Restitution
Restitution
Restitution is generally associated with the idea of returning something lost or stolen to its legitimate owner. In international law, however, the notion of restitution is linked with the issue of state responsibility. In this sense, restitution is one of the forms through which a state may discharge its obligation to provide reparation for the harm caused by its wrongful acts. More precisely, the term is used, in international practice, in at least two senses. In the strict sense, it signifies the return of unlawfully taken property to the original owner. In the broad sense, restitution (or, in its Latin version, restitutio in integrum) is the re-establishment, as far as possible, of the situation that existed before a wrongful act was committed.
Restitution as a Form of Reparation under International Law
A broad consensus exists among the international community preferring restitution over other forms of reparation under international law. This view is in line with the essential goal of reparation, which, according to the Permanent Court of International Justice's holding in its famous Chorzów Factory decision (1928), "must, so far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed."
It follows that restitution—which most closely conforms to that goal—is to be preferred over compensation and other forms of reparation whenever possible, unless the injured party renounces it. This primacy of restitution has been embedded in the articles on the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts, adopted on second reading by the United Nations International Law Commission (2001). Even advocates of this primacy, however, recognize that it is not unconditional, and they accept that compensation should be preferred at least when providing restitution would, in a situation involving two states, put a burden on the responsible state that is out of all proportion to the corresponding benefit for the injured state.
Restitution for Gross Human Rights Violations Amounting to Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity
The principles of restitution have been developed in the context of interstate relations. With the development of international human rights law and humanitarian law, however, some have come to believe that if individuals are the direct and ultimate holders of substantive rights under international law, they must also enjoy international remedial rights for obtaining redress when their rights have been infringed. The issue of reparation, including that of restitution, plays a prominent role in this context.
Although there is no reason for excluding the primacy of restitution with regard to gross violations of human rights, its usefulness may be limited, in practice, by the specific type of harm caused by these kinds of wrongs. In effect, genocide and crimes against humanity cause harm, first and foremost, to immaterial and unique interests, such as dignity, personal integrity, and liberty. These cannot be restored to their original status once they are impaired.
Restitution is most suitable and appropriate with regard to violations of property rights, such as illegal or arbitrary expropriations. However, this does not mean that the role of restitution with regard to crimes against humanity is only marginal. In fact, the most invasive attacks on property are often linked with gross human rights violations. Genocide, for instance, may be accompanied by the destruction of houses and the pillage of goods. Furthermore, the destruction, plundering, and pillage of private property can by themselves amount to crimes against humanity or war crimes. This may occur, for example, when the dispossession or destruction is achieved through blatant discriminatory measures, or with the intent of persecuting a group or a collectivity, or when it is "committed by pressure of mass terror." However, a number of practical and political factors may hinder the concrete possibility for the victims to get their property back. This is particularly true with regard to two types of highly politicized restitution claims: those related to historical injustices and those connected with armed conflicts.
The former type of claim relates to serious impairments of human rights committed in a distant past, at a time when they possibly did not even constitute a breach of the existing law. The specificity of these claims lies in the fact that they are arguably based on moral grounds, rather than on the legal responsibility of the state involved. This is one of the reasons why this type of claim is generally dealt with in the framework of political settlements, rather than in the courts. The huge lapse of time passed since the occurrence of the injury poses an additional major obstacle for restitution in these cases. Properties are often destroyed or no longer identifiable, their economical destination may be irreversibly changed, or they may have been transferred to third parties acting in good faith. Under these circumstances, restitution of full ownership is often a virtually impossible option. This situation is well illustrated by land restitution claims put forward by indigenous communities for historical dispossessions.
Restitution claims connected with armed conflicts are complicated by the fact that the dispossessions often take place in conjunction with ethnic cleansing and land occupation with a view to annexation. Here, restitution may still be materially possible but politically unrealistic, particularly when it would mean the return of huge numbers of forcibly displaced persons to territories that have passed under the control of the same group who forced them to flee. In this context, property restitution can hardly be seen as an absolute goal but needs to be reconciled with other, concurring goals, to be settled in the framework of political negotiation.
