POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (Update 1)

The government must comply with three constitutional requirements to use a confession against a defendant in a criminal case: a voluntariness requirement, a right to counsel requirement, and a warning requirement.

A court will refuse to admit into evidence a confession that was not voluntarily made by the defendant for two reasons. First, an involuntary confession may not be reliable. Second, the due process clauses of the Fifth Amendment and fourteenth amendment and the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination prevent the government from using unconscionable methods to induce a person to confess to criminal activity.

A confession is not "involuntary" unless the police obtained the confession through means that were unfair and coercive. Thus, if the police use physical force, or the threat of physical force, against the defendant or against the defendant's family or friends in order to make a defendant confess to a crime, the defendant's confession is involuntary. The police may use a confession that they gained by lying to, or tricking, the defendant so long as the lies or tricks were not both unfair and coercive. A judicial finding of coercive police activity is a prerequisite to finding that a confession should be excluded from evidence under the voluntariness test. In Colorado v. Connelly (1986) the Supreme Court ruled that the government could use a confession from a man who, according to psychiatric testimony offered at trial, suffered from a psychosis that reduced his ability to invoke his right to remain silent when he was asked a question by police officers. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's statements were voluntary because the police had not used any unfair and coercive tactics to obtain his statement.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees each defendant a right to counsel. It does not restrict government questioning of a suspect prior to the time that criminal proceedings have been initiated against that suspect. However, the right to counsel is violated when the government actively elicits information from a defendant outside the presence of his attorney after the beginning of criminal proceedings.

The Sixth Amendment does not protect a defendant who voluntarily gives information to a government employee who did not actively elicit that information but only listened to the defendant's statement. Thus, after a defendant has been charged with a crime and placed in a jail cell, the police may place a government informant disguised as a prisoner in the cell with the defendant. If the informant asks the defendant questions, the defendant's answers cannot be used against the defendant at trial. If the informant does not actively elicit information from the defendant, and the defendant makes incriminating statements to the informant, the defendant's incriminating statements may be used against him at his trial.

inPatterson v. Illinois (1988) the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant who agreed to waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel after he was given the Miranda warnings had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and that his subsequent confession could be used against him. All questions whether a defendant waived his constitutional rights prior to confessing to a crime are to be determined by reference to the miranda rules, which comprise the third limitation on confessions.

in miranda v. arizona (1966) the Supreme Court held that the police may not interrogate a person who is in police custody (or who has otherwise been deprived of his freedom by the police) unless the police clearly inform the person (1) that he has a right to remain silent; (2) that anything he says may be used against him in court; (3) that he has the right to an attorney and to have an attorney present during any questioning; and (4) that an attorney will be appointed for him if he is indigent.

What happens after the suspect is given the Miranda warnings? If, following the Miranda warnings, the defendant "knowingly" and "intelligently" waives his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney, the police may interrogate him, and his subsequent confession may be used against him. If the person in custody indicates (either before or during the interrogation) that he does not want to talk to the police, the police must stop questioning the person. However, if the defendant has not requested an attorney, the police may at a later time give the defendant the Miranda warnings again and ask whether the defendant will waive his rights and talk with them. If the defendant says either before or during questioning that he wants to meet with an attorney, the police may not question the defendant at any later time, or ask the defendant at a later time to waive his rights, until the defendant has met with an attorney.

In the 1980s the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant's waiver of constitutional rights after the Miranda warnings would be effective unless the police had used unfair coercive methods to secure his waiver. In Colorado v. Spring (1987) the Court held that a defendant who had waived his rights after receiving the Miranda warnings did not have a right to be informed as to the nature of the charges that might be brought against him or the nature of the crime that was being investigated. In Moran v. Burbine (1986) the Court held that a defendant made a "knowing and intelligent" waiver of his rights following Miranda warnings, so that his statements could be used against him at trial, even though the police who gave him the warnings failed to tell him that an attorney had attempted to contact him.

The police are not required to use any specific set of words to inform the defendant of his rights so long as the statements made by the police to the defendant encompass the substance of the Miranda warnings. For example, in Duckworth v. Eagan (1989) the police gave the defendant the Miranda warnings and then added, "We have no way of giving a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court." The Supreme Court found that the statement did not undercut the substance of the Miranda warnings because it did not induce the defendant to waive his rights to forgo the presence of counsel at questioning. Therefore, the defendant's subsequent waiver of his rights was a valid waiver; his confession could be used against him.

In the 1980s confession cases, the Supreme Court was lenient in admitting into evidence incriminating statements made by defendants so long as the police did not engage in any coercive activity. However, the Court continues to protect the integrity of the adversary process by requiring police to honor a defendant's request for an attorney and to avoid any attempt at gaining information from a defendant outside of the presence of his counsel after judicial proceedings have been instituted against the defendant.

John E. Nowak
(1992)

Bibliography

Kamizar, Yale; La Fave, Wayne R.; and Israel, Jerold H. 1990 Modern Criminal Procedure: Cases, Comments, and Questions, 7th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co.

La Fave, Wayne R. and Israel, Jerold H. 1985 Criminal Procedure. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co.