Intellectualism in Education: The Educational Philosophy of R. S. Peters and P. H. Hirst

May Mei-lin NG

Abstract

In what ways does knowledge contribute to the development of the young mind? This essay examines an answer offered by two prominent educational philosophers in the analytic tradition: R. S. Peters and P. H. Hirst. Seeking to revive the ancient Greek liberal education tradition, Peters and Hirst regard education as the liberation of the intellect from innocence to achieve rational autonomy. Following their analytic style in philosophising, this discussion starts with a conceptual analysis of “education” and develops from it the intellectualist claims as put forward by Peters and Hirst. Implications are then drawn on how the reconsideration of the primacy of knowledge and understanding in education may help us critically review the existing curriculum, so driven by narrowly defined academic performance and extrinsic aims.

Introduction

Transmission of knowledge has always been taken for granted in schooling. Yet, we seldom ask why this task is given utmost attention in the upbringing of our youth. In what ways does knowledge contribute to the development of the young mind? This essay examines an answer offered by two prominent educational philosophers in the analytic tradition: R. S. Peters and P. H. Hirst. Seeking to revive the ancient Greek liberal education tradition, Peters and Hirst regard education as the liberation of the intellect from innocence to achieve rational autonomy. Following their analytic style in philosophising, this discussion starts with a conceptual analysis of “education” and develops from it the intellectualist claims as put forward by Peters and Hirst. Implications are then drawn on how the reconsideration of the primacy of knowledge and understanding in education may help us critically review the existing curriculum, so driven by narrowly defined academic performance and extrinsic aims.

Intellectualism

As indicated by its suffix “-ism”, intellectualism denotes a doctrine related to intellect. As a word, intellect is usually linked with mind, intelligence, brain power, reasoning, as well as rational thinking. On the one hand, intellect in general encompasses the ability to think logically and understand systematically, or the ability to reason. So we very often refer to those who are good at using their intellect as smart, intelligent, clear-minded or rational. On the other hand, intellect is also in a close conceptual relationship with knowledge, with which the intellect is nurtured. So we often address people of knowledge as intellectuals.

Drawing on the ordinary usage of “intellect”, intellectualism in education is defined as any doctrine that puts forward intellectual development as the primary aim of formal schooling. In order to foster the intellectual development of students, both the enhancement of understanding and the attainment of knowledge need to be achieved.

In its widely accepted form, intellectualism refers to the commonly held belief that the sole purpose of schooling is the transmission of knowledge: if knowledge is properly transmitted from teachers to students, students' understanding can be enhanced and as a result their intellectual ability develops. Nonetheless, this form of intellectualism can only be either too vague or else misleading. For there remain questions about what constitutes knowledge, how the transmission of knowledge is related to the enhancement of understanding, and in what sense understanding contributes to intellectual development. It is necessary to further explore the criteria of knowledge and understanding as well as of intellectual development so that we would not be ensnared by the popular yet oversimplified equation put between being able to regurgitate facts and being knowledgeable.

In the modern Western philosophical discourse on education, two prominent English philosophers have endeavoured to answer the above questions—they are R. S. Peters and P. H. Hirst. Peters is said to have single-handedly “revolutionized the way in which the philosophy of education is now practised and understood” (Carr, 1986, p. 269), while Hirst's philosophical account is said to be “politically influential in the late 1970s” in Britain (White, 1990, p. 111). Peters and Hirst were close collaborators in defence of their intellectualist position; both have adopted the analytic style in philosophising and are eloquent in explicating key educational concepts. In the following, we will examine their educational doctrines as the most sophisticated form of intellectualism.

The Concept of Education

According to Peters and Hirst, there are two sets of formal conditions that must be met when one attempts to analyse the concept of education: the conditions of desirability and the conditions of knowledge (Hirst & Peters, 1970). In other words, if certain conditions of desirability and knowledge are not met, one cannot claim that one is doing something out of educational concern. As intellectualists, Peters and Hirst tend to stress in their writings the conditions of knowledge, upon which they believe the conditions of desirability can be grounded.

