The United States and Its Allies Prepare for War

When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (1937–) ordered the Iraqi military to invade Kuwait in August 1990, he set in motion a series of events that would soon lead to war. Countries around the world condemned the invasion and demanded that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait. The United States led a coalition of thirty other nations that began sending troops, aircraft, and ships to the Middle East to help defend Saudi Arabia against an Iraqi attack. This massive military buildup received the code name Operation Desert Shield.

In November the United Nations Security Council set a deadline of January 15, 1991, for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. (The United Nations Security Council is responsible for maintaining international peace and security. It consists of five permanent member nations—the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China—and ten elected members that serve two-year terms.) Although many world leaders tried to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the crisis, Hussein refused to remove his troops. By the end of 1990, it appeared likely that the coalition allies would have to go to war to force Iraq out of Kuwait. As the march toward war continued, however, some popular opposition emerged in the United States and elsewhere. Protesters held antiwar demonstrations in major cities, and the U.S. Congress held heated debates about whether to give President George H. W. Bush (1924–; served 1989–93) authority to use force against Iraq.

Military buildup in the Persian Gulf

The United States began sending military forces to the Middle East a few days after Iraq invaded Kuwait. American military operations in the region were controlled by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), a special branch of the Department of Defense based in Florida. CENTCOM was a unified command, meaning that it could direct all branches of the U.S. military (the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines). The commander in chief of CENTCOM was General H. Norman Schwarzkopf (1934–), who reported directly to General Colin Powell (1937–), chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the main military advisors to the president, consisting of a chairman and the chief of each branch of the armed services), and Richard Cheney (1941–), the U.S. secretary of defense.

On August 6, 1990, Schwarzkopf and Cheney traveled to Saudi Arabia to establish a formal military alliance. The Saudi leader, King Fahd (1923–; ruled 1982– ), agreed to allow American troops to enter his country. Several American warships were already stationed in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. Navy had maintained a presence in the Gulf since the end of World War II (1939–45), and this presence had been expanded during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88). Its main purposes were to maintain stability in the region and to protect commercial oil tankers. As soon as the agreement with Saudi Arabia was in place, Schwarzkopf began sending American military aircraft and ground forces to the region.

The first U.S. warplanes arrived in the Middle East on August 8. These aircraft included F-15 Eagle fighter planes and E-3 Sentry AWACS (short for Airborne Warning and Control System) radar planes. The first U.S. troops arrived by transport planes on August 9. These forces came from the U.S. Army's 82nd Airborne Division, which always kept a brigade on high alert, ready to be sent to war at a moment's notice.

Over the next few weeks, the American military continued to send troops and equipment to the Middle East in ships and planes. Cargo ships were used to transport heavy gear, such as tanks, helicopters, trucks, and artillery, to the Persian Gulf. On some days, up to 150 ships were on their way to and from Saudi Arabia. If these ships were spaced evenly over the 8,000 miles (12,875 kilometers) between the United States and the Persian Gulf, there would have been a ship every 50 miles (80 kilometers). At one point planes were landing in the Saudi desert every twelve minutes around the clock, carrying troops, weapons, electronic equipment, food, and other supplies. By the end of August, the operations had delivered 72,000 troops and 100,000 tons (90,700 metric tons) of cargo. CENTCOM also moved its headquarters to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

The military buildup continued through the fall of 1990. By early November the United States had sent 230,000 troops to the Persian Gulf. On November 8 Bush announced that he planned to send another 200,000 American soldiers to Saudi Arabia. Operation Desert Shield thus became the largest U.S. military deployment since the Vietnam War (1959–75). About one-third of the U.S. Army and two-thirds of the U.S. Navy and Marines would eventually be stationed in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf.

Other nations contribute

Other nations in the coalition against Iraq sent troops and equipment to the Persian Gulf as well. The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates) contributed 145,000 troops, 330 aircraft, and 36 warships to their own defense. (The Gulf Cooperation Council is an organization founded in 1981 to promote peace in the Middle East and avoid outside interference in regional affairs.) Great Britain sent 25,000 troops, 54 aircraft, and 17 warships to help the coalition. Egypt sent 40,000 troops, while Syria added 15,000 more. Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, and Spain each contributed a warship. Russia and several other countries provided two warships each. Japan did not send any military forces, but its government provided financial assistance to the coalition.

By January 1991 more than 500,000 coalition forces were stationed in Saudi Arabia or on ships in the Persian Gulf. They faced roughly 545,000 Iraqi troops in Kuwait and along the border between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Some people claimed that the coalition's military buildup helped stabilize the situation in the Middle East by forcing Hussein's troops to remain along the border instead of invading Saudi Arabia. But others claimed that the massive buildup showed that Bush and other coalition leaders had already decided to attack Iraq.

