MENCIUS
(fourth century BCE)

Mencius, a Chinese philosopher, is often regarded as the most important Confucian thinker after Confucius. He lived in the Warring States period, during which China was divided into different states with their own rulers, often waging war against each other. He traveled from state to state to convert rulers to the teachings of Confucius. At the same time, he also combated other influential movements of thought, especially those associated with Mozi and Yang Zhu (fifth to fourth century BCE). One's main access to his thinking is through the Mengzi (Mencius), probably compiled by his disciples or disciples of his disciples. The text was subsequently edited and shortened by Zhao Qi in the second century CE, and this is the version of the text available today.

Elaborating on Confucius's teachings, Mencius highlighted four ethical attributes: ren (benevolence, humaneness), yi (propriety), li (observance of rites), and zhi (wisdom). Ren has to do with love or concern for others and involves a reluctance to cause harm and the capacity to be moved by the suffering of others. The scope of such concern includes not just human beings but also certain kinds of animals, and there is a gradation in ren in that one has special concern for and obligations to those closer to oneself. Ren results from cultivating the special love for parents that everyone shares as an infant and the affective concern for others shown in the well-known Mencian example of one's commiseration for the infant on the verge of falling into a well.

The earlier use of yi refers to a proper regard for oneself and distancing oneself from disgrace, involving such things as not brooking an insult. Mencius retained this use of yi, but disgrace for him is measured not by ordinary social standards but by ethical standards, and yi has to do with a firm commitment to such standards. One regards what falls below such standards as potentially tainting oneself and insists on distancing oneself from such occurrences even at the expense of death. One example is that of a beggar starving to death, who would reject food given with abuse despite the resulting loss of life. According to Mencius everyone shares responses of this kind, which provide the starting point for cultivating yi.

Li originally referred to rites of sacrifice and later to rules of conduct governing ceremonial behavior as well as behavior in other social contexts. Mencius continued to use li in this way, and in addition used it to refer to an ethical attribute having to do with the observance of li. This attribute involves a general disposition to follow li, as well as a mastery of the details of li that enables one to follow li with ease. It also involves one's observing li with the proper attitude and mental attention, such as reverence in interacting with others or sorrow in mourning.

In early Chinese thought, xin, which refers to the physical heart, is regarded as the site of both cognitive and affective activities. It is translated as "heart" or "mind," and sometimes as "heart/mind." Xin can form certain directions, which can take the form of long-term goals in life or more specific intentions. The fourth ethical attribute, zhi, involves having proper directions of the heart/mind, which in turn requires an ability to assess situations without adhering to fixed rules of conduct. This discretionary judgment may lead one to deviate from established rules of li, and may also guide one's behavior in situations in which no general rule is applicable.

For Mencius, these four ethical attributes result from people cultivating four kinds of predispositions of the heart/mind. These include commiseration, the sense of shame, a reverential attitude toward others, and the sense of right and wrong. He referred to these as the four "sprouts" or "beginnings" and regarded the four ethical attributes as growing from these predispositions in the way that a plant grows from a sprout. Besides commiseration and the sense of shame, he also regarded love for parents and obedience to elder brothers as the starting point for cultivating ren and yi, respectively. His view that the heart/mind has these ethical predispositions provides the basis for his response to the Moist and Yangist challenges.

Mozi advocated the doctrine of indiscriminate concern for everyone. He did not believe that human beings have the appropriate predispositions to begin with and thought that one could restructure one's motivations accordingly after endorsing this doctrine. In the absence of such predispositions, the practice of indiscriminate concern seems humanly impossible, a point seized on by Mozi's opponents. By contrast, Mencius thought that human beings have ethical predispositions that relate to the ethical ideal in the way that a sprout relates to a full-grown plant. Such predispositions contain within them a direction of growth and provide the appropriate emotional resources that one can draw on to achieve the ideal.

The Yangists advocated nourishing xing (nature), a term referring to the direction of growth or development of a thing. They understand the xing of human beings in biological terms, such as living to an old age, and regarded it as the proper direction of development for humans. Mencius rejected the biological conception of xing, instead, xing is constituted by the ethical direction implicit in the predispositions of the heart/mind. The view that xing has an ethical direction is expressed in his well-known slogan that xing (human nature) is good.

Although the heart/mind has the relevant ethical predispositions, they need to be nourished for them to flourish, and one should also guard against the various factors that can potentially harm their growth. Mencius often highlighted the senses as something that can lead one astray. The senses operate automatically—when they come into contact with their ideal objects, they are just pulled along unreflectively by these objects. By contrast, the heart/mind can reflect on what is proper and can halt any course of action it regards as improper. The heart/mind should constantly exercise these capacities to ensure that one progresses in an ethical direction.

One may also be led astray by erroneous doctrines, such as Mohist and Yangist teachings, which Mencius explicitly opposed. One may also be led astray by problematic desires. For example, in a series of dialogues between Mencius and King Xuan of the state of Qi, the king referred to his great desire to expand territories and his feverish desires for wealth, women, and display of valor. These desires not only led the king to harsh policies but also led him to rationalizations about his inability to be caring toward his people. Mencius's response was to try to steer the king toward seeing that a more caring policy toward the people is not only compatible with the king's desires but actually enables their attainment in a higher form. For example, a king who seeks to be invincible can do so by practicing ren government, thereby drawing the allegiance of the people. He will become invincible not in the sense of superior military strength, but in the sense of being without opposition.

While Mencius's teachings competed for influence with other kinds of Confucian teachings for several hundred years after his time, he eventually came to be regarded as the true transmitter of Confucius's teachings. Zhu Xi included the Mengzi as one of the Four Books, which became canonical texts of the Confucian tradition. Mencius also came to be regarded as the greatest Confucian thinker after Confucius himself, and his teachings have been influential on the development of Confucian thought in the Song (960–1279), Ming (1368–1644), Qing (1644–1912) Dynasties, and up to modern times.

See also Chinese Philosophy; Confucius; Mozi; Yang Zhu; Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi).

Bibliography

Chan, Alan K. L., ed. Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002.

Graham, A. C. "The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature." In Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature, 7–66. Albany: SUNY Press, 1990. Originally published in the journal Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies 6 (1967).

Graham, A. C. Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989.

Lau, D. C., trans. Mencius. London: Penguin, 1970.

Legge, James, trans. The Works of Mencius. 2nd ed. Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1895.

Nivison, David S. The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1996.

Shun, Kwong-loi. Mencius and Early Chinese Thought. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.

Kwong-loi Shun (2005)