Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 1985

Petitioner: City of Cleburne, Texas

Respondent: Cleburne Living Center

Petitioner's Claim: That the decision to deny the Cleburne Living Center a special use zoning permit served a legitimate government need and the zoning ordinance was constitutional.

Chief Lawyer for Petitioner: Earl Luna, Robert T. Miller, Jr., Mary Milford

Chief Lawyer for Respondent: Renea Hicks, Diane Shisk, Caryl Oberman

Justices for the Court: Harry A. Blackmun, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Byron R. White

Justices Dissenting: William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens

Date of Decision: July 1, 1985

Decision: Ruled in favor of Cleburne Living Center by finding that the denial of a permit was based on prejudice against persons with mental retardation. The zoning ordinance was declared unconstitutional.

Significance: No more groups were added to the intermediate scrutiny list. The ruling helped eliminate housing discrimination against the disabled and encouraged group homes.

S ociety has often isolated and restricted persons with mental retardation (MR) within institutions and hospitals. The American Association on Mental Retardation defines mental retardation as significantly below average intellectual functioning combined with problems in carrying out everyday life activities. However, people with MR range from those with disabilities hardly noticeable to others needing constant care.

By the 1960s group homes became a desirable living arrangement option. The homes allowed persons with MR to lead normal lives as much as possible by residing in a regular community setting. Twenty-four hour supervision and support was provided. However, controversy grew between organizations trying to establish group homes and existing neighbors. Neighbors' arguments against the homes varied widely from safety fears to potential economic effects on their property values. This scene played out in Cleburne, Texas.

The Feathersone Group Home

Cleburne Living Center (CLC) sought to lease a house at 201 Featherstone Street to establish a group home for the mentally retarded. The home would house thirteen men and women with MR. They would be under constant supervision of the CLC staff. The city of Cleburne identified the group home as a "hospital for the feeble-minded" requiring a special use permit. The zoning ordinance (assigns particular uses to certain areas of a city) for the area required special use permits for construction of "hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded, or alcoholic [sic] or drug addicts or penal or correctional institutions." After a public hearing on CLC's application, the City Council voted three to one to deny CLC a special use permit.

CLC filed suit in Federal District Court charging the city's zoning ordinance was unconstitutional and, therefore, invalid (not legal). It discriminated, they claimed, against persons with MR in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause in the U.S. Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause states that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction [geographic area over which a government has authority] the equal protection of the laws." Equal protection means that all people in similar situations must be treated the same under the law.

Was Fear Important?

The District Court found that the Council's decision was based mainly on the fact that the group home's residents would be persons with MR. Nevertheless, the court found the zoning ordinance constitutional. The court applied only the lowest level of scrutiny (examination) required in equal protection cases and found that the city had a legitimate (honest) interest to respect the fears of residents in the immediate neighborhood.

Upon appeal by the CLC, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court and, ruling in favor of CLC, reversed the decision. The Court of Appeals applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to the zoning ordinance. The intermediate level requires that the government, in this case the city of Cleburne, have not just a legitimate reason but an important reason to discriminate against a certain group. Ruling the ordinance unconstitutional and therefore invalid, the Court of Appeal found that the city had no important reason or interest making it necessary to direct discrimination against persons with MR. Cleburne appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which agreed to hear the case.

In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court decided Cleburne's zoning ordinance was unconstitutional and violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals on the scrutiny level issue, but, nevertheless, agreed on the end result that invalidated Cleburne's zoning ordinance.

When Is Intermediate Scrutiny Necessary?

Writing for the Court, Justice Byron R. White analyzed the two major points of the case. First, the Court turned its attention to the scrutiny issue. The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the intermediate level of scrutiny. The Court refused to allow persons with MR to be elevated to a heightened level of scrutiny. White explained that the Court had devised three levels of scrutiny for equal protection cases. The levels assess the constitutionality of different kinds of state and local legislation that affected certain groups or classes of individuals who had been traditionally and purposefully discriminated against through America's history. The highest level of scrutiny applies to laws that classify groups by race, alienage (a person living in the United States but a citizen of a foreign country), or national origin. The next level of scrutiny, intermediate, applies to women and illegitimate children (born out of wedlock). If any of these groups are singled out for particular treatment in a law, the law may be found unconstitutional unless the law serves either a "compelling" (very important) or important interest to the government. If the law does not single out any of these groups, it must only have a rational (reasonable) or legitimate basis for treating groups differently.

