Jamal Ahmad al Fadl, testifies that Osama bin Laden tried to purchase uranium for nuclear weapons in Sudan in 1993-94.

November 15, 2001 The London Times reports that it discovered a blueprint for a "Nagasaki bomb" in files found in an abandoned al-Qaeda house in Kabul, Afghanistan. The U.S. government later reported, though, that such documents were not accurate and that al-Qaeda may have been "duped" into buying them.

March 23, 2002 The U.S. government reports that it discovered a biological weapons laboratory under construction near Kandahar, Afghanistan, which was abandoned by al-Qaeda when it was forced out of the area by the U.S. military. Allegedly it was being built to produce anthrax, but no biological agents were found in the facility.

Source: Monterey Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Database.