The Indochina War (1946–54)

In 1946, the struggle between Vietnam's French colonial rulers and its Communist-supported nationalist movement finally erupted into all-out war. This war—known as the Indochina War or the First Indochina War (the Vietnam War is sometimes referred to as the Second Indochina War)—lasted for eight long years. It finally ended in 1954, after France suffered a humiliating defeat in an area of northern Vietnam known as Dien Bien Phu.

Stalemate in the early years

From 1946 to 1949 French occupation forces and the Viet Minh waged bitter war, with neither side able to gain a meaningful advantage. The nation of France entered the Indochina War willingly. Both its government and its military believed that controlling Vietnam was crucial to France's postwar economic recovery, and they expressed confidence that their superior weaponry and resources would lift them to victory.

But the Viet Minh forces proved to be a dedicated and skilled enemy. Operating in small units that specialized in guerrilla warfare (surprise attacks and sabotage), these troops assumed control of significant areas of the countryside in northern and central Vietnam. They also mounted occasional strikes in the south, despite the heavy French military presence.

In addition, France underestimated Ho Chi Minh's (1890–1969) popularity in many Vietnamese communities. His message of national independence and his promises of land reform appealed to many Vietnamese, despite their war weariness and reservations about Viet Minh methods (some peasants, for example, were forcibly drafted into the army). In 1949, France tried to reduce popular support for Ho Chi Minh by introducing a new Vietnamese government headed by Bao Dai (1913–), who had previously ruled as emperor from 1926 to 1945. But most people recognized that this new regime (government) was still under the control of the French, and the strategy failed.

As the months passed with no apparent progress in its efforts to smash the Vietnamese rebellion, France became divided over whether to continue its efforts. After all, the Viet Minh continued to operate throughout the north, and the guerrilla movement seemed to be growing in the south as well. Moreover, the French troops found it very difficult to distinguish between peaceful Vietnamese and those that actually carried out Viet Minh missions. "The Viet Minh were like fish in water," recalled one Viet Minh official. "That was our slogan. Our fighters moved and worked among the people like fish in water."

The Cold War

As the Indochina War dragged on, it became part of a larger struggle that was taking shape at the same time between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), also known as the Soviet Union. This struggle, which developed in the months immediately after World War II (1939–45) and quickly grew into the dominant factor in international politics for the next four decades, was known as the "Cold War."

The Cold War was essentially an intense rivalry between two dramatically different political and economic philosophies. The United States and its allied nations (nations that join together for a common cause) believed in principles of democracy and capitalism. In contrast, the Soviet Union and some other countries, including China, supported communism. These differences created extreme distrust and hostility on both sides. Before long, the United States and the USSR were engaged in a fierce competition to establish their political philosophies and influence in all corners of the world. As this political battle unfolded, both sides also raced to develop their military forces and weaponry. When this "arms race" developed, the two sides became even more suspicious and fearful of one another.

By 1947, U.S. President Harry Truman (1884–1972; president 1945–1963) had become convinced that the Soviet Union and its Communist philosophy posed a tremendous threat to the safety and well-being of the United States and its allies. The Soviets had helped bring Communist governments to power in a number of Eastern European countries, and they seemed intent on expanding their influence in other areas of the globe as well. In response to the growing Soviet sponsorship of Communist activities around the world, Truman devised a policy that came to be known as the "containment doctrine." It authorized the United States to provide financial and/or military aid to any nation threatened by Communist forces.

Truman's policy was widely supported by the American public. It also was praised by most U.S. military and political leaders. These leaders had been profoundly disturbed by the flood of new Communist governments in Eastern Europe. They saw Truman's containment doctrine as the United States' best defense against the "Domino Theory," a political theory that had rapidly gained acceptance in U.S. military and government circles. According to this theory, the loss of one country to communism usually triggered similar collapses in neighboring countries, as if the nations were dominoes falling against one another in succession. By the early 1950s, this theory had become an essential factor in most U.S. foreign policy decisions.

United States provides active support to France

In 1949 and 1950, several significant political changes took place around the world. In 1949, Communists under the leadership of Mao Zedong (1893–1976) took control of China after a long war. A few months later, both China and the Soviet Union formally recognized Ho Chi Minh and his Communist leadership as the rightful rulers of Vietnam. Then, in June 1950, North Korea's Communist government attacked U.S.supported South Korea, apparently with the approval of the Soviets. The attack by North Korea triggered the Korean War (1950–53), in which American-led forces defended South Korea against the Communist armies of both North Korea and China.

