Salafist Group for Call and Combat

LEADERS: Abu Mossaab Abdelouadoud; Mokhtar Belmokhtar

USUAL AREA OF OPERATION: Algeria

OVERVIEW

In 1996, militants from the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) created a splinter faction called Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC), or the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (also called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat). The GSPC promised Algerians that it would deviate from the GIA practice of targeting civilians. Based on this promise, the group developed support throughout Algeria and has become the largest and most significant anti-government movement in that country.

The group is a salafist organization that operates throughout northern Africa, specifically Algeria. Salafist comes from the term salafi, which refers to fundamentalists. Salafists adhere to a strict and "pure" interpretation of the Koran. The GSPC objective is the removal of the present government in Algeria to be replaced with an Islamic state that adheres to a strict interpretation of Islam. Although committed to its principal goal of an Algerian Islamic state, the GSPC has publicly pledged its support for groups such as al-Qaeda, and its members have been participants in plots on European targets.

HISTORY

After centuries under French rule, Algeria sought independence from the colonial power, resulting in an eight-year conflict. The independence movement in Algeria was led by maquisards (guerillas) from the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) or National Liberation Front. On July 3, 1963, France declared Algeria independent. By September 1963, a constitution had been passed and the presidential election placed Ahmed Ben Bella into power. By 1965, a bloodless coup was led by the minister of defense, Colonel Houari Boumediene, who was elected president in 1976. The FLN then nominated and backed the election of Colonel Chadli Bendjedid in 1979. Bendjedid remained in power through the 1984 and 1988 elections due to the support of the FLN. In 1989, a new constitution allowed for the formation of political parties other than the FLN. As a result, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), or Islamic Salvation Front, was established. In 1991, the FIS won the first round of elections, prompting the army to nullify the election and cancel the next round scheduled for 1992.

With economic uncertainty prevailing in the country and the political unrest caused by the election, violence broke out throughout the country, led by Islamists. President Bendjedid declared a state of emergency and created the High Council of State (HCS) to lead the country in the interim. The HCS moved quickly to dissolve and make the FIS an illegal organization. In the midst of violence sweeping the country, the leader of the HCS, Lamine Zeroual, called for elections to occur in 1995. The FLN-backed candidate, Zeroual, won 75% of the vote due in large part to FIS not being able to participate. During this time, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) began its campaign of assassinations, bombings, and massacres, which included targeting civilians thought to be supporters of the government. In 1999, on the eve of the election, six out of the seven candidates withdrew from the race under suspicion of fraud. As a result, Abdelaziz Bouteflika won the election with the support of the military. Bouteflika moved quickly to curb the violence and proposed a referendum to grant amnesty to those who took up arms against the government, except in the case of rape and murder. The referendum, called a Civil Accord, was approved in 2000 and many of the militant groups in Algeria accepted the amnesty and relinquished their weapons.

One of the few groups that did not accept amnesty was the GSPC. Between 1996 and 1997, Algerian Salafist groups, such as the GIA, had perpetrated an estimated 150,000 deaths, including civilian women and children thought to support the government and oppose their jihad (holy war). This resulted in significant fragmentation among the groups. In 1998, one of the GIA members, Hassan Hattab (or Abu Hamza), left the group to form the GSPC, taking many defectors with him. Hattab vowed to put an end to the policy of attacking civilians. In 2000, as an estimated 5,000 militants surrendered their weapons under the Civil Accord, the GSPC refused to do so and gained support among the Salafists. As a result, the GSPC surpassed its parent organization in membership.

The GSPC operates a campaign of bombings, attacks on military, police, and government convoys, and false roadblocks. In March 2000, the GSPC took responsibility for a bombing at an oil pipeline in Der Chouyoukh. The bomb and subsequent fire damaged the pipeline and many trucks. The GSPC attacked a military convoy in July 2002, killing six soldiers. Also in 2002, members of the GSPC looted and burned a professional training center in rural Algeria. The group also engaged in bombing attacks on police patrols in August and October 2002, resulting in the death of one police officer. The GSPC also targeted civilians in October 2002, by raiding rural neighborhoods and extorting money from the residents. In May 2003, a total of 32 European tourists were taken hostage in six separate incidents. The tourists were held in two groups of 17, with the intention of obtaining ransom for their release. One of the groups was discovered and after a firefight with the Algerian Army, the tourists were released. The other group, however, remained in captivity until August, when the German government reportedly paid a $6 million ransom. In March 2004, the GSPC successfully assassinated Abdennacer Abou Hafs—an imam from el-Harrah considered to be in collusion with the Algerian government. In June 2004, a truck bomb was used to target a utilities facility in the city of Algiers, resulting in injuries to eleven people. In June 2005, the GSPC assassinated the head of Djelfa Judicial Police Mobile Brigade by using a homemade bomb. Also in June 2005, a road block was set up between Tizi Ouzou and Boghi. For two hours, twenty armed militants harassed and looted vehicles. Three soldiers were killed and one civilian was shot in the incident.