Restitution in the Framework of International, Treaty-Based Judicial Mechanisms for the Protection of Human Rights
The substantive duty to provide reparations is reinforced in the context of judicial mechanisms of protection, where international courts are vested with the power to adjudicate both on the merits of allegations and on remedies. The potential of remedies, however, may be partly frustrated by the courts themselves if—on the basis of a restrictive interpretation of their remedial powers—a timid, low-profile approach to reparation is taken. A quite restrictive approach is adopted, for instance, by the European Court of Human Rights, which is generally reluctant to order specific remedies. However, it seems to be more audacious when it comes to infringements of property rights. The court has occasionally ordered states to return unlawfully seized properties to the former owners, thus affirming the primacy of restitution. The fact remains, however, that even in property cases, the court is not always prepared to order reparation to take place on the basis of restitution.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, enjoying broader remedial powers than its European counterpart, handed down a landmark judgment in 2001 in the Awas Tingni case. The Court found that Nicaragua had violated the rights to property and judicial protection of the members of the Mayagna (Sumo) community of Awas Tingni, an indigenous community located on the forested area of Nicaragua's Caribbean coastal region. For reparation, the Court ordered the government to take various measures to recognize, protect, and enforce the community's historical title on its ancestral land and resources. Although restitution was not an issue as such, the decision shows the potential of human rights mechanisms in cases of large-scale operations of dispossession that affect whole communities.
Unlike international state responsibility, the international responsibility of individuals has traditionally been conceived as being criminal in nature. Accordingly, the focus of international justice, as administered by international criminal tribunals, has centered on imposing penalties to the perpetrator, rather than on affording redress to the victims. Over the years, however, the view has gradually emerged that the international responsibility of individuals must include some obligations of a civil nature in respect of the victims.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) recognizes the right of the victims to reparation in general and to restitution in particular. Article 75 of the statute enables the ICC to "make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation." It remains to be seen whether the ICC will, in practice, be able to make an effective use of the power thus granted to it.
Restitution outside the Framework of International Adjudication
Most reparation claims relating to gross human rights violations have been dealt with through political agreements reached outside of the typically adversarial procedures of judicial litigation. These agreements often include the setting up of specific procedures and ad hoc bodies to process individual claims.
In the late 1990s groups of Holocaust survivors have provided the impetus for establishing important reparations programs in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and other European countries, to provide comprehensive solutions to the quest for reparation for damages incurred as a consequence of or in relation to events that happened during the Nazi era. Because of the legal and material hurdles accompanying restitution, however, most of these reparation programs have been designed to provide financial compensation rather than the restitution of the original property. A notable exception is the General Settlement Fund, established in Austria in 2001. This program comprises a specific procedure for the return of property wrongfully taken in Austria during the Nazi period. Restitution, however, is only possible under the condition that the property concerned was owned by the Austrian federal government at the moment when the fund was established.
Another example of Holocaust-related restitution is provided by the Claims Resolution Tribunal. The tribunal was established through a class action settlement in the United States, by an agreement between two Jewish associations and the Swiss Bankers Association. The tribunal is tasked with providing restitution to the legitimate owners of the assets they deposited with Swiss banks before World War II and which have remained dormant since then.
Restitution of property has also been a key element of the South African democratic transition. Individuals and collective entities that were dispossessed of property during the apartheid regime on the basis of racially discriminatory laws or practices, have the right to receive restitution of that property or equitable redress. Various organs and procedure, including a Land Claims Court and a Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, have been established to give effect to the victims' right to restitution.
Finally, the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995, dealing with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, paid special attention to the issue of restitution. It established a Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees (subsequently renamed Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees), which was mandated to receive and decide reparation claims relating to forcible dispossessions in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war. Under the terms of the agreement, claimants had the right to choose between a return of the property they lost or to accept "just compensation in lieu of return." Similarly, some years later, the Housing and Property Directorate and Claims Commission were established in Kosovo (1999) for dealing with claims of individuals who had lost property as a result of discriminatory laws enacted under the Slobodan Milosevic regime or in connection with the conflict of 1999.
SEE ALSO Compensation; Rehabilitation; Reparations
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alford, Roger P. (2002). "The Claims Resolution Tribunal and Holocaust Claims against Swiss Banks." Berkeley Journal of International Law 20:250–281.
Barkan, Elazar (2000). The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices. New York: Norton.
Bazyler, Michael J. (2002). "The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective." Berkeley Journal of International Law 20:11–44.