These events convinced the United States that it needed to focus greater attention on the French-Viet Minh conflict in Vietnam. All of Southeast Asia seemed to be in danger of being swallowed up by communism, and Vietnam suddenly loomed as a key strategic country in the fight to contain it. American policymakers condemned Ho Chi Minh as a Soviet-sponsored agent of communism and assured France that the United States was willing to step forward and help them in their battle to regain possession of Vietnam.

On February 7, 1950, the United States formally recognized the French-controlled government of Bao Dai as the legitimate government of Vietnam. By the spring of 1950, the United States was providing direct political, economic, and military support to French forces in Vietnam. Despite such aid, however, many leaders harbored doubts about getting involved in the region. In fact, many officials did not believe that the United States would be able to help transform Vietnam into a peaceful, anticommunist nation. For example, analyst Raymond B. Fosdick argued that "whether the French like it or not, independence is coming to Indochina. Why, therefore, do we tie ourselves to the tail of their battered kite?" Most U.S. officials, however, believed that the threat posed by communism was so great that the United States had to side with the French.

French support for war fades

U.S. military and economic assistance provided a much-needed boost to the French war effort in Vietnam. Despite the influx of U.S. aid, however, the Viet Minh managed to strengthen their hold over the country's northern provinces. They were able to do this in large part because the rise to power of the Communists in China, Vietnam's neighbor to the north, gave Ho Chi Minh and his forces a valuable ally. In fact, the Chinese Communists provided the Viet Minh with considerable military assistance throughout the remainder of the Indochina War.

With the help of Chinese weapons and other equipment, the Viet Minh expanded quickly into a significant military force. As their army grew in size, the Vietnamese Communists showed a greater willingness to confront the French in bigger battles, especially in the thick jungles of northern Vietnam. The Viet Minh continued to strengthen their hold over the region's rural areas, and in the fall of 1950 they launched successful strikes against French military positions and supply routes throughout the area.

The assaults resulted in the death or capture of approximately 6,000 French troops in October alone, and ultimately forced French troops to abandon large expanses of territory along the Chinese border. "That was the first disaster of the war," confirmed French historian Jean Lacouture. "[It] gave the idea that the war was nearly impossible to win because the Viet Minh, with China behind it, had a great enormous sanctuary. So the war became more and more unpopular from 1950— and very expensive, though of course the United States paid."

By the end of 1950, the Viet Minh forces—commanded by General Vo Nguyen Giap (1911– )—seemed to be on their way to eventual victory. "Giap could feel satisfied with his achievements in 1950," writes Phillip B. Davidson, author of Vietnam at War: The History 1946–1975. "He demonstrated the effectiveness of his Main Force units; he seized the initiative; and he demoralized the French command. Beyond that, he had unnerved the French government, which now realized that there was no way to win Indochina without a massive effort, and this was politically impossible."

American aid not enough

From 1950 to 1954, the United States steadily increased the amount of financial assistance it provided to France's military operations in Vietnam. By 1954, the U.S. aid total reached almost $3 billion, an amount that covered about 80 percent of all French military spending in the Indochina War. This was even more aid than France received from theMarshall Plan, a massive U.S. program of financial assistance designed to help European nations rebuild after the devastation of World War II.

Nonetheless, the war continued to swing in favor of the Viet Minh. By the end of 1952, French casualties (dead, wounded, and missing) had reached 80,000 to 90,000, and the Communists showed no signs of letting up. In fact, the Viet Minh made good use of traditional Vietnamese hostility toward France in their efforts to gain new recruits to their cause. Ho Chi Minh also continued to present the Viet Minh as a primarily nationalistic—rather than Communist—force that was fighting to restore Vietnamese independence. This message appealed to many young men. It also made it very difficult for France to gain the support of Vietnamese communities, most of which just wanted an end to the war.

The battle of Dien Bien Phu

As 1953 unfolded, France continued to lose ground. By late 1953, French territorial control had been reduced to positions around Hanoi, Haiphong, Saigon, and a smattering of other areas.

And in May 1954, France's dream of re-establishing colonial rule over Vietnam finally came to an end, as the French suffered one of the most significant defeats in modern military history.