Enforcing the UN's economic sanctions

The first mission for the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf was to enforce the economic sanctions against Iraq. A few days after the invasion of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council had passed Resolution 661, which placed strict restrictions on trade with Iraq. These restrictions (called an embargo) were intended to punish Hussein for breaking international law by invading Kuwait. Under the sanctions, Iraq was not allowed to sell its oil to other countries, and other countries were not allowed to sell weapons or other goods to Iraq. The embargo applied to everything except humanitarian aid, such as medicine and food needed for the health and welfare of Iraqi civilians (people not involved in the military, including women and children). Many people hoped that the sanctions would hurt the Iraqi economy and make it impossible for Hussein to continue his expensive occupation of Kuwait.

On August 25 the United Nations passed Resolution 665, which gave coalition naval forces the authority to stop and search all ships traveling to and from Iraqi ports in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. Navy stopped the first ship on August 31. During the next six months, coalition forces stopped an average of 40 ships per day and boarded an average of 4 ships per day to search them for illegal cargo. By the start of the Persian Gulf War in January 1991, coalition naval forces had logged a total of 6,960 stops and 832 boardings. Only 36 ships were carrying banned cargo, and these ships were sent to other ports. As quoted in The Persian Gulf War by Zachary Kent, General Schwarzkopf noted that the coalition effectively "formed a steel wall around the waters leading to Iraq. Thanks to these superb efforts not one cargo hold, not one crate ... of seaborne contraband [illegal goods] ever touched Saddam Hussein's shores." The trade sanctions were costing the Iraqi economy about $30 million per day.

Moving toward war

As the military buildup continued through the fall of 1990, many world leaders tried to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the crisis. For example, Russia sent high-ranking diplomats to meet with Hussein, and King Hussein (1935–1999; ruled 1953–99) of Jordan (no relation to Saddam Hussein) met frequently with leaders on both sides. As time passed and Iraq continued to occupy Kuwait, however, war began to seem unavoidable.

On November 29 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 678, which established a deadline of midnight on January 15, 1991, for Hussein to withdraw his army from Kuwait and comply with all previous UN resolutions. If Iraq continued to occupy Kuwait after the deadline, the Security Council authorized the coalition to use "all necessary means to ... restore international peace and security in the area." Twelve of the fifteen members of the Security Council voted in favor of the resolution, while Yemen and Cuba voted against it and China abstained (did not vote).

The resolution did not convince Hussein to remove his forces from Kuwait. Instead, he responded by making threats against the U.S.-led coalition and Israel. Hussein stated that if his troops were attacked, they would burn Kuwaiti oil wells and create an environmental disaster. He also threatened to use chemical weapons against coalition troops and against Israel. Hussein wanted to draw Israel into the dispute because he knew many of the Arab nations in the coalition had long-standing conflicts with the Jewish state. He believed that the Arab forces would not be willing to fight alongside Israelis defending their country, and the coalition would fall apart.

Ever since Iraq had invaded Kuwait in August, the Iraqi forces had held hundreds of American and European citizens as hostages. Some of these people had been used as "human shields" to protect key Iraqi military and industrial targets from being attacked by the coalition, for fear of hurting their own people. In early December Hussein announced that he would release all the foreigners being held in Iraq and Kuwait. During the next two weeks the Iraqis released about 565 hostages, including 175 Americans. The U.S. Embassy in Kuwait City was officially closed, and the remaining five diplomats were allowed to leave the country. Some people viewed Hussein's decision to release the foreign hostages as evidence that he was willing to negotiate an end to the crisis. But on December 22 Hussein stated that he had no intention of leaving Kuwait and that his troops planned to use chemical weapons if they were attacked.

Final efforts to avoid war

As the UN deadline approached, President Bush made one last effort to negotiate a peaceful settlement. On January 9, 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker (1930–) went to Geneva, Switzerland, to meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz (1936–). Although Bush made it clear that no deal was possible unless Iraq withdrew from Kuwait, he said that the meeting was "meant to be a firm signal and a broad gesture to show desire for a peaceful resolution to this crisis." Baker and Aziz talked for more than six hours, but the meeting produced no agreement.

During the meeting, Baker gave Aziz a letter from President Bush to Hussein. The letter contained a stern warning about the consequences Iraq would face if it failed to withdraw from Kuwait by the UN deadline. "We stand today at the brink of war between Iraq and the world," it read, according to Understanding the Crisis in the Persian Gulf by Peter Cipkowski.