Das, Hans (2004). "Restoring Property Rights in the Aftermath of War." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 53:429–444.
Ellis, Mark S., and Elizabeth Hutton (2002). "Policy Implications of World War II Reparations and Restitution as Applied to the Former Yugoslavia." Berkeley Journal of International Law 20:342–354.
Gray, Christine (1999). "The Choice between Restitution and Compensation." European Journal of International Law 10:413–423.
Kirgis, Frederic L. (2001). "Restitution as a Remedy in U.S. Courts for Violations of International Law." American Journal of International Law 95:341–348.
Kriebaum, U. (2003). "Restitution Claims for Massive Violations of Human Rights during the Nazi Regime: The Austrian Case." In Reparations: Redressing Past Wrongs. Human Rights in Development Yearbook 2001, ed. George Ulrich and Louise Krabbe Boserup. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
Leckie, Scott, ed. (2003). Returning Home: Housing and Property Restitution Rights for Refugees and Displaced Persons. Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers.
McBride, J. (2000). "Compensation, Restitution, and Human Rights in Post-Communist Europe." In Property and Protection: Essays in Honour of Brian W. Harvey, ed. Brian W. Harvey, Franklin Meisel, and P. J. Cook. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Mostert, Hanri (2002). "Land Restitution, Social Justice and Development in South Africa." South African Law Journal 119:400–428.
Nowak, M. (2003). "The Right to Reparation of Victims of Gross Human Rights Violations." In Reparations: Redressing Past Wrongs. Human Rights in Development Yearbook 2001, ed. George Ulrich and Louise Krabbe Boserup. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
Ratner, Morris A. (2002). "The Settlement of Nazi-Era Litigation through the Executive and Judicial Branches." Berkeley Journal of International Law 20:212–232.
Thomsen, S. (2000). "Restitution." In Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ed. Rudolf Bernhardt. New York: North-Holland.
Wassgren, Hans (1995). "Some Reflections on Restitutio in Integrum Especially in the Practice of the European Court of Human Rights." Finnish Yearbook of International Law 6:575–595.
Pietro Sardaro
Paul Lemmens
Restitution
RESTITUTION
From the Latin restituere, meaning to restore something, to set it up where it had been. In moral theology restitution is an act of commutative justice whereby property is restored to one who has been deprived of it by unjust damage or theft. Not every giving back of something can be called restitution. The restoration of a thing to a person who once owned it but who for some reason lost ownership of it for a time is not restitution. It could be an act of charity, kindness, or liberality, but it would not, in the strict sense, be restitution, not being an act of commutative justice nor presupposing a violated right.
Restitution, then, is the repairing of an injury, the righting of a wrong. The wrong in question could be either theft of something belonging to a person or the damaging of his property. There are, therefore, two grounds of restitution: (1) the possession of something belonging to another and (2) damage done to the property of another. That stolen property no longer exists because it has been exhausted in use by the thief is not a circumstance that excuses from restitution; for in using, spending, or giving away what he has stolen, the thief has spared his own property and thus continues to be "richer" and in virtual possession of his unjust gain.
The obligation to make restitution is founded on natural law. Given ownership as a true right, if a person is deprived by theft or unjust damage of what is his, what he has lost must be restored to him to balance the scales of justice. To deny that this is morally necessary is to deny the inviolability that is a property of true rights. A thing is said to cry out for its owner—res clamat domino. The injustice continues until it is repaired. Not just the original theft of a thing is wrong, but the retention of it by the thief is equally unjust and is, in effect, a prolongation of the act of injustice.
This obligation of natural law is enforced by the Seventh Commandment of the Decalogue: "You shall not steal" (Ex 20.15). To the obligation of restitution there was added in the Old Law the further obligation of satisfaction: "When a man steals an ox or a sheep and slaughters or sells it, he shall restore five oxen for the one ox, and four sheep for the one sheep" (Ex 21.37). This disposition of Hebraic law points to two elements in an act of theft or damage: there is an imbalance of justice caused by the act; and there is guilt of the crime incurred by its performance. Restitution of what was taken remedies the inequity; punishment—in the instance cited, the exaction of more than was taken—is to make amends for the guilt of the crime.
An obligation to restitution may be modified by the good, bad, or dubious faith of one in possession of something belonging to another.