In their co-authored book The Logic of Education, Hirst and Peters (1970) examine the different uses of the concept of “education” and argue that knowledge and understanding is central to the use of the concept in that

“education” suggests not only that what develops in someone is valuable but also that it involves the development of knowledge and understanding. Whatever else an educated person is, he is one who has some understanding of something. He is not just a person who has a know-how or knack (p. 19).

Reading into this passage carefully, we can pinpoint the main thesis of their intellectualist claims:

1. The concept of education implies the ideal of an educated person.
2. In logical terms, the development of knowledge and understanding is the necessary condition of education; in other words, any activity that does not involve the development of knowledge and understanding cannot be counted as education, and any person who has not understood something cannot be counted as an educated person.
3. The understanding achieved through education is by nature non-technical knowledge.
4. The desirability of education can be grounded in knowledge and understanding, through which desirable states of mind characterised by some depth and breadth of understanding can be brought about.

Hence, the educated person is one whose mind has been deepened and broadened by knowledge and understanding of a non-technical sort.

We may wonder why “know-how” is excluded from the knowledge of an educated person. Partly this is because Peters and Hirst have a very rigorous definition of knowledge and understanding, which will be discussed in the next section. Yet, in order to appreciate their arguments more fully, we must put ourselves in the social context where the two philosophers were situated: in the political realm, they were against the instrumentalist voices dominating the educational policy discourse; in the academic realm, they were not satisfied with the progressive movement, as it lacked clear criteria for educational endeavours (see Hirst & Peters, 1970). Therefore, as Hirst (1974) puts it,

there has thus arisen the demand for an education whose definition and justification are based on the nature and significance of knowledge itself, and not on the predilections of pupils, the demands of the society, or the whims of politicians (p. 32).

So, on the one hand, they uphold the intrinsic value of knowledge and understanding as fulfilment of the mind; on the other hand, they seek to expound upon the public criteria that are grounded in theoretical knowledge in a broad sense in order to provide rational justification for how learning experience should be organised in schools.

Confronting the contemporary predicaments of education, among them a consumerist view of schooling and a relativist view of ethics, Peters and Hirst have deep faith in the rational ability of the human mind: contemplating upon the good is not only the key to the good life, the act of contemplating itself constitutes the good life. Schools, therefore, are to initiate students into an intellectual life in pursuit of knowledge and understanding (Hirst & Peters, 1970), in and by which they can lead a justifiable and enjoyable educated life.

Looking back to the Western history of philosophy, such an intellectual stance has its roots in a long philosophical tradition going back to ancient Greece, when Socrates and Plato can be seen as the spokespersons. As Hirst (1974) himself puts it, his philosophising can be regarded as a “revival” of the Greek tradition of liberal education, which envisages education as

freeing the mind to function according to its true nature, freeing reason from error and illusion and freeing man's conduct from wrong (p. 31).

Rooted in metaphysical realism, the Greek notion of liberal education takes the pursuit of knowledge—that is, the representation of reality—as the essential function of the human mind, which in itself completes the best form of life for human beings. Even though Peters and Hirst are no longer convinced by the metaphysical justifications that the Greek philosophers put forward, they still hold it as true that (1) the human mind is by nature rational; (2) exercising the rational ability of the mind can liberate people from innocence, prejudice and error; and hence (3) with the development of their rational ability through education, people can be free to lead a good (and virtuous) life.

Although Peters and Hirst proclaim that they derive their educational views from conceptual analysis (see Hirst & Peters, 1970), it is not difficult to see from the above discussion how deeply their intellectualist stance has been influenced by the Greek philosophical tradition. We cannot, however, be warranted in undermining the significance of their contributions to the modern philosophical discourse on education, one of which is the conceptual rigour they have shown in the arguments they put forward. This can be seen from their explication on the nature of knowledge and understanding.

