Détente: A Lessening of Tensions

F rom 1969 through 1975, the United States and the Soviet Union, the world's two superpowers, established policies promoting détente between them. Détente, French for "lessening of tensions," marked a relaxing of tensions between the rival nations, exemplified by increased diplomatic, commercial, and cultural contact. Western and Eastern European countries also experienced a détente and better cooperation during this period. The Cold War entered a new phase during détente. Consistent contact and communication between the United States and the Soviet Union was perhaps the greatest single achievement of détente. The détente period is also significant because it marked the beginning of improved relations between the United States and China. Recognizing that China and the United States could become allies pushed the Soviets toward détente. These positive changes were bright spots in U.S. foreign affairs at a time when the United States seemed all but consumed by the challenge of extricating itself from the Vietnam War (1954–75).

The first treaty of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in May 1972, lessened the threat of nuclear war by bringing the arms race under control. The treaty represented the core of détente. The negotiations that led up to SALT I continued after it was signed and established a direct line of communication between the two superpowers.

Even with all the talk of cooperation, the United States and the Soviet Union continued their competitive Cold War struggle. Neither gave up a single offensive weapon already in development or production. Likewise, as governmental troubles occurred in nations around the world, neither country gave up opportunities to further its global influence, political philosophy, and economic goals in those afflicted areas. The Soviet Union promoted communism as the best system of government. In a communist government, a single political party controls almost all aspects of society. Communist economic theory includes a ban on private ownership of property and businesses so that goods produced and wealth accumulated can be shared equally by all. The United States supported democracy, a completely different political system, as the best choice for people around the globe. In a democracy, several political parties select candidates to run for election to various government offices; the people vote to elect one candidate for each office. In the United States, democracy is paired with capitalism, an economic system that allows property and businesses to be privately owned. Competition determines prices, and individuals who compete successfully in business can accumulate private wealth. The government is only minimally involved in controlling goods and production.

The European détente began through the efforts of Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970), the president of France, and Willy Brandt (1913–1992), the West German chancellor who came to power in 1969. Both sought to open communications with the East, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union, and they achieved major improvements in East-West relations.

In August 1974, America's Watergate scandal, which stemmed from the burglarizing of the offices of the Democratic National Committee and the cover-up that followed, and the subsequent resignation of U.S. president Richard M. Nixon (1913–1994; served 1969–74) interrupted détente. Détente activities culminated in the Helsinki Accords, signed in the summer of 1975 by thirty-five nations, including the United States, now under the leadership of Gerald R. Ford (1913–; served 1974–77) . However, by the spring of 1976, détente had stalled; superpower relations would go into a freeze by the spring of 1977.

China opens to the United States

By early 1969, tensions between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union were at an all-time high. The PRC was by this time simply called China. China's leaders, Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and Premier Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), had cast a wary eye toward Czechoslovakia, where the Soviets had stopped a revolt in 1968. The Brezhnev Doctrine (1968), named after Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982), proclaimed the right of the Soviet Union to intervene in the internal affairs of other communist states and to impose its particular communist principles on them. Although the doctrine largely applied to the Soviet satellite nations of Eastern Europe, China's leaders feared that Soviet aggression would someday focus on China. They were also not happy that the Soviets treated them arrogantly when the Chinese tried to share industrial and military technology with the Soviets. China had managed to develop its own nuclear weapons during the 1960s but had done so without Soviet help. By 1969, the border between China and the Soviet Union, over 3,000 miles (4,827 kilometers), was guarded by an ever-expanding military buildup on both sides. Sporadic fighting broke out between Soviet and Chinese troops.