Circumstances of Restitution. The general rule is that restitution should be made to the person who has been injured and that it should be made as soon as is morally possible. The inequity arising from the injustice is not remedied by giving the property to one who was not the owner; unnecessary delay in making restitution prolongs the act of injustice; it might possibly do further harm to the injured party. Restitution need not be made openly or in a way that might cause the offending party's guilt to become known. It can be made secretly, anonymously, or even in the form of a gift, provided this can be done without causing the one to whom restitution is made to feel obligated to give a gift in return. An employee can make restitution to an employer by doing extra work for which he is not compensated.
When the injured party or his whereabouts is unknown, restitution should be made to the poor. This is not an exception to the general rule that restitution should be made to the person who has been injured. It is rather a way of disposing of the property according to the wishes of the rightful owner, who is presumed to want his property to be used in the interests of the poor if it cannot be restored to him personally.
Causes Excusing from Restitution. Certain reasons will justify the deferring of restitution, either for a time or permanently. Impossibility, physical or moral, is the chief cause justifying a temporary postponement. It is physical when restitution simply cannot be made; it is moral when it cannot be made without grave hardship, provided the hardship involved in making the restitution is notably greater than that which would be suffered by the injured party in being made to wait for the return of his property. When the impossibility has passed, restitution must be made without further delay. The causes that permanently absolve from the obligation are: (1) condonation, which is the remission of the debt granted expressly or tacitly by the one to whom it is owed; (2) compensation, which occurs when what one owes another is counterbalanced by what the other owes him; (3) composition, which is the remission of the debt granted by the Holy See where restitution is owed for ecclesiastical property or where the creditors are unknown.
Restitution Owed by Cooperators in Injustice.
Not only the perpetrator of an injustice, but those who cooperate with him may also be bound to restitution. Moralists distinguish two general kinds of cooperation, positive and negative.
Positive Cooperation. This can take different forms.(1) If one cooperates by inducing another by counsel or persuasion to do an injustice, he is bound, if the principal agent does not do so, to repair all the harm done in consequence of his counsel or persuasion. If he retracts his counsel before the act has been committed, he is not obligated to restitution. Cooperation by way of praise, flattery, ridicule, etc., is reducible to cooperation by counsel, and the same general rule regarding restitution is applicable to it. (2) If one cooperates by commanding or ordering a subordinate to do an injury, he is bound, even before the actual agent, to repair all the harm done under his orders. (3) A cooperator by consent is bound to restitution to the extent to which the consent contributed effectively to the perpetration of the injustice. (4) One who cooperates by sheltering an evil doer or receiving stolen goods is bound to restitution so far as his cooperation results in preventing the injured party from receiving the compensation that is due to him. (5) A cooperator by actual participation is obligated to make restitution for the harm of which he was the efficacious and culpable cause. If his cooperation was essential to the injury, he is obligated equally and in solidum with the other essential cooperators for the whole harm done, i.e., he is bound only to his proportionate share in the repair of the harm if the others are prepared to shoulder their responsibility, but he is bound to repair the whole wrong himself if the others refuse to make restitution. If the different cooperators act in a conspiracy aimed at effecting the whole damage, each conspirator is bound in solidum with the others to repair the total damage, and each, if the others default, must take full responsibility. But if the cooperators act without conspiracy and each independently of the others effects some harm, each is obligated only to the repair of the harm he has done individually.
Negative Cooperation. The negative cooperator, i.e., one who is bound in justice to prevent injury to another and fails to do so, is bound to restitution if he could have prevented the injustice without incurring unreasonable risk or difficulty. A person may be bound in justice to prevent an injury either by reason of his office or of some contractual obligation, e.g., a parent with respect to the controllable behavior of his children, a policeman, a watchman. A negative cooperator, however, is bound to restitution only when the actual perpetrator of the act, or others more positively implicated in it, fail to meet their obligation.
Order in Which Cooperators Are Bound. In the case of theft, the obligation to restitution rests primarily upon the unjust possessor of the stolen thing, and he must restore it to its owner. He has a right to expect compensation from the one from whom he bought it, provided he acquired it in good faith. If the thing no longer exists, the person who profited most by the theft is considered the possessor. After the possessor, the obligation falls upon the mandans, i.e., the one under whose orders or command the theft was committed. Effective persuasion is considered equivalent to command. Next are bound the actual thief and those actively associated with him in the commission of the act. Among these there may be a priority of responsibility depending upon the nature of the participation of each. Some may be leaders or may contribute to the crime in an essential way. Finally responsibility falls upon the negative cooperators. Except for the unjust possessor, the order is substantially the same in the case of unjust damage. The above order is applicable in ordinary cases. Extraordinary circumstances may alter it in particular cases.
