The Siege at Cuba

The Spanish-American War (April-August 1898) began on April 21, 1898, when the United States decided to fight Spain for control of the Spanish colony of Cuba. Rebels on the island of Cuba had been fighting the Spanish army since February 1895 for freedom from Spain and the right to govern themselves. The Spanish tactic of relocating civilians into crowded concentration camps to prevent them from helping the rebels was killing hundreds of thousands of innocent Cubans through disease and starvation. And the Cuban Liberating Army's tactic of burning sugarcane fields and mills was destroying the island's economy, in which American businesses had invested $50 million. America eventually decided it had to intervene to protect its financial interests and the welfare of the Cuban people.

War strategy

Before the war began, the United States had planned to coordinate its military strategy with the Cuban Liberating Army. On April 9, 1898, U.S. war secretary Russell A. Alger (1836-1907) and U.S. Army general Nelson A. Miles (1839-1925) sent Lieutenant Andrew S. Rowan on a mission to find Cuban general Calixto García (1839-1898; see entry in Primary Sources section). With assistance from rebels in Jamaica and on Cuba, Rowan found García in Bayamo, Cuba, on May 1, 1898. That same day, Commodore George Dewey (1837-1917; see entry in Biographies section) defeated a Spanish squadron in a naval battle at Manila Bay in the Philippines, giving the United States its first big victory.

After meeting with Rowan, García sent him back to Washington, D.C., with Cuban officers, maps, and military data. In a memorandum to Secretary Alger, García welcomed coordination with the U.S. Army. In a letter to Cuban general Máximo Gómez y Báez (1836-1905; see entry in Biographies section) on May 11, García said he had asked the United States to land troops on the northern coast of the island, along with arms and ammunition. That strategy would allow both armies to conduct joint operations designed to capture the city of Holguín in the province of Oriente in the eastern half of the island. From there, Cuba and the United States could make plans for defeating Spain in its strongholds in the west.

During the month of May, the United States assembled an army in Florida and other locations for its assault on Spain. When the war began, the U.S. Army had only 28,000 regular soldiers, compared to Spain's 180,000 military personnel in Cuba. Newly enlisted troops and volunteers would have to make up the difference needed for victory; as it turned out, more than one million men answered U.S. president William McKinley 's (1843-1901; served 1897-1901; see entry in Biographies section) request for volunteers.

While the army prepared to do battle, two U.S. naval squadrons, led by Admiral William T. Sampson (1840-1902) and Commodore Winfield S. Schley (1839-1909), set out to form a blockade in Cuba. Spanish admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete (1839-1909; see entry in Biographies section) and his six-vessel fleet had sailed from the Cape Verde Islands south of Spain on April 29 for an unknown destination. This gave rise to fears that Cervera might be headed to bombard cities on America's eastern coast. The U.S. Navy eased tensions somewhat by sending vessels to defend major eastern ports, such as Portland, Maine, and by forming a squadron of fast vessels to patrol the East Coast.

Unbeknownst to the United States, Cervera's fleet was not in good working order, so the fifty-nine-year-old sailor wished to avoid the U.S. Navy. Steaming around the Caribbean Sea for a couple of weeks, Cervera avoided Sampson and Schley and slipped into port at Santiago de Cuba on the southeast coast of the island on May 19. After Sampson and Schley set up a blockade to keep Cervera there, the U.S. Army decided to land troops near Santiago for their initial assault on the island. The change of plans disrupted coordination with General Gómez, who was expecting the United States to land somewhere on the other side of the island. This confusion set the stage for an American military effort that used and abused the Cuban Liberating Army.

Las Guásimas

On June 7, 1898, General Miles ordered General William R. Shafter (1835-1906; see entry in Biographies section) to board American transport vessels with troops enlisted in the Fifth Army Corps in Tampa, Florida. The V Corps, as the army called Shafter's men, broke camp and headed for the Tampa port. Regiments there fought with each other to get on the limited number of available transports—thirty-two vessels that could carry only sixteen thousand passengers plus horses, wagons, ambulances, and artillery. Fist fights and gun threats between fellow soldiers suggested the futility of trying to make peace in Cuba with war.

The V Corps sailed for Cuba one week later. A smaller U.S. expedition was then battling Spain at Guantánamo on the southeastern tip of the island. An American victory in that battle made landing there a safe bet. Upon conferring with García and Sampson, however, Shafter decided to land near Daiquirí twelve miles southeast of the stronghold at Santiago. Disembarking near Daiquirí would shorten the tough march to Santiago and also make it easier for García's forces to guard their American allies.

On June 22, the U.S. Navy bombed suspected Spanish defenses near the planned landing point. When Cuban rebels signaled that the Spanish had retreated, the V Corps began to disembark and assemble on the shore. The troops made their landing free of enemy fire thanks to protection from U.S. vessels at sea and Cuban rebels on land. Exploration revealed that the Spanish forces had burned and deserted not only Daiquirí but also the port city of Siboney, further up the coast, where more U.S. troops landed on June 23.