U.S. president Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger (1923–), decided to take advantage of the Soviet-Chinese rift. In early 1970, Kissinger began secretly traveling to Warsaw, Poland, where he met with Chinese officials. This secret type of negotiation is referred to as a back channel. China had long isolated itself from the rest of the world, and the small amount of information that leaked out about its brutal 1960s Cultural Revolution (see Chapter 12, Home Front Turmoil: The 1960s) convinced other nations that they wanted nothing to do with China anyway. But now the United States and China saw that the opening of relations between them could be advantageous, for a number of reasons. China could be an effective block to further Soviet aggression eastward. Fearful of Soviet aggression, China was eager to respond to the United States, a powerful potential ally. President Nixon was also trying to wind down the war in Vietnam. He believed China was supplying weapons to communist North Vietnam, the U.S. enemy in this conflict. He hoped that opening talks might halt this activity, thereby helping him pull U.S. troops out of Vietnam more quickly. Lastly, Nixon and Kissinger believed that if the Soviets thought the United States and China were becoming allies, the Soviets would push for better relations with the United States. The Soviets feared that China and the United States might form a partnership against the Soviet Union.

Secret back-channel talks with Kissinger progressed, and before long the United States eased trade and travel restrictions to China. In spring 1971, China invited the U.S. Ping-Pong team to play a tournament in Beijing, the capital city. The team traveled to China in April 1971, was warmly received, and set a positive tone for future exchanges. In July, Kissinger became the first U.S. government representative to visit China since the communist revolution in 1949. The talks between Kissinger, Mao, and Zhou were still secret and still cordial, and they paved the way for a visit by President Nixon. Nixon's plane touched down in China on February 21, 1972, beginning a very public visit. Live television covered Nixon and his wife, Pat, as they walked with Chinese officials along the Great Wall, a 1,500-mile (2,400 kilometers) wall that runs across northern China. A beaming Nixon toasted Mao and Zhou in the Great Hall of the People. Nixon agreed to begin withdrawing U.S. troops from Taiwan, a nation the United States had long supported and China had opposed. Nixon's only disappointment came when the Chinese did not agree to halt support for the North Vietnamese. Nevertheless, tensions were lessened over both Taiwan and Vietnam. Nixon's historic trip to China was a Cold War turning point. It paved the way for full diplomatic relations with China seven years later in 1979 during the administration of Jimmy Carter (1924–; served 1977–81). It greatly strengthened America's position in the world. Overall, the trip served to put a great deal of pressure on the Soviet Union. A U.S.-China alignment was the Soviet Union's worst nightmare: The Soviets and Chinese already had strained relations; improved U.S.-Chinese relations would result in major rivals to the east and west, which, the Soviets feared, could develop a growing anti-Soviet coalition.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I)

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I)—negotiations for limitation of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union and the United States—had begun in 1969. Fearing that China and the United States might form a partnership against the Soviet Union, Soviet leaders were eager to improve relations with the United States. After Nixon's trip to China, Kissinger quietly visited Moscow and paved the way for

the completion of SALT I. The negotiations revolved around offensive intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and antiballistic missile (ABM) systems. ICBMs carried single nuclear warheads to a target thousands of miles away. MIRVs were offensive multiple warheads, each guided to a different target but installed atop a single missile. ABM systems were proposed defense systems to intercept incoming missiles. There was no assurance ABMs could really defend against all incoming missiles. But if one country had a working ABM, it could go on the offensive against the other and then protect against retaliation. Therefore, if the United States tried to develop an ABM, the Soviet Union would feel compelled to also develop an ABM, and vice versa. The cost of attempting to develop an ABM was billions of dollars. The United States was not eager to spend this money, and the Soviet Union, its economy struggling, was desperate not to spend that much.

Ultimately, SALT I capped the number of ICBMs for a five-year period; only ICBMs already manufactured or in the construction process would be allowed. No cap was put on MIRVs, so the race to build MIRVs continued. The only real progress came on the question of ABMs. Each country was allowed two ABM systems: one to protect its capital city and one to defend a field of offensive missiles. This ruling would significantly slow any ABM development, to the great relief of both countries.

President Nixon arrived in Moscow on May 22, 1972, for the signing of the treaty. He was the first American president to go to the Kremlin, the seat of the Soviet government in Moscow. Although the Soviets would have been much happier if Nixon had gone to Moscow before Beijing, SALT I was signed, and Brezhnev offered toasts all around. A few days later, Nixon and Brezhnev signed the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States and Soviet Union. The Soviets had proposed and prepared the Basic Principles, and they considered the document a major achievement in détente. It stated that neither superpower would take advantage of a situation at the expense of the other. It was a kind of charter, or set of rules and guiding principles, for détente. It spoke of peaceful coexistence, long a Soviet catchphrase. Each superpower was to strive to lessen the chance of military conflicts and nuclear war. Kissinger and Nixon did not consider the document as important as the Soviets did. As noted in Cold War: An Illustrated History, 1945–1991, it is likely Nixon had not even read the document when he signed it.

