Political Representation

Although in the early twenty-first century representative government is synonymous with democracy, the concept of political representation arose separately from the idea of the rule of the people. Broadly political representation refers to an arrangement whereby one is enabled to speak and act with authority in the behalf of some other.

There are two issues that must be addressed in any theory of representation: who or what is to be represented, and who or what is to be the representative. The first question revolves around the description of constituencies. The second concerns the method of selection by which the representative is determined. There are specific answers to these questions that make representation compatible with and complementary to democracy. Once such a constellation of ideas is in place, however, the drama with which the conjunction of representation and democracy is received—in 1820 James Mill (1773–1836) wrote that "in the grand discovery of modern times, the system of representation, the solution to all difficulties, both speculative and practical, will perhaps be found" (p. 21)—eclipses somewhat the predemocratic origins of the concept of representation.

Classical Consent

An institutional arrangement that looks quite similar to modern representative democracy was established in Athens in 501 b.c.e. when Cleisthenes established the Council of Five Hundred, whose members were appointed in equal numbers from the ten tribes. The principle of sortition (lot) came to be central to the representative offices in Athens. This mechanism protected against the advantage the oligarchic elements enjoyed in elections, and kept representation democratic. The primary rational for the use of a system of representation was its usefulness for extending the reach of democracy over a community larger than could be governed through the direct participation of all. However this Athenian institution did not receive a contemporaneous theoretical advocacy to match its practical use. Among those theorists who did not simply disparage democracy (Aristotle stands out) the ideal polity was limited in size precisely by the requirements of direct participation in deliberative proceedings. The Roman assemblies, also apportioned on a tribal basis, did gradually become representative in fact, in that most citizens did not attend. No conceptual or legal recognition of this arrangement was put forth however. From ancient Greece to the eighteenth century, democratic regimes were always conceived of in terms of the "Athenian model" of a small community whose citizens participate directly in the government of affairs.

Election is an ancient custom, and early statements of electoral principle, such as that by Pliny the Younger (62–111), seem to imply a representative relation, "The emperor of all the people should be chosen by all the people" (imperator omnibus eligi debet ex omnibus ). The practice of obtaining the consent of the "better part" of the people is referred to by Pope Celestine I (422–432), who states that "a bishop should not be given to those unwilling [to receive him]," and Pope Leo I (440–461) affirms that "He who governs all should be elected by all." Numerous instances of such electoral consent can be found throughout the first millennium, in ecclesiastical settings at least. In 1140 Gratian transmitted the Roman principle, which required such consent: "What touches all must be approved by all" (quod omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari et approbari debet ). (A similar formulation, referring exclusively to private matters, is found as early as the Justinian Code of 531.)

Medieval Corporatism and the Origin of Political Representation

The medieval conception of representation moved beyond the idea of consent, based on the principles of the right of the majority to determine an issue and the quod omnes tangit. These principles alone, realized in the context of feudal and Germanic law, were inadequate to produce the concept of representation. This tradition of law contemplated only real individuals as persons with rights and interests, and consequently contained only the concept of a proctor: one real person acting on behalf of another real person, as an agent. Political representation only arose after 1150 c.e. when the concept of the proctor was conjoined to the concept of a corporation, a fictive person comprised of a group of individuals with similar interests which was itself considered the seat of rights and interests. The corporation introduced the idea of the conscious embodiment of a collective unity, a social community, for the sake of the defense and advancement of the common interests of the community as a whole. Such representative relations are referred to repeatedly by Thomas Aquinas, for example, in the Summa Theologia (1265–1273), where a temporal or ecclesiastical authority, prince, king, ruler, pope, bishop, or other, is said to "represent" their communities in the sense that they stand as allegorical images or symbols of the collective and disembodied whole. This symbolic representation functions specifically when magistrates, by virtue of their office, represent the image of the whole state, and generally when the weightier part (sanior pars ) of any group is taken (both definitionally and procedurally) as the majority (maior pars ).

The idea of a corporation, and the collectivist conception of the relation between representative and constituency, was soon challenged by William of Ockham with his conception of a constituency as the aggregation of real individuals. Ockham's nominalism, applied to the corporate theory of representation, rejects the attribution of rights to abstract fictions such as the collective entities, the church and the state. Only real individuals have rights and interests, and these cannot be alienated to a fictive corporate entity. The notion of a representative of the corporate whole does not take into account the fact that real individuals cannot delegate all their authority or alienate all their rights: Delegation is always subject to the reservation that the delegate do nothing contrary to the faith and to sound morals. In rejecting the corporate account of representation, and in insisting that delegates can only represent real individuals and groups of individuals, Ockham prevents the assimilation of the representative to the community it represents. This distinction between representative and constituency clears the path for the development of a theory of the representative's accountability and responsiveness to the constituency.