Knowledge and Understanding

In Peters and Hirst's view, the kind of knowledge that deserves serious educational concern should have a discriminative and specific meaning so that it is useful in differentiating “education” from merely “training”.This is why, as mentioned earlier, technical “know-how” is not considered to be an important component of knowledge. As Peters (1966) states:

There is very little to know about riding bicycles, swimming, or golf. It is largely a matter of “knowing how” rather than of “knowing that”, of knack rather than of understanding (p. 159).

Since “knowing how” to a large extent deals with the realisation and the effectiveness of means in order to achieve ends, it has nothing to do with the question of truth (“knowing that”), and therefore it can be called a mastery of skills or “knack” but not “knowledge”. For instance, we would not call someone who is good at swimming a knowledgeable person, but it is perfectly fine to have him or her named a master in swimming. Nonetheless, even though Peters has linked “knowing that” with “understanding”, we must not mistake him as equating the accumulation of information with the development of knowledge and understanding. For Peters has aptly remarked, “We would not call a man who was merely well informed an educated man. He must also have some understanding of the ‘reason why’ of things” (ibid., p. 30). In other words, from the intellectualist perspective, the significance of any form of knowledge-centred education does not lie in the amount of knowledge to be transmitted to students but in how students have come to be able to reason things out and thus arrive at the most justifiable true beliefs.

In order to examine more closely the nature of knowledge as justified true beliefs, we may carry on our discussion with Hirst's conceptual analysis of knowledge. According to Hirst (1974), knowledge as the achievement of understanding should meet two epistemological requirements:

1. Concepts appropriately related in a logical structure so that propositions can be formed
2. Criteria for judging the propositions to be true

Thus, any form of knowledge, by its very nature as knowledge, is composed of propositions logically linked within a coherent conceptual system, and there exist “public criteria” for judging the truth or falsity of the propositions. For example, mathematics as a distinct form of knowledge consists of mathematical propositions represented by numbers and mathematical symbols, whose truth can be determined analytically by their logical relationships within the system; in physics, factual propositions are linked to each other by explanatory causal laws, which are verifiable by scientific measures (ibid.).

Both Peters and Hirst stress the public character of how knowledge is developed and justified. Hirst believes that, through the establishment of systematic and publicly tested knowledge, people can grasp “both the external world and their own private states of mind in common ways” (ibid., p. 39). Peters (1966) takes it as providing a system of “impersonal standards to which both the teacher and learner must give their allegiance” (p. 53). In their view, such objectified understanding as grounded in systematic knowledge is especially important to educational discourse, for it can provide objective and impersonal standards by which the content of education is to be organised (Hirst & Peters, 1970).

Based upon the two epistemological criteria noted above, Hirst (1974) distinguishes seven forms of knowledge, each of which has its own distinctive key concepts, logical structure and methodology, and truth criteria. The forms of knowledge delineated are mathematics, physical sciences, human sciences, history, religion, literature and the fine arts, and philosophy. He believes that the categorisation of knowledge can offer a curriculum guide for a comprehensive and all-rounded development of knowledge and understanding in the school setting.

From the above discussion, we may come to a conclusion that the intellectualism defended by Peters and Hirst is one that advocates an education system that is built upon objective epistemological criteria through which students can be initiated into a mode of learning that emphasises rational understanding of a wide spectrum of established systems of knowledge. Such an education, in the spirit of liberal education and in contrast to specialist training, aims at an all-rounded intellectual development of students which is to be appreciated for its own sake and also to be beneficial to the pursuit of the good life.

Educational Implications

Both actively engaged in academic discourses on education, Peters and Hirst have aptly responded to theoretical as well as practical concerns. Theoretically speaking, their arguments have offered an alternative perspective grounded in conceptual analysis and epistemology to the then popular but very often vague progressivist claims (Hirst & Peters, 1970; Peters, 1966). On a more practical level, they have argued forcefully against the instrumentalist view of education by pinpointing the development of knowledge and understanding as an intrinsic, rather than merely extrinsic, aim of education (Hirst, 1974; Peters, 1966).