This is a war that began with your invasion of Kuwait; this is a war that can be ended only by Iraq's full and unconditional compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 678. There can be no reward for aggression. Nor will there be any negotiation. Principle cannot be compromised. However, by its full compliance, Iraq will be able to rejoin the international community.... What is at issue here is not the future of Kuwait—it will be free, its government will be restored—but rather the future of Iraq. This choice is yours to make.... I write this letter not to threaten, but to inform. I do so with no sense of satisfaction, for the people of the United States have no quarrel with the people of Iraq.

After reading the letter, Aziz refused to deliver it to Hussein.

On January 12 the Secretary General of the United Nations, Javier Pérez de Cuellar (1920–), went to Baghdad and met with both Aziz and Hussein. Once again, however, the meeting failed to make any progress toward ending the crisis.

Opposition to war grows

As the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait continued through the fall of 1990, President Bush seemed increasingly determined to go to war against Hussein. In fact, some observers claimed that Bush had made up his mind to launch an offensive war back in November, when he doubled the number of American troops in the Persian Gulf. The president often made statements that seemed designed to increase support for war among the American people. For example, he described Hussein as an aggressive dictator who could threaten world peace with chemical and nuclear weapons.

But many people in the United States and around the world opposed the massive military buildup in the Persian Gulf. Some people doubted that Hussein, as the leader of a relatively small Arab nation, really posed much of a threat. Others wondered whether freeing Kuwait was worth the cost, estimated at $2 billion per month during Operation Desert Shield, and the potential risk to American soldiers. After all, Kuwait was not a democracy (a form of government in which the people govern the country through elected representatives) before the Iraqi invasion. Most Americans could not even find the tiny nation on a map. In addition, Iraq did have some historic claims on Kuwaiti territory. Some people argued that the Arab countries of the Middle East should be allowed to settle regional conflicts on their own.

"No blood for oil"

Perhaps the loudest criticism of the military buildup in the Persian Gulf was that the United States was going to war just to protect its supply of oil. At the time the United States imported 50 percent of its oil from foreign countries, and Kuwait and Iraq each controlled about 10 percent of the world's known oil reserves. The U.S. government had a strong interest in preventing Hussein, or anyone else who might be unfriendly to American interests, from controlling too much of the Middle East's oil.

President Bush, whose family had made a fortune in the Texas oil industry, mentioned on several occasions Kuwait's oil supplies as a factor in sending U.S. troops to the Persian Gulf. In a speech before Congress, as quoted in The March to War by James Ridgeway, Bush explained that the Gulf region contained the "lion's share" of the world's oil and declared that "we cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless [as Hussein]. And we won't." Bush also referred to maintaining the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf as a matter of national security and stated that "our jobs, our way of life" would be at risk if Hussein were allowed to control Kuwait's oil reserves.

Many Americans felt that the nation's dependence on foreign oil was a poor reason to get involved in a costly war. Instead, they argued that the United States should adopt energy policies that would encourage conservation and the development of renewable sources of energy, like solar power, to reduce the nation's dependence on the Middle East. A popular antiwar slogan at the time was "No Blood for Oil!" The Bush administration seemed to recognize that fighting over oil was an unpopular cause. Over time it stopped focusing on protecting Kuwait's oil reserves and emphasized the idea of freeing Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation. The administration argued that the world could not simply stand by while independent nations were overrun by aggressive neighbors.

U.S. Congress debates a declaration of war

Debate over the approaching war took place in homes, schools, and offices across the United States throughout Operation Desert Shield. As the UN deadline neared, the U.S. Congress held a series of heated debates to decide whether to grant President Bush formal permission to use force against Iraq. The president acts as commander in chief of America's armed forces. But the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the sole authority to declare war. The founders of the country wanted to make sure that the people's elected representatives had the final say in whether to enter a war. However, some presidents have used their position as commander in chief to lead the nation's military forces into battle without a formal declaration of war. The Vietnam War (1955–75), for example, was referred to as a "police action," not a war. In trying to persuade Congress to authorize the use of force, Bush said that he was willing to use the American military to force Iraq to leave Kuwait regardless of what Congress decided.

The congressional debates lasted for three days and were broadcast live on television. Many senators and representatives argued that President Bush should wait and give the trade embargo more time to pressure Hussein economically. When the final votes were counted on January 12, however, the Congress had voted to declare war against Iraq if Hussein failed to withdraw from Kuwait by the UN deadline. The resolution passed the U.S. Senate by a vote of 52 to 47 and passed the House of Representatives 250 to 183. It was only the sixth time in the nation's history that Congress had voted to go to war.