Bibliography: thomas aquinas, Summa theologiae 2a2ae, 62. n. jung, Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, ed. a. vacant et al., 15 v. (Paris 1903–50) 13.2:2466–2501. h. noldin, Summa theologiae moralis, rev. a. schmitt and g. heinzel, 3 v. (Innsbruck 1961–62). b. h. merkelbach, Summa theologiae moralis, 2:284–342. h. davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology, rev. and enl. ed. by l. w. geddes (New York 1958) 2:284–323.
[a. doolan]
Restitution
RESTITUTION
In the context ofcriminal law, state programs under which an offender is required, as a condition of his or her sentence, to repay money or donate services to the victim or society; with respect to maritime law, the restoration of articles lost by jettison, done when the remainder of the cargo has been saved, at the general charge of the owners of the cargo; in the law oftorts, or civil wrongs, a measure of damages; in regard to contract law, the restoration of a party injured by a breach of contract to the position that party occupied before she or he entered the contract.
The general term restitution describes the act of restoration. The term is used in different areas of the law but carries the same meaning throughout.
The basic purpose of restitution is to achieve fairness and prevent the unjust enrichment of a party. Restitution is used in contractual situations where one party has conferred a benefit on another party but cannot collect payment because the contract is defective or no contract exists. For instance, assume that a person builds a barn on the property of another person. Assume further that the structure is not erected pursuant to a contract or agreement and that the owner of the property on which the barn sits refuses to pay the builder for the barn. Despite the absence of a contract, a court can order the owner to pay the builder the cost of the labor and materials under the doctrine of restitution.
Courts in seventeenth century England first developed the doctrine of restitution as a contractual remedy. The concept migrated to courts in the United States, and it has since expanded beyond its original contractual roots. Courts now apply restitution in the areas of maritime or admiralty law, criminal law, and torts. In admiralty law restitution may be ordered when a shipping crew must throw goods overboard to keep the ship afloat. In such a case the owner of the jettisoned goods may gain some recovery for the goods from the owners of the other cargo under the doctrine of restitution.
In criminal law restitution is a regular feature in the sentences of criminal defendants. Restitution in the criminal arena refers to an affirmative performance by the defendant that
benefits either the victim of the crime or the general public. If a victim can be identified, a judge will order the defendant to make restitution to the victim. For example, if a defendant is convicted of stealing a person's stereo, the defendant may be sentenced to reimburse the victim for the value of the stereo, in addition to punishment such as jail time and monetary fines.
Courts try to fashion the restitution of a criminal defendant according to the crime committed. For example, a defendant convicted of solicitation of prostitution may be ordered to perform work for a local shelter for battered women as a form of restitution to the general public.
In tort law restitution applies to the measure of damages required to restore the plaintiff to the position he or she held prior to the commission of the tort. For example, if a person is injured by another person, the injured party may collect medical expenses and lost wages as restitutionary damages. Other civil damages are distinct from restitutionary damages because they are not based on the amount required to restore the injured party to his or her former status. punitive damages, for example, are damages assessed against a civil defendant for the purpose of punishing the defendant's conduct, not to provide restitution.
further readings
Knapp, Charles L. 1987. Problems in Contract Law: Cases and Materials. Boston: Little, Brown.
Shoben, Elaine W., and William Murray Tabb. 1989. Remedies: Cases and Problems. Westbury, N.Y.: Foundation Press.
cross-references
restitution
res·ti·tu·tion / ˌrestəˈt(y)oōshən/ • n. 1. the restoration of something lost or stolen to its proper owner: seeking the restitution of land taken from blacks under apartheid.2. recompense for injury or loss: he was ordered to pay $6,000 in restitution.3. the restoration of something to its original state: restitution of the damaged mucosa. ∎ Physics the resumption of an object's original shape or position through elastic recoil.DERIVATIVES: res·ti·tu·tive / ˈrestəˌt(y)oōtiv/ adj.