The meeting in Moscow established a working relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. New lines of communication had been established and would eventually lead to discussions on trade and allow U.S. tourists to travel to the Soviet Union. While in Moscow, Nixon had offered to sell U.S. surplus wheat to the Soviets. Soon after Nixon's return to the United States, the Soviets agreed to buy four hundred million bushels of wheat for roughly $700 million and obtained U.S. loans to do so. Some U.S. officials chuckled that the Soviets were quite good at capitalist negotiations. Conservatives believed the United States had been outsmarted in the deal. Nevertheless, the Soviets would continue to buy U.S. grain for many years.

Despite all the arms control talk and the signing of the Basic Principles, both countries knew that détente rested on

the principle of strategic weapons parity, or equality, and mutual deterrence. Each side had the capability to destroy the other even if the other side struck first. Nixon and Kissinger knew this; Brezhnev knew it as well. Kissinger considered this relationship necessary for long-term coexistence between the two superpowers. Enforcing détente was merely a way to establish less tense relations and lessen the risk of anyone launching a nuclear war. As for arms control, the Soviet Union went right on with its buildup, uninterrupted, because they were behind the United States in the ICBM race. This was allowed because they had room to expand under their caps, whereas the United States did not; this was a major issue with some critics of the agreement. Soon, the Soviets had exceeded U.S. ICBM launchers by 50 percent. Both countries continued developing new MIRVs and new nuclear submarines.

Ostopolitik

Ostopolitik was a new policy instituted by West German chancellor Willy Brandt. Brandt took over leadership of West Germany in October 1969. He replaced Konrad Adenauer (1876–1967), who had been adamant in his refusal to recognize East Germany as an independent nation. Ostopolitik recognized East Germany and territorial changes that occurred at the conclusion of World War II (1939–45), including the new boundaries of Poland. This new policy was a major force in the so-called European détente. Another major force was Charles de Gaulle, the president of France, who refused to let the United States position its nuclear weapons in France. De Gaulle also pulled out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was formed for the mutual protection of the United States and Western European nations. Both Brandt and de Gaulle were hoping for a more cooperative relationship with Eastern Europe, even though Eastern European countries were under the strong influence of the Soviet Union.

In December 1972, East and West Germany signed a mutual recognition treaty. Also, for the first time since Berlin was divided into four sectors (Soviet, British, American, and French; after World War II), West Germany officially recognized East Berlin as part of East Germany. In turn, East Germany recognized the role of the United States, Britain, and France in West Berlin and guaranteed access to West Berlin from West Germany (see Chapter 3, Germany and Berlin). This détente-influenced mutual political recognition marked a new beginning in East-West European cooperation. The U.S.-Soviet détente would ultimately collapse by 1976, but the European détente continued to flourish.

Influence of Cold War worldwide

The lines of communication established between the superpowers were pressed into active negotiations at the end

of 1972. A new round of talks began on extending the agreements of SALT I. In the summer of 1973, Brezhnev traveled to the United States for a summit. At this summit, a document called the Prevention of Nuclear War was signed. The document bound both countries to do everything possible to prevent nuclear war.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union proved that despite talks and treaties, neither country would stop trying to extend its influence in the world. The situation in Europe had stabilized, so there was little Cold War competition left there, but many countries in the Third World were very unstable. (The term Third World refers to poor underdeveloped or developing nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Most Third World countries have economies primarily based on agriculture, with few other industries.) The Soviets supported revolutionary liberation movements within these countries whenever they erupted. They expected the revolutionaries to adopt communism and ally themselves with the Soviet Union. The United States supported extremely conservative governments that were strongly anticommunist—but often run by brutal dictators. The Cold War would therefore continue, on a global scale.