Also, drawing on the insights of Peters and Hirst's philosophy, we would be able to critically review many of the shortcomings evident in the current educational practices. As noted at the start of this chapter, transmission of knowledge has long been taken for granted in the modern education system. Lack of discussion on the nature and the educational values of knowledge might have contributed to deficient intellectualist educational practices, as exemplified by the trends in spoon-fed teaching, memorised learning, examination-moulded curriculum objectives, as well as performance-defined assessment of learning. In opposition to these trends, Peters and Hirst have argued for a more defendable and desirable form of intellectualism, as follows:

1. Education, as distinct from skill training, needs a purpose in itself, namely, the appreciation and enjoyment of the pursuit of knowledge and understanding as a worthwhile activity in itself.
2. As far as the educator is concerned, imparting knowledge, as distinct from transmitting information, requires initiating students into a systematic investigation of various forms of knowledge in the hope of an all-rounded development of their rational ability; transmission of knowledge should not be deemed educational if it does not foster the development of rational ability.
3. In the honourable spirit of liberal education, the educational value of knowledge must encompass the promotion of the good life, as “being educated” implies being able to tell the right from the wrong. Imparting knowledge without the intention to promote the good life of students through knowledge and understanding in any way should not be deemed educational.

It is my belief that Peters and Hirst's educational philosophy illustrates a form of intellectualism which is among the most philosophically defendable and educationally relevant, even if we are not convinced that their conclusions can be derived from conceptual analyses alone. As Peters and Hirst have suggested, knowing what is good is a prerequisite for pursuing what is good. If we have come to know better (or erred less) of the truth in intellectualism through their arguments, then Peters and Hirst have definitely made a significant contribution to our educational discourse.

Postscript

It must be added that, for the sake of conciseness, the discussion above focuses on the earlier views of Peters and Hirst without following up on later developments. Also excluded is a critical investigation into their claims and the underlying assumptions.

In response to criticisms, Peters later shifted his attention to education as “coping with human conditions” (Peters, 1981) from education as “initiation into knowledge and understanding”. Hirst also has introduced the communitarian concept of “practice” into his account (Hirst, 1993). Interested readers are encouraged to pick up these lines of thoughts on their own. For those who are interested in the recent developments and debates in the analytic tradition of educational philosophy, Hirst and White (1998) can be a useful resource.

References

Carr, W. (1986). R. S. Peters' philosophy of education: Review article. British Journal of Educational Studies, 32(1), 268–274.

Hirst, P. H. (1974). Knowledge and the Curriculum: A Collection of Philosophical Papers. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Hirst, P. H. (1993). Education, knowledge and practices. In R. Barrow & P. White (Eds.), Beyond Liberal Education: Essays in Honour of Paul H. Hirst (pp. 184–199). London: Routledge.

Hirst, P. H., & Peters, R. S. (1970). The Logic of Education. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Hirst, P. H., & White, P. (Eds.) (1998). Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition. 4 vols. London: Routledge.

Peters, R. S. (1966). Ethics and Education. London: Allen & Unwin.

Peters, R. S. (Ed.) (1981). Democratic values and educational aims. In Essays on Educators (pp. 32–50). London: Allen & Unwin.

White, J. P. (1990). Education and the Good Life. London: Kogan Page.

Further Reading

Cooper, D. E. (1993). Truth and liberal education. In R. Barrow & P. White (Eds.), Beyond Liberal Education: Essays in Honour of Paul H. Hirst (pp. 30–48). London: Routledge.

Elliott, R. K. (1986). Richard Peters: A philosopher in the older style. In D. E. Cooper (Ed.), Education, Values and Mind (pp. 41–68). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Hirst, P. H., & Peters, R. S. (1970). Education, and teaching. In The Logic of Education (pp. 184–199). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.