As a group persons with MR are neither a certain race, alienage, national origin, all female, or illegitimate. Therefore, they do not automatically fall into the top or intermediate levels of scrutiny. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in trying to elevate them into one of these higher levels. Citing several major pieces of legislation specifically designed to outlaw discrimination against the mentally retarded, White showed that persons with MR have neither been traditionally nor purposefully treated unequally by the laws. White also pointed out that persons with MR have a "reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world. . . They are thus different. . . Legislators, guided by qualified professionals . . . " are better able to address their needs than are the courts. A degree of different treatment would indeed be expected to best serve persons with MR. Therefore, the government has a rational basis to enact legislation that treats persons with MR differently. White concluded the lowest level of scrutiny with the rational basis requirement is sufficient protection for persons with MR. The Court reasoned to elevate persons with MR to the intermediate scrutiny level would also require they elevate all persons with disabilities to that level and they were not willing to do so.

Pure Prejudice

Having addressed the scrutiny issue, White next turned to the specific question of whether Cleburne's zoning ordinance requiring special permits for "hospitals" for the "feeble-minded" was constitutional. White stated, "We inquire . . . whether requiring a special use permit for the Featherston home in the circumstances here deprives respondents [CLC] of the equal protection of the laws."

White first wrote,

The city does not require a special use permit . . . for apartment houses, multiple-dwellings, boarding . . . houses . . . nursing homes [etc.]. . . It does, however, insist on a special permit for the Featherston home, and it does so . . . because it would be a facility for the mentally retarded. May the city require the permit for this facility when other care and multiple-dwelling facilities are freely permitted?

ZONING ORDINANCES

Z oning ordinances divide a village, town, city, or county into residential (single family and multi-family), commercial or retail, and industrial (light or heavy manufacturing) districts. Ordinances must be part of a comprehensive plan for the entire area. Ordinances generally require certain building features or architecture, limit density, provide for parking areas, schools, parks, and may establish historical areas or buildings.

Ordinances must promote the common welfare of all people of the community rather than promoting a particular group's desires. The zoning ordinances must be reasonable because by their nature they limit use of property by the owners and they may not be used arbitrarily by governments. With the use of maps, ordinances must be clear and specific in describing districts. Only persons wronged by the regulations may challenge them.

The goals are to maintain the area's characteristics important to the residents, control population density, and create healthful and attractive areas. They must look to the future and strive to bring about orderly growth and development by considering practicalities such as adequate streets, walkways, and drainage sewers.

Municipalities have some flexibility to impose restrictions they otherwise might not be able to require such as requiring special use permits in specific situations. These permits must have reasonable goals before they may be imposed

White looked for a rational basis (all that is required at the lowest scrutiny level) for the city ordinance to treat persons with MR unequally. The City Council argued that the majority of property owners located within 200 feet of the Featherstone facility had negative attitudes toward or fear of the facility. The Court responded, "mere negative attitudes, or fear, . . . are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like." The Council argued that the facility was across the street from a junior high school and students might harass the Featherstone residents. The Court countered that thirty mentally retarded students attend the junior high suggesting students are already used to persons with MR. The Council put forth several more concerns such as the home's location on a "five hundred year flood plain." The Court reasoned that none of these concerns set the Featherstone home apart. All of the concerns could also apply to any of the other buildings in the area not required to a have a special permit. The Court found no rational basis or reason to treat the mentally retarded differently. White concluded, "The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded." The Court found the ordinance unconstitutional and therefore invalid.

The Cleburne decision closed the door to more groups being added to the heightened scrutiny list. At the same time, it helped eliminate one form of housing discrimination, discrimination against the disabled. The decision opened wider the opportunity for persons with mental retardation to live within "normal" communities.

Suggestions for further reading

American Association on Mental Retardation. [Online] Website: http://www.aamr.org (Accessed on July 31, 2000).

The Arc of the United States (national organization of and for people with mental retardation). [Online] Website: http://www.arc.org (Accessed on July 31, 2000).

Meyer, Donald, ed. Views From Our Shoes: Growing Up with a Brother or Sister with Special Needs. Bethesda, MD: Woodbine House, 1997.