During the second day of landing, the V Corps discovered that Spain had retreated toward Santiago to an area called Las Guásimas. General Joseph Wheeler (1836-1906), a Confederate (Southern) general during the American Civil War (1861-65), commanded the U.S. cavalry division—troops who typically served on horses but fought in Cuba on foot because space restrictions had forced them to leave most of their horses in Tampa. Wheeler ordered an attack on Las Guásimas for June 24.

That morning, Wheeler led a regular army regiment along the main road to Las Guásimas, while American officers Colonel Leonard Wood (1860-1927) and Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919; see entry in Biographies section) led the 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry—known as the Rough Riders—through the dense woods parallel to the road. Some Cubans went along as guards, but Cuban colonel González Clavell refused to send his troops on the mission, for he believed it was not carefully planned and was unnecessary for capturing Santiago. When deadly gunfire erupted, the reality of war set in as soldiers fell to the ground, injured or dead.

As it had done in its battles with the Cuban rebels since 1895, however, Spain retreated as soon as the U.S. Army reached its battle lines. According to Michael Golay in The Spanish-American War, Wheeler greeted the retreat by yelling, "We've got the damn Yankees on the run!" When the fight was over, the United States had sixteen casualties and fifty-two soldiers wounded, while Spain suffered ten fatalities and twenty-five wounded.

American news correspondents on the scene called the Cubans cowards for not participating in the battle. According to Philip Foner in The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, however, Spain was retreating all the way to Santiago, so Clavell had been right that the dangerous, deadly ambush was unnecessary. An American Civil War veteran agreed with the Cuban general in a letter published in the New York Times, condemning the ambush as foolishly executed.

El Caney and San Juan Heights

Spain now dug in its heels at El Caney and San Juan Heights, its last defenses separating the U.S. and Cuban armies from Santiago. The American troops spent one week resting, restocking supplies and ammunition, and discussing plans. Then, at 6:30 A . M . on July 1, General Henry Lawton (1843-1899) and his division of 5,400 troops began an assault on El Caney. Although Lawton expected to capture the village in two hours, he had severely underestimated the difficulty of the task.

Just hours into the El Caney charge, General Shafter ordered Wheeler and General Jacob Kent to begin attacking San Juan Heights. In this battle, Roosevelt's Rough Riders joined with African American soldiers in the 9th and 10th Cavalries for a famous charge up Kettle Hill (which got its name from a large iron sugar mill pot sitting atop it).

The battle was bloody and deadly. A balloon used by the U.S. Army to survey the situation made it easy for the Spaniards to know where to fire at the American and Cuban armies. Black powder clouds from the American soldiers's rifles added to this problem. By the time the United States had won the battle after eleven hours of killing, 205 of its troops were dead and 1,180 were wounded. For Spain, 215 were dead and 376 were wounded.

Americans again blamed the Cubans for failing to help in the effort, accusing them of watching the battle from a nearby hill. Foner counters these charges by noting that a contingent of twelve hundred Cubans helped General Adna R. Chaffee open the road to El Caney. General Clavell's contingent also participated in the attack, and rebels under General García's command helped with the final push to take El Caney. Other Cubans staked out positions north of Santiago to prevent Spain from sending reinforcements.

The Battle of Santiago Harbor

After the battle of San Juan Heights, Santiago and Admiral Cervera's fleet were all that stood between the United States and victory in Cuba. Admiral Sampson and General Shafter disagreed on how to proceed, however. Shafter wanted the navy to steam into the harbor and take out Cervera's fleet before the army stormed Santiago. This strategy would deprive the troops in Santiago of support from the guns onboard the Spanish vessels.

Sampson, on the other hand, wanted the army to storm Santiago first. He did not think it was safe for the navy to go into the harbor to take out Cervera's fleet. Mines in the harbor might destroy his vessels before they ever reached Cervera. According to Golay, naval officer Alfred Mahan summed up Sampson's thinking when he wrote, "If we lost ten thousand men, the country could replace them; if we lost a battleship, it could not be replaced."

On the Spanish side, a similar argument existed between Cervera and the Spanish military commander, Ramón Blanco y Arenas (1831-1906). Blanco wanted the Spanish navy to leave port and try to escape Sampson and Schley's blockade. Cervera knew his fleet would not survive the effort, but Blanco felt it was better for morale and the honor of Spain to lose in battle than to be destroyed at anchor.

Blanco prevailed by ordering Cervera to make the run. On the morning of July 3, Cervera's fleet began to steam out of the harbor. Sampson was aboard the flagship New York, headed for a meeting with Shafter in Daiquirí. That left Commodore Schley responsible for preventing Cervera's escape.

Sampson had left orders for the Americans to rush Cervera's fleet to prevent it from escaping the harbor. When this tactic failed, the battle turned into a race along the Cuban coastline. Schley commanded thirteen vessels to Cervera's six, which moved slowly due to marine growth on their bottoms. Over the course of four hours, between 9:00 A . M . and 1:00 P . M ., the American vessels overtook the Spanish ships and either destroyed them or bombed them into surrendering. Ironically, the last vessel to be defeated was the Cristóbal Colon, named for the Italian explorer (Christopher Columbus, 1451-1506) who claimed Cuba for Spain during his famous voyage of 1492.