Chile

In 1970, the communist-leaning Salvador Allende Gossens (1908–1973) was elected as Chile's new president. Many Chileans questioned his policies, and he might have lost power before long. Nevertheless, through the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Nixon and Kissinger engineered a military coup (short for coup d'état; an illegal or forceful change of government) in which Allende was killed. General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (1915–1999) took control. Although he was a ruthless dictator, the United States was willing to officially recognize him as president of Chile because he was noncommunist.

Iran

Between 1972 and 1979, to combat a growing Soviet presence in the Middle East, the United States allowed Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919–1980), the shah, or ruler, of Iran, to buy approximately $20 billion worth of U.S. weapons. (The shah had been returned to power by a CIA coup in the 1950s. See Chapter 14, A Freeze in Relations.) The shah allowed no political freethinking and brutally punished anyone speaking out. Nevertheless, his pro-American stance kept Nixon pleased and communism at bay.

Angola

Long under Portuguese rule, the African country of Angola was given its independence in 1975. Civil war among various factions ensued. The United States, China, and South Africa supported one side of the guerrilla warfare, or irregular and independent attacks; the Soviets supported the other. Taking it a step higher, the United States engaged the CIA in covert, or secret, activities to support the guerrillas whose sentiments leaned toward America. In response, the Soviets sent ten thousand Cuban soldiers into Angola to help support the government for over a decade.

The October War—The Yom Kippur War

On October 6, 1973, the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel. Unprepared, Israel suffered territorial losses and pleaded for quick help from the United States. While Egypt and Syria were backed with Soviet materials, Israel received war planes and other supplies from the United States. Within ten days Israel was on the offensive, trapping Egypt's Third Army on the Sinai Peninsula. The Soviets threatened to intervene to save the Third Army; the Soviets did not want to see Egypt, a pro-Soviet country (though not solid) suffer another embarrassing defeat to Israel as in 1967. The United States put all its nuclear armed forces on alert but at the same time called on Israel to stop advancing. Israel complied, and both the United States and the Soviet Union backed off. The October War proved that the two superpowers had no intention of putting the new rules or guidelines of détente into practice. Through intelligence, the Soviets probably knew of Egypt's plan to attack Israel but did not warn the United States ahead of time. The crisis eventually took the super-powers closer to nuclear war than they had been since the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 (see Chapter 9, Cuban Missile Crisis).

Cuba, again

The only détente-era direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union occurred in 1970. The Soviets began building a submarine base at the Bay of Cienfuegos in Cuba. The base would supply Soviet nuclear submarines. After a U-2 spy aircraft flying over Cuba took a photograph of the construction, the United States confronted the Soviets, arguing that agreements made at the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis prohibited such construction. The Soviets quickly backed away, and the crisis blew over.

Watergate

The beginning of the end of détente actually occurred only a few months after Nixon's triumphant trip to China in February 1972. On June 17, 1972, a security guard at the Watergate building complex in Washington, D.C., caught five men breaking into the Democratic National Committee Headquarters office. One of the men, James W. McCord Jr. (1918–), worked for the Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP). The break-in eventually led directly to the White House—and to Nixon himself—and to presidential impeachment proceedings, a legislative process charging a public official with misconduct. With the problems of Watergate at the forefront, détente became entangled in a web of domestic American politics. Détente had always depended on the personalities of Kissinger, Nixon, and Brezhnev. But weakened by the Watergate scandal, Nixon could do little.

On August 9, 1974, Nixon became the first American president in history to resign. He was replaced by Vice President Gerald Ford—who himself had replaced Spiro Agnew (1918–1996) a year earlier after Agnew was forced to resign due to an income tax evasion scandal—making him the first U.S. president who had never been popularly elected to eithere

the office of president or vice president. Ford would continue pursuing the policies of détente.