In late 1953, a large French military force had been assigned to Dien Bien Phu, a military post in northwestern Vietnam. The French troops were sent there in order to prevent the Viet Minh Communists from taking control of the Mekong River valley and the nearby region that bordered the country of Laos. By this time, however, war-weary France was already preparing to negotiate an end to the war. In fact, Viet Minh and French negotiators were scheduled to join other international officials in Geneva, Switzerland, on May 7, 1954, to discuss terms of a peace treaty. But French General Henri Navarre, who ordered the deployment to Dien Bien Phu, reasoned that if the French military still held strong positions in Vietnam when the negotiations began, France would be able to negotiate a treaty that would be more beneficial to its interests. As U.S. official Walter Medell Smith remarked at Geneva, "You don't win at the conference table what you've lost on the battlefield." Navarre's plan underestimated the size and strength of Viet Minh forces in the area surrounding Dien Bien Phu. In early 1954, the Viet Minh successfully isolated the garrison (military post) from other French troops, and in March they launched a fierce siege on the stronghold. Over the next two months, Viet Minh units battered the trapped French soldiers with artillery, antiaircraft guns, and automatic weapons fire. France tried to provide the garrison with supplies by parachute, but this strategy did not work very well. Many parachute drops missed their mark, and Viet Minh antiaircraft guns shot down several French transport planes.

As the siege dragged on, conditions inside Dien Bien Phu decayed rapidly. Outnumbered and outgunned, the garrison's defenders—which also included Vietnamese troops from Bao Dai's government—suffered terrible casualties, especially as food, medicine, ammunition, and other supplies dwindled away. "The surgeons at Dien Bien Phu are reaching the limit of their endurance, and the overflow of wounded are waiting on the ground for their dressings to be changed," reported the French magazine Le Monde at the height of the siege. "The water of the river in which bodies float can be filtered only in eyedrop amounts. There is just enough water to give the men when they get delirious from thirst."

Alarmed by the deteriorating situation, some top U.S. generals and advisors, including Vice President Richard Nixon (1913–1994), recommended that the United States begin military air strikes on Communist positions throughout northern Vietnam. President Dwight Eisenhower (1890–1969; president 1953–1961), who succeeded Truman as president in 1953, gave serious consideration to the proposal. After all, he firmly believed that if the Communists gained control of Vietnam, other Southeast Asian nations might also turn to communism. But despite his belief in the Domino Theory, Eisenhower decided that direct military involvement in Vietnam was too risky. His refusal to order air strikes greatly angered the French government, which realized that a major disaster was unfolding at the remote outpost.

On May 7, 1954, the garrison at Dien Bien Phu was finally overrun by Viet Minh forces. An estimated 8,000 Viet Minh were killed in the siege and battle, and another 15,000 troops were injured during the campaign. By comparison, only 2,200 French troops died in the clash (another 6,000 were wounded, and 10,000 were captured). But despite these statistics, the Battle of Dien Bien Phu was universally regarded as a tremendous Viet Minh victory, and as a shocking defeat for France. In fact, the loss of Dien Bien Phu triggered a tremendous shakeup in the French government and created an outcry against the war throughout France that could not be ignored. On July 20, 1954, France agreed to permanently withdraw from Vietnam under terms of an agreement known as the Geneva Accords.

"The battle of Dien Bien Phu . . . ranks with Agincourt, Waterloo, and Gettysburg as one of the great military engagements in history," writes Stanley Karnow in Howard Simpson's Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot. "It spelled the end of France's crumbling empire in Asia, and while nobody foresaw the possibility then, it eventually opened the way for America's commitment to the region over the years that followed. So it was a decisive episode that indirectly set in motion a process that was to have profound and pervasive consequences for the United States."

Sources

Billings-Yun, Melanie. Decision Against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1958.

Davidson, Phillip B. Vietnam at War: The History 1946–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988.

Duiker, William J. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.

Dunn, Peter M. The First Vietnam War. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.

Fall, Bernard. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1966.

Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. Rev. ed. New York: Viking, 1991.

Olson, James, and Randy Roberts. Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945–1990. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Simpson, Howard R. Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1994.

Words to Know

Cold War A period of intense rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, as both nations competed to spread their political philosophies and influence around the world after the end of World War II (1939–45). The climate of distrust and hostility between the two nations and their allies dominated international politics until the 1980s.

Communism A political system in which the government controls all resources and means of producing wealth. By eliminating private property, this system is designed to create an equal society with no social classes. However, Communist governments in practice often limit personal freedom and rights.

Domino Theory A political theory that holds that the fall of one country's government to communism usually triggers similar collapses in neighboring countries, as if the nations were dominoes falling in sequence.