The GSPC also engages in alliances with other Islamic fundamentalist groups, such as al-Qaeda. The group's ties to al-Qaeda are decades-old and rooted in its parent organization, GIA. Many of the GIA members and participants fought in the Afghan-Soviet war and had ties to Osama bin Laden. However, as GIA employed mass killings—which included moderate Muslims—al-Qaeda remained a distant source for support. As the GSPC rejected these tactics, the group gained the financial and logistical support of al-Qaeda. As a result, the GSPC operates as a recruiting center for the organization.

In 2004, the leader of GSPC, Nabil Sahraoui, was killed by the Algerian army. The group entered a period of disarray due to a lack of leadership until Abu Mossaab Abdelouadoud assumed the leadership. However, the group appears to have divided into two factions. Abdelouadoud operates the GSPC out of the northern region of Algeria, while a former GSPC member, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, is leader of the splinter group called the Free Salafist Group out of the southern region of the country.

LEADERSHIP

ABU MOSSAAB ABDELOUADOUD

Abu Mossaab Abdelouadoud was appointed the leader of the GSPC in 2004. Abdelouadoud assumed command of the group several months after the previous leader Nabil Sahraoui was killed by the Algerian army. Abdelouadoud's real name is Abdelmalek Dourkdal.

MOKHTA RBELMOKHTAR

Mokhtar Belmokhtar was born in Gardhaïa, which is on the edges of the Sahara desert. He joined the military and fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. After Belmokhtar left the army, he developed a smuggling operation in the southern region of Algeria. He is believed to be leading the faction of the GSPC that kidnapped thirty-two European tourists in 2003.

PHILOSOPHY AND TACTICS

The GSPC identifies itself as a salafist organization, referring to the salafist sect of Islam. As salafists, the group seeks to overthrow the current government in Algeria and replace it with an Islamic state that adheres to a strict interpretation of Islam. In order to accomplish this, the group employs tactics ranging from assassinations to alliances with other Islamic fundamentalists. The GSPC targets the Algerian government and security forces, particularly in rural regions. Although the group promised to end targeting civilian, approximately 900 people have been killed in raids conducted by the GSPC. The group generates funds by operating false roadblocks and participating in petty crimes, credit card fraud, document fabrication, and the smuggling of cigarettes, drugs, vehicles, and arms. The U.S. State Department asserts that the group is also funded by Algerians living abroad, and by Iran and Sudan. In addition, the GSPC has emerged as a recruiting site for al-Qaeda. After the group offered its support to Osama bin Laden after the September 11 attacks, the GSPC pledged to attack U.S. and European targets. As a result, the group has been linked to several foiled plots against Western targets.

KEY EVENTS

1989:

Change in the Algerian constitution allows for the formation of political parties other than the FLN.

1991:

Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) wins first round of elections, which prompts the military to nullify the election results and cancel subsequent elections.

1992:

Bendjedid declares a state of emergency as violent protests erupt throughout the country. The High Council of State (HCS) is created to lead the government.

1994:

The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) becomes the most active group participating in assassinations, bombings, and massacres of civilians thought to support the FLN government.

1995:

Leader of the HCS, Lamine Zeroual, calls for elections and wins 75% of the vote. The FIS is not permitted to participate in the election.

1998:

GSPC, under the leadership of Hassan Hattab, splits from the GIA and promises to end the practice of targeting civilians.

1999:

Bouteflika, the FLN and military backed candidate, is elected president and proposes a Civil Accord to offer amnesty to Islamic militants willing to disarm.

2000:

Referendum called Civil Accord is passed, and many militants turn in their weapons and disarm. The GSPC rejects amnesty.

2000:

The GSPC bombs a pipeline in Der Chouyoukh, causing damage to the trucks and pipeline.

2001:

GSPC leader, Hattab, issues a statement in support of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda after the September 11 attacks on the United States.

2002:

GSPC kills six soldiers during an attack on a military convoy.

2002:

GSPC militants target civilians in rural neighborhoods and set fire to a professional training center.

2003:

Thirty-two European hostages are taken by the GSPC. After some are released, the remaining hostages are held until the German government pays a $6 million ransom.

2004:

Abdennacer Abou Hafs, an imam, is assassinated by GSPC members.