When Nixon left Washington, D.C., he left behind more than the break-in scandal. His legacy includes an improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations and many other notable foreign relations achievements. He, Kissinger, and Brezhnev had established détente essentially by themselves, and it had worked to lessen Cold War tensions between the two super-powers. By withdrawing from Vietnam, Nixon recognized that America had limits to its power. But he also showed communist-fearing Americans that the communist world outside the Soviet Union was not a monster ready to devour the United States. Instead it had many centers that were rarely even loosely joined to one another. Because Nixon understood this, he defined his Nixon Doctrine, announced in July 1969, as a shift in American foreign commitments. It was a shift away from immediately sending American troops wherever a communist rebel group threatened to gain control in a country. The United States would no longer act as the global police; it would rely more on other Western nations to take more responsibility with U.S. backing. Government leaders and the American public alike hoped this policy would help them avoid all future entanglements that resembled the one in Vietnam. Indeed, China took the Nixon Doctrine as a positive sign and opened the door for renewed relations.

Helsinki Accords

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, more commonly known as the Helsinki Accords, was signed on August 1, 1975, in Helsinki, Finland. Signers included thirty-five nations, which included Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Historians view this signing as the mountaintop of détente. The accords consisted of three parts or "baskets," as they were called. The first basket recognized all existing borders of European nations and called for cooperation and peaceful settlement of disputes with neighbors. The second basket called for cooperation of all the nations in trade, cultural exchanges, and scientific and industrial advances. The third basket involved human rights, calling for the free movement of people and free circulation of information and ideas. Human rights refers to certain economic and political freedoms that all people, simply by being human, deserve. Examples of human rights include freedom from oppression, freedom from un-lawful imprisonment and execution, and freedom from torture, persecution, and exploitation.

The third basket caused Soviet leaders to pause. Its terms were not compatible with communism. However, in the spirit of détente, Brezhnev was able to persuade these leaders to overcome their doubts about basket three. He went to Helsinki to sign the accords. President Ford also went, to sign for the United States. At the same time, symbolizing a new era of cooperation, the American space program and the Soviet space program joined together—literally, by the linkage of each country's spacecraft—high above Earth and carried out joint experiments.

Détente stalled

In addition to the Helsinki Accords, President Ford reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to détente in a November 1974 summit meeting with Brezhnev in Vladivostok, located in the far eastern reaches of the Soviet Union. Ford also kept Henry Kissinger in his cabinet, or group of top advisors, as secretary of state. Despite all these efforts, détente had been partially derailed when Nixon left office. The Soviets could not understand why he was forced from office for what seemed in their view an insignificant act. With the key détente figure of Nixon now gone, the Soviets doubted that détente could go on without him.

Meanwhile, the 1976 U.S. presidential election loomed. One Democratic hopeful, U.S. senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson (1912–1983) of Washington, had already criticized the U.S. policy of détente. He saw no reason why the United States should cap its number of missiles. He opposed further trade with the Soviet Union unless the Soviets allowed Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel. Russian Jews were persecuted for their religious beliefs in the Soviet Union; Soviet authorities began applying a tax on Jews emigrating out of the Soviet Union, which made it much more difficult for many. This was a pet issue with Jackson, who wanted the Soviets to ease up on their emigration policies toward the Jews.

Meanwhile, a Republican candidate, Ronald Reagan (1911–), the governor of California, was also forcefully opposed to détente. Neither Jackson nor Reagan had wanted the United States to sign the Helsinki Accords in 1975, and both used the accords as a campaign issue. Reagan believed that the Soviets gained a lot more than the United States with formal recognition of communist rule in Eastern Europe and that trade agreements supported the continuation of the communist system. Jackson believed the human rights issues were basically ignored on both sides. By the spring of 1976, President Ford and Kissinger knew public opinion was turning against détente, and Ford quit using the term in his run for the presidential election. Further SALT negotiations stalled.

Democrat Jimmy Carter, the governor of Georgia, was the ultimate victor in the presidential race. President Carter vowed to eliminate nuclear arms from the world, but he had no foreign policy expertise. Quickly, he sent to Moscow a plan to radically reduce arms; the plan went far beyond anything ever discussed before. Soviet leaders thought it was outrageous and did not take it seriously. They flatly rejected it. Carter also immediately set out on his campaign for human rights around the world, citing the third part of the Helsinki Accords, the human rights "basket" that had riled the Soviets before they signed the agreement. (At the signing in 1975, Kissinger did not press the human rights section of the accords, aware it was a Soviet sticking point.) Carter's human rights effort was also based on the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948), whose principal author was Eleanor Roosevelt (1884–1962), widow of the late U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945; served 1933–45). Included in Carter's early actions was a letter of support to Andrey Sakharov (1921–1989), noted Soviet nuclear physicist and father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb. Sakharov had fallen out of favor with the Soviets because of his outspokenness and went into exile in early 1980. Human rights advocate Carter admired Sakharov and believed he had been persecuted for his antinuclear arms race views.