It was the medieval development of parliaments that accrued to themselves the powers of deliberation and decision, first in 1188 in the Spanish kingdom of Leon, that brought the concept of representation to a proper political setting. These parliaments were power-sharing arrangements, particularly regarding the levy of taxes and troops, among crown, bishops, nobles, and wise men. The authority that the consent of such parliaments conferred was bolstered as they came to be understood as representative in nature. The first explicit recognition of political representation is found on the occasion of the English Parliament of 1254, when knights of the shires were elected in county courts and empowered to speak for and bind the whole county. The authority that such direct consent conveyed was repeatedly affirmed in formulations such as that of the Chief Justice of England who, in 1365, proclaimed that "Parliament represents the body of all the realm." By the fourteenth century as well, members of Parliament were expected to convey the grievances of their constituencies to the king and his counselors, giving rise to the formula "Redress of grievances before supply." Thus the function of the representative was to serve as a two-way channel of communication, expressing grievances and popular opinion, while garnering popular support for the policies of rulers. This in turn gave rise to the affirmation that rulers, in so far as they are representative, must act in the interests of those they represent.

The political theorists of Renaissance Italy, while interested in republican and participatory theories of government, had no conception that legislatures might properly consist in representatives elected by the people rather than the people themselves. There was some development of a protodemocratic conception of representation among some Puritans, especially the Levelers in England. In their search for a practical expression of their demands for a broader franchise and a government responsive to a broad electorate, they merged the democratic idea of rule by the people with the idea of representation. Through the seventeenth century, the corporate conception of representation in which individuals were considered to be subsumed into the political body and its image, the representative, dominated both theory and practice.

Representing the Rights and Interests of Individuals

Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan (1651) contains a theory of authorization and consent that produces a conception of representation that straddles the corporatist-individualist divide. Individuals, in becoming party to the social contract, authorize the sovereign, who then becomes their representative. It is only after they enter into the contract that individuals are merged into the body politic. Once constituted, the state is conceived of in the medieval corporatist fashion, with all political rights of individuals being alienated unto it, with the single exception of the right to life of the individual, which, not being properly political, cannot be alienated. The individualist elements of Hobbes's theory begin the process that results in the individualization of the theory of political representation, laying the way for the development of modern democratic representation.

John Locke makes representation central to his theory of government in The Second Treatise of Government (1690), stating that the consent of the majority (primarily to taxation) must be given "either by themselves or their representatives chosen by them" (p. 362). He also introduces a fairly robust conception of the accountability of the representative organ to the people. The government is entrusted with the "right of making laws … for the public good," that is, in the interest and for the benefit of those represented, and if it breaches that trust, the people may rescind their authority and place it in another government. The mechanism of election is only imperfectly integrated into this theory, and is inadequate to attain the required degree of accountability, however, so Locke must include the "appeal … to Heaven," namely, the force of arms, as an alternate mechanism for the selection of representatives (p. 427)

The idea of the representation of individuals, and not corporations, paved the way for the theory of governmental accountability. This in turn paved the way for a democratic conception of representation, as all that was left at this point was to extend the franchise to the whole people. Montesquieu, in his discussion of the constitution of England, praises the institution of representative legislatures in a clear foreshadowing of the democratic revolution in representative practice: "As, in a free state, every man, considered to have a free soul, should be governed by himself, the people as a body should have legislative power; but, as this is impossible in large states and is subject to many drawbacks in small ones, the people must have their representatives do all that they themselves cannot do" (p. 159). However the democratization of representation faced two challenges in the years preceding the advent of representative democracy.

In his attack on political representation in Of the Social Contract (1762), Rousseau equates it with the use of mercenary solders, and then asserts that it is literally impossible: "Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be alienated; it consists essentially in the general will, and the will does not admit of being represented" (p. 114). The essential moral capacity of persons, the very soul of politics for Rousseau, cannot be delegated. It requires the direct, unmediated participation of the individual. Against this background, it is clear that representative democracy itself symbolizes the triumph of the liberal view of the appropriate sphere of politics: that the state should be limited in its enforcement of comprehensive moral or religious doctrines. It also heralds the triumph of an instrumental view of politics, as opposed to the classical view that direct participation in politics is a distinct endeavor essential to or necessary for the fullest expression of human being.

While affirming the centrality of representation to legitimate government, Edmund Burke revives the corporatist view that the interests and rights of the community are "unattached" to any concrete entities such as population, territory, and tax contribution. His view of parliament is that it is "the express image of the feelings of the nation," (Thoughts, p. 292) and as such is "not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests … but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole" (Speech, p. 69). For this reason, representatives need not be tied directly to the constituencies they represent. Constituencies need not have direct representation, as they still enjoyed "virtual representation" deriving from a "communion of interests and sympathy in feelings and desires between those who act in the name of any description of people and the people in whose name they act, though the trustees are not actually chosen by them" (Letter, p. 629). Rather than viewing the representative as a delegate, authorized to do only what the constituency wills, and limited by the expressed interests and preferences, Burke saw the representative as a trustee authorized to judge and act independently of the constituency's "opinions."