2004:

GSPC leader, Nabil Sahraoui, is killed by the Algerian army. Abu Mossaab Abdelouadoud is appointed the new leader.

2005:

The GSPC assassinated the head of the Djelfa Judicial Police Mobile Brigade.

OTHER PERSPECTIVES

The GSPC went largely unnoticed by outside sources until after the September 11 attacks on the United States. After the group pledged its support to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the group slowly came under scrutiny. In September 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13224, which froze the assets of organizations believed to operate terrorist activities, against the GSPC assets. The next year, the U.S. State Department designated the GSPC as a terrorist organization and determined that "civilians have been attacked" in activities undertaken by the GSPC. In that report, the State Department identified the group as one of the "most effective remaining armed groups" and "the largest, most active terrorist organization in Algeria." In addition, the State Department stressed that one of the concerns surrounding the GSPC is its alliance with al-Qaeda. The report states that the group has fostered and developed continued alliances first established by the GIA.

PRIMARY SOURCE
Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) a.k.a. Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

DESCRIPTION

The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), a splinter group of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), seeks to overthrow the Algerian Government with the goal of installing an Islamic regime. GSPC eclipsed the GIA in approximately 1998, and is currently the most effective and largest armed group inside Algeria. In contrast to the GIA, the GSPC pledged to avoid civilian attacks inside Algeria.

ACTIVITIES

The GSPC continues to conduct operations aimed at Algerian Government and military targets, primarily in rural areas, although civilians are sometimes killed. The Government of Algeria scored major counterterrorism successes against GSPC in 2004, significantly weakening the organization, which also has been plagued with internal divisions. Algerian military forces killed GSPC leader Nabil Sahraoui and one of his top lieutenants, Abbi Abdelaziz, in June 2004 in the mountainous area east of Algiers. In October, the Algerian Government took custody of Abderazak al-Para, who led a GSPC faction that held 32 European tourists hostage in 2003. According to press reporting, some GSPC members in Europe and the Middle East maintain contact with other North African extremists sympathetic to al-Qa'ida. In late 2003, the GSPC leader issued a communiqué announcing the group's support of a number of jihadist causes and movements, including al-Qa'ida.

STRENGTH

Several hundred fighters with an unknown number of facilitators outside Algeria.

LOCATION/AREA OF OPERATION

Algeria, the Sahel (i.e. northern Mali, northern Mauritania, and northern Niger), Canada, and Western Europe.

EXTERNAL AID

Algerian expatriates and GSPC members abroad, many residing in Western Europe, provide financial and logistical support. GSPC members also engage in criminal activity.

Source: U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism. Washington, D.C., 2004.

SUMMARY

In the Algerian war for independence, the guerilla organization, the FLN, led the struggle against France. Once independence was granted, the FLN then became the leading, and only, political organization in the country. The GSPC seeks to follow the same path on its quest to create an Islamic state in Algeria. The group was formed by Hassan Hattab in 1998 after many members of the GIA became disillusioned by the civilian massacres taking place during the struggle. Although the GSPC promised to end the policy of targeting civilians, this has not happened—although the civilian deaths attributed to the GSPC are much smaller than those attributed to the GIA. The group rose to prominence after declining the government-offered amnesty in 2000 and surpassed its parent organization, GIA, in membership and support. Many of the defectors from the GIA fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union and, as a result, the group developed close ties to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. The membership of the GSPC is estimated around 800, although that number does not take into account the rumor that the group has split. Members of the GSPC residing in the southern region have developed a group called the Free Salafist Group and are believed to be led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar.

SOURCES

Periodicals

Daly, Sara. "The Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat: A Dossier." The Jamestown Foundation. March 11, 2005: vol. 3, i. 5

Schanzer, Jonathan. "Algeria's GSPC and America's War on Terror." Washington Institute. October 15, 2002.

Web sites

Australian Broadcasting Corporation. "The Salafist Group for Call and Combat." 〈http://abcasiapacific.com/cause/network/salafist.htm〉 (accessed October 16, 2005).

BBC News Online. "Profile: Algeria's Salafist Group." 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3027621.stm〉 (accessed October 16, 2005).

Center for Defence Information. "In the Spotlight: The Salafist Group for Call and Combat." 〈http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/gspc-pr.cfm〉 (accessed October 16, 2005).

Global Security. "Algerian Insurgency." 〈http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/algeria-90s.htm〉 (accessed October 16, 2005).

MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. "Salafist Group for Call and Combat." 〈http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3777〉 (accessed October 16, 2005).

SEE ALSO

Al-Qaeda