The cold numbers of the battle made it look like a nice victory for Schley. The United States lost only one soldier, Yeoman George H. Ellis, while killing 323 Spaniards and capturing 1,800 prisoners.

Surrender in Cuba

The naval victory at Santiago put the United States in position to end the entire war. General Shafter asked the Spanish commander in Santiago, José Torál, to surrender. Torál, however, refused, saying Spain would defend its honor by fighting to the death. Torál actually was waiting for four thousand reinforcements to arrive at Santiago from the west.

After more fighting and bombardment by the U.S. Navy over the next couple weeks, Torál finally agreed to surrender. He offered the United States not only Santiago but also all of the troops under his command, numbering around twelve thousand in the region surrounding the city. Shafter, Wheeler, and others attended a formal ceremony with Torál on Sunday, July 17. Later battles on Puerto Rico would bring the entire war to an end the following month.

America insulted the Cuban Liberating Army yet again during the surrender process. Shafter excluded the Cubans from negotiations and the ceremony on July 17. President William McKinley ordered that after victory, Spanish laws and public officials would remain in place until a new government could be set up. After fighting a revolution for three years and helping the United States win the war, the Cubans found themselves still governed, if only temporarily, by the very people they had fought to overthrow.

For More Information

Collins, Mary. The Spanish-American War. New York: Children's Press,1998.

Dolan, Edward F. The Spanish-American War. Brookfield, CT: MillbrookPress, 2001.

Feuer, A. B. The Santiago Campaign of 1898. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993.

Feuer, A. B. The Spanish-American War at Sea. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995.

Foner, Philip S. The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972.

Gay, Kathlyn, and Martin K. Gay. Spanish American War. New York:Twenty First Century Books, 1995.

Golay, Michael. The Spanish-American War. New York: Facts On File, Inc.,1995.

Graves, Kerry A. The Spanish-American War. Mankato, MN: Capstone Books, 2001.

Langellier, John P. Uncle Sam's Little Wars: The Spanish-American War, Philippine Insurrection, and Boxer Rebellion, 1898-1902. Philadelphia, PA: Chelsea House, 2001.

Linderman, Gerald F. The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American War. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1974.

Musicant, Ivan. Empire by Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the American Century. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1998.

O'Toole, G. J. A. The Spanish War: An American Epic-1898. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1984.

Rosenfeld, Harvey. Diary of a Dirty Little War: The Spanish-American War of 1898. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000.

Smith, Angel, and Emma Dávila-Cox, eds. The Crisis of 1898: Colonial Redistribution and Nationalist Mobilization. New York: St. Martin's Press,1999.

Somerlott, Robert. The Spanish-American War: Remember the Maine! Berkeley Heights, NJ: Enslow Publishers, Inc., 2002.

Wukovits, John F. The Spanish-American War. San Diego, CA: LucentBooks, 2001.

Zinn, Howard. A People's History of the United States: 1492-Present. 20th anniversary ed. New York: HarperCollins, 1999.

Hobson the Hero

On May 19, 1898, a six-vessel Spanish fleet led by Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete (1839-1909) sailed into harbor at Santiago de Cuba near the southeastern edge of the island. Richmond P. Hobson, a U.S. naval constructor, devised a plan to trap Cervera's fleet there. Hobson proposed to take six other men on the U.S.S. Merrimac and sink it in the narrowest part of the harbor, leaving Cervera no room for escape. The men planned to escape the sinking ship in a dinghy—a small boat—to be rescued by the warship New York.

Hobson wished to attempt the feat during daylight to navigate to the right position in the harbor. Admiral William T. Sampson (1840-1902), who commanded the U.S. Navy in Cuba, insisted that Hobson go at night to make detection more difficult. Shortly after midnight on June 3, Hobson and his crew began steaming through the harbor in the Merrimac. The men had cords tied to them so that by pulling on the cords at the right moment, Hobson could signal when to drop the anchors, flood the hull, and detonate the torpedoes that would sink the boat. As the crew approached its destination, it shut off the Merrimac's engines so the ship would glide into place.

Moments later, gunfire erupted from a small Spanish boat and from nearby forts, attacking the Merrimac under the light of the moon. Hobson tugged on cords amid the hostile fire and shouted instructions to bring the boat down. The surprise attack, however, prevented things from going as planned, and the Merrimac floated past the narrow part of the harbor before sinking where it would be ineffective as a blockade.

When daylight arrived, Cervera picked up Hobson and his men, who had survived and spent the night in their dinghy. Cervera applauded the crew's bravery and offered to exchange them for Spanish prisoners-of-war being held by the United States. Perhaps because the Americans had valuable information about harbor mines that had exploded during the event, Spain did not complete the exchange until after the U.S. Navy defeated Cervera's squadron on July 3. After being released, Hobson said Cervera called his feat "one of the most daring acts in naval history," according to Harvey Rosenfeld in Diary of a Dirty Little War.