Dissidents, or protesters, in several Eastern European countries demanded compliance with the human rights initiatives that the Soviets flatly rejected. Many dissidents were jailed. With the signing of the Helsinki Accords, many groups worldwide (even within the Soviet Union) more aggressively pressed the communist bloc regarding the lack of personal freedoms within their countries; it put the spotlight much brighter on the nature of communist rule. Brezhnev charged the Carter administration with meddling in internal Soviet affairs. Soviet-U.S. relations sank very low, and détente came to a close.

Ultimately, détente was not an alternative to the Cold War but a less belligerent way to wage it. A competitive relationship still existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both countries pursued a strategy of regular communication, which lessened tensions; both enjoyed claiming credit for the apparent progress in relations. However, both countries continued to build up their military strength, and each country remained vigilant about the activities of the other side. Despite official policies and treaties, neither country could bring itself to fully trust the other.

For More Information

Books

Garthoff, Raymond L. A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.

Gates, Robert M. From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

Isaacs, Jeremy, and Taylor Downing. Cold War: An Illustrated History, 1945–1991. Boston: Little, Brown, 1998.

Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger: A Biography. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.

Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994.

Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Thornton, Richard C. The Nixon-Kissinger Years: Reshaping America's Foreign Policy. New York: Paragon House, 1989.

Web Sites

Gerald R. Ford Library and Museum.http://www.ford.utexas.edu (accessed on August 12, 2003).

The Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace.http://www.nixonfoundation.org (accessed on August 12, 2003).

"SALT II Treaty." U.S. State Department.http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt2-1.html (accessed on August 12, 2003).

Words to Know

Brezhnev Doctrine: A Soviet act that proclaimed the right of the Soviet Union to intervene in the internal affairs of other communist states and to impose its particular communist principles on them.

Capitalism: An economic system in which property and businesses are privately owned. Prices, production, and distribution of goods are determined by competition in a market relatively free of government intervention.

Cold War: A prolonged conflict for world dominance from 1945 to 1991 between the two superpowers, the democratic, capitalist United States and the communist Soviet Union. The weapons of conflict were commonly words of propaganda and threats.

Communism: A system of government in which the nation's leaders are selected by a single political party that controls all aspects of society. Private ownership of property is eliminated and government directs all economic production. The goods produced and accumulated wealth are, in theory, shared relatively equally by all. All religious practices are banned.

Democracy: A system of government in which several political parties compete.

Détente: A relaxing of tensions between rival nations, marked by increased diplomatic, commercial, and cultural contact.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT): Discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union aimed at lessening the threat of nuclear war by bringing the arms race under control.

Watergate scandal: A scandal that began on June 17, 1972, when five men were caught burglarizing the offices of the Democratic National Committee in the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C. This led to a cover-up, criminal convictions, and, eventually, the resignation of President Richard Nixon.

People to Know

Willy Brandt (1913–1992): West German chancellor, 1969–74.

Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982): Leader of the Soviet Union Communist Party, 1964–82.

Jimmy Carter (1924–): Thirty-ninth U.S. president, 1977–81.

Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970): French president, 1958–69.

Gerald R. Ford (1913–): Thirty-eighth U.S. president, 1974–77.

Henry Kissinger (1923–): U.S. national security advisor, 1969–75; secretary of state, 1973–77.

Mao Zedong (1893–1976): Chairman of the People's Republic of China and its Communist Party, 1949–76.

Richard M. Nixon (1913–1994): Thirty-seventh U.S. president, 1969–74.