Dien Bien Phu A French fort in northwestern Vietnam that, in 1954, was the site of a major battle in the Indochina War.

Indochina War Later known as the First Indochina War (the Vietnam War became the Second Indochina War), this conflict took place between France and Communist-led Viet Minh forces in Vietnam, 1946–54.

Nationalism A feeling of intense loyalty and devotion to a country or homeland. Some people argue that nationalism, rather than communism, was the main factor that caused the Viet Minh to fight the French for control of Vietnam.

Viet Minh Communist-led nationalist group that worked to gain Vietnam's independence from French colonial rule.

People to Know

Bao Dai (1913–) Vietnamese political leader who served as emperor and head of state under French colonial rule, 1926–1945 and 1949–1955.

Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) A top U.S. general during World War II (1939–45) who served as the 34th president of the United States, 1953–1961. Although he was committed to stopping the spread of communism in Asia, he was reluctant to take direct military action in Vietnam.

Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) Vietnamese Communist leader who led Viet Minh forces in opposing French rule and became the first president of North Vietnam in 1954. He also led the North during the Vietnam War until his death.

Richard M. Nixon (1913–1994) U.S. vice president under Eisenhower. Elected as the 37th president of the United States in 1969, at the height of the Vietnam War. Resigned from office during the Watergate scandal in 1974.

Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) Served as the 33rd president of the United States, 1945–1953. Did not oppose France reclaiming control over Vietnam after World War II (1939–45).

Vo Nguyen Giap (1911–) North Vietnamese general and Communist Party leader during the First Indochina War and the Vietnam War.

First American Casualty in Vietnam

In September 1945, Army Major A. Peter Dewey became the first American soldier to die in Vietnam. Dewey had been assigned to Vietnam as part of a U.S. effort to search for American troops who had been captured by the Japanese or disappeared in Southeast Asia during World War II (1939–45). At the same time, British forces poured into the country in order to disarm the few remaining Japanese troops in the region. These British troops also helped French forces re-establish control of Saigon and other important areas in mid-1945.

As he traveled around Vietnam, Dewey became alarmed at the chaotic conditions in some areas of the country and the hatred that many Vietnamese expressed for the French. "Cochinchina is burning, the French and British are finished here, and we [the United States] ought to clear out of Southeast Asia," he stated in one report. British Major General Douglas D. Gracey, commander of the British mission to disarm the Japanese, grew angry with the American's criticism of France's operations in the country. He finally ordered Dewey out of Vietnam because of concerns that the major was actually sympathetic to the Viet Minh.

On the morning of September 26, 1945, Dewey set out for the Saigon airport to return to the United States. En route to the airport, however, he was ambushed by a small number of Viet Minh who mistakenly identified him as a French officer. They killed him with a burst of machine gun fire, making him the first of nearly 60,000 Americans to lose their lives in Vietnam.

President Eisenhower and the Domino Theory

U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower (1890–1969; president 1953–1961) was a firm believer in the so-called "Domino Theory." This theory stated that when one country in a region fell to communism, other nations in that region came under much greater risk of falling to communism as well. In April 1954, he held a press conference in which he explained the theory and his views on Indochina to the American public. At one point, a reporter asked Eisenhower to explain the strategic importance of China to the United States and other democratic nations. Eisenhower gave the following response:

You have, of course, both the specific and the general when you talk about such things. First of all, you have the specific value of a locality in its production of materials that the world needs. Then, you have the possibility that many human beings pass under a dictatorship that is inimical [harmful] to the free world.

Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the 'falling domino' principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.

Now, with respect to the first [consideration], two of the items from this particular area that the world uses are tin and tungsten. They are very important. There are others, of course, the rubber plantations and so on.

Then with respect to more people passing under this domination, Asia, after all, has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship, and we simply can't afford greater losses.

But when we come to the possible sequence of events, the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia following, now you begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the disadvantages that you would suffer through loss of materials, sources of materials, but now you are talking about millions and millions and millions of people.

Finally, the geographical position achieved [by controlling Indochina] does many things. It turns the so-called island defensive chain of Japan, Formosa, of the Philippines . . . to the southward; it moves in to threaten Australia and New Zealand [with communism].

[The loss of Indochina to communism] takes away, in its economic respects, that region that Japan must have as a trading area or Japan, in turn, will have only one place in the world to go—that is, toward the Communist areas in order to live.

So, the possible consequences of the loss [of Indochina to communism] are just incalculable [beyond calculation] to the free world.