Hussein misinterpreted the heated debate in Congress. He believed that the differences of opinion he saw on television meant that the American government was weak and would be torn apart by a war. It was not surprising that he did not understand the concepts of free speech and democratic decision making. After all, Iraqi citizens were not allowed to criticize Hussein or his policies. Hussein bragged that his army would inflict massive casualties (killed and wounded soldiers) on the U.S. forces, and he claimed that American society would never accept the high cost of a war against him.

Contrary to Hussein's beliefs, however, the U.S. government and the American people largely came together as soon as Congress declared war against Iraq. "As soon as the vote was completed, there was a change across the country," recalled Senator Robert Dole (1923–) of Kansas, as quoted in Understanding the Crisis in the Persian Gulf. "The people realized that Congress has a role to play, and played it in this situation. The American people were waiting for Congress to make a judgment. When the Congress did, then the people swung behind the president."

Protests continue

However, some people continued to speak out against the coming war, including environmentalists and religious groups like the National Council of Churches. Some Americans held peaceful demonstrations against the war in Washington, D.C., and in other major cities.

Although some people protested President Bush's policies, most Americans still supported the U.S. troops stationed in the Persian Gulf. Throughout Operation Desert Shield, millions of people tied yellow ribbons around trees in their yards to show their hope for the soldiers' safe return. Americans also sent thousands of letters, gifts, and care packages to the troops. The average U.S. soldier in the Gulf received 3.75 pieces of mail per day, including books, candy, and letters of support from complete strangers.

The reaction of the Iraqi people

In the meantime, the people of Iraq were growing increasingly concerned about the possibility of an attack by coalition forces. Many Iraqis supported the invasion of

Experiences of U.S. Soldiers in Operation Desert Shield

The American soldiers who served in Operation Desert Shield were on average twenty-seven years old. Most of them were members of the military reserves, meaning that they were civilians who had received some military training and were called up to serve on active duty when needed. Those who were stationed in Saudi Arabia wore tan uniforms with a desert camouflage pattern. While conducting drills or patrols they also wore bullet-resistant Kevlar helmets and vests. They carried M16 rifles and wore backpacks that held about 60 pounds (27 kilograms) of equipment, including food, water, bedding, and gas masks.

The American ground forces lived in tents in the Saudi desert. Some had difficulty adjusting to the open spaces, the desert heat, and the fine sand that got into their food, weapons, computers, and vehicle engines. The troops usually bathed using a bucket because of the scarce supply of water. They ate mostly prepackaged food called Meals Ready to Eat (MREs). They drove around in sturdy trucks they called Humvees, which was short for High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV).

The American troops stationed in Saudi Arabia had to adjust to the customs of that country. Saudi life centers on the Islamic religion. People stop whatever they are doing to pray five times a day. Some Muslims objected to King Fahd's decision to allow American military forces—which included Christians, Jews, and women—into Saudi Arabia. In order to minimize conflicts between the American soldiers and their Saudi hosts, General Schwarzkopf issued a special set of rules for the forces in Operation Desert Shield. "Islamic law and Arabic customs prohibit or restrict certain activities which are generally permissible in Western societies," he explained, as quoted in The Persian Gulf War.

Out of respect for the Islamic emphasis on modesty, Schwarzkopf's rules banned sexy books and magazines, including bodybuilding publications. The thirty-two thousand American women who served in the Persian Gulf faced a number of limitations on their behavior. They were allowed to drive only on military bases, since Saudi law bans women from driving. They were also required to dress modestly at all times, meaning that they had to keep their arms and legs covered and could not wear bright colors. When men and women went out in public together, they were not allowed to touch each other, and the women were expected to follow the Saudi custom of walking twelve paces behind the men.

Kuwait. Others were tired of warfare and opposed Hussein's actions, but they were afraid to speak out because criticizing the government was against the law in Iraq. As the UN deadline approached, many wealthy Iraqis fled the country or left for their summer homes outside Baghdad (Iraq's capital) with the hope of avoiding the future fighting. Other Iraqi citizens gathered at Muslim holy sites in the belief that coalition forces would spare these areas from attack.

Hussein declared January 15, the day of the UN deadline, to be a national "day of challenge." He ordered Iraqi citizens to march through the streets of Baghdad in a show of defiance against the U.S.-led coalition. Hussein even gave students and government workers the day off to ensure a large turnout. About five hundred thousand people showed up at the government-sponsored rallies in downtown Baghdad, where they burned American flags and shouted anti-Bush slogans. But observers noticed that, except for the protesters, the usually busy city of four million people was deserted.