Representative Democracy and Electoral Engineering

In practice, however, these views failed to prevent those in the American colonies without actual representation in parliament to formulate the revolutionary slogan "taxation without representation is tyranny." The constitutions of these colonies and the new American republic affirmed that only election by individuals produces real accountability, and guarantees that representatives will in fact act in the interest of their constituencies. James Madison, in part following Montesquieu, gave definitive expression to the rationales for representative democracy. First through representative institutions democracy can be extended over a much greater territory and population than had been thought possible until this time. This practice has several advantages, including the likelihood that the representatives would be superior to their constituencies in judgment, knowledge, and such skills as public speaking and negotiation.

Further Madison claims, in "The Federalist No. 10" (1787), the effect of a representative legislature would be to "refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations" (p. 409). Representative, as opposed to directly participatory, institutions provide more continuity and stability, as representative bodies are less likely than the people to act on sudden changes of opinion. Through the new science of electoral engineering a representative government can be made to aim more reliably at a general good that encompasses the interests and preferences of many, more reliably than if all individuals in the people were polled directly. In "The Federalist No. 51" (1788), Madison says a multiplicity of overlapping and opposed constituencies, resulting from divided government and federalism, would make majority domination less likely "by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable" (p. 166). Madison hoped that such institutions would reduce the importance of personal, that is, patron-client, ties between electors and their representatives. Such corruption was endemic in early parliamentary politics, and broad programmatic policies often suffered as a result.

The triumph of this view was so complete in the minds of democratic theorists by the mid-nineteenth century that, in Considerations on Representative Government (1862), John Stuart Mill could simply state it as matter of course, that "the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state in one in which the whole people participate.… But since all cannot, in a community exceeding a small town, participate personally in any but very minor portions of the public business, it follows that the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative" (p. 350).

The effects of the highly complex set of representative institutions in democracies have come to light only through experience. There is a wealth of examples, however, as elections are the primary source of government legitimacy in the world of the early twenty-first century, so much so that even dictators and ruling parties in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes have used elections to fashion themselves as "representative." While corporatist forms of representation without direct electoral connections survived into the twentieth century in places as varied as Germany in the 1930s to Sweden in the 1970s, direct election of representatives by individuals aggregated into constituencies formed on a territorial basis is now the primary connection between citizens and their governments.

The analysis of representative institutions has yielded real advances in the knowledge of democratic politics. In systems where voters chose from among individually named candidates, the personal relation between the candidate and constituents will matter a great deal more than in systems where voters choose from among parties and the lists of candidates associated with them. Maurice Duverger formulated a set of propositions that outline the effect of district size on the political system as a whole. A first-past-the-post electoral system, in which districts elect a single member by plurality vote, tends to produce a two-party system, while a system in which districts elect multiple members simultaneously tends to produce a multiparty system. While there are exceptions to these claims, a set of refined propositions has been developed to account for most cases. That there is ample, if only tacit, knowledge of the workings of representative institutions is also demonstrated by the various successful attempts to manipulate the electoral rules to achieving system-wide results. Possible manipulations, corrupt and salutary, include denying or ensuring minority representation, unifying divergent political interests into a few parties, and providing proportional representation to a wide variety of political positions. Thomas Hare developed a system of proportional representation called the single transferable vote, which is widely viewed to be the fairest, in that every individual's vote will count toward the electoral outcome. One puzzle that appears to outrun the ability of political scientists to illuminate, however, is why individuals vote at all. The irony of representation is that it allows the expansion of democracies over such large numbers that the likelihood of any single individual's vote being the tie-breaker is so infinitesimal that there seems to be no instrumental reason to vote. With or without large voter turnouts, however, the representative structure continues to confer and confirm the legitimacy of most modern governments.

See also Democracy ; Political Science .

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——. "Speech at the Conclusion on the Poll, 3 November 1774." In The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke. Vol III: Party, Parliament, and the American War, 1774–1780, edited by Paul Langford, 63–70. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989.

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Duverger, Maurice. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. Translated by Barbara and Robert North. New York: Wiley, 1954.

Hare, Thomas. A Treatise on the Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal. London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1861.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Edited by Richard Tuck. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

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——. "The Federalist No. 51." In The Federalist with Letters of "Brutus," by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, edited by Terence Ball, 251–255. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

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SECONDARY SOURCES

Cox, Gary W. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997. A useful introduction to both the scientific study and legislative practice of electoral engineering.

Kateb, George. "The Moral Distinctiveness of Representative Democracy." Ethics 91 (1981): 357–374. A defense against authoritarianism on the one hand and direct democracy on the other.

Manin, Bernard. The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997. A historical sketch, with particular attention to how representatives are distinguished from their constituents.

Mansbridge, Jane. "Rethinking Representation," American Political Science Review 97, no. 4 (2003): 515–538. Reviews forms of "virtual representation" in modern practice.

Monahan, Arthur P. Consent, Coercion, and Limit: The Medieval Origins of Parliamentary Democracy. Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987. A thorough synthesis of the historical scholarship.

Pitkin, Hanna F. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. A historically illuminating conceptual and linguistic analysis; the classic theoretical work.

Hans von Rautenfeld