Ping-Pong Diplomacy

The U.S. table tennis team was one of the first groups of Westerners to travel to China after the Cultural Revolution ended (see Chapter 12, Home Front Turmoil: The 1960s). The team's opportunity to visit China originated by chance: The U.S. team was in Japan for the world Ping-Pong championships early in 1971, and a young American player stumbled onto the wrong team bus. He sat down and soon discovered he was surrounded by Chinese team players, none of whom would speak to him. It was forbidden for the young Chinese to talk to foreigners. Feeling the snub was uncalled for, the Chinese team captain spoke to the American. The next day. the American team leader approached the Chinese team captain. With youthful eagerness and in the spirit of international competition, he asked if the U.S. team might be allowed to visit Beijing for a tournament.

Although no Americans had been in China for years, the time was right, politically speaking, to allow such a visit. The request went all the way to Chinese leader Mao Zedong, because no one else in China could make such an important decision. Mao, who was in the midst of improving relations with the United States, saw Ping-Pong as a great opportunity for exchange between the two countries.

In April 1971, in packed arenas, the American players competed against the Chinese players, who were known to be some of the best in the world. The Chinese defeated the Americans easily, but the warm hospitality the young Americans received seemed genuine and very enthusiastic. Although the U.S. team lost its matches, it scored big points for foreign diplomacy: Shortly after the U.S. team visit, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger traveled secretly to China to speak directly with Mao and President Richard Nixon was invited to China for a summit in February 1972.

End of the Vietnam War

When Richard Nixon campaigned for the U.S. presidency in 1968, he claimed he would bring an honorable end to the Vietnam War if he was elected. Nixon won the election over his Democratic opponent, Vice President Hubert Humphrey (1911–1978), and entered the White House in January 1969. By March, Nixon unveiled a new policy for the war; the policy was called Vietnamization. It called for the South Vietnamese army, which the United States had been supporting, to take over responsibility for fighting the war. Meanwhile, American troops, numbering over five hundred thousand at the time, would be phased out. As this policy was put into action, Nixon's national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, entered secret negotiations with the communist North Vietnamese to bring an end to the war. However, the talks were not productive. The United States hoped that in the spirit of détente cooperation, the Soviet Union and China could help bring an end to the war by talking with their fellow communists in North Vietnam. But this did not occur. In reality, neither country had much influence over the North Vietnamese.

To give the South Vietnamese army a fighting chance after U.S. ground troops were to be withdrawn from the war as part of Vietnamization, Nixon decided to attack North Vietnamese base camps in neighboring countries to destroy their war supplies and their sanctuaries, or safe places normally protected from attack. Because of continued public protests against the war and an unsupportive Congress, Nixon ordered secret bombing of Cambodian targets and support of South Vietnamese raids into Laos, another neighbor of Vietnam.

Finally, the secret peace talks became more productive in October 1972. Both countries had a reason to talk: Nixon needed to show progress in ending the war to the American public to gain reelection, and North Vietnam was not making satisfactory progress in gaining control of South Vietnam. On October 26, days before the presidential election, Kissinger made a public announcement: "Peace is at hand." Nixon won easily, boosted by the good news. However, the South Vietnamese, who had been left out of the negotiations,

rejected the settlement, believing it placed them in an impossible situation. They believed they were being sold out and would be left without outside assistance against a superior North Vietnamese army. Further talks broke down.

To bring North Vietnam back to the negotiating table, Nixon ordered eleven days of intensive bombing in North Vietnam through late December; this was known as the "Christmas bombing." Public protests again erupted around the United States. Though highly unpopular, the bombings soon led to a cease-fire settlement, which went into effect on January 27, 1973. Two months later, Nixon proclaimed "peace with honor" as the last American soldiers left Vietnam on March 29. However, fighting in South Vietnam would continue for two more years. Finally in early 1975, a North Vietnamese offensive took control of South Vietnam and captured its capital, Saigon. The last Americans and some pro-American Vietnamese evacuated in overloaded helicopters from the U.S. embassy's rooftop.

The war had finally ended. For the first time, the United States was on the losing side of a war, and the costs were dramatic. The United States spent $155 billion fighting the Vietnam War, and approximately fifty-eight thousand U.S. soldiers and over two million Vietnamese soldiers and civilians were killed.